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ABSTRACT 
 
ELANA PASSMAN 
The Cultivation of Friendship: French and German Cultural Cooperation, 1925-1954 
(under the direction of Donald M. Reid) 
 
 
Through a series of case studies of French-German friendship societies, this 
dissertation investigates the ways in which activists in France and Germany battled the 
dominant strains of nationalism to overcome their traditional antagonism. It asks how the 
Germans and the French recast their relationship as “hereditary enemies” to enable them 
to become partners at the heart of today’s Europe. Looking to the transformative power 
of civic activism, it examines how journalists, intellectuals, students, industrialists, and 
priests developed associations and lobbying groups to reconfigure the French-German 
dynamic through cultural exchanges, bilingual or binational journals, conferences, 
lectures, exhibits, and charitable ventures. As a study of transnational cultural relations, 
this dissertation focuses on individual mediators along with the networks and institutions 
they developed; it also explores the history of the idea of cooperation.   
Attempts at rapprochement in the interwar period proved remarkably resilient in 
the face of the prevalent nationalist spirit. While failing to override hostilities and sustain 
peace, the campaign for cooperation adopted a new face in the misguided shape of 
collaborationism during the Second World War. The push toward cooperation continued 
into the postwar period in two vastly different directions. Some invoked the idea of 
cooperation as an allegedly new way to overcome the Franco-German antagonism and 
 iv 
achieve lasting peace in a European community. But former Nazis and collaborators also 
harnessed this notion of cooperation after the war; they recast their wartime behavior in 
the more positive light of long-term efforts toward European cooperation. 
This study helps reshape the way we look at cooperation in 20th century Europe. It 
underscores the role of intellectual and cultural efforts in fostering healthier international 
relations. By arguing that the quest for cooperation was not simply a postwar venture, but 
that it emerged from the Locarno era, this study shows how advocates of cooperation 
persisted in their work even during the most marked periods of hostility. Ultimately, I 
contend that interwar efforts for cooperation helped shape both Vichy-era collaboration 
and postwar reconciliation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
An abyss has been dug between France and Germany that centuries . . . won’t make 
good.—Ernest Renan, 18711 
 
Let us look ahead with eyes cleansed of our old sufferings, with the clear eyes of free 
men. Let us dare look around us with sympathy, let us dare eye Europe and our former 
enemies and our former allies, let us dare propose—and if necessary impose—the 
necessary reconciliations. Let us vanquish those who only laid low our arms, a precarious 
victory which could be called chance, via understanding, a definitive and fruitful victory. 
Out of fear of being duped by those we fought, let us not be duped by ancestral terrors 
and sterile hatreds. 
 
Let us dare to live, dare to love, dare to create.—Régis de Vibraye, 19292 
 
 
In his Where does nationalism lead?, penned ten years after the Great War had 
ended, Régis de Vibraye wrote of the dangerous “mystique” of nationalism and the dawn 
of an “international consciousness” that could serve as a “new ethic.”3 De Vibraye was 
not alone in sensing the desperate need to think beyond national terms. In the decades 
after the First World War, networks of students, scholars, artists, businessmen, and clergy 
addressed the promise of a peaceful future under the auspices of Franco-German cultural 
cooperation. They aimed to reverse the tide of enmity particularly evident since the 
                                                          
1As quoted in Beate Gödde-Baumanns, “L’idée des deux Allemagnes dans l’historiographie française des 
années 1871-1914,” Francia 12 (1984): 612. 
 
2Régis de Vibraye, Ou mène le nationalisme? (Paris: Editions Argo, 1929), 185-186. De Vibraye wrote this 
book in the summer of 1928. 
 
3De Vibraye, Ou mène le nationalisme?, 183. 
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Franco-Prussian War. In an era shadowed by perennial suspicion and marked by two 
bitter wars, these Europeans sought mutual understanding. 
This dissertation explores various configurations of French-German cooperation 
through a series of case studies of Franco-German friendship societies from 1925 to 
1954. These “friendship societies” included associations, lobbying groups, and less 
formal committees geared toward reconfiguring the French-German relationship. They 
promoted cooperation in a variety of ways, whether by administering exchanges (most 
commonly for students); leading educational trips and outings; holding lectures, 
conferences, and retreats; sponsoring art exhibits, films, and concerts; or setting up 
charitable ventures. All but one (the earliest of the groups under consideration) published 
periodicals that both informed readers about the other country or about French-German 
relations more broadly and helped consolidate a community of supporters of the cause.   
By examining how members of such organizations imagined and continually 
reformulated their conceptions of cooperation, this study highlights the ways in which 
German and French activists argued about and understood their relationships to their own 
nation, to each other’s nations, and to Europe. In arranging opportunities for travel and 
bilateral encounter, designing publications, and mounting cultural events, these advocates 
of cooperation battled the dominant strains of nationalism. Whether their efforts were 
based on transnational developments like pacifism and the youth movement, beliefs like 
Catholicism, or shared experiences (for example, among veterans or academics), French 
and German activists established enduring networks that transcended the boundaries of 
the nation-state to promote the possibility of future European harmony.  
 3
Joint French and German attempts at rapprochement in the interwar period proved 
remarkably resilient in the face of the prevalent nationalist spirit in both nations. While 
such efforts failed to override antagonisms and sustain peace, the campaign for 
cooperation adopted a new face in the misguided shape of collaborationism during the 
Second World War. The push toward cooperation continued into the postwar period in 
two vastly different directions. Some invoked the notion as an allegedly new way to 
overcome the entrenched Franco-German antagonism and achieve lasting peace in a 
European community. But former Nazis and collaborators also harnessed this idea of 
cooperation after the war; they recast their wartime behavior in the more positive light of 
long-term efforts toward European cooperation. Ultimately, these continuities reveal that 
interwar efforts for cooperation helped lay the cultural groundwork for both Vichy-era 
collaboration and postwar reconciliation.  
Such efforts took place against the backdrop of a long, tortured history of French-
German conflict. Napoleon’s invasion and occupation of the German states sparked the 
German drive to unity. Between 1870 and 1945, the French and Germans fought three 
wars and weathered several close calls. The German Empire’s annexation of Alsace-
Lorraine served for 48 years as a constant reminder of French defeat. Conversely, French 
influence in the Saar, whether indirect or direct, was a thorn in the German side after both 
world wars. And the French and Germans would engage in alternating occupations for 
much of the period between 1914 and 1955. Since the 1815 Congress of Vienna for the 
Germans and the Franco-Prussian War for the French, the idea of an Erbfeind or an 
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ennemi héréditaire lent a tremendous virulence to the most basic French-German 
interactions.4  
France and Germany fought, most obviously, for territory. Above all, the 
Rhineland, Alsace, Lorraine, and the Saar became constant objects of French-German 
tensions. Liberated or lusted after, occupied or annexed—these areas and others, too, 
caught between the two European giants—suffered the fate of many borderlands. Their 
resources—coal, steel, even the Rhine itself—were coveted and their custody in dispute; 
potential resources, like Morocco, similarly fell under the shadow of the French-German 
rivalry. At times, France and Germany also fought over people as both nations laid claim 
to the population of Alsace and Lorraine; this struggle translated into a clash over the 
nature of national identity. The neighbors argued over pettier issues as well. Since the 
19th century, the two nations fought over proprietary rights to artistic and architectural 
movements. Did the Gothic, for example, represent the German or the French national 
style? And the memory of these battles—real and imagined—would color and shape the 
interactions, not only of diplomats, but also of ordinary citizens.  
Just as a rhetoric of danger and suspicion shaded the French-German relationship, 
a wealth of stereotypes governed it. The French and the Germans invoked their nations’ 
relationship as a metaphor to describe good versus evil, light versus dark, surface versus 
depth: the two nations were, invariably, opposites.  This relationship served as a symbol 
to mark morality and immorality, as a barometer of decency. Toward the end of the First 
                                                          
4For the dating of the term “Erbfeind,” see Julius W. Friend, The Linchpin: French-German Relations 
1950-1990 (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991), 8. For the dating 
of the term “ennemi héréditaire,” see Gödde-Baumanns, 609; Michael E. Nolan, The Inverted Mirror: 
Mythologizing the Enemy in France and Germany, 1898-1914 (New York: Berghahn, 2005), 24-27. Nolan 
suggests that the idea of the French as the hereditary enemy likewise crystallized after 1870/1871 in 
Germany.    
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World War, French Premier Georges Clemenceau wrote, “Is this not what the words 
epitomize, France facing Germany? Do they not represent the two historical poles, the 
encounter of two nations representing the good and evil?”5 Indeed, until 1900, calling 
someone “Prussian” legally qualified as libel or slander in France.6 
While the Germans became the prototypical Huns in the French mind, some 
Germans cultivated a similar impression of the French. Heinrich von Treitschke, for 
example, wrote about the “Gallic vandals” with their “Hunnish courage” in an 1870 
discussion of the Alsatian question.  In the same year, Prussian scientist Emil du Bois-
Reymond invoked the “Celtic wildness” of the French in his rectorship address on 
Friedrich Wilhelmstag at Berlin University.7 At various points in time, each imagined the 
other as the aggressor, whether in the shape of Napoleon or Bismarck. According to 
Michael Nolan, each nation tended to project its fears about its own weaknesses onto the 
other.8  
Yet ascribing such differences to the other nation did not always entail derision. 
In fact, since the Franco-Prussian War, the French have commonly resorted to an idea of 
the two Germanies, the “good Germany” of Goethe, Kant, and Beethoven, and the “bad 
Germany” of Attila, Bismarck, and Krupp.9 In similar fashion, the Germans embraced the 
French impressionists (long before the French themselves), while shunning French 
                                                          
5Georges Clemenceau, France Facing Germany: Speeches and Articles, trans. Ernest Hunter Wright (New 
York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1919), xxiv. 
 
6Harvey Clark Greisman, “The Enemy Concept in Franco-German Relations, 1870-1914,” History of 
European Ideas 19, nos. 1-3 (1994): 43. 
 
7Bernard Trouillet, Das deutsch-französische Verhältnis im Spiegel von Kultur und Sprache (Weinheim: 
Beltz Verlag, 1981), 143-145. 
 
8Nolan, 2, 6, 41. 
 
9Gödde-Baumanns, 609-619. 
 6
superficiality and decadence. Mutual fascination as well as mutual suspicion guided the 
French and German imaginations.10 As we shall see, “cultural germanophilia” could walk 
hand-in-hand with “political germanophobia,”11 just as the same could be said for cultural 
francophilia and political francophobia.   
This coexistence of fear and love brings us to the title of this study. Peter Gay has 
eloquently written about the “cultivation of hatred” across 19th century Europe.12 Yet 
surely the greater challenge lies in cultivating friendships than hatred. For the 
protagonists of this study, each diplomatic standoff, trade conflict, or nationalist tract 
made their task all the harder. In many cases, such frustrations led to the dissolution of a 
particular Franco-German organization or prompted a number of its members to quit. 
Some activists, however, found inspiration precisely in these crises diplomats could not 
be relied upon to resolve. The term cultivation thus seems especially well-suited to this 
study: first, in its insistence on the fastidious, labored nature of the quest for cooperation, 
and second, in its other sense of broadmindedness, of being cultured, even (dare I say) 
civilized or cosmopolitan. 
Practitioners of what Akira Iriye has called cultural internationalism sought to 
ease tensions between the two historic enemies for a wide variety of reasons. These 
                                                          
10See, for example, Distanz und Aneignung. Kunstbeziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich 
1870-1945. Relations Artistiques entre la France et l’Allemagne 1870-1945. Passagen/Passages vol. 8, ed. 
Alexandre Kostka and Françoise Lucbert (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004). 
 
11More rarely cultural germanophobia coexisted with political germanophilia. Conversely, it is certainly a 
challenge to think of a case in which cultural francophobia coincided with political francophilia. For the 
first argument, see Françoise Lucbert, “‘Artiste par le cerveau et l’oreille’: La perception de l’art allemand 
dans les milieux d’avant-garde parisiens de la fin du XIXe siecle,” in Distanz und Aneignung. 
Kunstbeziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich 1870-1945. Relations Artistiques entre la France 
et l’Allemagne 1870-1945. Passagen/Passages vol. 8, ed. Alexandre Kostka and Françoise Lucbert (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 2004), 53. 
 
12For an explanation of his title and quite different uses of the term “cultivation,” see Peter Gay, The 
Cultivation of Hatred. The Bourgeois Experience Victoria to Freud, vol. 3 (New York: Norton, 1993), 9. 
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activists, however, shared a wish to redefine the relationship between the two nations as 
one no longer based on antagonism. Not only did they envision alternate possibilities, 
they themselves worked to create a Germany and a France that could interact peaceably, 
perhaps even cordially. For cultural internationalists, culture acted not only as an end but 
as a means; culture could structure behavior. Accordingly, world affairs could be 
conducted in a new fashion. Dialogue and exchange could prove a more effective vehicle 
of diplomacy than the exertion of power.13  
Therefore, rather than wending our way through diplomatic conferences, summits, 
treaties, and internal legislative deliberations to address French and German attempts at 
conciliation (much less chronicling the French-German feuds that made these ventures 
necessary in the first place), we will instead explore the ways in which engaged citizens 
themselves took on the challenge of diplomacy. In their classic study of the history of 
French intellectuals, Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli chose to define intellectuals 
by their political engagement (rather than by their brilliance). For them, an intellectual 
was “a type of missionary . . . a confessor or martyr of great principles in the middle of 
the barbarians.”14 And while the activists examined here only rarely enjoyed the 
intellectual stature of an Albert Einstein or a Jean-Paul Sartre, they understood 
themselves to be performing a similar pioneering function. Though many of these 
mediators were not intellectuals in the traditional sense of great thinkers (and some were 
not even especially well-educated), they engaged in a particular form of civic debate that 
went against the grain. 
                                                          
13Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1997), see especially pages 2-12. 
 
14Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli, Les intellectuels en France de l’affaire Dreyfus à nos jours (Paris: 
A. Colin, 1986), 9. 
 
 8
This study approaches transnational cultural relations in several ways.15 First, it 
addresses the level of individual mediators—agents of cultural transfer who carried with 
them ideas and values across borders and “translated” them for those on the other side. It 
considers this process of transfer not as unidirectional, but as circular. And it takes into 
account the “multiplying factor” that many of these mediators had as educators, pastors, 
and representatives of the media; though they were relatively few, their ideas and feats of 
cultural translation reached a broader audience.16 Second, it looks at the cross-border 
networks and institutions these mediators built and maintained.17 The participants, and 
more centrally, the architects of these networks sought to fashion new modes of cross-
border communication and community. Third, it analyzes the ideas that these mediators 
were engaging, debating, and propagating. In this way, The Cultivation of Friendship also 
is a transnational history of the idea of cooperation and its interpenetration with notions 
of national identity and at times ideological or religious frameworks. 
Focusing on civic activism, this dissertation examines how engaged citizens 
conducted a new form of mediation, generally complementary—but at times in 
opposition—to the efforts of national governments. More particularly, it addresses the 
                                                          
15On the advantages and drawbacks of using the lens of cultural transfer, histoire croisée, comparative 
history, and transnational approaches more generally, see the following: Akira Iriye, “Transnational 
History,” Contemporary European History 13, no. 2 (2004): 211-222; Jürgen Kocka, “Comparison and 
Beyond,” History and Theory 42 (Feb. 2003): 39-44; Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, 
“Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity,” History and Theory 45 (Feb. 
2006): 30-50; Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung: Der 
Ansatz der Histoire Croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 
28 (2002): 607-636.  
 
16See Arnd Bauerkämper, Konrad H. Jarausch, and Marcus M. Payk, “Einleitung: Transatlantische Mittler 
und die kulturelle Demokratisierung Westdeutschlands 1945-1970,” in Demokratiewunder 
Transatlantische Mittler und die kulturelle Öffnung Westdeutschlands 1945-1970, ed. Arnd Bauerkämper, 
Konrad H. Jarausch, and Marcus M. Payk (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 11-37. 
 
17See Hans Manfred Bock, “Transaction, transfert et constitution de réseaux. Concepts pour une histoire 
sociale des relations culturelles transnationales,” in Échanges culturels et relations diplomatiques: 
Présences françaises à Berlin au temps de la République de Weimar, ed. Hans Manfred Bock, Gilbert 
Krebs (Paris: Publications de l’Institut Allemand, Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2004), 7-31. 
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ways in which an array of private organizations challenged the traditional Franco-
German antagonism by constructing new models of cooperation. In addition to analyzing 
their practice of cooperation, this study dissects their shifting ideas about the nature of 
cooperation itself.  
The route to cooperation was by no means straight. Members of French-German 
groups from the 1920s and early 1930s continually reassessed and reframed their pursuit 
of cooperation over the course of the 1930s and 1940s. Some carried a rather steady 
undercurrent of amity beneath a rising tide of animosity into the war years. Others 
involved in the 1920s abandoned their activism during the Nazi era, only to renew their 
interest in reconciliation after 1945. Alternatively, some of those pegged as collaborators 
during the Second World War reemerged in the 1950s as, once again, public champions 
of Franco-German friendship.  
This project investigates how and why particular people chose to act as 
intermediaries between two historically feuding nations and societies. What led them to 
enter into the thorny Franco-German debate? Why did they choose to continue to endorse 
conciliation, even in the face of mounting affronts on the part of the other nation? What 
were the proverbial straws that broke the camel’s back? And why would some return to 
the fold? 
Following a number of itineraries will shed light on these decisions. For example, 
Régis de Vibraye, whose 1930 anti-nationalist book Allemagne 1930 touted Franco-
German entente as a prerequisite for European peace, joined the Weimar-era Mayrisch 
Komitee rather late in its life. De Vibraye would maintain his enlistment in the cause of 
cooperation through his contributions to the Comité France-Allemagne in the 1930s and 
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the Groupe Collaboration of the Occupation era. Otto Abetz, the art teacher and youth 
group leader who launched the Sohlbergkreis in 1930, helped steer the Deutsch-
Französische Gesellschaft of the 1930s, served as the German Ambassador to occupied 
France, and was then thrown in jail after the war. Upon his release, Abetz joined a new 
Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft. In contrast, Emmanuel Mounier, the Catholic 
philosopher involved in the New Order groups of the 1930s, founded a committee for 
cooperation in 1948 that explicitly forbade collaborators from participating.  
This dissertation, of course, focuses on a specific milieu and in no way claims to 
describe the whole of French and German society during this period. Rather, the groups 
and individuals discussed here tended to defy majority opinion; that was often their very 
importance.18 What is handled is a particular meeting point between two national 
cultures. Neither left nor right, neither official nor wholly independent of officialdom, 
these border-crossers and armchair travelers, these nationalists and internationalists—and 
almost everything between—sought to break with tradition and to upend the status quo. 
Sometimes, they proceeded with passion, but perhaps more often with caution.  
If the mediators examined here promoted forms of Franco-German cooperation, it 
is essential to point out that they did not always share the same conceptions of 
cooperation, or of France or Germany. The vocabulary of cooperation ranged broadly. 
Cooperation is used here as an umbrella term to encapsulate any number of ideas, from 
the tentativeness of rapprochement to the liberality of reconciliation, from the rather 
benign understanding, to the damning scholarly term collaborationism. It may refer to 
                                                          
18Whereas Ory and Sirinelli believe that if ideas resonate among the public then they are important, this 
dissertation operates under the assumption that a minority belief is not only a legitimate object of study but 
can illuminate aspects of society hitherto obscured by the dominant narrative. c.f. Ory and Sirinelli, 71-74. 
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reconciliation, collaboration, collaborationism (that is, ideological collaboration), moral, 
intellectual, or spiritual disarmament, rapprochement, entente, friendship, befriending, 
understanding, comprehension, alliance, peace, or openness. Contemporaries and 
scholars alike often invoked these terms indiscriminately. Indeed, with the exception of 
collaborationism, these terms could be coded as positive or negative, dependent on the 
context. In a telling example from 1947, a French Communist official in occupied 
Germany (on the heels of French purges of “collabos” and in the midst of denazification 
efforts in Germany) referred—matter-of-factly, without bitterness or irony—to one 
group’s task “to collaborate in the spiritual and moral rapprochement of populations.”19 I 
call attention to these many terms in the attempt to impose some consistency on their use. 
Here, the word “cooperation” is always intended as value-neutral. 
Exploring this Franco-German milieu means that we will be shifting our gaze 
geographically, at times focusing on one country more than the other, at times 
spotlighting their capitals or their borderlands. It also means that the very notion of what 
is “French” and what is “German” will not remain stable over the course of this 
investigation. Some groups relied upon linguistic frontiers; for them, the Franco-German 
community comprised Austria, Luxembourg, even perhaps Morocco. Others adjusted 
their scope to a much more limited field, for example, by directing their efforts to border 
regions or occupied zones, where the French-German problem loomed particularly large.  
Conspicuously absent from this account of French-German relations is East 
Germany, whose relations with France tell a different, if interrelated story, one analyzed 
                                                          
19AOFAA Bade 118 No. 5246/PR. Confidential Letter from Adminstrateur de 4e classe Robert, délégué 
pour le G.M du cercle (Offenburg) to Délégué Supérieur pour le Gouvernement Militaire de Bade, Cabinet, 
Fribourg (10 Sept. 1947). He referred to BILD, the Bureau International de Liaison et de Documentation, 
discussed here in chapter six. 
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authoritatively by Ulrich Pfeil. On the political level, East German relations with the 
French in this period were deeply implicated with Soviet policy. On a cultural level, 
intellectuals and other mediators in France and the GDR often drew on the unifying 
legacy of Marxist or anti-fascist narratives. Those who subscribed to such messages came 
from different circles from those under investigation here, and what brought them 
together was often more ideological than it was specifically Franco-German (though it 
may have found expression in that realm).  On the level of civil society, French-East 
German friendship societies did not take hold until the birth of Échanges franco-
allemands in 1958.20 In other words, no comparable groups existed in the GDR within the 
timeframe of this project.  
* * * * * * * * * * * *  
 
The relationship between France and Germany has most often been characterized 
as one of “hereditary enemies” until an abrupt reversal after the Second World War. 
During the last sixty-odd years, then, the two nations maintained a “privileged 
partnership,” acted as the “motor of Europe,” and even took pride in being castigated as 
the heart of “Old Europe” on the march to America’s war with Iraq. Both crude 
generalizations belie a more subtle, if intuitive truth: both before and after 1945, hatred 
and love, fear and hope coexisted.  During the era most marked by a French-German 
                                                          
20Despite his title, Pfeil probes the complexities of the triangular relationship among the GDR, the FRG, 
and France. Indeed, he contends that one should not, as so many others have before, separate out histories 
of East and West Germany. His argument is compelling, especially for such a comprehensive look at post-
1949 French-German political and cultural relations as his. For this study, which is focused on a more 
specific milieu, and which follows (for the most part) individuals who began their work in the 1920s—or 
who built on their foundations—the case for including East Germany is less self-evident. Ulrich Pfeil, Die 
“anderen” deutsch-französischen Beziehungen: Die DDR und Frankreich, 1949-1990 (Cologne: Böhlau, 
2004), 22-24, 34, 174-290. An East German association named the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft was 
founded in 1962. See Pfeil, 300-310. 
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antagonism, mediators fumbled for something healthier. More recently, in an age of the 
“Franco-German motor,” vestiges of distrust linger.  
While French-German attempts at cultural understanding since World War II—
and especially since the 1960s—have been evaluated as positive desires to acquire 
education, cosmopolitanism, and peace, similar interwar programs, institutions, and 
informal exchanges between France and Germany tend to be analyzed by historians 
teleologically, as insidious precursors to collaborationism, or, at best, as misguided, 
doomed attempts at rapprochement.21 The idealist visions embraced by many on each 
side of the Rhine, however, must be examined as hopeful desires for the future of Europe. 
These groups carried out an array of activities, some of which we would find benign, 
perhaps even noble, others unsympathetic, perhaps even repugnant. But it is important to 
recognize that within a difficult and often changing context, these activists saw 
themselves as serving their nation’s interests, the objective of Franco-German 
cooperation, and the cause for peace. Thus, though these efforts at cooperation may have 
shifted between almost Panglossian optimism and rank opportunism, between hopeful 
realism and dubious idealism, there nonetheless existed intellectual affinities, 
                                                          
21For glowing assessments of post-1945 efforts, see, for example, Alice Ackermann, “Reconciliation as a 
Peace-Building Process in Postwar Europe: The Franco-German Case,” Peace & Change 19, no. 3 (July 
1994): 229-250; John E. Farquharson and Stephen C. Holt, Europe from Below: An Assessment of Franco-
German Popular Contacts (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975); Joseph V. Montville, “The Arrow and 
the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy,” in The Psychodynamics of International 
Relationships. Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work, ed. Vamik D. Volkan et al. (Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 1991), 161-175, especially 171-175. For an interpretation that suggests interwar efforts 
as a prelude to collaborationism, see, for example Rita Thalmann, “Du Cercle de Sohlberg au Comité 
France-Allemagne: Une évolution ambiguë de la coopération franco-allemande,” in Entre Locarno et 
Vichy: Les relations culturelles franco-allemandes dans les années 1930, ed. Hans Manfred Bock, Reinhart 
Meyer-Kalkus, and Michel Trebitsch (Paris: CNRS, 1993), 67-86. For an example that stresses the naïveté 
of interwar efforts, see, Jacques Le Rider, “La Revue d'Allemagne: les germanistes français, témoins et 
interprètes de la crise de la République de Weimar et du nazisme,” in Entre Locarno et Vichy, ed. Bock, et 
al., 363-374. 
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commonalities of purpose, and overlapping memberships that necessitate studying such 
groups as much for their continuities as for their differences. 
By surveying facets of dedicated activism on behalf of Franco-German 
rapprochement during the interwar era, this dissertation seeks to chip away at the notion 
of the 1920s as an “age of illusions,” an impression that has remained in the forefront of 
the public imagination despite Jon Jacobson’s dismissal of it some 25 years ago.22 Many 
scholars have claimed that Locarno-era efforts toward understanding bore little fruit, did 
not stave off the rise of nationalism, or at most served as models for cooperation after the 
Second World War. Such arguments underestimate the resilience of joint French and 
German attempts at rapprochement in the face of the prevalent nationalist spirit in both 
nations. Civic debates about Franco-German cooperation in the Locarno years resonated 
throughout the 1930s and beyond. In vastly different ways, these early efforts at 
cooperation shaped both the notorious collaboration of the Second World War as well as 
the post-1945 push for reconciliation. If we are to take seriously the ideas of this small, 
but dedicated core, we must focus on the myriad (re)incarnations of their efforts beyond 
the ruptures of 1933 and 1945. 
At the chronological center of our investigation, the Second World War—and 
with it the German occupation of much of France—serves as a fulcrum. It would be 
impossible to underestimate how thoroughly historians have plumbed the murky depths 
of the war and the occupation. But surprisingly, little of the scholarship (particularly in 
English) on the occupation period pursues in a sustained fashion the ways in which the 
French and the Germans interacted before the second war was unleashed. Just as an older 
                                                          
22Jon Jacobson, “Is There a New International History of the 1920s?” The American Historical Review 88, 
no. 3 (June 1983): 621. 
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tradition put Vichy “in parenthesis” within French history, and an even older tradition 
placed the Nazi years in parenthesis within German history, so, too, have most historians 
viewed collaboration(ism) not as part of a larger trend of French-German attempts at 
cooperation, but rather as an immediate response to the circumstances of war and 
occupation.23  
Indeed, a common assumption suggests that the occupation of France brought 
about an entirely new relationship between the French and the Germans. If it perhaps 
represents an extreme formulation of this perspective, Richard Cobb’s statement spells 
out the implications of such an argument quite clearly: 
At whatever level, whether timid, flirtatious or brassily calculated, run-of-
the-mill technical and administrative, cultural or repressive, ideologically 
convinced or brutally cynical, collaboration and collaborationism would 
normally remain a temporary and largely accidental relationship, imposed 
by quite exceptional circumstances, for which there was no recent 
precedent, as well as by unique opportunities…and confined within a time 
space of four years and one month . . . . 
 
Collaboration and resistance are both eminently personal stances that have 
no past, whether familial or historical . . .24  
 
Cobb’s position makes far more sense from a moral perspective than a historical one. If 
the positioning of oneself with regard to a conqueror and the contingencies of war were 
new, that is not to say that “there was no recent precedent.” By reframing the questions, 
we can unearth rather substantial continuities both before and after those four years and 
                                                          
23Certainly, scholars have considered individual biographies and how they bridged these apparent ruptures, 
but this study focuses on an evolution of networks and ideas centered on French-German cooperation. For 
examples of such biographies, see Barbara Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les français ou l’envers de la 
collaboration (Paris: Fayard, 2001); Corinna Franz, Fernand de Brinon und die deutsch-französischen 
Beziehungen 1918-1945 (Bonn: Bouvier, 2000); Geraldine Lillian Alden, “The Road to Collaboration: The 
Life and Times of Jean Luchaire” (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1998). 
 
24Richard Cobb, French and Germans, Germans and French: A Personal Interpretation of France under 
Two Occupations 1914-1918/ 1940-1944, Tauber Institute for the Study of European Jewry. (Hanover, NH: 
University Press of New England, 1983): 72-73. 
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one month. Instead of looking to gradations of guilt, we examine networks and 
institutions of Franco-German cooperation extant before the war; these not only involved 
people who might be predisposed to cooperation during wartime, but also had laid a 
foundation upon which the so-called “collabos” could build.   
If it is important to determine why collaboration during the occupation worked, it 
is necessary to look at prewar mechanisms of cooperation.  By looking at continuity, we 
can avoid the trap of wholly placing “Vichy in parentheses.”25  Most historians suggest 
the war marked a tremendous shift in the conduct of Franco-German relations because 
cooperation could only ensue on different terms: it could no longer be conciliation but 
collaboration.26 By separating examinations of interwar rapprochement from Occupation-
era collaborationism, this genre of scholarship has risked drawing an artificial line 
between them.27 Viewing this moment as a radical break implies a total novelty of 
structures and habits of Franco-German cultural encounters with the onset of the 
Occupation.  Such assumptions lead to overly critical interpretations of French 
                                                          
25I am borrowing this phrase, though not its significance, from Gérard Noiriel.  See Gérard Noiriel, The 
French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity, trans. Geoffroy de Laforcade 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1996). 
 
26This idea is more implied by the periodization of many books, which with the exceptions of Richard 
Cobb’s comparative history of two occupations and a slew of biographies, deals solely with pre-war or the 
1939-1945 era. Important exceptions include Julian Jackson, France The Dark Years, 1940-1944 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) and  Robert Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944, 
2d ed. (New York: Columbia, 1982). A short list of books on the Occupation that do not delve into 
preexisting structures in any depth would include: Eberhard Jäckel, Frankreich in Hitlers Europa: Die 
Deutsche Frankreichpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966);  Jean-Pierre 
Azéma, From Munich to the Liberation, 1938-1944, trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984); Laurence Bertrand Dorléac, Histoire de l'art, Paris 1940-1944 (Paris: Publications de la 
Sorbonne, 1986); Philippe Burrin, France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise, trans. Janet 
Lloyd (New York: The New Press, 1996); and Bertram M. Gordon, Collaborationism in France during the 
Second World War (Ithaca: Cornell, 1980). 
 
27Rita Thalmann, “Du Cercle de Sohlberg,” and Claude Lévy, “Autour du Jean Luchaire: le cercle éclaté de 
Notre Temps,”in Entre Locarno et Vichy, ed. Bock, et al (1993), 67-86; 120-130.  
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acceptance of German high culture during the Occupation.28  Moreover, unmoored from 
the context of Franco-German relations, these narratives suggest a novelty to postwar 
institutions that belies their earlier incarnations.29 In fact, the war period remains in many 
ways part of a Franco-German continuum. 
Such continuities, however, do not mean that the origins of French 
collaborationism lay in Locarno-era efforts for cooperation. Henry Rousso at best 
scratched the surface when he described the Mayrisch Komitee of the late Weimar years 
as a “sort of Comité France-Allemagne, but before Hitler’s seizure of power.”30 Although 
the Comité France-Allemagne, which studiously nurtured French ties to Nazi Germany 
included former members of the Mayrisch Komitee in its ranks, the organization should 
not be deemed a mere successor to a group born under the star of Locarno. Overlaps 
cannot be denied, but a conflation of the two organizations’ work would not only be 
simplistic, but teleological. Instead, a more complex story, full of intriguing connections 
and meaningful twists, will be told.   
After the war, when Franco-German collaboration was condemned, Franco-
German mediators faced new challenges; again, there was no simple progression toward 
cooperation. The memory of the Second World War weighed heavily on both French and 
German minds, a situation rendered yet more complex by France’s postwar occupation of 
parts of Western Germany. The war bequeathed a difficult legacy and created a 
complicated present; it deeply shaded efforts at cooperation and French-German relations 
                                                          
28For an unnuanced history of the Occupation, see David Pryce-Jones, Paris in the Third Reich: A History 
of the German Occupation, 1940-1944 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981). 
 
29See, for example, Farquharson and Holt, Europe from Below. 
 
30Henry Rousso, Un Château en Allemagne: La France de Pétain en exil: Sigmaringen, 1944-1945 (Paris: 
Éditions Ramsay, 1980), 215.  
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more broadly as well as hopes for a new European order. Yet even in this context, as both 
the French and Germans worked to reconstruct their devastated landscapes, activists 
urged a moral reconstruction of Franco-German relations. These mediators drew on 
examples from the past.   
While many of the groups here have been studied in isolation before, they have 
not been brought together in this way. This project seeks to enrich our understanding of 
the organizations that others have so carefully researched by placing this work in new 
contexts. We therefore owe a considerable debt to Hans Manfred Bock, who has spent 
much of his career documenting Franco-German civil society in the interwar years and 
who has helped shape a burgeoning field of Franco-German history in Europe.31 A 
number of other scholars’ tightly focused individual case studies—whether in the shape 
of painstaking monograph or short article—have likewise been of great use.32 While 
                                                          
31See, for example, Hans Manfred Bock, “Transnationale Begegnung im Zeitalter des Nationalismus: Der 
Lebensweg Otto Grautoffs (1876-1937) zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich,” in Sept décennies de 
relations franco-allemandes: Hommage à Joseph Rovan, ed. Gilbert Krebs (Asnières: Publications de 
l'Institut d'Allemand d'Asnières, 1989), 57-79; “Die Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft 1926 bis 1934: Ein 
Beitrag zur Sozialgeschichte der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen der Zwischenkriegszeit,” Francia 
17/3 (1990): 57-101; “Les associations de germanistes français. L’exemple de la Ligue d’études 
germaniques (LEG),” in Les études germaniques (1900-1970), ed. Michel Espagne and Michael Werner 
(Paris: CNRS, 1994), 267-285; “Initiatives socio-culturelles et contraintes politiques dans les relations 
universitaires entre la France et l’Allemagne dans l’Entre-Deux-Guerres,” Revue d’Allemagne et des Pays 
de Langue Allemande 34, no. 3 (2002): 297-310. 
 
32Examples of monographs include Ina Belitz, Befreundung mit dem Fremden: Die Deutsch-Französische 
Gesellschaft in den deutsch-französischen Kultur- und Gesellschaftsbeziehungen der Locarno-Ära: 
Programme und Protaganisten der transnationaler Verständigung zwischen Pragmatismus und Idealismus, 
Europäische Hochschulschriften: Geschichte und Ihre Hilfswissenschaften (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 
1997); Béatrice Pellissier. “Un dialogue franco-allemand de l'entre deux-guerres: la Deutsch-Französische 
Rundschau (janvier 1928-juin 1933) et la Revue d'Allemagne (novembre 1927-décembre 1933) ” (Ph.D. 
diss., Université de Paris IV-Paris Sorbonne, 1991-1992). Barbara Unteutsch and Martin Strickmann have a 
wider scope. Unteutsch focuses on three groups from the 1930s and war years; Strickmann looks to 
intellectuals (some of whom were affiliated with such organizations) in the late 1940s. See Barbara 
Unteutsch, Vom Sohlbergkreis zur Gruppe Collaboration. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutsch-
französischen Beziehungen anhand der Cahiers Franco-Allemands/ Deutsch-Französische Monatshefte, 
1931-1944, Münsterische Beiträge zur romanischen Philologie, ed. Wolfgang Babilas, et al. (Münster: 
Kleinheinrich Verlag, 1990); Martin Strickmann, L’Allemagne nouvelle contre l’Allemagne éternelle: Die 
französischen Intellektuellen und die deutsch-französische Verständigung 1944-1950. Diskurse, Initiativen, 
Biografien (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2004). For articles, see, for example, the following collected volumes: 
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these works have delved deep into the particularities of one or two Franco-German 
organizations or journals, they do not address longer-term trends or the big picture. 
These small-scale studies speak to interesting questions, but, even taken together, 
they make for a remarkably fragmented (and fragmentary) view of French-German 
relations, as well as of 20th century European history more broadly. Radical breaks—in 
the form of regime changes, wars, and occupations—have kept scholars from seeing 
continuities, whether of ideas or actors, that transcend these ruptures. These seemingly 
impassable divides have relegated an essential strand of European history to the realm of 
the incidental. Scholars have laid tiles, but have yet to grout between them, much less 
step back to view the whole mosaic. Therefore, I seek to determine how the pieces fit 
together, how individuals bridged and tried to overcome dramatic upheavals. Indeed, it is 
my contention that we cannot understand these ruptures in the European past without 
exploring the continuities that lay beneath them.  
By exploring the continuities—as well as the discontinuities—of Franco-German 
cultural cooperation, this dissertation mines three scholarly veins. Like the above-
referenced scholarship, this project highlights the importance of civil society and its 
influences on transnational relations in both France and Germany; indeed, this 
dissertation goes a step further to underscore the variety, vibrancy, and durability of civic 
activism in both nations. In so doing, it also demonstrates the limits to the study of 
diplomatic relations as a means to understand relations between Germany and France. 
Diplomatic historians have typically emphasized Franco-German political conflict, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Hans Manfred Bock, Reinhart Meyer-Kalkus, and Michel Trebitsch, eds, Entre Locarno et Vichy: Les 
relations culturelles franco-allemandes dans les années 1930, 2 vols. (Paris: CNRS, 1993); Bock and 
Krebs, eds. Échanges culturels. 
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thereby slighting any cooperation that occurred in the cultural realm. Finally, this project 
places collaborationism during World War II in an extended historical context. Thus, it 
subsumes Vichy-era collaboration, which historians have otherwise treated as a discrete 
unit, into the long-term development of Franco-German relations. 
 By examining the attempts toward French-German cooperation, this dissertation 
sheds light on both the national histories of France and Germany as well as on 
transnational history itself. In a recent invaluable essay, Allan Mitchell contended that the 
history of Third Republic France was inextricably linked with the history of Germany, 
that it would be, in fact, impossible to understand France at that time without taking into 
account its formidable neighbor. Throughout his career, Mitchell has helped illuminate 
Germany’s influence on France, from the army to the government to the church to social 
welfare.33 We know, too, that France has had a significant impact on the course of 
German history.34 Why not therefore take Mitchell’s argument about the history of 
France a step further? Neither the history of modern France nor the history of modern 
Germany can be told in its entirety without reference to the other. Indeed, Sorbonne 
Germanist Henri Lichtenberger said as much in 1929, near the start of the period under 
investigation here: “The two nations are inextricably linked to each other by the fatalities 
                                                          
33Mitchell’s recent essay is A Stranger in Paris: Germany’s Role in Republican France, 1870-1940 
(Berghahn, 2006). Other French-German works by Mitchell in this vein include The German Influence in 
France after 1870: The Formation of the French Republic (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1979); Victors and 
Vanquished: The German Influence on Army and Church in France after 1870 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 
1984); The Divided Path: The German Influence on Social Reform in France after 1870 (Chapel Hill: UNC 
Press, 1991).  
 
34Both David Blackbourn and Thomas Nipperdey, for example, open their classic 19th century German 
textbooks with reference to France. Here, in particular, we see revolutionary ideals transferred across the 
border. See, David Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780-1918 (1997), 
70-79; Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte, 1800-1866: Bürgerwelt und starker Staat (Munich: C.H. 
Beck, 1983), 1-5. French influence has notably been apparent in German art as well.  
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of neighborhood, probably also by racial affinities. Between their cultures there exists a 
tight interdependence since [the Gauls].”35  
Because this study lays stress on the interdependence of the two nations, it shifts 
Mitchell’s timeframe from one defined by the conventions of French history—the 
duration of the Third Republic—to one of equal importance to both France and Germany. 
Two diplomatic settlements bookend this study, the 1925 Treaty of Locarno and the 1954 
Paris Accords. Together, they provide a framework of symbolic moments for the quest 
for cooperation. These dates, whose significance is typically grounded in the political 
content of diplomatic pacts, will instead be deployed here as symbolic cultural markers: 
these dates were invoked by the activists themselves as they narrated their own visions of 
the history of cooperation. Franco-German mediators frequently invoked the Treaty of 
Locarno, relevant for its recognition of the 1919 border between France and Germany, as 
the emblematic foundational moment of their quest, and the “spirit of Locarno” became 
their rallying cry. The 1954 Paris Accords, which most notably placed West Germany on 
equal footing with other European nations almost a decade after the war, provided 
equally clear (and in retrospect, more enduring) proof of mutual goodwill. Shortly after 
the failure of the European Defense Community, France and Germany would become the 
backbone of the European project.36 With the signature of these accords, Adenauer hailed 
                                                          
35Henri Lichtenberger, “Psychologie du rapprochement franco-allemand,” Revue d’Allemagne no. 23 (Sept. 
1929): 769-783, see pp.773-774. 
 
36On Locarno, see Jon Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1972). On the Paris Accords, see Georges-Henri Soutou, “Les Accords de 
Paris. Une étape diplomatique traduisant les mutations européennes des années cinquante,” in Wandel und 
Integration: Deutsch-französische Annäherungen der fünfziger Jahre/ Mutations et intégration: Les 
rapprochements franco-allemands dans les années cinquante, ed. Hélène Miard-Delacroix and Rainer 
Hudemann (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2005): 41-52. 
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“the day of reconciliation with France.”37 On a narrower level, it was in 1954 that the 
Arbeitskreis der privaten Insitutionen für internationale Begegnung und Bildungsarbeit 
united a variety of groups interested in the French-German relationship for the first time 
under one umbrella.38 
With 1925 and 1954 as our chronological frame, then, we will pursue a number of 
case studies of French-German cooperation. The organizations under investigation here 
were by no means the only groups interested in French-German cooperation during this 
period. This dissertation, for instance, does not take as its subject political parties with 
transnational ties or agendas such as the Communists or Christian Democrats (in fact, I 
expressly look at groups claiming to be independent of party politics). Nor does it focus 
on other organizations interested in French-German cooperation that were nonetheless 
primarily oriented toward another cause, such as pacifist groups and international 
organizations affiliated with the League of Nations, the United Nations, or the European 
movement. In similar fashion, it does not place the spotlight on French and German 
institutes—the Institut français de Berlin, the Deutsche Institut in Paris, much less 
institutes with a more global mandate such as the Deutscher Akademischer Austausch 
Dienst (DAAD), Goethe Institute, or Alliance française. Each of these, of course, served 
as an important locus and agent of international exchange and cultural transfer, but these 
institutes were precisely that, neither directed toward French-German cooperation per se, 
                                                          
37Sherill Brown Wells, Pioneers of European Integration and Peace, 1945-1963: A Brief History with 
Documents (Boston: Bedford St. Martin’s, 2007): 19. 
 
38Hans Manfred Bock and Ulrich Pfeil, “Kulturelle Akteure und die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit: 
Formen, Ziele, Einfluss,” in Der Elysee-Vertrag und die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1945-1963-
2003, ed. Corine Defrance and Ulrich Pfeil. Pariser Historische Studien, vol. 71. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 
2005), 223. 
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nor the products of civic activism. On a more narrow level, the dissertation does not 
cover local book clubs, conversation groups, or foreign language circles.  
Rather, the selected cases share an agenda aimed first and foremost at improving 
French-German relations. Unlike many local clubs, these organizations possessed some 
combination of political influence, cultural capital, and the economic wherewithal to 
promote their ideas within their own society and meet their counterparts across the 
border. All worked to reshape the public mindset through the press, public lecture tours, 
or other publications. Most enjoyed at least some degree of support from the state(s); 
certainly, both the French and German governments took notice of each organization 
under review.39 Furthermore, all left an imprint on future incarnations of such friendship 
societies. Tellingly, many of the same people found themselves gravitating toward these 
organizations in their varied iterations. Together, these cases illustrate the common 
scope—as well as the kaleidoscopic variations—of the quest for cooperation.  
Part One, “Intellectual Demobilization and the Problem of Understanding, 1925-
1933,” considers three very different Franco-German associations during the Locarno era. 
Chapter one analyzes the Mayrisch Komitee, predominantly composed of well-known 
businessmen and intellectuals. The Komitee lent legitimacy to the notion of Franco-
German cooperation, lobbied to curtail chauvinist propaganda in the press, and helped 
define the rhetoric and methods of future associations devoted to cooperation. Chapter 
two explores the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, a broad-based organization that 
sought to educate the French and German reading publics about the complementary 
natures of French and German culture and established exchanges to foster mutual 
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understanding. Chapter three examines the Sohlbergkreis, devoted to creating a Franco-
German community through youth “encounters” that trumpeted common interests over 
national divisions.  
Part Two, “Maintaining a Franco-German Community, 1933-1944,” centers on 
the tensions confronting Franco-German friendship societies—as well as the inducements 
to join them—in the Nazi-era. Chapter four investigates the second incarnation of the 
Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, an amalgam of the earlier groups stamped with a 
Nazi-influenced agenda, along with its French analog the Comité France-Allemagne. 
Chapter five follows the wartime Groupe Collaboration, which by promulgating Franco-
German entente and the idea of a Europe united under the Germans, explicitly aimed at 
sustaining the politics of Montoire.  
Part Three, “Reconciliation and Redemption, 1945-1954,” explores the moral 
universe of postwar cooperation. Chapter six looks at the Catholic-oriented Bureau 
International de Liaison et de Documentation, which immediately sought reconciliation 
after the war. Chapter seven focuses on the Comité français d'échanges avec l’Allemagne 
Nouvelle, which called attention to the negative legacy of collaboration and insisted on a 
new form of Franco-German cooperation. In this way, the Comité underlined the legacy 
of the war and the need to purge both societies to achieve renewal.  
In a meticulous history of interwar French and German diplomatic relations, 
Franz Knipping vehemently argued that the Franco-German opposition continued even 
“behind the façade” of rapprochement during the heady Locarno years.40 This dissertation 
takes the reverse tack. Rather than pointing out the ubiquitous tensions in the French-
                                                          
40Franz Knipping, Deutschland, Frankreich und das Ende der Locarno-Ära 1928-1931. Studien zur 
internationalen Politik in der Anfangsphase der Weltwirtschaftskrise (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1987), 
see especially p. 220. 
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German relationship, obvious to contemporary witnesses and historians alike, it looks to a 
different, equally complex continuity. If, as Knipping rightly contends, French-German 
tensions endured even during moments of attempted conciliation, so too, did the quest for 
cooperation persist even during the most marked periods of hostility. I therefore privilege 
the smaller, less familiar story of cooperation over the far grander saga of hate. In this 
way, we can zoom in on those struggling to keep cooperation afloat despite the 
overwhelming tide of animosity. And, as we look to those cultivators of friendship, 
reaching out during the darkest hours, we will see that for many, their work toward 
cooperation was no mere act or façade, but a matter of profound conviction, firm 
commitment, and the essential key to a future European peace.
  
 
 
 
PART ONE 
 
Intellectual Demobilization and the Problem of Understanding, 1925-1933 
 
 
Three enormous questions loomed over Franco-German relations after the First 
World War: reparations, war guilt, and security. These issues pervaded international 
summits throughout the 1920s and were at the root of mutual French and German 
anxieties. The post-Versailles occupation of the Rhineland and the invasion of the Ruhr 
did little to assuage the French public and only inflamed German public opinion against 
the French, whom the Germans saw as poachers of their economy and stealthily 
expansionist abusers of the postwar order. In this hostile atmosphere, the two most 
celebrated proponents of rapprochement, Gustav Stresemann and Aristide Briand, 
hammered out the Locarno accords to ensure stability.  At the same time, the efforts of 
concerned activists who had urged Franco-German cooperation found greater resonance 
once the two governments explicitly sanctioned a policy of détente. 
Before Locarno, a number of international groups considered the easing of 
French-German tensions as a subset of their broader platform. Some form of Franco-
German cooperation was often folded into the agendas of, for example, Catholic and 
Protestant associations, international organizations affiliated with the League of Nations 
such as the Carnegie Foundation, and transnational political parties such as the 
Communists.  Socialists, too, saw in cooperation a worthy goal, one effectively captured 
a few years later in the G.W. Pabst film Kameradschaft. This joint Franco-German 
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production based on the 1906 Courrières mining disaster yoked a message of Franco-
German cooperation to a socialist trope: French and German workers would unite against 
their oppressors. But it was above all pacifists who led the charge for Franco-German 
entente in the 1920s. The tensions between France and Germany—and attempts to 
resolve them—drew worldwide attention when, for two years in a row, a Frenchman and 
a German shared the Nobel Peace Prize: Stresemann and Briand in 1926 and Ludwig 
Quidde and Ferdinand Buisson, leaders in the pacifist movement, in 1927. 
Scholars on both sides of the Rhine have argued that a bona fide politics of 
cooperation in the 1920s was doomed to failure.41 But, if cooperation was certain to fail, 
what compelled its advocates to work so hard for a lost cause? Rather than looking to 
diplomatic instances of cooperation: Locarno, Germany’s entrance into the League of 
Nations (1926), the end of interallied control over the Rhineland (1927), the Franco-
German Treaty of Commerce (1927), and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), the next three 
chapters examine the ways in which determined activists sought to engage in a Franco-
German dialogue, almost inconceivable after the war.  
These largely independent cultural efforts differed remarkably from the official 
cultural diplomacy of the time. After the signing of the peace, the two governments, 
thoroughly preoccupied with each other and fumbling for some sort of modus vivendi, 
were torn between projecting an image of national power and seeking rapprochement. 
Under the purview of the Foreign Ministry, the Services des Oeuvres françaises à 
l’étranger worked to spread French cultural influence abroad. The German government 
                                                          
41Hermann Hagspiel, Verständigung zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich? Die deutsch-französische 
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responded in kind to counter French efforts and to promote German culture in its stead. 
Thus when the French erected cultural institutes in, for example, Prague, Riga, and 
Warsaw, the Germans followed suit in Barcelona, Madrid, and Budapest; this was a battle 
on neutral ground. The Office National des Universités et Écoles Françaises (ONUEF) 
and the Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD) similarly worked to promote 
their respective nation’s culture and scientific research abroad. But it was not until 1929 
that the ONUEF extended its exchanges to Germany or until 1930 that the DAAD opened 
an office in Paris.42 At the official level, French-German cultural interaction after the war 
by and large was reduced to French efforts in the occupied Rhineland, namely the Centre 
d’Études Germaniques founded in Mainz in 1921 and a series of French schools in the 
occupied zone.  
The following year, the Sorbonne Germanist Henri Lichtenberger hinted that 
intellectual power was being exploited to serve a nationalist cause. In his L’Allemagne 
d’aujourd’hui, reissued and translated several times over the next decade, Lichtenberger 
argued that intellectuals and their output had been hijacked since the eve of the Great 
War. Even those long dead—most markedly Nietzsche—had been conscripted into the 
war effort to perform “the agonal function of intelligence.” Now the time had come, he 
explained, for what he alternately dubbed “intellectual demobilization” and the 
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“demobilization of esprits” that had not proceeded apace with military demobilization.43 
The phrase played upon the notion of “moral disarmament” which first surfaced after 
1919 among French military circles and was later picked up by, among others, French 
schoolteachers.44 According to Lichtenberger, intellectuals needed to shoulder the duty to 
lead the public to mutual understanding, the bedrock of his proposal. By placing the 
burden on intellectuals to illuminate the public, Lichtenberger—one of the most vigorous 
proponents of cooperation of the 1920s and one of the very few active members of both 
the Mayrisch Komitee and the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft—embraced a 
philosophy that neatly bridged the two groups.  
If demobilization and disarmament represented a first step, understanding was the 
second, more difficult, challenge. French and German activists struggled to find a proper 
vocabulary of cooperation. At its most basic level, this can be seen in the question of 
whether understanding represented a process or a goal. It likewise proved difficult to 
hammer out, much less stick to, one philosophy of understanding—even a loose one. 
Activists also had to determine what forms such understanding could take, and 
ultimately, how far they could push their demands. As they wrestled with these issues, 
proponents of cooperation found themselves hemmed in: bitterness about the war and its 
aftermath left many hostile toward the nation across the Rhine, nationalist groups 
stridently proclaimed very different goals and needs, and the two governments, the press, 
and an array of public figures in both nations preached constant vigilance.   
                                                          
43Henri Lichtenberger, L’Allemagne d’aujourd’hui dans ses relations avec la France. Le Nouveau Monde 
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Unlike official endeavors, the organizations analyzed in this section neither 
served as a form of “cultural penetration” nor were they limited to the zone of 
occupation. Above all, they were joint Franco-German efforts, which sought to overcome 
stereotypes and misinformation. Chapter one, which focuses on the Mayrisch Komitee, 
shows how intellectuals and industrialists in both nations strived to work together to 
sanitize the French and German press and thereby begin to reshape public opinion. The 
Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft (DFG), the subject of chapter two, reached out both 
east and west of the Rhine and sought, not penetration, but mutual understanding. 
Chapter three explores the ways in which the Sohlbergkreis, a group that brought together 
French and German youth, tried to thrust rapprochement from the realm of ideas into the 
realm of practice and everyday life.  
 Historians have rightly indicated that these groups were a political failure in that 
they did not in themselves reshape, or even appreciably influence, the international 
landscape. Not only is this verdict unfair—the expectation that they could is somewhat 
ridiculous—but this assessment also fails to recognize the important effects these 
organizations did have.  
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
The Mayrisch Komitee 
 
 
 
 
The very fact that in Franco-German relations there is virtually no connection between 
the question asked and the answer aimed at, that the truth about Germany does not fit into 
the ideological frame we have made to receive it: that is perhaps the essence of the whole 
Franco-German problem. Even in the purely political sphere, where question and answer 
seem to bear on the same realities, the two countries are unconsciously talking to 
themselves. –Pierre Viénot45 
 
One could almost say (pardon my mathematical formula): Franco-German entente is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for European peace.—Régis de Vibraye46 
 
 
 This study is about France and Germany, and yet it commences neither with a 
Frenchman nor a German, but a Luxembourger. Émile Mayrisch (1862-1928), whose 
position between France and Germany is embodied in the alternate spellings of his given 
name as Émile or Emil, was an industrial baron of the turn of the century and the Great 
War. Through his steel concern ARBED, he directed one of the central bases of the war 
industry. At his magnificent, sprawling chateau at Colpach, he and his wife, the translator 
Aline de Saint-Hubert, presided over one of the foremost salons of the era. Thus placed at 
the center of both elite economic and intellectual circles that included both the French 
and Germans, the bilingual Mayrisch wielded a particular influence over oft-separated 
communities. 
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46Régis de Vibraye, Allemagne 1930 (Bordeaux: Feret et Fils, 1930), 13. 
 32 
 As early as his 1911 merger of three steel factories into ARBED, Mayrisch met 
frequently with French and German industrial magnates to discuss the formation of 
transnational cartels and customs unions. When the re-erection of trade barriers with 
Germany after Versailles threatened business, Mayrisch spearheaded more concrete 
efforts to create a customs union for Luxembourger, Belgian, French, and German heavy 
industry—namely coal and steel.47 As a Luxembourger representative at the 1922 Genoa 
Conference, Mayrisch had made his official entrée into the realm of 1920s international 
summits.  Appointed head of the International Steel Entente in 1926, he became an even 
more prominent champion of transnational economic negotiations by promoting the cartel 
as a means to economic protectionism, and as a byproduct, toward international harmony. 
Without being his primary goal, Franco-German cooperation was a requisite 
accompaniment to his vision of a stable steel market that would tap the resources of 
Luxembourg and Belgium, Lorraine and the Saar. His network of personal connections 
and professional interests ideally situated Mayrisch to forge multi-national European 
cooperation.  
 Mayrisch’s personal network also extended into the highest intellectual circles of 
the Continent. Aline, as a translator of André Gide, invited him, along with numerous 
other writers from Thomas Mann to André Malraux to Colpach. A steady contributor 
(both financial and intellectual)48 to the Nouvelle Revue Française, the premier French 
literary review of the century, Aline maintained strong ties to the literary scene in France 
                                                          
47Mayrisch moved from “neutral” relations with Germany during the war when he maintained trade with 
the Germans to (by necessity) more pro-French relations at the war’s end. See Guido Müller, “Der 
Luxemburgische Stahlkonzern Arbed nach dem ersten Weltkrieg: Zum Problem der deutsch-französischen 
Verständigung durch Wirtschaftsverflechtung,” Revue d'Allemagne 25, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1993): 538-540. 
 
48Jeannine Wurth-Rentier, “Émile et Aline Mayrisch: Un couple luxembourgeois prestigieux de l’entre-
deux-guerres,” Revue des Deux Mondes 10 (1984): 86. 
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and Germany, and often brought writers and critics from the two nations together for 
sustained literary conversations at Colpach.  In particular, critics Jean Schlumberger of 
the NRF and Ernst Robert Curtius regularly visited. Other intellectuals included the 
philosopher Karl Jaspers and Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, the apostle of Paneuropa. 
 Early in 1926 Émile Mayrisch tapped a number of businessmen and intellectuals 
to join an organization to promote Franco-German understanding, the Deutsch-
Französische Studienkomitee [Franco-German Study Group] or the Comité franco-
allemand d’information et de documentation [Franco-German Committee for Information 
and Documentation] (henceforth known for simplicity’s sake as the Mayrisch Komitee, 
its shorter, common designation). Although scholars have generally discussed the 
Mayrisch Komitee in an economic context,49 I argue that the Komitee was important 
above all for its influence on the culture of Franco-German cooperation. As one of the 
earliest organizations to that end founded after Versailles, the Mayrisch Komitee helped 
establish a rhetoric of mutual understanding and lent a certain weight to the goal of 
rapprochement. By looking to improve Franco-German relations and stamp out 
stereotypes, the Mayrisch Komitee adopted a positive agenda. Its gradualist approach, 
however, revealed a more anxious perspective. Steeped in the memory of a bitter war and 
the contentious peace that followed, these advocates of cooperation feared the accusation 
that they were betraying national interests. Their pragmatic, guarded approach provided a 
space for the “spirit of Locarno” in the civic sphere yet subverted this spirit by eschewing 
pacifism and internationalism as castles in the air and by putting the brakes on a political 
                                                          
49Jacques Bariéty, “Industriels allemands et industriels français à l'époque de la République de Weimar,” 
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program for a United States of Europe. At once part of the spirit of Locarno and critical 
of it, the Mayrisch Komitee counters the prevailing notions of the late 1920s as an era of 
sunny idealism, even within some of the more progressive spheres.  
In relegating the Mayrisch Komitee to the economic sphere, historians have been 
driven to conclude that the group’s rather negligible impact on the economy demonstrates 
its minor role in interwar society.50 But in this case, economic and cultural history cannot 
be so easily disentangled; the example of the Mayrisch Komitee perfectly illustrates the 
nexus of diplomatic, economic, and cultural efforts for cooperation. By looking at the 
Komitee from a cultural perspective, we can see that the purely economic (or economic-
diplomatic) argument underestimates the broader influence of the Komitee, which was 
not limited to that sphere. Scholars have pointed to the elite backgrounds of the 
committee members as evidence of the seriousness of the group, but have also argued 
that these elites merely debated and networked behind closed doors. Yet, while the 
committee members did belong to the highest circles of the business and intellectual 
worlds, it was exactly their distinction that lent legitimacy to the organization and its 
ideas on cooperation. Prestige helped carve out a space to negotiate ideas on Europe and 
Franco-German cooperation that did not smack of quixotism. And by discussing these 
ideas, members helped define the rhetoric and methods of future associations devoted to 
entente. Moreover, the Komitee built a network of those pledged to Franco-German 
cooperation. Members’ encounters would sustain these channels of communication as 
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well as this creed, including among some of its more minor players who would 
consistently enlist in subsequent efforts toward Franco-German cooperation in the many 
years to come. Finally, the Mayrisch Komitee represents a way for us to see how very 
revolutionary the idea of cooperation itself was after the war. The fears, second-guessing, 
and pushes for gradualism demonstrate to what degree the idea was not mainstream.    
 
The Formation of the Mayrisch Komitee 
  In the aftermath of the Great War, fraternization between the French and Germans 
materialized as a phenomenon of the far left. Among pacifists, for example, efforts 
toward reconciliation can be traced back as early as 1921, and they multiplied during the 
Ruhr crisis.51 Among the majority of the French and German populations, however, 
distrust and resentment between the two nations ran high. Reparations and the “war guilt” 
clause, among other points in the Treaty of Versailles, as well as the 1923 occupation of 
the Ruhr exacerbated this on the political level. Formal scientific relations did not resume 
until 1926, and economic relations did not normalize until the Commercial Treaty of 
1927.52 University relations between Germany and France remained non-existent until 
1928. In general, strong nationalist feelings in France and Germany kept citizens on their 
own side of the border. In this pervasive mood of nationalism, bringing together French 
and German citizens who were not on the left posed an enormous challenge.  
Mayrisch was the ideal figure to undertake this task. First, he knew many 
individuals from both business and intellectual circles to recruit. Not surprisingly, once 
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he had enlisted some, it became easier to draft more members. His status as a neutral 
third party of course helped bring the former enemies together with fewer suspicions. 
Finally, Mayrisch provided the original idea—one that appealed at once to prospective 
members’ economic self-interest and their sense of constituting a vanguard of the elite. 
 If Mayrisch at multiple levels enabled the various members of the eponymous 
committee to meet, he was neither an intellectual visionary for the group nor a nuts and 
bolts organizer. Mayrisch’s future son-in-law, Pierre Viénot (1897-1944), a political 
writer, composed the ideological and structural recommendations for the group before its 
initial gathering; it was he who drafted its eventual statutes. Moreover, the able son-in-
law ran the Berlin office of the Komitee until 1930 when his involvement tapered off and 
he entered French parliamentary politics. Hans Manfred Bock has rightly pegged him as a 
“man of action.”53 We will return more fully to Viénot’s place in the Mayrisch Komitee; 
for now, we will examine his role in framing its project. 
 Viénot had analyzed the “Franco-German problem,” in an article in Germania 
(reprinted in French papers) in August 1925, a couple of months before the Locarno 
meetings. He explained,  
The more one studies the Franco-German problem, the more one is led to 
believe that its true particulars are of a psychological order and that the 
Franco-German conflict, in its material form—political or economic—is 
only a result and not a cause [italics in original]. If France and Germany 
think they have different interests, if they find themselves in conflict 
because of these interests, it is not because they are irreconcilable. It is 
that, on all sides, the routine imagination of the public only represents 
Franco-German relations in the form of conflict and it accepts this as a 
fundamental theme of national life.54 
                                                          
53Pierre Viénot, Ungewisses Deutschland: Zur Krise seiner bürgerlichen Kultur, with a foreword by Hans 
Manfred Bock. Réflexions sur l'Allemagne au 20e siècle/ Reflexionen über Deutschland im 20. 
Jahrhundert, ed. Deutschen Historischen Institut Paris (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), 75. 
 
54AN 411/AP/1, dossier 7. Unmarked press clipping. Pierre Viénot, “Le problème franco-allemand,” 2 Aug. 
1925.   
 37 
  
For Viénot, the Franco-German problem was thus a lack of imagination. If the public 
could only conceive of Franco-German rapprochement, then it could eventually take 
shape. Rather than approaching the issue through the tangled avenues of diplomacy, as 
would the Locarno meetings which reconsidered the Treaty of Versailles, or through 
controversial trade negotiations, as Mayrisch had long been advocating, Viénot wanted to 
address the problem head-on: by re-mapping the French and German psyches.  
According to Viénot, the Franco-German animosity persisted due to the distorting 
effects of long-held stereotypes, a strong memory of conflict, persistently negative 
portrayals of Franco-German relations, and the rumor mill. For Viénot, this filter of false 
information served to reinforce a cycle of distrust. Politicians and their parties played on 
the perceived concerns and fears of their constituents. The press transmitted these 
anxieties to a broader populace out of party loyalty and a desire to sell copy.55 Such 
heightened tensions among the populace, in turn, fueled politicians’ use of negative 
imagery, thereby kicking off a new cycle. For Viénot, reshaping Franco-German relations 
meant ending this vicious circle; in particular, it meant reorienting public opinion. Doing 
so would allow politicians to pursue new, more productive economic and diplomatic 
policies, ones not burdened by the lodestone of popular Franco-German hostility. A shift 
in mentalities, therefore, would remedy the governments’ and economic interests’ 
“powerlessness” even to begin to address the problem.56 Resolution to the Franco-
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German acrimony thus could not be attained through governmental or economic channels 
because they led to the symptoms rather than the disease. 
 To address these problems, Viénot drafted a proposal for a Franco-German 
“information committee” to act as a private initiative by citizens of the two nations 
working in their own national interests. This group would bring together the “leading 
circles” of the two countries and establish an office in each capital.57 These offices would 
scour the press clean of stereotypes and misinformation, while promoting those 
newspapers that presented a more positive view of the other nation. Finally, the offices 
would act as gathering places to make contacts, facilitate youth exchanges, and provide 
documents and publications the better to educate visitors.  
 Viénot’s idea to reform the press—and thereby cultivate public opinion—was at 
once the mainstay of his vision and its most controversial aspect. His initial proposal 
involved an office in Berlin to be directed by a French member with a German assistant; 
they would read the French press. In parallel fashion, the Komitee would establish an 
office in Paris to be directed by a German member with a French assistant; the Paris 
office would read the German press. Each representative would send out corrections and 
supplemental information accordingly to the papers. Indeed, the committee would be sure 
to assist foreign correspondents whose mistakes, according to Viénot, often could be 
traced to the fact that they were underpaid. 
 While the fundamental idea of a press oversight committee seemed useful, the 
German ambassador in Paris could not stomach the details. First, he questioned the 
viability of reviewing the press before publication, since newspapers revolved around 
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quick dispensation of information. Moreover, the newspapers themselves had no 
motivation to submit to independent examination. He painted such an effort skeptically: 
the representative would “study newspapers arriving from the home country with two 
days delay and then make the different organs notice their errors, with the obvious result 
that the organs would soon decline his critique, just as the correspondents of the 
newspapers in question would not put up with the director of the Information Bureau 
meddling with their reporting.”58 Finally, Ambassador Hoesch questioned the oddity of 
“no longer making propaganda abroad for one’s country, rather on the contrary, 
controlling one’s own national press upon its introduction into the other country.”59 This 
self-censorship, of course, was to be the truly revolutionary thrust of Viénot’s 
organization, if it could only work.60 
 The resistance of the German diplomats to the private initiative revealed their 
notion that politics, and by implication, politicians, determined events. The Mayrisch 
Komitee, founded on the principle that public opinion could be independent from 
government, parties, and special interests, and that a non-partisan committee could 
reconcile France and Germany, violated the assumptions of those in the German Foreign 
Office who believed that “public opinion is always a function of the situation brought 
about by cabinets, parties, and the economy.” According to one German diplomat, since 
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Locarno already existed, and politics shape public opinion, there was no point in 
doubling up with a new organization.61 Thus, from the Foreign Office’s perspective, by 
bringing about the Locarno treaties, these politicians and diplomats had influenced public 
opinion, resulting in the spirit of Locarno. Interference from private individuals—
regardless of how respected—would at best be redundant. These early struggles with the 
Foreign Office revealed the tension between the forces of official and private efforts for 
cooperation.  
 In response to the many criticisms by the German Foreign Office,62 the committee 
issued a report emending its plans. While this report reinforced some of Viénot’s original 
recommendations, including the emphasis on youth contacts, it also promoted less 
formal, “tactful interventions” in the press rather than explicit control.63 The private 
emphasis of the Komitee would remain, if nothing else, to address questions “the 
government has not yet asked.”64 Furthermore, though former government officials—
primarily ex-ambassadors—joined the organization, the private nature of the committee 
would be reinforced by its policy of excluding any politicians currently in service. 
Finally, the group would not ally itself with any political party.  
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The Mayrisch Komitee in Action 
The founding members of the committee consisted of twenty French and nineteen 
German members presided over by Émile Mayrisch. These members included the leaders 
of banks and magnates from heavy industry, as well as from chemical and electrical 
concerns such as Krupp and I.G. Farben, many of whom sought tariff reductions and 
open markets. Others were former ambassadors and government ministers along with a 
handful of prominent intellectuals and publishers like Franz von Papen and Lucien 
Romier. After a couple of months, the numbers expanded to thirty members from each 
nation, including two bishops. The French contingent tended to include a few more 
intellectuals than the German delegation, but in overall numbers, the membership balance 
sheet varied at most by one or two. On the German side, many hailed from the border 
regions of the Rhineland, in the industrial heartland. On the French side, however, most 
members resided in Paris. 
All members had been carefully selected from the highest echelons of business, 
society, the academy, and the press. Their status bolstered the reputation of the 
organization, shielded members from the rebuke that they were embracing the hereditary 
enemy, and placed members on a comfortable footing for socializing. Indeed, the 
Komitee was imbued with an elitist ethos. Writer Wladimir d’Ormesson (1888-1973) 
explained, “the elites, upon whom falls the responsibility of shaping the thought of their 
compatriots, must at all costs work hard at getting to know each other better and 
understanding each other [se pénétrer].”65 For these privileged few, prestige furnished a 
call to lay down arms, fraternize, and discover shared interests.  
                                                          
65Wladimir Comte d’Ormesson, “Deutsch-Französischer Austausch: Antworte auf unsere Umfrage,” 
Deutsch-Französische Rundschau 1, No. 6 (1928): 519. 
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In addition to showing distinction in their respective fields, members needed to 
exhibit a clear sense of patriotism. Due to the prevailing spirit of nationalism in both 
countries—and within the Mayrisch Komitee itself—members did not want their loyalties 
placed under suspicion. Many were veterans; one asserted that the bullet in his kidney 
gave him “the right to work for peace and to research, in security and national dignity, the 
practical modalities of a better entente between my conquering country and its former 
adversary.”66  Some French members had worked for the Occupation authority or in the 
newly liberated zones. Ernest Mercier, for example, helped apply sanctions against 
Germany when working for the Minister of Liberated Zones; thereafter, with the Military 
Control Commission, he supervised industry in the Rhineland.67  Jacques Seydoux had 
helped orchestrate the blockade of Germany and then worked at the Quai d’Orsay on 
reparations and debt questions.68  Fritz Thyssen had likewise worn his loyalties on his 
sleeve; during the Ruhr crisis, his resistance to French policies had led to his arrest.69 
New members faced intense scrutiny. In one instance, Prince Solms-Braunfels, whom the 
German Ambassador had floated as a potential member, was deemed too risky: others 
might see him as not German enough since he had married an Italian. Solms-Braunfels’ 
candidacy further came into question because he leaned suspiciously close to pacifism.70 
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If binational contacts were to be deemed useful, it was only the case in circumscribed 
conditions: the patriotism of individual members had to be beyond reproach.  
A brief biographical sketch of the two office managers, Viénot and Gustav 
Krukenberg (1888-1980), will help show how those with the most active daily 
involvement in committee affairs differed from the average member of the committee. 
Viénot had long observed Germany, first as a youth staying for two summers before the 
war near Koblenz, then, after 1923, in Bonn, Heidelberg, and Berlin where he lived 
through the end of the decade. Viénot had developed a certain technique of studying 
other cultures through his postwar work in Morocco alongside Marshall Lyautey, his 
mentor. Viénot understood a healthy respect for local customs and reliance on local 
leaders as elemental to his service in Morocco. In this way, Viénot was more open to 
honoring foreign customs than many of his contemporaries. Viénot, it has been argued 
elsewhere, brought these methods of analyzing foreign cultures on their own terms to 
postwar Germany.71 Leaving his unofficial post in the occupation of the Rhineland after 
only four weeks, Viénot used his connections to land a post at the university in 
Heidelberg, where he wrote and lectured about Germany until he moved to Berlin for his 
work with the Mayrisch Komitee. Through his many contacts with German sociologists, 
politicians, and business leaders, Viénot had a particularly privileged vantage point from 
which to view developments in modern Germany.   
Viénot’s pioneering views originated in an unusual mix of conservatism and 
cosmopolitanism. Raised in a conservative Catholic family, Viénot’s early life was 
                                                          
71Pierre Viénot, “France: Les leçons du Maroc,” Bibliothèque Universelle et Revue de Genève (July-Dec. 
1925): 1897-1908; Pierre Viénot, Ungewisses Deutschland; Hans Manfred Bock, “‘Connaître l'Allemagne 
et la reconnaître.’ Zu Entstehung und Zusammenhang der Deutschland-Analyse von Pierre Viénot 1922 bis 
1932,” Lendemains, no. 66 (1992): 27-48.  
 44 
dominated by right-wing values. He had volunteered for the war at age 17 and voted for 
the conservative Bloc National in 1919. Working in Morocco and traveling throughout 
much of Europe broadened Viénot’s perspective. Poincaré’s Rhineland policies and his 
invasion of the Ruhr frustrated him and turned him away from the French right. At the 
same time, however, he did not support Herriot’s Cartel des Gauches because of its 
attentisme [wait and see policy] in regard to the German question. Both official French 
policies dissatisfied Viénot as they did many members of the Komitee. He therefore, like 
much of the Komitee, chose to recast the terms of the debate from the geopolitical 
standpoint to the cultural, and in so doing actively pursue cooperation. 
 If Viénot, as the shaper of the Mayrisch Komitee, son-in-law of its founder, and 
long-time resident and analyst of Germany, was a natural candidate for the Berlin Office, 
his German counterpart in Paris was selected for entirely different reasons. Gustav 
Krukenberg,72 a well-connected war veteran like Viénot, stood out for his varied career, 
always in the service of someone eminent. He held a law degree, had belonged to the 
General Staff in the war, had been the secretary to the German Foreign Minister, and had 
worked for the National Confederation of German Industry [Reichsverband der 
Deutschen Industrie]. Both at the Foreign Ministry and the National Confederation of 
German Industry, Krukenberg had directly served future members of the Mayrisch 
Komitee. Until his nomination, he had neither lived nor worked in France; thus his 
qualifications were not knowledge of France and connections to it, but familiarity with 
the broader interests of Komitee members, well-connected German friends, and a discreet 
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personality.73 Krukenberg at least knew the French language, since he had earned his 
degree in Lausanne, and had experience working abroad—most recently in Amsterdam. 
The fox to Viénot’s hedgehog, Krukenberg was not deeply sensitive to the culture of the 
country under his watch as was his French counterpart.  
 Both Viénot and Krukenberg were veterans of the Great War.74 Both 
representatives’ battlefield service demonstrated their firm commitment to their 
respective homelands and was consistent with the experiences of many members. At the 
same time, though responsible for the daily administration of the committee, these two 
men were both younger and less prominent than their fellow members. If Viénot was the 
idealist and Krukenberg the realist, both tried to shape the group from the inside; the 
other members largely contributed to the committee by their communications with the 
outside. 
The Berlin and Paris offices, directed by Viénot and Krukenberg respectively, 
consisted of meeting spaces and libraries. The libraries contained the most important 
works on France in Germany, along with large collections of newspapers and magazines. 
In addition, the libraries housed an archive of press clippings. The Berlin library held 
about 400 volumes organized according to the following themes: France, Germany, “the 
Franco-German problem,” the war, and international issues (i.e. the League of Nations). 
The libraries evinced the group’s commitment to remain “above parties” through contents 
running the political gamut from pacifist Alain to Action Française founder Charles 
Maurras on the French side and from Prince Karl Anton Rohan of the European Cultural 
                                                          
73PA-AA DBP 702a. Bruhn to Rieth (31 Aug. 1926). 
 
74Viénot had been seriously wounded in the neck on the front. See the obituary by Jean Schlumberger, a 
fellow Mayrisch Komitee member. Jean Schlumberger, “Pierre Viénot (11 septembre 1944),” in Oeuvres, 
14-17.  
 
 46 
Union [Europäischer Kulturbund/ Fédération internationale des unions intellectuelles] to 
Hitler on the German side. The libraries’ commitment to diversity meant that they housed 
not only tracts in favor of Franco-German rapprochement, but also, for example, works 
by the prominent historian Jacques Bainville who turned anti-German polemic into an art 
form.  Readings covered politics, social movements, religion, science, art, the empire, 
and the economy of each nation. Moreover, the libraries possessed practical collections of 
guidebooks for those planning to travel abroad. Not surprisingly, the libraries contained 
many books by Mayrisch Komitee members such as Viénot, Wladimir d’Ormesson, and 
Régis de Vibraye as well as E. R. Curtius, Arnold Bergstraesser and Max Clauss. 75 
While the organization’s mission to the public was embodied by its distribution of 
information through its libraries and its work with the press, the Mayrisch Komitee 
retained a private sensibility when it came to its meetings. The semiannual meetings 
alternated among France, Germany, and Luxembourg and included all members. Before 
these plenary sessions, however, the French and German delegations would each gather 
in their respective capitals to discuss the agenda and address the national concerns of the 
larger group. Thus, even as it bridged the national divide, the Mayrisch Komitee in no 
way ignored national distinctions. Members deemed arbitration as beneficial to both 
parties but preferred to exchange points-of-view first within the confines of their own 
national faction before negotiating with the other side. Negotiation and dialogue, whether 
in the general assembly or at its soirees, was essential to the organization.  
The Komitee adhered to one of the fundamental principles of the post-Locarno 
push for Franco-German cooperation: reciprocity. Reciprocity ensured that each measure 
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toward entente taken in one country would be mirrored in form, content, and degree in 
the other; therefore, the group was careful to take parallel actions on either side of the 
Rhine. Its notions of balance were so rigorous that the group remarkably claimed that 
“both peoples face a common danger and bear the same responsibility.”76 By thus linking 
national interests with equal blame for the past, the Mayrisch Komitee wove together a 
blank past and a joint future for France and Germany. On this clean slate, the 
organization could draft a new balance sheet of settled accounts.  
In addition to an ideological reciprocity, the organization followed a balanced 
design. Yet the strict notions of reciprocity inherent in the structures of the Mayrisch 
Komitee—from the office locations in the two capitals, to the binational staff of each 
office, to the balanced membership roster—still occasionally threatened to be 
insufficient. As early as the May 1926 meeting, when a slew of German members were 
too ill to attend, the German Foreign Office made its fears known that the French might 
take control of the committee. Similarly, French members mistrusted the motives of the 
Germans; even dedicated member Wladimir d’Ormesson pointed out, 
The marked conciliatory intentions of France should not make our 
neighbors lose sight of the fact that the French—even those most 
convinced of the opportunity of Franco-German rapprochement—are not 
at all disposed to be the dupes of a politics that consists of transforming 
the sketch of a bilateral and fruitful peace into a unilateral bargaining chip 
to the profit of the German nationalists.77 
 
In general, members feared allegations that the Komitee was not in balance—that the 
actions in one country were stronger—and even felt the need to fend off accusations that 
                                                          
76PA-AA DBP 702b. “Deutsch-Französisches Studienkomitee. Zur gefl. Veröffentlichung.” (15 June 1931).  
 
77Wladimir d’Ormesson, Le Temps, “La crise allemande et la politique européenne,” 28 Dec. 1926. 
 
 48 
the employees were paid “with enemy money.”78 Thus, they assumed that the 
representatives in the Berlin and Paris offices would be taken for spies. 
The tentative nature of the Mayrisch Komitee surfaced in additional ways. 
Meetings were closed to the public, though some social events were open to those with 
invitations. On the one hand, this meant members could be more explicit at meetings than 
they would be before the public; on the other hand, it revealed the underlying fear that 
transparency would result in public condemnation. In addition, a 1927 proposal added 
guided discussions on particular themes to their sessions that already consisted of 
successful lectures. These point/counterpoint themes would be circulated before the 
meetings.79 By issuing advance notice for discussions, the group encouraged its members 
to think through what they were going to say and even research the topics at-hand. This 
new strategy buttressed the academic aspects of the Komitee, but it also revealed the 
fragile faith of its members that they could not get along without checks. It was a way to 
avoid spontaneous emotional outbursts and ensure a more controlled dialogue. 
Notwithstanding its guardedness, the Mayrisch Komitee created a specific 
network of people on both sides of the Rhine interested in cooperation through the 
regularity of its sessions and social events. By bringing together big business interests 
and intellectuals around the Franco-German question, the organization forged ties among 
those who would not otherwise share much common ground. In addition, by actively 
lobbying journalists, the Mayrisch Komitee incorporated some of these powerful voices 
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into the Franco-German network. Former Secretary of State Alfred von Nostitz-Wallwitz, 
the leader of the German half of the group, deemed “the personal element” the most 
important aspect of the Komitee’s work; according to him, interpersonal relationships 
fostered by the organization effectively began to counter the negative influence of the 
press.80 As will be demonstrated throughout the following chapters, the foundation 
created by the Mayrisch Komitee stayed in place through the 1940s and even into the 
1950s when a new generation began to build on the extant structures.  
 The Franco-German network around the Mayrisch Komitee would come to define 
a range of strategies in the effort toward cooperation for the coming years. While the 
Komitee did not actually arrange any formal student exchanges, it put forward the idea—
an unpopular one in the aftermath of war when official university exchanges were in 
hibernation.81 If such exchanges were not entirely new, they had been a phenomenon of 
the left, particularly among pacifist organizations. Members’ public, non-partisan 
endorsements of exchanges may have prepared the way for others to provide them as 
well. More centrally, the Mayrisch Komitee acted as a pressure group on the press to 
initiate the first, concerted anti-smear campaign of the enemy of old. In a further 
precedent, the Mayrisch Komitee established regular meetings and conferences on the 
Franco-German question. While religious and academic circles, for example, had held 
conventions with similar themes, these tended to be one-time or infrequent and they were 
truly worldwide in scope, such as those sponsored by Marc Sangnier. Moreover, such 
organizations dedicated themselves first and foremost to other goals within which 
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Franco-German cooperation could be subsumed. The Franco-German cause was not the 
raison d’être of any of these circles; thus, most actions in this arena had remained 
circumscribed and sporadic at best. In contrast, regular gatherings on the part of the 
Mayrisch Komitee created and helped sustain new, exclusively Franco-German channels 
of communication. 
 
A New Language of Understanding: Between Enlightenment and Self-Interest 
 In creating networks of people interested in entente and by defining strategies to 
work toward that understanding, the Mayrisch Komitee crafted, in embryonic form, a 
new discourse of cooperation. Though this matrix of ideas did not always cohere into a 
clear doctrine for the Komitee, it did furnish the beginnings of a new vocabulary and new 
positions by which future Franco-German mediators could orient themselves. Whether 
focusing on the economy, politics, or culture, that is to say, an emphasis on psychology 
and representation, committee members developed assorted arguments with which to 
bolster the cause of cooperation. Although this range of arenas for action deprived the 
group of an ideological center, it helped foster new alliances and spawn a breeding 
ground for new ideas. 
 Members considered their patriotism as a sine qua non of the group’s existence. 
At the heart of the organization’s credo lay the idea that Franco-German cooperation was 
in the national interest and transcended party differences. Even before the Mayrisch 
Komitee was launched, Viénot insisted that “above all the Franco-German problem 
requires a solution that appears on all sides to conform to the most pressing ‘national’ 
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interest, around which both men of the right and men of the left can rally.”82 This appeal 
to national sentiments aimed to bridge the sharp left/right division within each country. 
Furthermore, it highlighted the organization’s “realistic foundation in contrast to all the 
other similar works that pursue moral or philanthropic goals.”83 In large part, this 
declaration acted as a direct jab at the pacifist movement, but it also underscored 
members’ assurance that cooperation was essential for national security and 
advantageous to the national economy.   
 Although the Mayrisch Komitee did not recast the European economic situation, 
economic concerns lay at its heart. Economic interest existed both as a personal incentive 
to join and as a subset of the idea of working for the welfare of the nation. Members from 
big business adopted a position that bridged economic self-interest and an idealism that 
they could achieve what the government could not. For members, ensuring healthy 
relations with the neighboring state served alongside other forms of planning like 
rationalization and management-training to reinvigorate and modernize production and 
distribution to new markets.84   
 In this way, several French activists were expanding their sense of the need to 
revitalize the Third Republic through technocratic planning—a program they nurtured in 
the movement Redressement Français—to the broader European sphere. One year before 
the foundation of the Mayrisch Komitee, Ernest Mercier (1878-1955) had launched 
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Redressement Français, whose pragmatic, future-oriented doctrine had French 
modernization at heart. Mercier, along with several members of Redressement Français 
eagerly joined the Mayrisch Komitee with economic integration in mind.85 Indeed, the 
two groups overlapped in their appeal to elite experts to facilitate international stability. 
Redressement Français Member Etienne Fougère (1871-1944), founder of the 
International Silk Federation, president of the Association nationale d’expansion 
économique, parliamentarian for the Democratic Alliance, explained his position in his 
own journal L’Européen. “In the present state of things,” he wrote,  
the individualism of the European nations makes each of them a tributary 
of continents better favored by nature and whose social development has 
been greater. Let this individualism give way to the idea of entente and 
cooperation, and Europe will soon be seen to free itself from all financial 
and economic dependence and so become once more the pilot of human 
civilization.86  
 
For Fougère cooperation expressly stood for uniting European economic interests in the 
face of competition from the Soviet Union and the United States; it also involved a moral 
purpose. Cooperation thus represented a form of enlightened self-interest.  
 Émile Mayrisch melded a similar belief in the importance of economic self-
interest with a more cultural understanding of the Franco-German antagonism. 
Mayrisch’s faith in economic entente materialized with the Entente International de 
l’Acier, an accord among the top steel producers in France, Germany, Luxembourg, and 
Belgium ratified by Théodore Laurent, Ernst Poensgen, and Mayrisch, all members of the 
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Komitee.87 According to Mayrisch, international economic ententes served to unite all 
interests to bring about peace. He noted that international (by which he meant European) 
economic cartels “could reinforce and spread this confidence and constitute an important 
factor for peace and reconciliation. But it is also quite certain that a minimum of 
preliminary political confidence is necessary as a foundation for such pacts.”88 In the end, 
such resolve remained a matter of the imagination. A culture of confidence among 
producers—when trickled down to consumers, according to Mayrisch, could allay any 
short-term political exigencies. Thus, for the steel magnate, economics had the power to 
trump politics, but it was the imagination that drove the two. Just as with Viénot, trust 
and cooperation first had to be believed in by the public; economics alone would not 
resolve the Franco-German crisis. 
 If economic interests motivated many of the members, the main actions taken by 
the group lay in the cultural realm. Emphasizing the roles of psychology and 
representation as the root of the Franco-German problem, Viénot saw resolution only via 
new ways of thinking. As we have seen, Viénot’s vision called for the liberation from 
preconceptions whether based in stereotype or historical memory. For Viénot, it was a 
moral imperative “to leave the self” [sortir de soi] to achieve understanding.89 While he 
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accomplished this leaving of the self quite literally by living abroad, he was advocating in 
particular the temporary emancipation from the trappings of national identity. If this 
represented an unattainable goal, it was the path toward this ideal that mattered. 
 Leaving the self, according to Viénot, required first self-awareness and second a 
differentiated view of the other. He postulated that judgments about other nations 
typically said more about one’s own culture than about the reality of the other country.90 
Thus, it was essential to analyze the objective natures of each culture before coming to 
any conclusions. As such, Viénot described and dissected what he called the “national 
psychologies” of individual nations. While it was important to recognize these distinct 
identities, it was equally essential to imagine them as flexible. In this way, Viénot aimed 
to avoid the trap of stereotypes as well as the reifying concept of national character that 
locked nations into certain paths and excluded minority voices. Viénot, for example, was 
very careful to point out various internal divisions within Germany that demonstrated the 
existence of multiple Germanies: urban, rural, Catholic, Protestant, Bürger, worker, 
Socialist, Communist, National Socialist, and so forth.91 To this end, another member of 
the Komitee penned a travelogue of Germany that detailed his encounters with Germans 
from an array of parties, confessions, regions, professions, and generations.92 An 
awareness of diversity would thus help minimize stereotypes. 
Viénot’s theory involved acknowledging the existence of difference both within 
Germany and in comparison to Germany. Indeed, his notion of national psychologies 
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unequivocally highlighted national difference. For Viénot, it was more important to value 
national difference than to try to erase it.93 His motto in Morocco allegedly was: “Say 
different, but don’t say inferior.”94 This slogan similarly applied to his years on the 
Mayrisch Komitee. Coming to terms with difference could serve as the basis for a 
Franco-German understanding premised on the idea that the two cultures were 
complementary. Thus, Viénot pushed for comprehension and tolerance rather than 
assimilation into some larger European identity.  
 In arguing for French and German citizens to embrace national difference and 
leave the self, Viénot was advocating a psychological rapprochement between the two 
enemy peoples. This psychological rapprochement entailed a conscious untangling of 
preconceptions in order to prepare the two parties for dialogue. In the end, for Viénot, 
leaving the self entailed a complete change of perspective: a deliberate effort to step into 
the shoes of the Germans. He argued, “From what angle, then, are we to study Germany? 
From the German angle. More than any other people, the Germans examine and observe 
themselves. They have a morbid genius for national introspection. Let us follow them on 
this track.”95 In effect, this included imagining the Treaty of Versailles from the loser’s 
perspective and acknowledging the suffering of the Germans through the inflation; the 
onus of leaving the self fell to the victor. This radical idea thoroughly undermined the 
nationalist agenda of Poincaré and his followers.  
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 The intellectual kernel of the Mayrisch Komitee—which along with Viénot, 
included Félix de Vogüé, Wladimir d’Ormesson, and Jean Schlumberger96—often crafted 
careful articles on the importance of psychological rapprochement. D’Ormesson, a 
journalist and active member of the group, underscored the psychological underpinnings 
of the Franco-German antagonism. For him, damaging fantasies of the other nation were 
further exaggerated by images of the war.97 Thus, it was not so much experience, but 
memory filtered through propaganda that fostered enmity.  
The burden of memory lent a troubling cast to any future potential for Franco-
German cooperation. Pacifists, for example, aimed to bring the two nations closer by 
demonstrating their common interest in renouncing war. But for Mayrisch Komitee 
members, another basis for dialogue needed to be found to replace this loaded legacy of 
combat. According to Viénot, Franco-German rapprochement risked becoming an 
outmoded concept because its current form was based on the war experience. He pleaded, 
Inspired still, above all, by the memory of war, the politics of Franco-
German rapprochement only expresses at the current hour a confidence 
effort made by the two governments to combat the remains of the war 
psychosis in the two countries. It is clear that if it is to keep this negative 
character, it will quickly lose all value. We cannot forget that in ten years, 
men from twenty to forty years old will already belong to the generations 
that were not in the war. It thus appears to clairvoyant spirits that it is 
becoming urgent to give the politics of Franco-German rapprochement a 
more positive character.98 
  
                                                          
96Viénot sent these three men a copy of his recommendations to establish the Komitee so that he could get 
their approval before he forwarded it to other potential members. See Müller, “Pierre Viénot: Schöpfer,” 
24. 
 
97
“La Confiance en l’Allemagne,” La Revue d’Allemagne 1, No. 7 (1928): 664-665. 
 
98Pierre Viénot as quoted by the son of the Mayrisch Komitee treasurer Aloyse Meyer. See, Robert Meyer, 
“Colpach” in Centre de Recherches Européennes, Émile Mayrisch, 36. 
 
 57 
Germanist Henri Lichtenberger agreed that this emphasis on the past needed to be 
replaced with a focus on the future. He argued not only for moving beyond the legacy of 
war, but beyond historical judgment altogether. He explained, “I cannot see how a real 
improvement in Franco-German relations could be produced if you expect that before 
renewing intellectual cooperation the Germans recognize themselves as responsible for 
the war, or inversely that the French confess that the Treaty of Versailles was a crime 
against the rights of nations.” According to Lichtenberger, the two nations needed to steer 
away from big questions like respective guilt and instead address smaller, more practical 
issues. For him, the forging of scholarly contacts at an individual level and the exchange 
of publications—a transnational republic of letters—would gradually chip away at 
Franco-German grudges without risking going too far or too fast for public opinion. 99 
 Reticence on the part of Komitee members to go too far stemmed from fears of 
their efforts being deemed propaganda. German officials, for example, protested against 
Alfred Kerr and Thomas Mann speaking at the Sorbonne within the same month for fear 
of accusations of an invasion of German propaganda in the French capital.100 Ironically, 
the Komitee felt the need to tread very carefully to preclude being indicted as 
propaganda, when indoctrination was precisely what they aimed to combat. Régis de 
Vibraye, who joined the group in 1930, addressed the dilemma directly: “two errors are 
to be avoided. The first is to go too far and to envision solutions that could weaken our 
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country; the second is not to go far enough and to refuse reasonable and necessary 
solutions due to an excess of patriotic sensibilities.”101  
 Gustav Krukenberg advocated a particularly guarded approach. His distaste for 
words like “rapprochement” and “economic confederation” spoke to his doubts that, 
despite Locarno, much of the French and German publics were ready to let go the old 
prejudices. Although he noted with approbation that the Komitee treaded with care, 
Krukenberg worried that without adequate “factual and psychological preparation” of the 
populace, enthusiasts for cooperation might press their luck. Krukenberg’s anxieties on 
this count extended to his fears regarding the common shorthand (particularly among 
teachers) for the long-winded, yet carefully chosen official title of his group: 
“Verständigungskomitee” or “Comité de Rapprochement” [Understanding Committee or 
Committee for Rapprochement]. Both nicknames, he believed, could put the Komitee’s 
success in danger.102  
To invoke a positive basis for dialogue without imposing radical views or 
propaganda on the public, the Komitee championed objective reporting and unlimited 
information about the nation across the border. More accurate analysis of the other 
country would position the French and the Germans better toward cooperation. 
Krukenberg particularly emphasized the informational aspects of the committee, 
corresponding to its official name in French: Comité franco-allemand d’information et de 
documentation. The press would act as the main instrument for improved information, 
and the committee itself would document events and trends in each nation. As early as 
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the spring of 1926, at the organization’s general assembly meeting in Luxembourg, 
members already agreed that without better communications between the two nations, the 
promise of the Locarno treaties “threaten[ed] to remain illusory.”103 The main target 
would be public opinion. 
 The Komitee recognized the immense power of the press in the formation of 
public opinion in the modern age. Member Lucien Romier, the editor-in-chief of Figaro, 
explained in direct terms, “The press is no longer a little girl you put to sleep with songs 
and satisfy with a toy. It is a formidable industry that in certain countries disposes of an 
apparatus, personnel, capital . . . and means of penetration or pressure superior to any 
other industry.”104 For this reason, the Komitee considered the press a potential force for 
both good and evil, and it tried to harness it for good. D’Ormesson contended that the 
press had a “salutatory mission” but was plagued by the 
crushing responsibility . . . if one measures the consequences that the news 
can engender when it is erroneous, when information is tendentious, when 
only passion inflames campaigns, or when only interest finances them. 
The press is the daily intermediary by which nations communicate with 
one another, thanks to which they . . . get to know each other. It can be the 
great centrifugal force that draws people nearer but it also can just as 
easily constitute the principle obstacle to this rapprochement.105  
 
If it were to edify public opinion, the Komitee would have to woo the press.  
Expunging tabloid journalism, prejudice, and error from the press and replacing it 
with more generously-minded coverage proved a challenge. Even the well-meaning, who 
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were actively engaged in efforts toward Franco-German cooperation, could retain some 
biases or be misunderstood by readers. Jacques Seydoux, while a member of the 
committee, penned an article on disarmament that was interpreted as critical of Germany.  
Both Viénot and Krukenberg chastised him for publishing the article, so that Seydoux 
wrote a subsequent, more tempered article to clarify his argument, which he felt had been 
misinterpreted. Krukenberg mourned the fact that an ally’s work “add[ed] grist to the mill 
for those outside our committee who say that our efforts are wrong because the French 
side will never give Germany any rest.”106 Seydoux continued to print allegedly anti-
German articles, in particular for Le Parisien, and was thus eventually forced out of the 
Mayrisch Komitee for the sake of his “health.”107  Yet even once he left the Mayrisch 
Komitee, the Germans wished to keep him from turning to truly anti-German sentiments 
and especially from becoming a mouthpiece for such beliefs. 
 Another way the Komitee as a whole feared it would be damaged in the eyes of 
the public was by being associated with the three overlapping specters of “pacifism,” 
“internationalism,” and “Europe” (in the general sense of the two previous words). 
Members insisted that the agenda remain Franco-German but expressly not European.108 
A European program implied organized pacifism, which, to Mayrisch Komitee members, 
suggested illusory utopianism. By strictly drawing the line between their platform and the 
so-called “European” program, they hoped to stymie any accusations of utopianism. At 
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the same time, pacifism, internationalism, and Europe were concepts that the group found 
easier to dismiss outright than to challenge point-by-point.  
Although most members loudly voiced their opposition to pacifism, and many to 
a Europe-oriented platform, individual members adopted a range of positions in regard to 
Europe. As we have seen, the business contingent of the Komitee pursued the integration 
of European markets. Several members from the more intellectual cohort stressed that 
Europeans shared a common “Western” heritage. This loose faith in a shared Franco-
German language of Europeanness was particularly in evidence with the idea that the 
offices should be staffed by “French and German personnel used to speaking as it were 
the intellectual, sentimental, and moral language of the two countries.”109 In part because 
members brought different assumptions to bear in regard to Europe, and in part because 
“Europe” at that time was typically associated at the time with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
political vision, the Mayrisch Komitee tried to distance itself from such discussions. 
 
New Directions 
 From 1929-1933, the Mayrisch Komitee endured a series of ordeals. This topsy-
turvy period for the Komitee has often been mistaken as the prelude to its last breath. 
Instead, these years should be understood as the transitional era of the organization when 
the departure of several members and the enlistment of several others signaled a shift in 
the group’s outlook. 
 If the notion that the Mayrisch Komitee dissolved around 1930 is incorrect, that is 
not to say it thrived at that moment. Some have ascribed the end of the committee to 
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Mayrisch’s death in a car accident in 1928; according to this line, Mayrisch’s robust 
personality had held the group together and without him only descended into petty 
arguments.110 Certainly, his leadership was important to the group, but this argument 
underestimates the resilience of the committee’s ideology and the dedication of the group 
to its creed. The Mayrisch Komitee was more than the man after whom it was named.  
An extension of that argument, that Mayrisch’s neutrality as a Luxembourger lent 
a certain, necessary balance to the group is more convincing, especially in light of the 
internecine disputes a year after Mayrisch’s death. In the spring of 1929, the French half 
of the group virtually collapsed due to personality conflicts and financial strain. By June 
of that year, the French contingent actually voted for the closure of the offices 
altogether.111  To offset this decision, the French half concomitantly voted to broaden the 
committee membership. If conflicts split the group, no one wanted it to disappear 
completely. Mayrisch may have helped ease tensions either due to his character or his 
status as arbiter; his death indeed revealed tensions that had lain beneath the surface. The 
committee, however, was able to weather its storms without him.  
 When the French half of the committee voted to close the two offices, it acted on 
the idea that the necessary improvements in Franco-German relations had already been 
achieved.112 While the notion that cooperation had been attained seems almost ridiculous 
in hindsight, even then it was at best a questionable assumption. From the German 
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perspective, it certainly made little sense; France still occupied the Rhineland.113 
Moreover, even if relations had warmed between the two nations, cultural relations had 
barely resumed.  The international scientific community’s boycott of Germany persisted 
until 1926 and even then, Germans only reinserted themselves into the international 
scientific community by fits and starts, in part due to their own official counter-
boycott.114 Official visits by the cultural heroes of the day began with Thomas Mann’s 
famous visit to Paris in 1926, but even he earned a mixed reception at the Sorbonne by 
those who still understood the Germans to be the hereditary enemy. To anyone reading a 
newspaper, it would have been clear that there was still much distrust on the part of the 
French and the Germans toward each another. Finally, to dissolve the offices with the 
understanding that harmony had been achieved would belie the group’s long-term goals 
of safeguarding and reinforcing any détente.  
 Closing the offices in fact stemmed from financial strain and personality conflicts. 
Both offices were low on funds, and it was the French position of dissolving its office in 
Berlin that made the dissolution of the German office in Paris thinkable.115 Yet many in 
the Komitee wanted to save it. In response to the budget issues, Krukenberg offered to 
resign so that a cheaper replacement could be hired. Furthermore, the concurrent decision 
for a healthy extension of the membership list and a few minor amendments to the 
procedures demonstrate that the group anticipated its revitalization. In the end, the 
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committee voted to dissolve the two offices and replace them with a new center in Paris, 
named for Mayrisch and run by two secretaries-general. Although having only one office 
meant that the committee would sacrifice some of its reciprocity, the group chose Paris 
due to France’s centralization. Germans in France, they considered, always flocked to 
Paris—and in increasing numbers—whereas French visitors to Germany did not all share 
the same destination.116  Yet after all of the fuss about closing both offices to create a 
new, combined center in Paris, the committee returned to the old format, with the 
exception that the representatives swapped offices. Ultimately, the divisions about the 
office simply rehashed the original dispute over who should head each office. The 
tensions around 1929, therefore, were neither new nor particularly serious.    
 In May 1930, the Mayrisch Komitee did experience a shake-up, with three of its 
French members resigning (including the head of the French contingent, former 
Ambassador Charles Laurent) and nine new members added to the roster. At this 
juncture, the group began to lean toward a new agenda about Europe. Originally, as we 
have seen, Mayrisch Komitee members steered clear of the idea of Europe, largely 
because it reeked to them of pacifism. Yet, with the influx of new members in 1930, and 
an increasingly widespread interest in a federated Europe, the committee began “to 
consider these [Franco-German] problems in a European framework and put as its order 
of the day the question of re-organizing Europe on the economic and moral levels.”117  
By adjusting its scope from the Franco-German axis to the European sphere, the 
Mayrisch Komitee expanded its purview without altering its strategy.  
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Even as the Komitee opened the door to new members and new ideas on Europe, 
its course only changed subtly. Member Daniel Serruys gave a presentation on the 
economic foundations of the United States of Europe, an especially provocative topic in 
1930, after Briand’s proposal for a United States of Europe had been released; the 
previously skittish Mayrisch Komitee immediately formed a subcommittee to research 
the question.118 Nonetheless, Serruys himself considered a customs union utopian and 
pushed instead for gradual tariff reductions.119 The Komitee likewise did not 
wholeheartedly embrace European tendencies at this point; the 1930 assembly took place 
in Heidelberg, in part because it feared being associated with the Paneuropa Congress 
that was meeting simultaneously in Berlin.120 Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Paneuropa still 
remained too idealistic for them. 
 Some of the new members of the committee with European interests quickly 
obtained central positions. Two new secretaries-general joined the group in 1930; Max 
Clauss (1901-1988) replaced Pierre Viénot in Berlin, and Régis de Vibraye (b. 1882) 
took over the Paris office from Gustav Krukenberg. Clauss wrote regularly for the 
Europäische Revue and de Vibraye had just written a book on contemporary Germany. 
Both proponents of the “European” agenda, Clauss and de Vibraye would come to 
represent the new face of the Mayrisch Komitee in the coming years.  
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Max Clauss had befriended Viénot in 1925 Heidelberg, where Clauss studied 
under the sociologist Arnold Bergstraesser and Ernst Robert Curtius, both future Komitee 
members. Viénot had helped his German friend arrange a study trip to Paris, where 
Clauss worked at the École Normale under André Siegfried, yet another future member 
of the Komitee. Although Clauss did not join the Komitee until 1930, his avid interest in 
the Franco-German problem was evident in his capacity as secretary for the European 
Cultural Union and as a writer for its journal, the Europäische Revue. 121 Clauss likewise 
began participating in 1930 in the Franco-German youth movement, the Sohlbergkreis, to 
be discussed in Chapter 3. 
If Clauss had been a friend of Viénot, de Vibraye shared many of his intellectual 
interests. In Allemagne 1930, de Vibraye averred the importance of the “persistence of 
patries,” which fostered cultural diversity and creativity. For de Vibraye, nationalism 
expressed a shocking and egotistical defining of the self in opposition to or in ignorance 
of others. Patriotism, in contrast, represented a noble combination of reason and 
sentiment that respected the same in others and wished for peace.122 Like Viénot and 
other Komitee members, de Vibraye respected patriotism but considered nationalism to 
be based in ignorance. De Vibraye not only championed patriotism in France but in any 
nation or region. Cultural diversity, de Vibraye argued, was a fundamental human value 
and the basis for all progress. In blunt terms he explained,  
A humanity in which all members thought or felt the same would be closer 
to a tribe of Papuans than to humanity at the height of civilization. The 
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persistence of patries is an excellent factor of differentiation, thus of 
originality, and thus of personal and cultural development.123  
 
On the whole, this plea for diversity closely resembled Viénot’s convictions—with the 
exception that de Vibraye here fleetingly revealed his sense that some cultures could be 
superior to others. He would articulate this sentiment more directly a few years down the 
line.124 
In 1930, de Vibraye’s philosophy largely reflected that of Viénot. In parallel 
fashion, for example, de Vibraye boldly called upon his French readers “to make the 
effort to reason as if they were good German patriots, having experienced the war and its 
consequences.”125 Like Viénot, whose notion of leaving the self underscored national 
identity, de Vibraye championed empathy—an identity based on humanity as a whole. In 
addition, though de Vibraye called for peace, he, like Viénot and other Komitee 
members, saw himself as a realist, not a pacifist.126 Both peace and entente represented 
France’s interests and indeed those of Germany. Finally, de Vibraye similarly blamed the 
Franco-German antagonism on national psychologies: Germany was plagued by its sense 
of weakness, whereas France was haunted by “too much memory.”127 
Yet de Vibraye went a step further than Viénot by invoking the need for a 
federated Europe. Once the Franco-German axis was solidified, England, and eventually 
Central Europe, Scandinavia and the rest of Western Europe would join this political 
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entity.128 Not only did de Vibraye wish to promote a united Europe to further the cause of 
peace and security, but also to ensure a balance of powers within Europe. Reaching out to 
Germany represented a pragmatic strategy. He clarified, “Let us not be outrun; let us not 
allow present day Europe to center itself on Germany to our own detriment.”129 In other 
words, in 1930 de Vibraye imagined a peaceful, federated Europe dominated by none.  
Changes in the Mayrisch Komitee ensued not only from within but from without, 
in particular from the strengthening of the far right. By 1931, its German contingent 
leaned toward the right, as evidenced by its new focus on the Eastern borders and the 
customs union with Austria; this stance marked a shift from its earlier push for a customs 
union with France, Belgium, and Luxembourg.130 If the first concept of a customs union 
was rooted in a liberal notion of international free trade, the second incarnation bespoke a 
pan-German ethos. Both positions reflected the larger situation—the earlier resonance of 
Briandism and the subsequent predominance of nationalistic sentiments. That such a 
swing even infiltrated transnational spheres promoting greater understanding indicates 
the seismic shift underway in Europe. 
By 1932, the German Komitee representatives in Paris began keeping more 
copious notes on French policy and remitting them to the Foreign Office. This greater 
attention to local developments, not surprisingly, only increased once the Nazis gained 
power in Germany. The intensification of communications between the German Foreign 
Office and the German section of the Komitee reveals the increasing pressures the 
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German authorities placed on members.  In the initial transition after the Nazi seizure of 
power, however, the Mayrisch Komitee reduced its activities. To duck a backlash by the 
French, the organization opted for a brief period of hibernation, thereby temporarily 
avoiding being brought into the Nazi line [gleichgeschaltet].131 Furthermore, German 
members urged caution because they were convinced their correspondence was read by 
the French political police.132 Once relations between France and the new regime across 
the Rhine were more relaxed, the German Foreign Office figured the Mayrisch Komitee 
could be coordinated like other German associations.  
 Although the German section of the Mayrisch Komitee was neither immediately 
gleichgeschaltet nor flooded by new Nazi members, the group made some quiet, but 
fundamental changes. First, it made the decision, long in the works, to cease having a 
French representative based in Berlin. While this had long been under discussion for 
financial considerations, the timing of the decision clearly had more to do with the anti-
Nazi leanings of the current French representative, the student Paul Ravoux. The group 
opted not to replace Ravoux because it was shrinking its realm of activity. Instead, it 
decided to dispatch de Vibraye, a more accommodating French member, to Berlin more 
regularly. In effect, these changes signaled a subtle self-coordination with the new 
regime: with Ravoux sacked, the Berlin office’s activities would be greatly reduced while 
the Paris office would continue running. At this juncture, the Mayrisch Komitee’s 
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founding principle of reciprocity was utterly violated. The Germans could thus run a 
propaganda-like office in Paris with no such French bureau in Berlin to counterbalance it. 
 The French section did not vote for dissolution in 1933. Rather, the French 
members operated on the assumption that the Nazis were doomed to fall soon, though 
they differed on their explanations of why the Party’s dominance could not last.133 They 
carried on in the hopes of tempering Nazi aggression and reinforcing cordial relations 
between the two nations in the meantime. For some, this attentiste policy expressed a 
desire to avoid war at any cost.  De Vibraye, for example, who had encouraged a 
federated Europe with carefully balanced powers, began to yield on the question of 
reciprocity. His wish for peace and understanding, as iterated in Allemagne 1930 
increasingly placed the onus of rapprochement on the shoulders of the French. He wrote,  
Today the call for entente is made loudly [by Hitler] before the crowds. If 
we refuse contact, the German people will be justified in believing that it 
is we French, whether because of politics or the desire to keep Germany in 
its current state of weakness, who refuse to organize for peace.134   
 
Although de Vibraye acknowledged many faults of the Nazis, as early as 1934 he began 
to blame the French for German rearmament.135 In this way, he pushed his earlier idea to 
imagine the perspective of the German patriot to the extreme.    
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Looking Forward  
The Mayrisch Komitee created both an intellectual and organizational 
framework—exclusively dedicated to facilitating cooperation between France and 
Germany—on which future champions of cooperation would rely. Inspired by Locarno, 
with a defining mission to address the Franco-German “problem,” this private effort 
bolstered diplomatic initiatives. Civic activists had adopted a diplomatic function (though 
not always with official approbation). Though not alone on this path, Komitee members 
were among the most prominent to seek to bring the spirit of Locarno from the high halls 
of diplomacy to the often posh salons of industrial barons, intellectual elites, and media 
figures. In this way, they provided a legitimizing function for rapprochement as well as 
some of the conceptual tools with which to discuss it. 
Within the literature on Franco-German relations, the Mayrisch Komitee is often 
cursorily mentioned as one of several ephemeral organizations for Franco-German 
cooperation in the 1920s. By most accounts, which rely on an early study by Fernand 
L’Huillier, the Mayrisch Komitee faded away in 1933.136 Yet, as Ina Belitz has pointed 
out, the Komitee continued to exist until 1938.137 She explains the error made by many 
historians as due to sources that were unavailable to L’Huillier. Moreover, L’Huillier had 
excused himself for any gaps in research due to closed files and lack of time in 
Germany.138 For Belitz, the false periodization of the organization is simply an issue of 
“technical mistakes and inexactitudes”—problems to be resolved for the antiquarian.  
                                                          
136Fernand L’Huillier, Dialogues Franco-Allemands, 1925-1933 (Strasbourg: Publications de la Faculté des 
Lettres de l’Université de Strasbourg, 1971). See also Unteutsch, 38-39.  
 
137Ina Belitz, Befreundung mit dem Fremden, 187. 
 
138Curiously, a file exists in the same series in the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt as a few of the 
other files that L’Huillier seems to have examined that follows the Mayrisch Komitee into the late 1930s. 
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It is, however, essential to mark the Mayrisch Komitee’s existence well into the 
Nazi period because it sheds light on the choices made by each of its members. 
Moreover, this oversight has served to underestimate not only the longevity of the group 
and its ideas, but also to overlook the numerous connections between the Mayrisch 
Komitee and subsequent associations for Franco-German cooperation. Finally, the 
imbrication of the Komitee and Nazi-era groups reveals more than has previously been 
discussed about these later societies, namely the roots of the Comité France-Allemagne 
and the Nazi-era Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft. By examining the resonance of 
1920s ideas of cooperation into the late 1930s, we can trace the ways in which Locarno-
era mediators persisted in staking a claim for their beliefs despite the changed 
environment. In so doing, we can examine both how these mediators continued to exert 
an influence on Franco-German relations during the Nazi era, and how they were 
compelled to adapt their visions of cooperation to mesh with the new order. 
  The itineraries of Mayrisch Komitee members would diverge sharply over the 
course of the next decade, leading some toward Resistance and others toward Nazism. 
United around a vague belief in entente in the late 1920s, members adopted a multiplicity 
of stances toward cooperation once Germany became increasingly identified with the 
Nazis, and eventually became the occupier of France. Viénot, whose participation in the 
Mayrisch Komitee was waning as early as 1930, entered Parliament as a Socialist, then 
became part of Léon Blum’s cabinet, and ultimately served as a member of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Belitz likewise does not make use of this file. In addition, L’Huillier heavily relied on the private 
correspondence of Wladimir d’Ormesson whose participation in the Komitee dwindled during the 
Komitee’s transitional period. 
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Resistance.139 Ironically, Viénot entered Jean Giraudoux’s Propaganda Ministry at the 
start of the war, while Krukenberg worked for the German Propaganda Ministry; when 
push came to shove, these two men, who had spent several years combating propaganda, 
enlisted in the national cause. Krukenberg then reembarked on his military career, once 
again demonstrating an interest in France, as evidenced by his command of the 33rd 
Charlemagne Division of the SS. Most other members, however, would continue to 
participate in future associations for Franco-German cooperation; the names de Vibraye, 
Clauss, and Schlumberger, to name a few, will continue to surface through our narrative. 
                                                          
139Viénot died in London in 1944. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft 
 
 
 
I am persuaded that a Franco-German entente will be born spontaneously from reciprocal 
knowledge [connaissance] and that the most sure means by which to realize this is to 
express oneself in an entirely good faith.—Maurice Boucher140 
 
Reciprocity in the relations between the Germans and the French should not have as a 
goal the leveling of the national characteristics of each country so as to produce a Franco-
German unity brew from both cultures. Rather [it should] awaken the neighbor’s 
understanding of the other’s character through the protection of the national [volklichen] 
peculiarities of each country through the method of rational objectivity.—Otto 
Grautoff141 
 
 
As the Mayrisch Komitee battled against forces seeking to drive the wedge 
between France and Germany deeper, so too did it challenge a fellow organization for 
cooperation, the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft [DFG], launched on the heels of the 
Komitee’s foundation. If anything, the two organizations were more similar than 
different; therein lay the root of their rivalry.142 In fact, membership of the two 
organizations eventually overlapped. The Mayrisch Komitee feared the DFG would 
splinter the effort for understanding and thereby strengthen the already dominant 
nationalist cause. If the Gesellschaft in many ways reflected the means and aims of the 
                                                          
140PA-AA R70550 No. II Fr 5490. Maurice Boucher to Otto Grautoff (27 Nov. 1926). 
 
141Otto Grautoff, “Gegenseitigkeit der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen,” DFR 3, no. 5 (1930): 381. 
 
142See PA-AA R70550; R70551; R70552 in particular for a look at Grautoff’s long struggles against 
Mayrisch Komitee members, for funding and for “moral” support—both private and official. 
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Komitee, it also threatened its uniqueness and vulgarized the task of cooperation by 
opening it to the broader educated reading public. Both groups, moreover, clamored for 
the attention—and funds—of the French and German foreign ministries and of powerful 
private donors. Their fierce rivalry makes clear there was more than one approach to the 
question of cooperation at the beginning of the Locarno era.  
Like the Mayrisch Komitee, the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft took root 
thanks to the Spirit of Locarno. While the DFG similarly tapped into the surge of interest 
in cooperation born of Locarno, it channeled these energies into creating a better 
informed and more civically engaged public. Its more expansive view of who could (and 
should) effect rapprochement meant that it developed into a broad-based organization in a 
way the Mayrisch Komitee never would.  
The handiwork of art critic Otto Grautoff, the DFG developed into an active 
community of Germans interested in learning about France and the ways in which the 
two countries were similar or complemented each other. The DFG arranged talks by 
French and German intellectuals and artists, screened films, sponsored educational trips, 
managed student exchanges, and matched up young pen pals. With a focus on sociability 
as well as on knowledge, the association proved an active and ambitious forum for 
mutual understanding. Its associated journals, the Deutsch-Französische Rundschau 
(DFR) and the Revue d’Allemagne, reinforced and expanded this community by reaching 
out to a diverse binational readership of male and female teachers, lawyers, students, 
businessmen, and journalists.  
The larger DFG project involved a new form of diplomacy that, though it relied 
on traditional diplomatic channels and on national governments, bypassed the 
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conventions of diplomacy in favor of a less formal cross-border conversation. Like that of 
a diplomat, however, the organization’s perspective remained grounded in the national. It 
revolved around the concept of “understanding”: learning about the other culture while 
maintaining a strong connection with one’s own. DFG activists, like the more moderate 
elements of the Mayrisch Komitee, did not believe in shedding national identity or 
“leaving the self” as advocated by Viénot. Instead they opened the door to interaction and 
face-to-face contact with their neighbors, as equals. 
By trying to foster understanding, the DFG and its reviews took on an explicitly 
political function. To advocate understanding—even at the height of the Locarno era—
was itself profoundly political and surprisingly controversial. Key factions within the 
political leadership, the intellectual world, and the broader public viscerally opposed a 
Franco-German rapprochement of the Stresemann-Briand variety. DFG members, in this 
sense, became political and civic activists, eager to immerse others in the quest for 
cooperation. To dispute the usual rhetoric of antagonism in a seemingly neutral way, they 
adopted a strict stance of nonpartisanship. Both the DFG and its reviews brandished their 
nonpartisanship as a badge of honor, and the dispassionate tone and zeal for balance in 
the reviews underlined the organization’s refusal to take sides.  
If (French) academics, as Johann Chapoutot has convincingly argued, were trying 
to put the brakes on Briand and Stresemann’s attempts at rapprochement, DFG activists 
were seeking to accelerate the two Foreign Ministries’ progress. What is more, they 
hoped to lay out more lasting models of cooperation—structurally, by setting up cross-
border contacts, and conceptually, by recasting French and German ways of perceiving 
each other.     
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Origins 
In 1925, art historian Otto Grautoff (1876-1937) embarked upon his arduous 
crusade to create a German-language journal dedicated to the idea of “getting to know” 
the society and culture of contemporary France. A range of constraints—from the ever-
present need for funding and the corresponding need to please any patrons to the 
interventions of the foreign ministries in both countries—gradually shaped the project 
into a set of journals: the Deutsch-Französische Rundschau, a German-language review 
about France and the Revue d’Allemagne, a French-language review about Germany.  To 
oversee the German publication, Grautoff created an association, the Deutsch-
Französische Gesellschaft, that would eventually lie at the heart of his endeavor. Funded 
by membership dues and magazine sales—along with substantial contributions from the 
Foreign Offices of both countries and some wealthy German businessmen—the DFG and 
its affiliated structures never knew financial security, despite a financial committee 
headed by leading personalities of Germany’s big banks and businesses and its honorary 
committee consisting of a range of distinguished politicians and intellectuals, including 
Konrad Adenauer and Albert Einstein.143 
Initially, Grautoff imagined creating a German-language review to be entitled 
Frankreich: Monatshefte für das französische Geistesleben der Gegenwart [France: 
Monthly Review of Today’s French Intellectual Life] as a counterpart to the Revue 
Germanique, a French academic journal founded in 1905. The stroke of genius that 
elevated what was to be a fairly typical intellectual-literary review into a unique and 
                                                          
143Whereas the financial interests played an active role in the DFG, the members of the honorary committee 
did not seem to participate in the DFG’s decision-making process. Instead, they seem to have lent their 
names for prestige and some vague approval of the cause of Franco-German understanding. 
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vastly more ambitious two-pronged project came from the German Foreign Office’s press 
bureau.144 By encouraging Grautoff to think more broadly and develop a French-language 
review, German officials converted Grautoff’s cultural-educational project into one that 
would better serve the ends of the German state by promoting German culture abroad. 
Rayonnement culturel was not the exclusive domain of the French. Like German cultural 
institutes in Barcelona (1923) and Madrid (1925) as well as the DAAD (1926), a French-
language review could help spread Germany’s influence.145 And taken as a pair, the 
reviews would help, in the words of a Foreign Office representative, “lay the ground for 
Franco-German understanding,” a goal that reflected that Office’s own objectives of 
peacefully negotiating further revisions of Versailles and reclaiming equal footing with 
France.146  
Because of the recent turn toward diplomatic conciliation as embodied in 
Locarno, Grautoff had great expectations of the active support and participation of major 
politicos on both sides of the Rhine including Foreign Ministers Stresemann and Briand 
as well as Minister of War Paul Painlevé147 and Ambassador Leopold von Hoesch. 
Indeed, early drafts of his proposals sent to the German Foreign Ministry named these 
                                                          
144PA-AA R70550 No. II Fr 441126 Draft Prospectus of issue 1 “Frankreich: Monatshefte für das 
französische Geistesleben der Gegenwart” Juli 1926; PA-AA R70550 No. AA II Fr. 4309 “Aufzeichnung 
über den Plan einer Zeitschrift für Frankreich und Deutschlandstudium,”signed Schwendemann (21 Sept. 
1926). 
 
145The Paris branch of the DAAD did not open until 1930. Hans Manfred Bock, “Initiatives socio-
culturelles et contraintes politiques dans les relations universitaires entre la France et l’Allemagne dans 
l’Entre-Deux-Guerres,” Revue d’Allemagne et des Pays de Langue Allemande 34, no. 3 (2002): 299-300.  
 
146PA-AA R70550 No. II Fr.471526 Draft Letter AA to Grautoff (27 Oct. 1926).  
 
147Painlevé’s lack of involvement was subsequently underscored by his refusal to participate in a DFR poll 
about cultural exchange. According to his response published in the DFR, the Minister of War was honored 
to have been contacted, but had no time to respond. See “Deutsch-französischer Austausch,” DFR 1, no. 6 
(June 1928), 516-536. 
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politicians and other luminaries as board members before they had consented, much less 
been contacted about the creation of such an organization. Grautoff’s audacity, whether a 
misguided strategy by which to gain official support and the eventual adherence of 
leading lights or a simple act of overconfidence, did not go undetected. The German 
Foreign Office noticed his presumption, a characteristic that would haunt Grautoff’s 
relations with allies and rivals alike over the ensuing years (and which some attributed to 
his guile and others to his denseness).148 German officials in the Foreign Office in fact 
showed little enthusiasm for a new journal that would showcase France to the German 
public.     
 German officials, however, were excited about the prospect of a French-language 
review promoting German culture to the French public. In the hope of furthering the 
French-language review, the German Foreign Office sent Grautoff to France to enlist 
prominent Frenchmen in his project. Although Grautoff succeeded in gaining the support 
of the Quai d’Orsay along with the collaboration of a number of Germanists, those whom 
he met cautioned him on a number of fronts. All suggested he court conservatives rather 
than merely falling back upon the usual suspects. Instead of naming members of the 
Mayrisch Komitee, pacifists, socialists, or others predisposed to a project for French and 
German understanding, Radical Senator Anatole de Monzie recommended tapping 
                                                          
148The frequency of such incidents is rather baffling. Pierre Bertaux called him a “swindler” and a “crook” 
and otherwise criticized and mocked him in various letters to his parents. Representatives of the German 
Foreign Office noted his clumsiness, tactlessness, and lack of business acumen. French officials had similar 
complaints. Even Boucher considered him “hopeless.” See comments sprinkled throughout the diplomatic 
correspondence; Pierre Bertaux, Un normalien à Berlin. Lettres franco-allemandes (1927-1933), ed. Hans 
Manfred Bock, Gilbert Krebs, and Hansgerd Schulte (Asnières: PIA, 2001), 106, 131, 134, 209, 302-303; 
Béatrice Pellissier, “Un dialogue franco-allemand de l’entre deux-guerres: la Deutsch-Französische 
Rundschau (janvier 1928-juin 1933) et la Revue d'Allemagne (novembre 1927-décembre 1933)” (Ph.D. 
diss., Université de Paris IV-Paris Sorbonne, 1991-1992), 28-30. Historian Hans Manfred Bock, in contrast, 
has praised Grautoff for his “aplomb.” See Hans Manfred Bock, “Die Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft 
1926 bis 1934: Ein Beitrag zur Sozialgeschichte der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen der 
Zwischenkriegszeit,” Francia 17 no. 3 (1990): 65.  
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prominent nationalists like historian Jacques Bainville, a rabid Germanophobe associated 
with the Action française, the conservative writer and anti-Dreyfusard Paul Bourget, and 
philosopher Henri Bergson as well as the leading Jesuits of France.149 Such conservative 
nationalists would help the Revue d’Allemagne cast its net more widely. Their names, 
moreover, would in theory also lend credibility to the project of rapprochement and help 
reclaim the notion from the extreme left. Such a plan went unexecuted.    
  From Lille in the North to Bordeaux in the South, Germanists signed on to 
Grautoff’s project, even as they tried to temper Grautoff’s expectations. Readily pledging 
to participate, Germanist Henri Lichtenberger nonetheless warned Grautoff that the 
French did not tend to cultivate an interest in foreign peoples, German or otherwise. Most 
potential readers of the Revue d’Allemagne, he added, would gravitate to it out of “fear 
and curiosity” of Germany, a comment clearly geared toward moderating Grautoff’s 
hopes that interest would stem from more noble sentiments.150 Lichtenberger’s 
assessment reflected a larger pattern of interwar French culture, as seen, for example, in 
the study of the German language as a way to “know the enemy” rather than as a sign of 
admiration or a symbol of reconciliation.151 Indeed, the French academic community’s 
                                                          
149See PA-AA R70550 No. II Fr 5490 Bericht. Grautoff to AA (Stamped 17 Dec. 1926). Bergson was not 
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150PA-AA R70550 No. II Fr 5490 Bericht. Grautoff to AA (Stamped 17 Dec. 1926). 
 
151On learning the German language during the interwar period, see Corine Defrance, “Le Centre d’Études 
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marked hostility toward Germany meant that Grautoff’s enlistment of so many 
Germanists to his project marked quite a coup.152 
 Lichtenberger’s circumspection notwithstanding, Grautoff managed to lay the 
basis for the French review by landing editors, a publisher, and prospective donors in the 
space of a few weeks. Oswald Hesnard, who had participated in the major diplomatic 
summits of the 1920s at Briand’s side, heard about the project and contacted Grautoff to 
commend him for advancing the work of Stresemann and his own mentor Briand. He 
explained to Grautoff: “You are, without a doubt, convinced like me, that the economic 
accords that are talked about so much—and talked about so much with good reason—
whether of potash, steel, chemicals, or textiles—can only create an ‘atmosphere’ between 
our two countries if the representatives of the mind [Esprit] bring the incomparable 
weight of their authority and their irreplaceable support to the work of 
rapprochement.”153 The French Foreign Ministry likewise saw an ally in Grautoff. When 
publisher Georges Crès backed out, the Quai d’Orsay quickly helped find a substitute in 
Emile Paul.  The Revue franco-allemand, more aptly renamed the Revue d’Allemagne 
before its first issue in November 1927, appeared at a time when the fate of its German 
twin was still in question. 
 Whereas Grautoff helped launch the Revue d’Allemagne in France without major 
incident, he met strong resistance in Germany to the Rundschau from an unlikely source. 
Initial opposition came not from ardent nationalists but rather from the very groups 
Grautoff was tapping for financial support: those individuals who had recently expressed 
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153PA-AA R70550 No. II Fr 4605. O. Hesnard to Grautoff (15 Oct. 1926). 
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interest in the Franco-German problem by enlisting in the Mayrisch Komitee. While 
Mayrisch Komitee members Lichtenberger and Ernst Robert Curtius, the esteemed 
scholar of French literature, agreed to join the editorial boards, their encouragement 
proved the exception rather than the rule.154 Most of the Komitee—above all the 
constituents from big business—actively obstructed Grautoff’s efforts. Grautoff claimed 
to have seen a note—sent from the Mayrisch Komitee address to German authorities and 
signed by a certain “Dr. K.,” presumably Gustav Krukenberg—that denounced his 
nascent organization as a Communist cell.155 It is, in any case, clear from internal 
Mayrisch Komitee reports that Krukenberg convinced German members of his 
organization to refrain from helping the DFG and to block its expansion whenever 
possible. Soon thereafter, the German and French halves of the Mayrisch Komitee 
together decided in a closed meeting that promoting the DFG did not lie in their 
interest.156 For the next few years, the Mayrisch Komitee would use its considerable 
prestige and influence to try to undermine the DFG’s relations with the German 
administration and to alienate its prospective donors.  
 German officials hesitated to give their full support to the Rundschau, though they 
were bound to the larger project by the strictures of reciprocity. Reciprocity had 
informally governed Franco-German cultural politics since Locarno; it implied a 
partnership of equals, relative openness, and shared political risk. A pledge of support to 
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the DFG from the French—both financial and “moral”—was contingent upon a 
comparable guarantee from the Germans. German officials expected the same from the 
French before they would make a declaration in favor of Grautoff’s project. Therefore, 
Grautoff was caught in an impasse. A series of negotiations between Grautoff and the 
two governments took the better part of a year.   
 Yet even as Grautoff was stranded in the post-Locarno game of reciprocity, the 
rules of reciprocity gave him a slight edge over the two governments.  At times, Grautoff 
used this to his advantage. He reminded German officials of their “European duty” to 
contribute a share equal to that provided by the French. It would, he feared, lead to “a 
highly painful political effect” were he to tell the French Foreign Ministry that Germany 
was not interested in participating.157 Failure to meet the French half-way, Grautoff 
warned German officials, could lead to dangerous repercussions. There was no need to 
spell out these possibilities. Grautoff used a similar bargaining strategy the following 
year when the Rundschau needed additional funds to stay afloat. If the Rundschau sank, it 
would drag down its French corollary with it. Grautoff therefore asked the German 
Foreign Office to drum up donations from representatives of some of Germany’s 
foremost businesses—Deutsche Bank, Knorr-Bremse, Dresdener Bank—or, with the 
disappearance of the Rundschau, risk feeding France’s “mistrust toward Germany” and 
“strengthen[ing] all hostile tendencies anew.”158  
 Reciprocity also had a bearing on the internal structure of the DFG and its 
reviews. The logic of balance, for example, compelled Maurice Boucher, the chief editor 
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of the Revue d’Allemagne, to serve on the editorial board of the Rundschau, just as his 
DFR counterpart Otto Grautoff sat on the editorial board of the Revue; in this way, they 
could respectively safeguard French and German interests.159 Each review, moreover, 
published contributions from French and German authors. The reviews, both monthlies, 
were to address similar themes and maintain similar print-runs.  
 The notion of balance became such an integral part of the DFG that it quickly 
began to color its self-image. Only a few months after the DFG’s foundation, DFG 
General Secretary, Rundschau editor, and editor-in-chief of the news agency Wolffs 
Telegraphisches Büro Edgar Stern-Rubarth explained that the initiative for the DFG came 
“at the same time from Paris and Berlin.”160 Stern-Rubarth’s romanticization of the DFG 
origins, which could have been more fittingly idealized as the uphill battle of the lonely 
(German) pioneer, fostered a sense of the simultaneous and equivalent desires of the two 
nations for rapprochement. It also stressed to the DFR’s German readers that the French, 
under the sway of Briand, were equally committed to the project of understanding.  
  Although the notion of reciprocity governed Grautoff’s project, in practice, its 
strictures were not fulfilled. If the two journals did not “resemble each other like eggs,” 
that was never the editors’ intention.161 More significantly, the two Foreign Offices 
constantly questioned the legitimacy of the twinned journals, the Deutsch-Französische 
Rundschau and the Revue d’Allemagne, precisely because they were not in true balance. 
Complications regularly ensued when one country learned its subsidies outweighed those 
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160Edgar Stern-Rubarth, “Chronik: Die Verständigungsorganisationen in Frankreich,” DFR 1, no. 4 (1928): 
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of the other. Worse still, the German review was affiliated with the DFG, whereas the 
French review had no parallel association to advocate for Germany. Insisting on true 
reciprocity, the German Foreign Office threatened to cut funds to the Rundschau 
altogether unless its French counterpart immediately developed a Franco-German 
Society. Yet, even when the Revue d’Allemagne began to list its affiliation to the already 
extant Ligues d’Études Germaniques, the official German response was that reciprocity 
had not been achieved. The associations in each nation had to be founded at the same 
time, with the same structure and goals, and a similar caliber of members to attain 
reciprocity—and thus be entitled to support from the German government. After all, why 
should the German government assist an organization that promoted France, unless there 
were a corresponding group that championed Germany to the French? 
  Once the first issue of the Deutsch-Französische Rundschau appeared in January 
1928—astonishingly only two months after the first issue of the Revue d’Allemagne—the 
two journals settled into an easy rhythm, appearing once a month largely without 
incident. These first years corresponded to the apogee of the Locarno era,162 by which 
time the notion of rapprochement had become acceptable in broader circles. In 1928, 
even Raymond Poincaré played the part of a long-time rapprochement devotee, twice 
repudiating German war guilt, purporting that an aggressive cabinet had forced his hand 
in the Ruhr, and boasting that he personally had conceived the 1926 Briand-Stresemann 
meeting at Thoiry.163   
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The New Diplomats 
In France, it was common to refer to the two Germanies—a militaristic, 
bureaucratic “Prussian” Germany of Bismarck and the Romantic, musical, “good” 
Germany of Schiller. This genre of dualism was matched in Germany by the tensions 
between imagining the France of “liberté, egalité, fraternité” and the France of 
superficiality, immorality, decay. During the First World War, Grautoff readily 
subscribed to this dualistic view of France. Ina Belitz has contended that, rather than 
looking to his personal experiences across almost a decade’s residence in prewar Paris, 
Grautoff fell back upon clichés about France he had gleaned from art and literature. His 
1915 article “Das Doppelantlitz Frankreichs” [“The Two Faces of France”] blamed 
revanchist France for the war. Grautoff would prove to be a fervent German patriot, a 
“Liberal-national,” and allied with “bourgeois center-right party” sensibilities.164 Yet he 
dedicated his career to studying France. His views toward that country were ambivalent 
and in flux.  
Grautoff’s relations with France stretched back to the beginning of his career as 
an art critic. In fact, he preferred to trace his French connection back even further, to his 
mother’s Huguenot ancestors. Born in 1876 to a Protestant family in the northern city of 
Lübeck and named after Bismarck, Grautoff was, however, firmly ensconced in the 
German Bildungsbürgertum. Though he initially followed in his father’s footsteps to 
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apprentice as a bookseller, with the encouragement of his closest childhood friend 
Thomas Mann, Grautoff shifted gears and began to study art history in Munich, then 
Paris. As an art historian and critic, Grautoff focused on French Classicism, namely 
Poussin, but he also wrote the first German monograph on Rodin as well as books on 
Impressionism, Lübeck, and the Munich art scene. In concert with Frantz Jourdain, he 
organized a Bavarian arts-and-crafts component to the French Salon d’Automne of 1910, 
an instance of French-German cooperation on an organizational level but also noteworthy 
for placing German crafts on par with French paintings.165 In Paris, Grautoff and his wife 
Erna ran a salon for many years, attended by the likes of Apollinaire, Jean Jaurès, and 
Stefan Zweig. Erna, with the help of her husband, translated pacifist writer (and Nobel 
laureate) Romain Rolland’s vast oeuvre, including his 10-volume novel cycle Jean-
Christophe; Rolland, too, frequented the Grautoff salon.   
Grautoff’s intimate connections with France and the French proved useful, but at 
times placed him in a suspicious light both in France and in Germany. In 1914, Grautoff 
closed the doors to his salon, left Paris, and contacted the German Foreign Office to 
volunteer his services as a potential informant. Shortly thereafter, he began to work for 
the Zentralstelle Auslandsdienst, a new office in Berlin devoted to war propaganda; his 
duties over the course of the war included reporting on the influence of the Pan-German 
League in France, translation work, censorship, and propagandizing. In a public relations 
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capacity, Grautoff addressed French grievances about damage to their cultural patrimony, 
and, as the war drew to a close, he looked for ways to keep German art from the hands of 
the Allies.166 In the immediate aftermath of the war, Grautoff found himself mistrusted on 
both sides of the border. Shunned by the French for his propagandizing, yet considered 
too close to the French for German comfort, the art historian withdrew into a quieter, 
more isolated lifestyle and distanced himself from both French and German intellectuals 
of his acquaintance. But he continued to put pen to paper, writing Zur Psychologie 
Frankreichs (1922) and Die Maske und das Gesicht Frankreichs in Denken, Kunst, und 
Dichtung (1923) as well as numerous essays and articles, before he embarked on the 
project that would shape the rest of his life. 
 Years later, Grautoff identified a moment in 1920—when he returned to Paris to 
collect his belongings from the apartment he had left so hurriedly at the start of war—as 
his epiphany. Both local authorities and his former neighbors took him for a spy; that 
evening, in frustration at his inability to pick up his Parisian life where he had left it off, 
Grautoff vowed to work for French-German understanding.167 His resolution seems to 
have remained latent for several years. Aside from trying to renew some old contacts, he 
took no concrete steps until 1924 when cooperation with France had become less 
controversial. It was not until Locarno or thereabouts that Grautoff’s conversion became 
apparent.      
By around 1925, Grautoff’s attraction to things French transformed into a full-
blown obsession with French-German cooperation. According to his wife Erna, Grautoff 
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passed his DFG years with “no personal life . . . no relaxation . . . no Sundays, no family 
life.” Daughter Christiane, whom they sent to reform school, agreed wholeheartedly, so 
much that she later painted a picture of emotional neglect. Her father, “at once friendly 
and curt” to his three children, was always busy “writing books, writing and giving talks” 
and otherwise furthering the DFG. Her parents only visited her a couple of times once 
they had her institutionalized for alleged petty theft. Erna put a more positive spin on her 
husband’s single-minded devotion: “. . . the DFG is identical with the labor, the energy, 
the tenacity of its founder and leader. They cannot be separated.”168 But if the DFG owed 
both its existence and its survival to Grautoff, surely others would have objected to 
calling it his enterprise alone. 
Maurice Boucher (1885-1977), almost a decade younger than Grautoff, was 
serving as music editor for the Parisian daily L’Avenir, teaching at the lycées Chaptal and 
Louis-le-Grand, and working toward his doctorate in German literature when he was 
tapped for the editorship of the Revue d’Allemagne. Henri Lichtenberger, Boucher’s 
adviser at the Sorbonne, recommended him for the position. Grautoff proceeded to court 
Boucher for his linguistic skills and knowledge of Germany; he found him “active, 
reliable, earnest, and independent.” A product of France’s finest schools (the lycées 
Janson-de-Sailly, Henri IV, and Louis-le-Grand as well as the École Normale), Boucher 
possessed an impeccable background. His diverse interests—he was trained in both 
German and law and was an amateur composer and violinist—would, moreover, serve a 
cultural journal well. Upon Lichtenberger’s retirement in 1935, both Boucher and 
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Germanist Edmond Vermeil, an occasional contributor to the Revue and member of the 
Mayrisch Komitee, joined the faculty at the Sorbonne.169  
Like Grautoff, Boucher had a complicated relationship with the nation he studied. 
His father, General Arthur Boucher, had penned pamphlets on the pre-war Franco-
German antagonism and against German nationalism; during the war, the General 
continued this genre of writing with a booklet on the French war effort. Like his father, 
the younger Boucher served heroically in the war; he was wounded four times by 
Germans. After the war, Boucher worked for the Mission Nollet, the Inter-Allied Military 
Control Commission to disarm Germany, first in Berlin and then in the Ruhr. Grautoff 
depicted his French colleague as a mirror image of his ideal self: Boucher was “no 
sentimental pacifist, no conscientious objector on principle, but a Frenchman who is 
deeply anchored in his nation, who wants to see the greatness of France safeguarded, who 
carries in himself much Latindom, yet for all that, a Germanist who profoundly feels the 
Franco-German problem in itself and for his country to its fullest extent, to its deepest 
depth, in its labyrinthine confusion.”170 
Boucher’s credentials proved controversial. German officials raised a number of 
objections against Boucher’s candidacy, all revolving around his stint in the disarmament 
commission. They feared above all that Germans would associate him with the Rhenish 
separatist movement. Such qualms about Boucher did not solely come from Germany. 
The French board of the Institut Français de Berlin later passed over Boucher’s 1932 
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candidacy for the directorship for fear that Germans, remembering Boucher’s 
involvement in the Occupation of the Ruhr, would assume the elite academic research 
institute had a political, indeed propagandistic agenda.171 In the end, Boucher was 
approved to lead the Revue d’Allemagne because of Grautoff’s advocacy, because his 
links to the separatist movement were tenuous at best, because it was too late to find a 
replacement of his caliber, and because French officials made clear that they could just as 
easily object to Grautoff’s history with the Zentralstelle Auslandsdienst.172  
 Although Grautoff did not hesitate to appoint Boucher as editor of the Revue 
d’Allemagne, their friendship seems never to have gotten off the ground. Indeed, their 
relationship is perhaps best characterized by its conspicuous lack of communication. 
Boucher’s letters often went unanswered for months, even when he made clear how 
urgently he needed Grautoff’s answer on a matter of business.173 Their infrequent 
contacts kept them from developing joint strategies by which to further their project and 
to raise much needed funds. Grautoff’s silence ensured the bonds between Paris and 
Berlin remained weak; moreover it belied the organization’s mandate to unite the French 
and the Germans into one “working community.” Instead, it reinforced the national 
orientation of the journals. For his part, Grautoff ultimately blamed the French editorial 
staff—namely Boucher—and its lack of “courage” and “organizational abilities” for the 
                                                          
171AN AJ16 6945. Comité de l’Institut Français de Berlin. Séance du 10 novembre 1932. 
 
172PA-AA R70551 Telegram 682 Bülow to Paris (21 June 1927); PA-AA No. AA II Fr 2925 Kühn to AA 
(12 July 1927). 
 
173For one example see, PA-AA R70552 Abschrift from Boucher and Emile Paul to Grautoff (3 Oct. 1928), 
telegram from Emile Paul and Boucher to Grautoff (11 Nov. 1928), Kuhn to Bassenheim (23 Nov. 1928). 
 92 
failure to erect a French associational counterpart to the DFG.174 But as we will see, 
Boucher, like Grautoff, would spend the rest of his career studying and trying to effect an 
understanding with the nation across the Rhine. 
  
The Reviews 
Covering classic and contemporary French literature, philosophy, music, art, 
politics, and the economy as well as Franco-German relations, the Deutsch-Französische 
Rundschau aimed to “avoid sentimental pacifism” in favor of pursuing “mutual 
enlightenment and rational understanding.”175 An announcements section in each issue of 
the DFR illuminated the many connections between France and Germany springing up 
from community to community, person to person. These announcements not only listed 
items of importance to the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, such as donations and new 
members, but also extended to a much broader range of French-German points of contact. 
These ranged from exhibitions and exchanges to more symbolic triumphs, such as 
Oleander, the first German horse to race at Longchamps since the war.176 In this sense, 
the Rundschau served as a clearinghouse for the myriad, often ephemeral, Franco-
German initiatives after Locarno. 
The DFR’s French-language counterpart, the Revue d’Allemagne aimed to spread 
and deepen knowledge about contemporary Germany to its French readership. From its 
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first issue in 1927, the editors of the Revue d’Allemagne proclaimed they were neither 
conformists nor swayed by high politics. By not overtly aligning themselves with 
rapprochement politics or party politics more generally, the editors established their 
independence and credibility in three principal ways. First, the journal’s neutrality 
implied that it was scientific and unbiased; however, at the same time, the Revue 
d’Allemagne provided an alternative to the academic, less accessible Revue Germanique. 
Second, it appealed to readers of all political and social backgrounds who might hold an 
interest in Germany, whether from hatred or fascination or pacifist tendencies. In similar 
fashion, it attracted contributing writers from an array of political stances. Finally, it 
seemed to be about culture, a potentially less divisive subject than politics. In this way, 
the Revue d’Allemagne created a lieu de rapprochement—a space in which Franco-
German relations could be negotiated and a certain idea of Germany (or even multiple 
visions of Germany) mapped out for French readers, just as the DFR did for its German 
audience with regard to France.  
 Although the Deutsch-Französische Rundschau and the Revue d’Allemagne by 
and large operated independently of each other, with separate budgets, distinct if 
overlapping editorial boards, and different publishers, they maintained a similar scope. 
Both, moreover, emphasized contemporary issues. They rarely, however, published the 
same articles, and when they did, these generally were on Franco-German relations per 
se.177 Slightly more often, articles on the same theme appeared in each journal, but 
regarding the particular national context, such as “Le Sport en Allemagne” (Revue 
d’Allemagne Feb. & March 1928) and “Sport in Frankreich” (DFR March 1928)—both, 
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in this case, by Marcel Berger. Unlike the Rundschau, which reported on the doings of 
the DFG, as well as other Franco-German exchanges and conferences at some length, the 
Revue d’Allemagne devoted little attention to Franco-German gatherings. If the Revue 
sometimes listed events, it provided few articles on the sociability aspects of Franco-
German relations. And, as Béatrice Pellissier has charted, the Revue d’Allemagne paid far 
more attention to literature than did the Rundschau, which favored articles on 
“civilization” instead. 
The reviews relied upon a variety of authors and perspectives for content; only a 
fraction served as regular contributors.178 Contributors ranged from celebrated authors—
Colette and Paul Valéry, Thomas Mann and Alfred Döblin—to publishers, artists, 
journalists, and educators. There were travelogues and theater reviews, economic reports 
and political chronicles, even the rare article on sports. Rather generously, the reviews 
published Mayrisch Komitee accounts of their latest meetings, despite the fact that the 
Komitee had cast the DFG as a rival and interloper. The two reviews’ sheer volume—
thousands upon thousands of pages each over more than half a decade—attests to their 
ambition as well as to a certain exuberance. Their heft announced the import of their 
project to skeptics who considered cultural relations frivolous. To dedicated readers, their 
comprehensiveness provided a creditable guide to the neighboring land.  
It would be impossible to pinpoint one political outlook for either of the reviews. 
Because of their structure as forums, the two reviews presented remarkably diverse 
portrayals of French and German culture and society. Indeed, an early proposal for the 
Revue contended that the quantity of contributions mattered more than their quality; the 
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more perspectives, the more exact impression of contemporary Germany French readers 
could glean from the review.179 Although the journals avoided blanket condemnations 
and generalizations, their articles varied widely in tone from gloomy assessments of the 
political situation to unfailingly sunny reports. And, with articles like “Germany—France 
as Gastronomic Problem,” the journals revealed a sense of humor about the challenges of 
rapprochement.      
Because new members of the DFG were printed in nearly every issue of the DFR 
and membership in the association included a subscription to the Rundschau, we have a 
clear sense of who received the journal. Almost 3000 readers subscribed. Some had clear 
professional ties to France, or, like Mayrisch Komitee member Max Clauss, demonstrated 
their interest in France in other ways. A stolidly middle class membership—largely 
lawyers, educators, doctors, and businessmen—comprised the DFG roster. Hans Manfred 
Bock has determined that 17.2% came from “intellectual professions” such as education, 
journalism, and the arts; 16.3% held administrative positions in the public sector such as 
law and diplomacy; and 12.8% were in business.180  
Unlike the purely male domain of the Mayrisch Komitee, the broader base of the 
DFG incorporated women, who represented approximately one quarter of its total 
membership. Some, like teacher Josy Schäfer, spearheaded projects that operated under 
the purview of the DFG, such as Schäfer’s youth program based in Nuremberg. Similarly 
Hélène Leroi, a French women’s rights activist residing in Heidelberg, belonged to the 
DFG and also headed an exchange program. Others included women from prominent 
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families like Frau Maximilian von Harden, Frau von Falkenhayn, Frau Minister Koester, 
and Frau Else Rathenau. All told, the DFG ranked over 700 women among its 2775 total 
members.181 
Subscribers to the Rundschau were scattered throughout Germany, although over 
half (1610) were concentrated in Berlin alone. Successful DFG branches in Frankfurt, 
Stuttgart, Breslau, Mannheim, and Nuremberg ensured sizeable local readerships in each 
of these cities. Hamburg, Cologne, and Leipzig saw more modest figures, while Munich 
was home to a mere 10 subscribers. Indeed, aside from Nuremberg’s 57 members, 
Bavaria represented only a small slice of the DFR’s readership.182 In contrast, a high 
concentration of readers hailed from the border regions near France. Whereas 178 
subscribers (including 130 from Stuttgart) hailed from the region of Württemberg and 
122 from Baden (including 77 from Mannheim), only seven came from the Palatinate and 
five from the Saar. These trifling figures mirrored those in the most distant reaches of 
Germany from France, in Upper Silesia (4), West Prussia (3), and East Prussia (4), where 
locals tended to fix their attention on other, nearer borders. Along the French border, 
many (76) even came from the various Allied occupied zones of the Rhineland—along 
with 21 from the recently French-occupied Ruhr. Subscribers also came from abroad, 
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with 58 in France and 20 in Austria, small numbers trickling in from Switzerland to 
Czechoslovakia, and even one lone reader in Siam.183   
The lack of a corresponding French association, the constant sore spot of both the 
DFG and German officialdom, has left us with little record of who specifically read the 
Revue d’Allemagne. After its first year, Lichtenberger reported that the Revue had 
approximately 300 subscribers and sent newsstands and bookstores an additional 600 
copies each month to put up for sale. One thousand copies—thus 100 more than the 
highest possible number of paying French readers—were shipped to Germany for 
distribution.184 Such low numbers—especially relative to the number of readers of the 
Rundschau—suggest, above all, the impact of an association on subscription levels. But 
they also point to a larger, longstanding pattern: a traditionally greater awareness of and 
appreciation for French culture among the Bildungsbürgertum than for German culture 
within educated French circles.185 To be sure, the Rundschau only expected to have 850 
subscribers by the end of its first year.186 But the Revue continued to have fewer readers 
in France than did the Rundschau in Germany. Each journal was able to maintain a print 
run of around 3000. Additional copies of the Revue were sent to libraries throughout 
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Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas, sometimes unsolicited.187 A German consul 
in Bordeaux could summon to mind only two potential readers of the Revue d’Allemagne 
in town: a professor of German literature—Robert Pitrou, who had recently contributed a 
short piece to the Rundschau—and an attorney-general at the court of appeals.188 In 
contrast, German officials remarked upon the ubiquity of the Revue d’Allemagne in 
kiosks and bookstores in Paris, where the Deutsch-Französische Rundschau could hardly 
be found and was overpriced to boot.189  
The best articles (and DFG talks) not only proved informative but also, perhaps 
more importantly, modeled a set of conceptual tools with which to study or come to terms 
with the nation across the Rhine. The reviews, in this sense, criticized popular culture by 
setting an example of prose that was concrete and straining to be devoid of bias, that 
neither pandered nor condemned, that never resorted to simple Francophilia or 
Germanophilia, much less Francophobia or Germanophobia. Most typically, the journals 
relied upon plain reportage and dry analysis as a means to get at the “truth” of the other 
nation. Some articles more generously addressed the most positive aspects of the other 
culture. Two of the more subtle approaches, dismantling stereotypes and audience-
flattery, deserve a closer look.  
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The overall content of the journals, Grautoff contended, served to undermine 
stereotypes. He explained how this strategy functioned in the Rundschau: “We would like 
to lay out the French reality against the prejudices that still persist in Germany. They say 
that France is a decadent country. You will see in this review examples of French 
idealism and heroism.” In similar fashion, he invoked articles on transportation networks 
and department stores that challenged the stereotype of French “incapability of being 
organizers” and articles on family life that countered the notion of France as 
“libertine.”190 At the inaugural festivities for the DFG branch in Stuttgart, Henri Jourdan, 
soon to be named the director of the Institut Français de Berlin, deployed a similar 
strategy by describing the typical French woman, not as a cigarette-smoking, powdered 
new woman straight out of Victor Margueritte, but as “domestic, bourgeois, capable” 
[bürgerlich tüchtig].191  
The reviews, and the DFG more generally, also tried to warm up their audience to 
the notion of understanding by relating how very much the other country cared about 
them. Most consistently, this method surfaced as listings of events devoted to the other 
culture. In 1931, Grautoff revealed this strategy a bit more directly in his Franzosen 
Sehen Deutschland. Here, from its first page onward, he emphasized to his German 
audience how very much the French were interested in Germany. This was mediation by 
flattery, a way to tame the idea of France and the French for German readers. These ideas 
echoed those articulated by the ENS student Pierre Bertaux—an avid observer of 
Weimar-era Berlin—in a private letter to his parents a few years earlier. According to 
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Bertaux, it was important to stroke the egos of national-thinking Germans to open them 
toward the French; this would serve as Bertaux’s mantra over the next few years he lived 
on-again, off-again in Berlin.192 Grautoff pursued this genre of flattering the Germans the 
following year in an appearance on the Berlin radio, in which he stressed the 
“spontaneous, voluntary tributes to the German Geist in the French provinces” in honor 
of the 200th anniversary of Goethe’s death.193 The French, it seems, celebrated Goethe 
more than any other country, and they did so without the need for prompting from either 
French or German officialdom. This kind of flattery, then, served as another tool with 
which to open skeptical readers’ (and listeners’) hearts and minds gradually to the nation 
across the Rhine. A simple willingness to engage with the other culture would help lay 
the groundwork for the more formidable goal of mutual understanding.  
 
The Credo of Understanding 
At the center of Grautoff’s edifice was the rather elusive, if encompassing notion 
of understanding. Understanding, both linguistically and conceptually, proved a slippery 
term. Activists constantly employed the word, but often in very different ways. The task 
of understanding also represented an enormous challenge: How could one both reach out 
to the other and remain rooted in the self?  
The first issue of the Rundschau proclaimed “understanding between Germany 
and France” as its objective.194 Elsewhere, DFR editor Edgar Stern-Rubarth described 
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understanding as a process rather than as a condition or goal,195 thereby implying that 
France and Germany had a constant task ahead of them. DFG activists regularly invoked 
the term “understand” in all its forms: as objective and process, as noun, adjective, and 
verb. Along with a sense of empathy, understanding entailed the two major components 
of knowing—knowing information and knowing people—a distinction we do not make in 
English, but learn as the difference between savoir and connaître,  wissen and kennen.  
If the Deutsch-Französische Rundschau and the Revue d’Allemagne primarily 
aimed to expand knowledge about the other culture, their task was predicated upon the 
assumption that France and Germany were, in fact, different from one another. 
Contributors to the journals generally believed in national difference and celebrated these 
differences as virtues. In an early DFG speech in Frankfurt, Grautoff carefully 
emphasized the importance of being anchored in one’s own nationality while having an 
awareness of the other culture.196 Whereas nationalists typically elaborated upon national 
difference to impugn those who did not belong, the DFG credo—as much as there was 
one—suggested that national difference energized nations. The task of understanding, in 
fact, called for celebrating difference.  Grautoff, for one, pointedly argued that his project 
did not entail the dissolution of difference or assimilation; he did not believe in a 
“Franco-German unity brew.”197  
One way to picture the advantages of French and German distinctiveness was to 
paint their cultures as complementary. Although they were inherently different, together 
                                                          
195Edgar Stern-Rubarth, “In Pertinacem,” DFR 1, no. 7 (1928): 582-585. 
 
196As discussed in “Mitteilungen der Deutsch-Französischen Gesellschaft: Elie Faure in Berlin,” DFR 1, no. 
7 (1928): 631. 
 
197Otto Grautoff, “Gegenseitigkeit der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen,” DFR. 3, no. 5 (1930): 381. 
 
 102 
they created a more perfect whole. In this way, too, they balanced each other’s 
deficiencies. Grautoff described Europe as a balancing act between the oppositional 
characteristics of France and Germany. The two nations’ complementary natures yielded 
a tempered middle-ground. Accordingly, neither was satisfactory by itself and each 
needed the other to thrive.198 Activists readily fell back upon the notion of 
complementarity as an explanatory device. Edmond Jaloux, an editor of the Revue 
d’Allemagne, for example, later traced his interest in literature of Germany, Russia, and 
Scandinavia to his origins in sunny Marseilles; as a Mediterranean type, he needed 
literature of the North to “complete” him.199 
Others, like Henri Lichtenberger, stressed that differences between the two 
nations were minor, and that understanding would best be achieved by focusing on their 
commonalities. His philosophy is worth quoting at length:    
It is in any case my profound conviction that confidence can only be 
reborn between France and Germany if each of the two peoples 
understands and admits the right of the other to exist such as it is, with its 
specific traits and its own individuality . . . . Neither the German nor the 
Frenchman should deny his own individuality, his national genius. The 
problem is not to pretend to erase the undeniable and likely irreducible 
innate differences but to know how to tolerate each other despite clear 
divergences. The problem is to sense that despite the differences that 
separate us, the French and the Germans are not two heterogeneous 
species sworn to eternal antagonism, but that there is much common 
ground, that the same elements mixed according to different proportions 
led without a doubt to differentiation, but that at the heart of the matter 
nothing that is German is completely foreign to the Frenchman and, in 
turn, nothing which is French is completely foreign to the German.200 
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Although Lichtenberger, like Grautoff, did accept that there was such a thing as 
difference, he believed a surer path to understanding lay in bearing in mind the 
imbrication of the two cultures. 
Some instead believed understanding involved a dialectical process. Paul Ravoux, 
a French student in Berlin, wrote in the Revue d’Allemagne about his frustrations at a 
DFG-sponsored debate, which he generally enjoyed. “This Franco-German dialogue,” he 
argued, “was nothing more at heart than successive accounts of two points-of-view, the 
French and the German. One did not see the concrete line where the two positions could 
meet.”201  For Ravoux, understanding meant more than being informed; it necessitated 
give-and-take and synthesis. While Ravoux expressed one view of understanding, the 
DFG speakers he criticized seemed to have had another. 
Thus, if activists in the DFG—even those at its helm—agreed on the importance 
of understanding, they did not all agree on what that meant. Generally, the DFG and 
Grautoff insisted upon the importance of patriotism and of maintaining one’s national 
identity. But, at times, articles in the two journals, talks at the DFG, and even Grautoff’s 
own rhetoric left that sense of cultural rootedness behind; on these occasions, the DFG 
resembled Viénot’s ideal of “leaving the self” more than a little. In a 1929 interview on 
French radio, for example, Grautoff reiterated his faith in the virtues of national 
difference, arguing “Germany and France do not need to disavow their originality to 
understand one another.” But, in his very next sentence, Grautoff switched gears. “To 
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understand,” he said, “is to put oneself in the other’s place, to forget oneself, to make the 
jump into the unknown and isn’t that to feel the profound motives of a people in a flash 
of lightening.”202  
It was not understanding as knowledge and education alone that mattered to the 
DFG. Understanding included another, less cerebral, more social component: getting to 
know individuals from across the Rhine. Boucher explained the need for cultural 
exchanges of all sorts—teachers, laborers, journalists, children. For the editor of the 
Revue d’Allemagne, “It is in multiplying points of contact that one perceives that 
allegedly irreducible psychological differences are reduced most often to differences 
without essential importance that rely more on historical and superficial conditions than 
on ethnic character.”203 Personal contact, in other words, helped combat stereotype and 
essentialism. 
Sociability, moreover, seemed dynamic and modern; certainly, it represented a 
clear rupture from the past decade of silence before Locarno. Rather than looking to 
dusty books or heavy theory, Gottfried Salomon of the Frankfurt DFG branch preferred 
an active approach to understanding at the “banal” level. For Salomon, understanding 
was not the stuff of books, but of conversation, not talks but movies, not articles but 
classes. Understanding, thus, was about movement [Verkehr] and about ordinary people. 
“Therefore it is a mistake,” wrote Salomon, “to expect understanding from theater or 
concerts, from extravagant artists and illusionary arts.” 204   
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  In light of Salomon’s comment about the importance of “ordinary people,” we 
must turn to the question, understanding for whom? The DFG was a relatively inclusive 
group, especially when compared to its contemporary, the Mayrisch Komitee. Unlike the 
Komitee, women played an important role. Women wrote for the reviews, gave public 
lectures, organized exchanges, held memberships, and a few even sat on the DFG board. 
Significantly, they were rarely singled out as a category for particular activities or 
statistical purposes as the DFG did by age or profession; women were simply part and 
parcel of the project for understanding. Salomon strongly believed that workers needed to 
be part of it too, and as a New Year’s resolution in 1930, the Rundschau pledged to create 
worker exchanges. In his regular Rundschau column on the economy, however, 
Alexander Gutfeld argued that practically speaking, the DFG, due to its methods, goals, 
and bourgeois ethos, would never find broad appeal among the “proletariat.”205  Indeed, 
workers never had a palpable presence in the DFG.   
The notion of understanding did not go uncontested. A tongue-in-cheek DFR 
article by one Jean R. Kuchenberg led one German newspaper to rage about to “what 
extremes a politics of understanding at any price can lead.” The DFR article argued that 
recent French literary depictions of Germany—showing its seamy and fun-loving side 
whether through portraits of Berlin prostitutes or carnival in Mainz—helped overturn 
stereotypes of dour Prussians. In this way, writers helped the cause of rapprochement 
“more than all of the professors’ trips.” A critic from Tag thoroughly misinterpreted the 
DFR article as an ode to sin, and strung together a series of quotations taken out of 
context to create a different story about an erotic Berlin, whose “whore bars and sleazy 
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hotel districts” showed affinities with Parisian haunts. According to Tag, the DFR author 
maintained that a convergence in German and French morals served as a form of 
rapprochement “more important than all of the professors’ trips.” Tag responded 
indignantly, “We renounce [such] an understanding in a cesspool!” 206  
Because of the heterogeneity of the organization, activists sometimes embraced 
unique perspectives, in some cases, adopting a pointed stance that did not reflect the DFG 
perspective, in others, muddying the waters or simply digressing. At times, DFG 
representatives tucked their mission into a broader, inchoate vision of Western 
Civilization. Grautoff explained, “the two great wings of Western Civilization, the French 
and the German, must rise together…the harmony of their flight can alone permit a 
European entente.”207 More specific invocations of Western Civilization, the Occident 
[Abendland], and even of Europe—except in the sense of a European peace—were, 
however, erratic at best. None of these represented the broader vision of the DFG. If 
individual members championed a European customs union, expressed their sympathies 
with the pacifist movement, or invoked a desire for an ill-defined European unity, their 
attitudes were emblematic of the DFG’s diverse base and democratic outlook, not 
indicative of a DFG stance.208 
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While some deemed a cultural project for understanding insubstantial relative to 
the heavy-lifting of diplomatic summits and trade negotiations, proponents of 
understanding cast their work as both more permanent and more far-reaching. In this 
view, cultural understanding could build up into something solid and durable, whereas 
diplomatic relations were always contingent and susceptible to reversals. If detached 
from politics and allowed to adopt their own rhythm, intellectual and social relations 
could gain enough momentum that they would carry on regardless of the “momentary 
fluctuations” of diplomacy.209 The “long view” of understanding—which applied equally 
to improving baseline knowledge and to fostering contacts—acknowledged there would 
be no easy victories. As one DFR contributor explained, “the centuries-old wall that 
stands between the two peoples cannot be overrun, but has to be eroded stone by 
stone.”210 The long-lasting resolution to a longstanding problem would be slow-going. 
 
Membership and Associational Life 
Although Grautoff’s original proposal only called for an association as a shell 
through which to raise money for his German-language review, the Deutsch-Französische 
Gesellschaft quickly developed into one of the most important components of Grautoff’s 
project. The Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft formally registered as an association in 
January 1928, the same month the Rundschau first appeared. According to its statutes, the 
association aimed to:  
increase and deepen understanding for France in Germany. By taking 
stock of French intellectual output [Geistesguter], through profound 
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awareness of our neighbors, it wants to contribute to a détente between 
both countries and build bridges between France and Germany while 
maintaining one’s own sense of nationality [Staatsgefühls]. Its goal is to 
join together Germans and French from all circles and areas into a 
working community, to serve these creative peoples of occidental Europe 
through the exchange of ideas.211 
  
Basic membership, which included a subscription to the DFR, cost 20RM, representing a 
few marks off the cover price for a year. Within its first months, a branch in Vienna 
opened, and branches in Frankfurt, Mannheim, Cologne, Stuttgart, Breslau, and 
Nuremberg followed over the course of the next couple of years. In addition, a few local 
groups already in existence, like the year-old Deutsch-Französische Gruppe in Hamburg 
and Hélène Leroi’s Franco-German student exchange organization (the Deutsch-
Französische Schüleraustauschkomitee), begun in February 1926, joined forces with the 
DFG without themselves disbanding.      
DFG board members hailed from a variety of backgrounds and included 
businessmen, writers, and politicians. Grautoff as DFG President and Stern-Rubarth as 
General Secretary duly noted board members’ levels of involvement. Some, like Cologne 
mayor Konrad Adenauer, they considered “active” and Nuremberg mayor Heinrich 
Luppe was even “very active,” whereas Gertrud Bäumer of the Bund Neues Frauen 
“never does anything” and artist Otto Dix “concerns himself with nothing.”  Former 
Education Minister Emile Honnorat, in contrast, they deemed important for exchanges. 
Others still seem to have been selected for their qualities as figureheads more than 
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anything else, among them André Gide and Albert Einstein.212 Ordinary members, as we 
have seen, largely hailed from the professional classes.  
Grautoff sent letters to government officials and other prominent citizens to solicit 
new members. Appealing to the desire for peace, Grautoff suggested that the “core of the 
European problem” resided in French-German relations; he therefore called upon “men 
and women whose feelings of responsibility for Europe were toughened over the difficult 
years, whose youth passionately strives for long-range goals for humanity, whose opinion 
derives from truth without bias, whose will for a peaceful solution to European tensions 
is drawn from moral integrity.”213 Such appeals helped launch the various DFG branches, 
which Grautoff created with the support of local mayors. Though initiated from Berlin, 
many of these branches quickly developed their own programs and contacts with 
France.214 
Like the reviews, the association pursued rational discussion. According to 
Grautoff, “The association which I founded and to which I devote myself entirely is 
hardly composed of sentimentalists. We do not want to embrace each other, pour out our 
hearts, and spill tears. We want to summon up all of our intellect to understand events by 
researching the multiple causes and dispelling misunderstandings. Franco-German 
entente, if it is really to endure, must avoid the murkiness of feelings.”215 This insistence 
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on sober analysis paralleled the comportment of the Mayrisch Komitee but would 
contrast strongly with another Franco-German group, the Sohlbergkreis, founded the 
following year (and the subject of chapter three). 
Although the DFG continued to grow—with new memberships peaking in 1930—
the association’s successes were never paralleled in France. Always seeking to boost 
Germany’s image abroad, German officials pushed hard to create a French corollary to 
the DFG. To this end, they invoked the notion of reciprocity, but to no avail. Grautoff 
likewise pressured Boucher into launching a French association, but Boucher refused 
because he was already overworked and believed an additional obligation would detract 
from his capacity to direct the Revue. Above all, Boucher argued that associations and 
clubs—though beloved in Germany—did not fit within the French national tradition. If 
Boucher’s argument erased a long line of French clubs and associations since the 
Revolution, it resonated; others would repeat this argument to justify the lack of a French 
association. To overcome this limitation, a representative from the German Embassy 
suggested founding a French corollary that adhered more closely to French traditions. In 
his view, ambitious and moneyed women would relish the opportunity to run such a 
group, presumably along the lines of a salon, though possibly more as a société de 
bienfaisance. The ideal according to this German official, then, was for a French 
association to provide a “decorative” function for events, not to serve as the driving force 
of the organization.216  
To placate frustrated proponents of reciprocity, the Gesellschaft began to cite an 
affiliation with the Ligue des Études Germaniques (LEG). Like the DFG, the French 
LEG promoted understanding and French-German contact. Se Connaître, the Ligue’s 
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bulletin, explicitly invoked the notion of understanding in its title, roughly translated as 
“Getting to Know Each Other.” But the Ligue was a fundamentally different organization 
from the DFG.  Founded in the spring of 1928 as an alliance for German-language 
teachers in France, the Ligue sought to boost interest in learning German. German 
teachers had seen losses of almost 50% in their secondary school classrooms since 1913, 
as French students turned to English or Spanish rather than the language of the “boche.” 
To attract students and to hold onto their jobs, Ligue teachers explored new pedagogical 
strategies, promoted exchanges, and encouraged student German clubs. The Ligue—as a 
decentralized alliance of small groups throughout France (and French North Africa) held 
together largely by a 10-page bulletin—did not maintain substantive ties with the DFG. 
Given the autonomy of the Ligue’s own branches, its independence from the German 
association is not surprising. If the Rundschau and the Revue recounted the Ligue’s 
goings-on, such reportage was part and parcel of the reviews’ chronicling of Franco-
German events. Henri Lichtenberger sat on the LEG’s honorary board, but he played a 
role in all French-German groups of any importance. Otherwise, the DFG-LEG 
connection served only as a useful source of contacts when arranging travel or 
exchanges.217 For the DFG, association with the Ligue was largely a marriage of 
convenience, based on their similar age and purviews, and geared toward keeping up 
appearances.   
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 If the Deutsch-Französische Rundschau and the Revue d’Allemagne aimed to 
expand knowledge, the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft centered on the notion of 
understanding as embodied in face-to-face contact. To this end, the DFG arranged trips, 
exchange programs, talks, and miscellaneous events. These activities helped establish 
personal contacts and set in place organizational structures that proponents of cooperation 
would turn to in the decades to come.   
 On the first DFG trip to France in 1929—a  whirlwind week-long tour through 
Paris and its environs—the 33 Germans squeezed in as many destinations and meetings 
as they could to ensure they would come away with the most thorough overview of 
contemporary France possible. On Monday, for example, they went to the Montmartre 
Cemetary, visited the Chamber of Deputies, took a boat ride down the Seine, toured the 
Sèvres porcelain factory, and enjoyed an evening reception at city hall. They later toured 
newspapers and factories in addition to attending receptions at the German Embassy and 
the Quai d’Orsay. Remarkably similar trips to Paris became an annual event for the DFG; 
the DFG also lent a hand to the Ligue as it planned its annual German tour, alternately to 
Berlin or throughout Germany. 
From their first tour, the DFG visitors not only played the role of observers—as 
they did at a Paneuropa Union meeting—but also actively took part in political (and 
politicized) ceremonies that catered to both the French and German publics. The press in 
both countries was particularly taken with what it variously described as a symbolic hug 
or kiss of reconciliation between Grautoff and Colonel Yves Picot of the disabled 
veterans’ organization Gueules Cassées at a function hosted by the group Amitiés 
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Internationales.218 The following day, Grautoff led his group in a wreath-laying 
ceremony at the graves of German soldiers at Bagneux. As he laid the black, red, and 
gold wreath, Grautoff reminded the travelers of their duty to future peace: “The sacrifice 
they made for us should unite us in an oath to exert all of our strength toward an ethic of 
peace, so that the notion of international reconciliation [Volkerversöhnung] will be set in 
stone for the coming generations.”219 The German ceremony at Bagneux, on the heels of 
the embrace between the French veterans’ leader and the former German propagandist, 
was a step toward the joint Franco-German commemorations that would take hold in the 
1930s and most famously resume in 1984 with the embrace of Helmut Kohl and François 
Mitterand at Verdun.  
 In addition to arranging such study-trips for adults, the DFG facilitated programs 
for youth, who could carry on the message of cooperation to future generations. On 
occasion, the DFG helped match families with student au-pairs or helped place children 
in summer camps.220 More centrally, the DFG coordinated a pen pal program and student 
exchanges.  
 The Zentralstelle für Schülerbriefwechsel, led by Dr. Max Bäcker, paired up 1000 
pen pals in its first six months; in its first five years, it laid claim to matching 15,000.221 
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Supported in part by the Prussian Ministry for Art, Science, and Education and the 
French Ministry for Public Instruction,222 Bäcker’s center had an educational mission but 
was also anchored to the traditions of the international pacifist movement and more 
recent international initiatives like the League of Nations.223 Such international (and even 
internationalist) antecedents notwithstanding, the DFG aligned its youth programs with 
its overarching agenda by emphasizing the apolitical pursuit of knowledge and 
understanding under a mantle of patriotism. “From letter to letter,” Grautoff explained, 
“the correspondents understand each other better, and soon—with the girls faster, the 
boys somewhat slower—they are on the best and most cordial, comradely terms; even 
invitations for vacations are earnestly proposed. There is nothing to read about politics in 
the letters; nowhere are any of the customary national prejudices to be found. But with 
every opportunity they show pride in the homeland and seek to give their friend an idea 
of the cultural level of the fatherland with as impressive facts as possible.”224  
 The DFG also took on the more ambitious task of student exchanges through two 
offices, the Mittelstelle für Schüleraustausch aimed at schoolchildren, and the Mittelstelle 
für Studentenaustausch, geared toward college students. Both offices had started 
independently—the effort for schoolchildren by Hélène Leroi in Heidelberg, the effort for 
college students by Josy Schäfer in Nuremberg—but then became part of the DFG 
enterprise. If the numbers of students sent on exchanges and homestays appears slight by 
today’s standards, the total was impressive in the interwar context, in which hardly 
anyone crossed the Rhine to study, certainly not as part of an organized group. Aspiring 
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Germanist Pierre Bertaux was widely pegged in 1928—as well as years later—to have 
been the first French university student in Berlin since the war. And though he 
occasionally encountered a French student in Berlin and knew of others before him, 
Bertaux himself slipped into the habit of naming himself the first.225  There were not 
enough others to dispute the claim. Each year, the DFG helped send a few hundred youth 
abroad, which vastly increased the opportunities for young people to meet and befriend 
boches or Erbfeinde. Such exchanges, which the Mayrisch Komitee supported but neither 
developed nor participated in, would help set into motion a rising tide of French-German 
exchange. No longer would a French student in Berlin prove such a spectacle. At the end 
of 1932, Grautoff reported that the Mittelstellen had facilitated 1225 exchanges for 
schoolchildren and several hundred for college students under the DFG aegis.226 
But even among those French and Germans who supported the quest for 
understanding, the benefits of cultural exchange were not a given. In 1918, the head of 
the French organization devoted to academic exchanges proclaimed the “moral 
impossibility” of sending students to Germany.227 Ten years later, in a DFR survey in 
which most extolled the virtues of exchange, some still urged caution. A number of 
government officials in both France and Germany deemed the issue of cultural exchange 
so controversial that they refused to contribute a public statement; the French Embassy 
counseled the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to avoid the survey, just as a 
representative of the German Foreign Office advised a secretary of state for the 
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Chancellery to do the same.228 For educator L. Rivaud, the memory of war left his 
countrymen with such bitterness that he felt it would be dangerous to bring large numbers 
of Germans into France: “Today’s attempts to produce ‘rapprochement’ gradually, 
though supported by the entire French government with the utmost energy and tenacity,” 
he argued, “dog the masses with mixed feelings: hope and also mistrust.” In Rivaud’s 
mind, “the beginnings of a future Franco-German friendship should stay small and barely 
noticeable; mass undertakings would provoke a stir and mistrust . . . . Too much haste 
and go-ahead spirit would perhaps have a bad effect.” Paul Dubray, one of the DFG’s 
earliest members, believed exchanges needed to be tightly controlled because few could 
be trusted to take on the task diplomatically: journalists, with their prejudices, would be 
hopeless and those “very young [and] inexperienced” “would damage more than be of 
use.”229  Some Germans likewise opposed exchanges and urged disengagement with the 
French altogether until a resolution in the Rhineland; they believed that exchanges, even 
cultural, acted as an implicit acceptance of an unacceptable occupation.230 
Lectures by experts from across the Rhine became a mainstay of DFG life, 
particularly in Berlin, but had likewise proved controversial.  This genre of intellectual 
relations only resumed in the mid-1920s, and even then led to vigorous nationalist 
opposition, especially in Paris. In early 1926, Action Française members provoked a 
skirmish at a Paris talk by Elisabeth Rotten of the German branch of the League of 
Human Rights; subsequent talks by Alfred Kerr, Thomas Mann, and Hermann Keyserling 
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were hardly publicized out of fear of further violence. Edouard Herriot himself admitted 
that the potential threat of the reactionary league the Camelots du Roi, a youth 
organization affiliated with the Action française, hindered efforts for intellectual 
rapprochement in Paris.231 German officials echoed such pessimism. According to 
Ambassador Leopold von Hoesch, though “intellectual cooperation” provided a popular 
catchphrase since the war, and many claimed to work in its name, it was in reality not 
widespread. He posited that the French tended to spurn German culture, with the 
exception of Goethe, Heine and music—but, he added slyly, in the cases of the 
composers, the French “stamped them as Austrian to make them more palatable.”232 
Lectures sponsored by the DFG thus underscored its willingness to face 
opposition, its commitment to represent authentic contemporary voices to the public, and 
its characteristic independence from officialdom. Its first talks—a lecture tour on 
Napoleon by French writer Elie Faure—made clear that DFG events would not all be 
adulation and smooth talk. If Faure’s first speech in Berlin’s Herrenhaus on the topic of 
“Napoleon and a New World” brought the over 800 in attendance to applause, a 
subsequent talk in Marburg, in which Faure argued that Germany owed its idea of unity 
to the French Emperor, was met with less enthusiasm (though the audience still 
appreciated his “warmth” toward Germany).233 Talks occasionally not only failed to 
charm audiences, but also displeased authorities. A 1930 DFG talk by Henri Torrès, an 
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editor and more importantly a socialist lawyer known for defending Communists, went 
forward without the imprimatur of Foreign Minister Julius Curtius.234 Public talks, 
debates, and conferences remained a regular feature of DFG life, with hundreds, 
sometimes over a thousand in attendance; in 1932 Berlin alone, the DFG held about 30 
public lectures.235 
Additional activities, like concerts, teas, soirées, an annual charity ball, and 
bimonthly French-German lunches in Berlin likewise brought together those interested in 
mutual understanding; they often involved notable guest speakers or performers. The 
DFG screened movies as well, although Grautoff’s ambition on this front was thwarted 
by his overreach. On a personal level, Grautoff frowned upon the cinema. His daughter, 
film actress Christiane Grautoff, later described her father as having nothing about him of 
the 20th century—he only bothered with the cinema when it served the cause of the 
DFG.236 In this case, movies could help shed light on French culture to German 
audiences, attract new blood to the DFG, and provide a convenient way to make money 
for the financially-straitened organization. Grautoff thus dreamed up a DFG house, 
complete with movie theater, as a new meeting place for the association, a venue for 
French events in Berlin, and a public home for his private library of several thousand 
books, periodicals, and art slides. French officials, who had in mind an institute that 
would demonstrate German commitment to a politics of understanding, were 
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supportive.237  Yet due to the group’s budgetary woes as well as to Grautoff’s typically 
inappropriate way of asking his Foreign Ministry for aid, his movie theater was never 
erected, and the DFG house, too, remained a pipedream.238  
Although the DFG fixed its gaze upon the present, Grautoff was well aware of the 
degree to which memory shaped the contemporary world. Therefore, in addition to his 
work illuminating the past in articles in the Rundschau and the Revue and talks given at 
the various DFG branches, Grautoff staged two interventions geared toward transforming 
collective memory. In the first instance, Grautoff targeted youth, the key to a future 
peace; in the second, he addressed the culture of memorialization.   
First, Grautoff sought to break the pattern of indoctrinating French youth with 
Germanophobia. Like many (pacifist-leaning) teachers in France, Grautoff hoped a new 
narrative of European history—one that refused to perpetuate nationalist clichés or 
glorify war—could lay the basis for a future peace. In the interest of preventing another 
war, French schoolteachers had recently launched what Mona Siegel has called “nothing 
less than a textbook war” against the use of rabidly nationalist books in the public 
schools. Although German teachers were slow to enlist in this battle—joint French-
German efforts to revise textbooks began so late that the Nazi takeover put them on hold 
before they had even gotten off the ground—Grautoff, in his own way, joined the French 
teachers’ crusade. In 1930, once the most egregiously offensive textbooks had been 
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amended or excised from public school classrooms across France, but before bilateral 
reforms were under discussion, Grautoff came upon what he deemed an offensive and 
“embarrassing” history text used in French Catholic schools. He therefore issued a direct 
plea to the author, a professor at the University of Besançon and the editor-in-chief of the 
Catholic daily La Croix, to purge references to blind German aggression and German 
crimes in the Great War from future editions. Criticizing the historian’s means of 
instilling patriotism, Grautoff contended, “If it is a question of teaching your children 
love for France, I admit that I do not see the necessity to inculcate them with hatred of 
Germany in the same stroke.” Grautoff, moreover, appealed to the author as a Catholic, 
presumably more interested in fostering peace than stirring up hatred. Finally, Grautoff 
wrote the historian that “it serves nothing to be hypnotized by the past;” what is essential 
is to prepare a path to a harmonious future. Surprisingly, the historian was persuaded.239 
Yet Grautoff’s remarkable victory proved his only entrée into the battle of the books. If 
French terrain had by and large been freed of these so-called “bellicose” books, Grautoff 
never steered the fight to his own homefront. 
In another albeit less successful intervention, Grautoff addressed overt nationalist 
symbolism in the landscape. Specifically, Grautoff discovered the series of anti-German 
plaques and memorials at the forest of Compiègne, where the Armistice had been signed. 
The most egregious read, “Here succumbed on the 11th of November 1918 the criminal 
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pride of the German Empire, vanquished by the free peoples whom it wished to 
subjugate.”240 Grautoff worked to change the wording as a way to begin cleansing the 
official record—this was, after all, a state-administered site—of a Germanophobia that 
defied his efforts for understanding. The promise of Locarno (and the potential of his 
own project) could never be realized in the face of such flagrant violations of its spirit. 
And the public, accosted by such visible reminders of mutual animosity, would never 
bow to Locarno’s mandate. Ultimately, Grautoff’s object in Compiègne was not realized 
until 1940 when the offending memorial was removed in quite a different spirit by his 
countrymen.  
 
Unfettered but Bound  
There was ambivalence on the part of both the French and German 
administrations toward the DFG and its reviews. Though neither administration 
controlled the organization, both sought to influence it. On the one hand, officials did so 
in a positive sense by helping fund the project; on the other hand, they constantly 
meddled in small affairs to sort out issues of reciprocity. Government officials also 
worried about the journals’ content and wanted to use the journals for their own ends. 
From the DFG perspective, while it refrained from pursuing one nation’s cultural agenda, 
still, it relied on both governments. It thus maintained a complicated relationship with 
officialdom and with the notion of propaganda.   
The German Foreign Ministry, like the French Foreign Ministry, helped subsidize 
both reviews to varying degrees. Grautoff, whether due to incredible foresight or to serial 
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bungling, managed to play the two foreign ministries off each other to gain the support of 
each, especially by appealing to reciprocity. He let drop to German officials various 
numbers under discussion with the French as if they were guaranteed subsidies and vice-
versa. Officials on both sides of the Rhine had a hard time deciding if this was a 
deliberate (often successful) strategy to up the ante, or more likely, symptomatic of 
Grautoff’s lack of subtlety. The editors of the Revue d’Allemagne determined that 
“without the principle of reciprocity [their] work would be impossible,” and the 
Rundschau editors agreed.241 
Although the journals remained a private enterprise, they were often assumed to 
be propaganda. If it is unlikely that subscribers believed this to be the case, it is clear that 
employees of the German Foreign Office were at odds over the journals’ status. Although 
the German Foreign Office expressed support for the Rundschau, notably by extending a 
greeting from Stresemann to readers in the first issue, officials in the Foreign Office’s 
press bureau considered the DFR a form of “foreign propaganda in Germany.” Tolerated 
as a necessary corollary to the Revue d’Allemagne, the Rundschau, according to such 
officials, would nonetheless be foolish to underwrite.242 Legation Councilor Bülow 
rushed to correct the misguided press bureau; instead of each journal operating as one-
sided propaganda, he explained, they worked together for “understanding and 
rapprochement.”243   
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Suspicions of propaganda extended beyond the confines of the Berlin office. A 
German consular official in Antwerp bemoaned the fact that such “otherwise excellent” 
German propaganda as the Revue d’Allemagne appeared in French, a language which 
would alienate the local Flemish population; marginalia on this letter indicate the Foreign 
Ministry’s impatience with this point-of-view, presumably in part because even its own 
employees fell back on this interpretation of the Revue d’Allemagne.244 A German consul 
in Bordeaux warned that there was such a thing as too much propaganda. “In view of the 
political attitude of local educated circles, who stand under the intellectual influence of 
the nothing less than German-friendly press,” he argued, “German propaganda efforts 
should only proceed here with great caution because each step that is recognized as an 
attempt at publicizing [Werbetätigkeit] or could be meant as such will be met with 
mistrust and opposition.”245 
For some in the German Foreign Ministry even the Revue d’Allemagne caused 
concerns. Their fear of the Revue turning into an instrument of French propaganda so 
persisted that even after it agreed to help fund the journal, some wary officials insisted on 
monthly installment payments rather than an annual contribution.246 In this way, the 
Foreign Office could exert tighter control, not in the form of direct censorship, but 
through the potential to withhold funds.  
On occasion, Grautoff used such suspicions to his advantage; they proved 
especially helpful in alternately gaining support from the two Foreign Ministries. A 
fundraising advantage lay in the fact that the DFR could be touted as French cultural 
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propaganda—just as the Revue d’Allemagne could be hyped as German cultural 
propaganda. When trying to win Stresemann over to his budding project, for example, 
Grautoff described the Revue d’Allemagne as German cultural propaganda that even the 
French advocated: “In the history of Franco-German relations,” he explained, “it is the 
first time that official France financially and morally supports a magazine that ultimately 
serves as German cultural propaganda.”247 Rarer still, Grautoff—or even one of the 
foreign ministries—tried to court certain wealthy potential patrons by trumpeting one of 
the journals as propaganda in service of the nation; this rather misleading route implied 
that understanding only served as the ostensible purpose of the organization.  
 These (often contradictory) accusations of government propagandizing aside, the 
DFG and its journals sometimes took steps that seriously conflicted with official 
positions.  Otto Grautoff was particularly prone to gaffes, as everyone he met seemed to 
note. But more serious infractions revolved around activists who publicly took a stand on 
hot-button political issues like reparations or the Saar. Yet neither the journals nor DFG 
talks remained entirely devoid of politically contentious issues. In Paris, Grautoff gave a 
speech (excerpted in the Rundschau), in which he argued that the French needed to give 
up their pretensions to the Saar and revise their stance on the Polish corridor.248 Grautoff 
took a strong position, but it was the German position, and German officials did not 
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complain. Edgar Stern-Rubarth wrote of the “disastrous effect” of the Rhineland 
occupation, by no means a neutral position, without comment from officialdom.249  
 In general, the DFG and its journals exercised great liberties to say and do as they 
wished. When given the chance, however, the German Foreign Office tried to preempt or 
soften Grautoff’s frequent gaffes. In a draft of his Hôtel de Ville speech to be given 
during the DFG’s first group trip to Paris, for example, Grautoff concluded with the wish 
that the French community in Berlin would grow, and asserted with an authority he did 
not wield, “Send us many of your co-citizens.” The Foreign Office suggested he supply a 
different context to his invitation; rather than welcome the French as immigrants, 
welcome them as travelers. 250    
 Grautoff wanted to serve his country well (and, to be sure he relied on 
government funding); this translated into regular attempts to cozy up to German 
authorities or seek their approval. Grautoff, for example, submitted the draft of his Hôtel 
de Ville speech for approval without having been asked to do so. A more troubling 
incident helps shed light on Grautoff’s eagerness to serve his government, even at the risk 
of impinging upon his organization’s transnational mission and independence. In the fall 
of 1930, Grautoff forwarded to the German Foreign Ministry a private letter from 
Boucher that denounced the Nazis as thugs.251 He tattled on his counterpart at the Revue 
d’Allemagne and thus acted, unbidden, as an informant to the German authorities more 
than two years before Hitler’s takeover. Grautoff’s loyalties, then, lay more with the 
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German state than with his French colleague. This was, in other words, a firm expression 
of the DFG credo that it served the interests of Germany without partisanship. Here was a 
testament to Grautoff’s status as an upstanding German citizen precisely because he 
worked together with the French.    
 
The End of Locarno? 
By 1930, the DFG was well-established, playing host to a constant stream of 
events and harboring a strong core of activists; indeed, three new branches were created 
in that year, and new subscriptions to the DFR poured in during the early months of 1930 
at record pace.252 This stability and growth peaked after what Hermann Hagspiel termed 
the major ruptures that brought Verständigungspolitik to its end: 1929 when the death of 
Stresemann, the depression, resurgent nationalism, and increased French intransigence in 
the Rhineland together signaled the end of an era. The DFG’s moment of triumph—when 
more new members than ever staked an interest in the project for understanding and the 
number of French-German events multiplied—took place, moreover, when the Locarno 
Era, according to Franz Knipping, was entering its penultimate stage of collapse.253 
Evidently, while the death knells of Locarno were tolling, there was still a ready market 
for its message.    
In the midst of DFG successes and rising political tensions, the German Foreign 
Office once again acknowledged the organization’s importance. For a skeptic in the Press 
Bureau, the strengthening of the DFG meant the need was all the more pressing to create 
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a French corollary to advocate for Germany. A powerful DFG, without a French 
counterweight to balance it, was dangerous. Others in the Foreign Ministry argued, 
however, that in the face of mounting nationalist opposition to France, a strong DFG was 
needed more than ever.254  
It was precisely at this point, when the base of the DFG was rapidly expanding 
and the political situation was deteriorating, that the organization began to face unusually 
severe fiscal problems. The DFG had never performed well financially; indeed, the DFR 
had itself been 30,000 Marks in debt in 1929. For the Rundschau in particular, such 
financial difficulties had been the rule rather than the exception. By the end of its first 
year of operation, both allies and rivals expressed concerns about the financial stability of 
the DFR. Boucher, whose Revue had firmer financial footing, sent regular missives to 
Grautoff to check on the Rundschau’s future solvency; the end of the Rundschau would 
bode badly for his own enterprise. Boucher’s concerns were shared by some at the 
German Foreign Office. In fact, some officials suggested that the Rundschau would be 
better off in the hands of the rival Mayrisch Komitee, whose deeper pockets could 
resuscitate it. Although such a proposal was never realized, and the Mayrisch Komitee 
still disapproved of Grautoff, the Komitee did, in a goodwill gesture, give a token 
donation to the DFG at the end of its first year.255 Several wealthy businessmen also 
stepped in to cover the Rundschau’s debts.256  
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The economic crisis hit the DFG and its reviews hard; no longer could it count on 
official subsidies and generous private donations to sustain it. In light of broad-spectrum 
budget cuts, both the French and German Foreign Ministries slashed their subsidies to the 
organization, though, significantly, neither ceased sending aid altogether. The economic 
crisis also meant that some members lagged in paying dues and that most large donors 
decreased their contributions dramatically for the following year (1931). Walther 
Rothschild, DFG treasurer and publisher of the Rundschau as well as publisher of an 
array of trade magazines, more than once covered publishing costs from his own pocket 
and in 1931 cancelled 18,000 Marks of DFR debt altogether.257 Grautoff and his wife 
Erna would later devote much of their personal savings to keeping the entire organization 
afloat.  
In 1930, when budgetary problems began to jeopardize the DFG, another, more 
insidious force began to rear its head. Intermittently, the DFG’s political—and at times 
barely political—views came under fire from German officialdom. Criticisms from the 
administration made clear that, at least for the German Foreign Ministry’s French 
department, the end of Locarno had arrived. Even the splash of blue, white, and red in the 
corner of a DFG poster proved controversial in 1930 Germany.258 Grautoff could only 
describe his work at this point, as “an exhausting back-and-forth between 
disappointments and hopes.”259 
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A 1930 DFR article on the evacuation of the Rhineland led to a firm dressing 
down of Grautoff by the German Foreign Office, which deemed his criticism 
“inappropriate.”260 Although the journal’s mission explicitly revolved around informing 
readers about contemporary France and Franco-German relations, the German Foreign 
Office had resolved from the outset that its support for the journal was conditional upon 
its avoidance of contemporary bones of contention, notably the issues of war guilt and the 
occupied Rhineland.261 Grautoff not only broached the controversial subject, but he also 
implied that Germans should thank the French for withdrawing from the Rhineland 
earlier than expected. The German Foreign Office took the time to compile ten pages 
worth of crib sheets and talking points—including a lengthy list of grievances against the 
French in the Rhineland—for an official meeting with Grautoff, in which ministry 
officials would try to convince him of the DFR’s misguided assessment of French actions 
in the Rhineland.262 If the German Foreign Office also threatened to suspend financial 
support to the DFR as a consequence of this article, the newspaper Tag presented its 
harsh assessment to the public. “If both peoples should reach out their hands in 
reconciliation, one should not forget how each faces the other enormously differently. 
France, conscious of its victory, proud of [its] acquired supremacy, with all possibilities 
for expansion fitting a free, armed [wehrhaft] people. In contrast, impoverished Germany, 
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without weapons, dismembered, a people without colonies, a people whose children still 
in later generations will bear the burden of tribute . . . . In a word, if we have equal rights 
with other peoples, only then will the moment have arrived when thoughts of 
understanding can really grow effectively.”263 
Grautoff’s response to Ministry criticism was to ask for more guidelines from that 
office. In fact, he chastised the Foreign Office for having left his organization, once in 
place, largely to its own devices. Through the turmoil of the late Weimar years, the DFG 
would seek to please the successive German administrations. Certainly neither the 
Rundschau nor the Revue d’Allemagne articles always conformed with official policy; 
indeed, both reviews maintained their diversity of perspectives throughout their 
existence, and as Beatrice Pellissier has pointed out the Revue d’Allemagne even 
increased its coverage of politics after 1930.264 Nonetheless, Grautoff went out of his way 
to ask the Foreign Ministry for guidelines repeatedly without prompting from on high. 
Due to “changed political conditions,” in September 1932, he even requested guidelines 
for the DFG’s winter series of talks from Franz von Papen’s government, though that 
administration leaned significantly to the right of Grautoff’s usual Center sensibilities.265  
Political and economic conflicts became intertwined. In 1931, the DFG faced 
increasing financial troubles as official support dwindled. The amount of government 
subsidies was constantly in question and often arrived months later than promised despite 
repeated pledges that the DFG and its reviews served the interests of the state. In the 
summer of 1931, the German Embassy in Paris begged off from hosting its usual 
                                                          
263W.F., “Merkwürdige Verständigungspolitik,” Tag (3 Oct. 1930). 
 
264Pellissier, 616-617. 
 
265PA-AA R70554 No. AA II Fr 3039. Aufzeichnung über die DFG. Grautoff to Köpke (7 Sept. 1932). 
 
 131 
reception for visiting DFG members, and French officials, too, declined to participate, as 
if, one newspaper remarked, “they no longer considered a reception for an association for 
Franco-German understanding opportune.”266 Nonetheless, the German Embassy 
continued to stress the importance of sustaining the Revue d’Allemagne, so that 
intellectuals would not interpret its failure as a “disquieting symptom” of a sharp turn in 
foreign policy.267  
While the German Foreign Office was encouraging potential patrons to donate to 
the DFG or lend their names to its leadership to promote its standing, and while Grautoff 
was scrambling to reorganize the structure of his venture altogether,268 the association’s 
financial situation worsened. Grautoff complained that, whereas his journal hardly 
received any money from the Quai d’Orsay, Boucher’s Revue received substantial 
support from the German Foreign Ministry. He therefore told German officials they 
needed either to convince the Quai to increase French aid to the Rundschau, or to take 
some of their own funds away from Boucher to help the Rundschau.269 In Grautoff’s 
myopic view, financial exigency entitled him to attempt to save his own journal at the 
risk of undercutting both. 
Erna Grautoff took a more sympathetic, if melodramatic approach on behalf of 
the organization. In desperation, she begged the Foreign Office to help sustain the DFG. 
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Her husband, she explained, had taken no pay in five months, her own assets were 
depleted, and their household debts—for the children’s school, for groceries—could no 
longer go unpaid. Moreover, her husband needed his work for the DFG. She entreated 
them: “I know there are many tragedies in Germany. But they perhaps do not always 
concern a man whose work has such a scope and affects the future as much as Grautoff, 
[they] do not always have as their focus an intellectual community here and in France, 
whose life and efforts have a value and who can be credited with destroying the [foul] 
atmosphere of an entire country.”270          
It was not the Grautoffs alone who were on the brink of financial ruin. The 
Rundschau had not paid its contributors for several months, and that eventually precluded 
it from commissioning future articles. Moreover, the Rundschau’s financial situation was 
sapping the foundations of the DFG. By the fall of 1932, the DFG’s financial outlook had 
become, in Grautoff’s words, “catastrophic,” but he also believed that liquidation “would 
be a blow to all the French people who have been working for us in their country.”271 The 
last three months of 1932, the DFG sponsored no events in order to cobble together the 
savings to put toward the Rundschau. Rothschild again stepped in to cover the DFR’s 
debts in December 1932. That year, memberships started to taper off as well. 
Hoping to breathe new life into his organization and build a sturdier structure for 
it, an exhausted Grautoff, with the support of the German Foreign Office, made a 
dramatic declaration to the board in December 1932. He called for the liquidation of the 
group so that the board would not be financially liable for his poor management. He 
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would, moreover, relinquish his rights to the DFG, a representative of the Foreign 
Ministry would become its president, and the Ministry itself would cover DFG debts. 
New leadership would, in this view, repair the damage wrought by Grautoff’s lack of 
business savvy. Every member of the board, furious at Grautoff for the suggestion, 
refused to vote for liquidation; Rothschild initially walked out, though he was eventually 
convinced to return. The official slated to take the reins called the meeting, which lasted 
several hours, “grotesque.”272 
 When the board instead quietly decided to cut costs by shrinking each issue of the 
DFR by 40% beginning with the January 1933 issue, angry DFG activists lambasted 
Grautoff. Aside from setting the DFG on a certain path to a decline in membership, the 
decision to shorten the Rundschau, contended the indignant leader of the branch in 
Württemberg and occasional contributor to the DFR Erich Benz, was a sign of Grautoff’s 
betrayal. Benz accused Grautoff of at best caving in to the fascists, at worst doing their 
dirty work. A crisis in broader Franco-German relations and the spike in expressions of 
nationalism signaled the need to multiply efforts, not to cave, or worse, go gently into the 
night. Benz particularly emphasized the import of the DFG in connecting Germans 
outside of Berlin—whether in cities or the countryside—in common cause, and the 
degree to which subscribers in the regions read each issue of the Rundschau “with rapt 
attention.” For Gottfried Salomon, head of the Frankfurt branch and similarly shocked at 
the decision, the reduction of the DFR to a “mere bulletin” spelled the association’s 
doom. If Benz was angry, Salomon was bewildered that reductions would take place in 
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the broader context of political crisis, when readers were eagerly turning to the pages of 
the Rundschau.273  
 The DFG’s financial problems did not reflect a diminishment in ardor among 
activists, though to be sure, the DFG began to see a notable decrease in members. Beyond 
the stubborn persistence of the board, the fury of Benz in Württemberg, and the 
disappointment of Salomon in Frankfurt, interest in the project of understanding had not 
abated. Robert Bosch, the Stuttgart industrialist, chose this moment to write Grautoff of 
his wish to launch a new organization for understanding in light of recent popularity, 
particularly in France, for the cause.274  
 
On Death (Before Resurrection) 
On 12 January 1933, Maurice Boucher gave a talk at the Hotel Esplanade in 
Berlin on “The Death and Resurrection of Liberalism;” at the same event, Fritz Kern of 
the University of Bonn spoke about the “Crisis of Liberalism;” by the end of that month, 
Hitler was Chancellor.275 For some, the end of Liberalism and democracy signaled the 
end of the quest for understanding; for others, it did not.  
The Nazi administration did not cut off ties to the DFG, but instead both blunted 
official support of the group and began to work toward bringing it in line with the new 
regime; together, these changes—on top of their preexisting troubles—brought the 
Rundschau and the DFG to an end. In March 1933, the German Foreign Ministry reduced 
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its subsidy to the DFG to a paltry four-month subscription of ten copies of the 
Rundschau. Ostensibly, the Ministry cuts related to the “financial situation,” but its lack 
of enthusiasm for the DFG in fact stemmed from the organization’s failure to follow 
Foreign Ministry recommendations about reorganization; significantly, this intransigence 
on the part of the DFG seemed to grate on the new administration’s nerves more than the 
DFG’s internationally-oriented agenda.276 At the same time the Foreign Ministry was 
subtracting funds, it was helping to reshape the DFR. The March issue of the Rundschau 
listed several new editors on the cover; some editors’ names, in turn, disappeared 
altogether. The April edition showed more changes; by then, the only editors from before 
that spring were Grautoff and Stern-Rubarth, along with the French editors.277 The 
Rundschau only survived another two months before it ceased publication with its June 
1933 issue; that spring, Grautoff left Germany for Paris. Apparently, there were limits to 
his allegiance to the state.  
That June, Eugen Bolz, the president of the region of Württemberg and a longtime 
member of the DFG, was arrested. Bolz’s arrest set off alarms in France, largely because 
of the explanation provided in the German press: “Bolz was always the committed 
adversary of all national aspirations. The fact that he belonged to the Deutsch-
Französische Gesellschaft is known.” Havas-Berlin put it even more directly, stating that 
local officials turned to Bolz’s membership in the DFG as “proof of a lack of national 
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convictions” [nationaler Gesinnung].  Regardless of the more significant reasons for 
Bolz’s arrest, news reports spread an unambiguous message about the new footing of the 
DFG. French Ambassador André François-Poncet immediately demanded clarification 
from the German Foreign Office: Was Bolz’s arrest a local matter, indicating a 
misunderstanding on the part of Württemberg police, or was it a sign that the new 
regime’s policy toward France—despite recent assurances to the contrary—no longer 
comprised a “spirit of harmony and peace?”278 Was the DFG, previously supported by the 
German government, now off-limits? More broadly, did expressing an interest in France 
now constitute a treasonable offense?   
Grautoff belatedly dashed off a few lines to Boucher to inform his French 
counterpart of the Rundschau’s demise,279 but neither this news, nor the anxiety of the 
French Embassy, sealed the French review’s fate. Indeed, the Revue d’Allemagne 
continued to appear and, notably, continued to receive subsidies from the German 
Foreign Ministry.280 The new regime was not averse to promoting Germany abroad, and 
Boucher proved open both to Reich suggestions and money. Boucher told the German 
Foreign Ministry, “Without thinking of a full-scale Gleichschaltung that would take away 
all value from the review, and to which I personally would not consent, I think that we 
could bring to our collection an exact representation of everything that is the official 
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point-of-view.” The French editor therefore proclaimed his willingness to publish any 
official Nazi statement as well as his right to bracket such articles off as exactly that. 
Boucher took it upon himself to translate these official contributions for the Revue.281  
Boucher’s striking stance operated on two levels, each consistent (in its own way) 
with the longstanding ethos of the DFG enterprise. First, it reiterated the Revue’s 
“academic” neutrality; the Revue d’Allemagne would continue to teach about Germany 
without censuring its government or resorting to partisan barbs. Second, the Revue would 
trust its educated readers to draw their own conclusions straight from Nazi sources.  As 
early as its first issue in 1927, the Revue trumpeted the value of primary sources.282 In 
light of the blatant hostility toward the other nation common to the press—the very 
problem being tackled by the Mayrisch Komitee—the Revue (like the DFR) found merit 
in giving readers direct access to the other nation, without the distractions of 
editorializing. For much of the French audience, the radical nature of official Nazi 
propaganda (labeled accordingly) may have been more damaging than no reportage at all.  
The DFG did not collapse because Verständigungspolitik stopped attracting 
devotees. Poor management, combined with the indiscriminate blow of the financial 
crisis, smothered the organization though not its heart. If new measures—even before 
Hitler’s ascent to the Chancellorship—ensured the German Foreign Office was keeping 
closer tabs on the DFG, the group still managed to carry on for awhile; for some, its 
mission became even more relevant than before. But the new regime dealt the DFG a 
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final, soft blow. For Grautoff, 1933 was the end, but for others, 1933 only spurred them 
to work harder. Understanding had not been achieved.  
The group’s demise should not be equated with group’s failure. The DFG’s 
emphasis on understanding provided an important reconceptualization of French-German 
relations. Its coordination of exchange programs and routinization of events dedicated to 
the Franco-German question made available new models of cooperation. The DFG, 
moreover, helped set into place thousands of French-German contacts; many of these 
individuals would keep in touch long after the organization disappeared. Finally, the 
group helped attract a relatively sizeable base to the cause of cooperation; their interest in 
resolving the Franco-German problem likewise did not die with the group. All told, the 
DFG’s structures and ideas would have a significant impact, in the short-term on another 
organization named the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, and in the long-term on 
organizations born after 1945.   
  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Sohlbergkreis 
 
 
 
 
Our existence is based on similar experiences. The weight of the past oppresses us less 
than the old generation. Instead, the painful tests have brought us to a stronger sense of 
our responsibilities to our times and to our future. Never has youth felt so morally obliged 
to seize the meaning of the present world and the reality of life and to collaborate in their 
reconstruction.—Friedrich Bentmann283 
 
I will not speak ill of diplomacy. But diplomacy often implies lies, and often also 
disguise, even more often dissimulation. At Sohlberg, we did not conduct diplomacy. We 
did not lie, we did not disguise ourselves, we hid nothing. We made a very grand and 
very spontaneous effort toward total good faith thanks to which we not only succeeded in 
getting to know our partners well, but equally to know ourselves better. With joy, with 
profit, we practiced intellectual and sentimental nudism.—Jean Luchaire284 
 
 
In 1930, teacher Dr. Friedrich Bentmann proclaimed, “In no other era has youth 
better experienced how powerful is the link that unites the individual to the national 
community and how much, on the other hand, the fate of a nation is bound up with that of 
supranational groupings.”285 Bentmann rallied youth to cure the myopia of their elders by 
embracing a common Franco-German heritage that rose above the boundaries of the 
nation-state.  Echoing such wishes, journalist Jean Luchaire pointedly asserted, “One day, 
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the Franco-German union will be complete and, with it, the European union.”286 Their 
group, the Sohlbergkreis [Sohlberg Circle],287 sought to harness the energy of youth to 
the cause of French-German cooperation. In this way, it intended to build upon the rush 
of diplomatic efforts at conciliation that began with Locarno while redressing their 
shortcomings. Cooperation would not only be forged through the cold calculations and 
deal-making of politicians, but also—and more enduringly—through the bonds of cross-
border camaraderie. Participants looked to their elders—the front generation—for a 
model by and against which to create generational solidarity.  
Conceived by Otto Abetz, president of the coalition of youth groups in Karlsruhe, 
and organized by Abetz and journalist Jean Luchaire, the 1930 Sohlberg Congress aimed 
to bring together over one hundred French and German youth of all professions, classes, 
political orientations, and religious affiliations. In one week of lectures and co-habitation, 
participants would learn about each other’s culture and discuss their differences, 
similarities, and shared responsibilities. Luchaire explained that the encounter served as 
“vast and honest examination of the conscience.”288 Such meetings continued for the next 
few years, alternating locations from Germany to France, beginning with Sohlberg, a 
peak in the Black Forest. Around the campfire, in the woods, on ski slopes, under tents, 
and in hostels, youth not only discussed cultural difference but also practiced 
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rapprochement. This was a small-scale experiment in integration designed (ideally) to 
leave a lasting imprint on participants. 
The message of the Sohlbergkreis reverberated beyond the confines of the 
meetings. Through Luchaire, the group maintained close ties to the Briandist newspaper 
Notre Temps, and after the first two conferences, Abetz launched a review entitled 
Sohlbergkreis.289 Both periodicals covered the Sohlbergkreis in detail. After the first 
conference at Sohlberg, moreover, the group moved away from targeting individual 
young people in favor of tapping into existing networks of youths that covered a wider 
geographic, socioeconomic, and ideological swath. Subsequent conferences included 
leaders of the major youth organizations—political, confessional, student-oriented—in 
each country. In this way, though the meetings themselves remained small, Sohlbergkreis 
participants could report on the results to the groups they represented and thereby amplify 
the impact of each encounter.  
The Sohlbergkreis found an echo in both the short and long-term. In similar 
fashion to the Mayrisch Komitee and the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, the 
Sohlbergkreis built up a network of activists for cooperation and established a model by 
which to achieve it. Then, in the mid-1930s, a resuscitated Deutsch-Französische 
Gesellschaft and its partner the Comité France-Allemagne built on the vestiges of the 
Sohlbergkreis. The coming decades would witness other new groups cherry-picking 
elements of the Sohlbergkreis they found most to their tastes, just as they would from its 
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Locarno-era contemporaries. Thus, though the endeavor did not survive long as the 
Sohlbergkreis, neither was it a mere flash in the pan.  
The circle’s succession of meetings became increasingly fraught with tensions, as 
German nationalists became a more active and vocal element. While some French 
participants found this development disquieting, others found themselves attracted to the 
new dynamism they observed. The debates within the group point to the greater splits 
among those disposed to Franco-German cooperation during the 1930s as the Nazis 
gained a tighter grip on Germany. Participants began to ask themselves to what extent a 
late-1920s Briandist-style cooperation now made sense. But, for many, the growing 
power of the National Socialists, both in the Sohlbergkreis and in Germany more broadly, 
sounded the alarm to intensify their campaign for entente.  
Because the Sohlbergkreis included a number of figures later closely (and 
infamously) linked to the Nazis—Otto Abetz, Jean Luchaire, Bertrand de Jouvenel, to 
name a few—judgments of the group tend toward the heated. Both scholars and former 
participants have often read the Sohlbergkreis through the lens of the war and occupation. 
For many historians, the Sohlbergkreis paved the way to collaborationism. To lend 
support to this view, they have paid close attention to the involvement of those who later 
became Nazis or Nazi sympathizers and have highlighted “volkisch” or other radical 
elements of the meetings that conform to their understanding of Nazi culture.290 Such a 
focus comes at the expense of the reformist and internationalist principles that lay behind 
the group’s origins. A cruder version of this argument casts Sohlbergkreis participants as 
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early (and dangerous) appeasers.291 Sohlbergkreis alumni, in contrast, have tended to 
place their activism in the context of the history of European integration.292 Their 
engagement offered proof of their early devotion to European cooperation, and perhaps 
also, a testament to their having been taken in by Nazi rhetoric. This perspective clearly 
privileges the Sohlbergkreis’ reform-minded and European goals. At the same time, it 
excuses entanglement with the Nazis in one of two ways. It suggests that they had tried to 
moderate Nazi views and attenuate their influence. Alternatively, it claims ignorance of 
the Nazi-inspired nationalist thrust that grew to dominate the group, implying that those 
true believers in a European peace had been hoodwinked by the outwardly international 
rhetoric of the group.   
These standpoints underestimate the initial ideological diversity of the 
Sohlbergkreis and view cooperation itself in an overly simplified light. In fact, the 
Sohlbergkreis revealed some of the same ambivalences about cooperation as did its 
contemporaries, the Mayrisch Komitee and the Deustch-Französische Gesellschaft.  Just 
as with the Mayrisch Komitee and the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, we can see 
with the Sohlbergkreis that cooperation could be rooted as much in patriotic (and 
national) principles as in pacifism or other international ideals. Moreover, in cooperation 
(some) internationalists and nationalists, left-wingers and right-wingers could find 
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common cause. Finally, because so many meanings could be ascribed to it, cooperation 
could stand for divergent objectives as signaled by the disparate forces it seemed to unite. 
Rather than focusing attention on the moral value of the Sohlbergkreis, this chapter 
(along with Part Two) demonstrates the need to examine the quest for cooperation in all 
its facets. The following chapters therefore serve as a reminder that grassroots activism 
and even cooperation itself are not inherently good and that the push for peace and 
cooperation was neither straightforward nor unambiguous.  
Before turning our attention to the case of the Sohlbergkreis, two questions must 
be addressed. First, did the Sohlbergkreis experience transpire in a bubble? The answer is 
both a qualified no and a qualified yes. Each summit was small; interim reunions were 
even smaller. The most extensive write-ups of the encounters appeared in journals like 
Notre Temps, the DFR, the Revue d’Allemagne, and the group’s own Sohlbergkreis, for 
audiences much larger than their own, but an echo chamber nonetheless. While 
participants forged strong ties to one another, and often worked to transform the opinions 
of their colleagues back home, they nonetheless found their efforts limited by the political 
and ideological concerns represented by their diverse backgrounds. 
Why then look to Sohlberg at all? Numerous accounts indicate that, on a personal 
level, the experience was meaningful. Indeed, both Abetz and Luchaire considered the 
Sohlberg Congress as the foundational moment for their careers: here they channeled 
their ideals of Franco-German rapprochement into practice. In this sense, the Sohlberg 
Circle played an important role in the history of collaboration. In fact, it was at these 
encounters that some of the most infamous collaborators first mingled with the likes of 
Abetz, including Bertrand de Jouvenel, Alfred Fabre-Luce, and Pierre Drieu la Rochelle. 
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At the same time, however, the Sohlbergkreis also featured in the lives of well-known 
resisters including socialist martyr Pierre Brossolette (1903-1944), attorney and European 
activist André Weil-Curiel (1910-1988), and Social-Democrat Hermann Maass (1897-
1944), executed as a member of the Kreisauer Kreis. Finally, the Sohlbergkreis serves as 
a microcosm of the evolving relationship between the French and Germans in the 
turbulence of the early 1930s; its fraying reveals not only the deterioration of Franco-
German relations, but ideological fracturing within the French camp.  
 
Origins 
The Sohlbergkreis began at the initiative of art teacher Otto Abetz (1903-1958), 
then also head of the umbrella organization for youth groups in Karlsruhe, the 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Karlsruher Jugendbünde. Four and a half years after Locarno, Abetz 
sought out the young press magnate Jean Luchaire (1901-1946) at his Paris office. Moved 
by Luchaire’s book of the previous year, Une Génération réaliste, which portrayed both 
the anxieties that plagued his generation and the reformist spirit that guided it, Abetz 
believed he had found in Luchaire a kindred spirit. Accordingly, Abetz, accompanied by 
his close friend (and future brother-in-law) Friedrich Bentmann, proposed holding a joint 
summit, wherein youth from the two nations could discuss the possibility of leading the 
nations away from tensions and toward some form of coexistence.  
Abetz had spent the last ten months mapping out a plan and floating his ideas to 
his local constituents, who represented a diverse political, social, and religious base. 
Bearing the marks of the war and yet enjoying historic ties to the French, the citizenry of 
Karlsruhe, Abetz believed, could serve as the ideal guinea pigs for an experiment in 
cooperation. The 1916 bombardment and the postwar occupation had stirred up local 
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resentments, and because France was a close neighbor, the stakes were high. If an area so 
directly affected by the war proved willing to open the door to France, it could provide a 
useful model to the rest of Germany. Abetz’s bold plan sought to cut across both national 
and ideological boundaries at a time when neither was easily bridged.  
Abetz had lately become an avid francophile, a taste he had developed in art 
school and nurtured in an informal book club led by literary scholar Adolf von Grolmann 
(1888-1973), who would later speak at Sohlbergkreis events.293 Abetz’s biographer 
Barbara Lambauer has dated this interest in things French to around the time that 
Stresemann and Briand shared the Nobel Prize in 1926.294 Yet alongside his fascination 
with French culture, Abetz described having harbored much resentment at the nation 
which had shelled his town and imposed on his nation the Treaty of Versailles. “To the 
France of Force, I dedicated all of my hate,” he recalled, “to the France of the Mind 
[Esprit], all of my love.”295 Scholars have often fallen back upon Abetz’s own description 
of his “Janus-faced” view of France as a way to account for his seemingly contradictory 
actions, one moment fawning, the next vindictive, when he served as German 
Ambassador during the Second World War. At different moments, and to different 
audiences, Abetz presented himself in vastly different ways, which has made it difficult 
to pinpoint his character and motives. Consequently, he has been painted as a 
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misunderstood idealist, a disarmingly charming war criminal, an ambitious climber, and a 
shifty fraud. 
Successive layers of re-telling his own past have obscured Abetz’s actual point-
of-view. It is not even clear, once we peel away the layers, if there would be anything 
there at all. Some have, in this sense, portrayed Abetz as the ultimate accommodator, 
taking on whatever ideology (and personal associations) that would feed his insatiable 
ambition. This view, while more than plausible once the National Socialists were in 
power (though, to be sure, Abetz took some false steps), does not account for Abetz’s 
initial efforts to spearhead the Sohlbergkreis. There were surer ways to win points with 
the Weimar government, much less find his way to the hearts of the citizenry of 
Karlsruhe or the national leadership of Germany’s youth groups.  
The German youth movement had left a deep imprint on Abetz, above all by 
demonstrating the power of camaraderie. Abetz had spent over a decade in the 
Wandervogel, which fed his love of nature and likely fostered his ability to rely on his 
wits. Before he enrolled in art school—when he unhappily served as an apprentice at a 
bookstore—Abetz disappeared on a backpacking tour through Switzerland and Italy for 
several months. This rough and ready persona stayed with him. The young Radical 
journalist and Sohlbergkreis activist Bertrand de Jouvenel later recalled that Abetz had 
walked to the Rethel summit from Karlsruhe, with just a backpack on his shoulders; to 
the conference he led, Abetz wore a “two-piece gymnastics uniform in a rough blue 
flannel.”296 French members of the Sohlbergkreis evidently teased him for looking like a 
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“badly licked bear.”297 More outdoorsy than bookish, more enamored with the arts than 
business, politic without being political (at least early on), and thoroughly unconcerned 
with appearances, Abetz was well-suited to stand at the head of all Karlsruhe youth 
groups.   
From all reports, Luchaire, in contrast, was dazzling and precocious. He wrote for 
several major newspapers and claimed that the French left-wing press owed the majority 
of its international coverage to him by 1925.298 Certainly, by the age of 24, Luchaire had 
at minimum established himself as a commanding presence in the realm of the press. He 
compressed a full life into his short years: by 25, he had four children, heavy personal 
debt, and a ubiquitous presence in Radical circles.  Though not formally a member of the 
Radical Socialist Party, Luchaire was affiliated with the Radical press, became involved 
in groups close to the party (namely, the Fédération des jeunesses laïques et 
républicaines), and maintained close connections with party pillars Aristide Briand, 
Joseph Caillaux, and Édouard Herriot. His star rose so high that, in 1940, he was named 
head of the French press syndicate, which led to the later sobriquet “Führer of the French 
press.” Six years later, he faced the firing squad. 
As a teenager living in Italy, Luchaire had worked hard for French-Italian 
cooperation.  From the age of thirteen to eighteen, Luchaire lived and studied in Italy, his 
birthplace, where his father Julien Luchaire was Director of the French Institute of 
Florence, Milan, and Naples.  His illustrious father (for a time married to the editor of 
Nord und Süd Antonina Vallentin, a friend of Stresemann) later became the director of 
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the International Institute of Cooperation of the League of Nations. At thirteen, the 
younger Luchaire and his friend Gabriel Monod-Herzen began their own bilingual 
newspaper, Jeunes Auteurs (later renamed Vita latina, then Vita), which covered 
international affairs and attracted the notice of the French daily Le Matin, the Comité 
France-Italie, and the Latin Youth League. At the Latin Youth League, Luchaire 
advocated French-Italian cooperation—a Union latine—as the key to peace and an 
eventual European unity.299 It was 1917, and, though he had not experienced the horrors 
of the battlefield, Luchaire had seen plenty of blood as a volunteer at military hospitals in 
France and Italy. 
Luchaire harbored a particular animus against Mussolini, which surely played no 
small part in his turn away from notions of French-Italian and toward French-German 
cooperation. Swapping Italy for Germany, however, did not mean abandoning his dream 
of a united Europe. Throughout the 1920s, Luchaire pursued ideas of European-wide 
cooperation, whether by advocating Germany’s inclusion in the League of Nations in Le 
Petit Parisien, launching two journals devoted to the idea of Europe—the unsuccessful 
La jeune Europe and the far more influential Notre Temps, or attending Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s first Pan-European Congress alongside Yvon Delbos. In a 1932 article, 
Luchaire did not so much explicate his personal and much earlier transition away from 
the French-Italian to the French-German cause as he spelled out the implications of 
entente with each (as well as the attendant concessions) and the fact that working with the 
Germans risked little of any bearing to the French. Mussolini’s “violent” language 
signaled the need to tread carefully to avoid alarmism or aggravating the Italians. 
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Nonetheless, Luchaire dismissed what he called the French nationalist argument about 
Italy as a “Latin sister,” an idea he had avidly embraced a few years earlier, albeit from 
the left.300 Instead, he argued, the key to peace, European unity, and the maintenance of 
empire was entente with Germany.301 It therefore comes as no surprise that Luchaire, as a 
proponent of European unity and a champion of closer relations with Germany, readily 
acceded to Abetz’s plan. 
The meeting between Abetz and Luchaire led to a broader effort to recruit youth 
to attend a conference slated for late July and early August of 1930, just a few short 
weeks after the last French troops left the Rhineland. Promoting the encounter in 
Germany fell to Abetz and several of his friends, while in France, the task was shared by 
Luchaire and Cécil Mardrus, head of the recently founded Groupe universitaire franco-
allemand (Gufa), an association tied to the Sorbonne. The first congress drew 
approximately 120 French and German “youth” under age 35. The term was used loosely 
to identify those from about eighteen to those in their early 30s; these were not 
adolescents, but students and other young people near the start of their careers. Though 
perhaps too self-indulgent for working class youth,302 Sohlberg brought together 
numerous strands of French and German political thought and social experience. On the 
German side, they came from Karlsruhe youth groups under Abetz’s umbrella. An equal 
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number hailed from the young Social Democrats as from the young nationalists.303 Most 
of the French participants at Sohlberg were students at the Sorbonne; about thirty 
belonged to Cécil Mardrus’ Gufa.304 Some were readers of Luchaire’s Notre Temps, who 
had seen the announcements in the paper.   
German organizers lobbied in vain for governmental funds, until a last-minute 
fundamental reframing of the conference agenda by Karlsruhe teacher Gustav 
Mittelstrass brought satisfaction. Mittelstrass explained that the congress had nothing to 
do with “fraternization with random French people” but in fact had national interests at 
its core. It would bring together patriotic—in his words “national feeling”—groups from 
France and Germany “in the spirit of the leagues.” Mittelstrass’ canny pitch is the first 
indication we have that some Sohlbergkreis planners had come to the project from 
oblique angles or were simply willing to adjust their stated aims to find favor with 
officialdom. With this new platform in mind, the German contingent managed to secure a 
negligible amount of funding from the German Ministry of the Interior as well as from 
Baden’s Ministry of Culture and Education; in addition, it received a token pledge of 
support of the German Foreign Ministry in the form of waived visa fees for the French 
visitors.305  
The French government acted with even more caution than the German.  
Reticence to provoke controversy helps explain why French officials denied the group 
permission to hold its first Franco-German congress—with its provocative central themes 
                                                          
303
“Deux Jeunesses en Présence,” Notre Temps, 10 Aug. 1930. 
 
304PA-AA R98888 Telegram 1759. Zimmermann [AA] to Gesandten Freytag (19 July 1930). 
 
305Cf. Lambauer, 26-27; Dieter Tiemann, Deutsch-französische Jugendbeziehungen der Zwischenkriegszeit, 
Pariser Historische Studien vol. 28, ed. Deutschen Historischen Institut Paris (Bonn: Bouvier, 1989), 117; 
Unteutsch, 52, 249. 
 
 152 
on borders and identities—in recently recovered Strasbourg.306 Coming out of the storm 
of the 1928 trials of Alsatian autonomists, the region was not ready for another divisive 
episode.307 This decision shielded the Alsatian city from political protests or other 
turmoil, just as much as it protected participants from any trouble. The first gathering 
therefore took place on a remote mountain on the German side of the frontier, about 30 
kilometers from Strasbourg. In this way, the French government held much of the 
responsibility for lending the encounter not only its name, but also its rustic character, 
close in spirit to the German nature movement. The choice to hold the first meeting away 
from all distractions and societal influences, moreover, was instrumental to its success; 
alone in the wilderness, participants were not held captive to the prejudices around them 
and were able to enjoy a remarkable sense of intimacy.  
A couple of months after Sohlberg, some participants from Karlsruhe created the 
Kreis der Freunde der Sohlberg-Camp [Circle of Friends of Camp Sohlberg], a subgroup 
of Abetz’s Karlsruhe umbrella organization, soon renamed the Sohlbergkreis and 
extended to all of Germany. A year after the first conference, French participants 
followed suit and founded a group with the unwieldy title, the Comité d’entente de la 
jeunesse française pour le rapprochement franco-allemand [Entente Committee of 
French Youth for Franco-German Rapprochement], presided over by Luchaire. 
Developed to make up for the insufficiencies of Versailles at shaping a future peace,308 it 
acted as an organizational counterweight to the Sohlbergkreis. In theory, the Comité 
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d’entente incorporated about 270,000 members because it united many of the leading (not 
explicitly nationalist) youth groups of France including the Association Catholique de la 
Jeunesse française, Jeunesses Laïques et Républicaines, Fédérations des Associations 
Chrétiennes d’Étudiants, Foyer International des Étudiantes de Paris, Étudiants Jeunes-
Républicains, and Jeunesses Démocrates Populaires.309 It comes as little surprise, 
however, that these 270,000 individuals did not fundamentally change their stance toward 
Germany because of their notional ties to the Sohlbergkreis. 
Subsequent Sohlbergkreis meetings at Rethel and Mainz brought together 
members of an even broader range of youth groups. From France, participants came from 
Marc Sangnier’s Catholic Jeune République, the Radical Socialists, and the Second and 
Third International on the left and the nationalist Action Française and Jeunesses 
Patriotes on the right. While at the first meeting at Sohlberg, the Germans largely hailed 
from Karlsruhe, subsequent congresses saw them representing a variety of youth groups 
from throughout Germany from the socialist to National Socialist. After Hitler’s rise to 
power, meetings saw the German contingent winnowed down to those sympathetic to 
National Socialism. 
Between its major summits, a multitude of small gatherings and reunions took 
place. Immediately after Sohlberg, for example, a number of French participants traveled 
together through Germany. Their trip acted as its own form of public relations, as the 
group wrote up its happy impressions for the French press. A mixed French-German 
contingent met in the Black Forest after the second meeting at Rethel in order to continue 
their conversation, particularly on such matters as the youth movement. And each winter, 
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Sohlbergkreis veterans from both sides of the Rhine met at a Black Forest ski lodge for a 
week; there, they could reconnect and ensure that, as according to Luchaire’s wishes, 
they would not consign the Sohlberg experience to the realm of memory but instead 
internalize its message until the next round. 
For those who subscribed to its agenda, the Sohlbergkreis’ non-partisanship and 
readiness to draw from all quarters held tremendous appeal. Amid the political turmoil 
and fragmentation of both the Weimar Republic310 and the late Third Republic, a call to 
unity both across party lines and across national lines stood out as unconventional and  
even inspiring. Francophobia ran rampant in the German youth movement, and French 
young people were not exactly flocking to Germany in droves.311 Sohlbergkreis 
participants, in contrast, sought to liberate themselves from complacency, fatalism, and 
negativity; as a grassroots movement, the Sohlbergkreis would take charge and guard 
against the slide into another war. Here they could move “beyond government 
conferences and the League of Nations” and instead “take their fate in their own 
hands.”312 
 
 
Sohlberg 
Participants in the 1930 meeting at Sohlberg were convinced that the primary 
category of social identification was generation, a category that transcended identities of 
class, race, gender, and most importantly, national belonging. In this view, youth from 
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France and Germany had more in common than did either the citizenry of France or of 
Germany. This understanding of the importance of generation, of course, had dominated 
among the so-called “front generation” that had fought in the Great War. But most 
attendees at Sohlberg were in their twenties, and were thus too young to have served on 
the battlefield. Because their childhoods had been scarred by the war, however, they, too, 
shared a common experience and understanding of the war. Jean Luchaire dubbed them 
the “realist generation” in a book of that name he wrote in 1929.313 These youth held the 
keys to a peaceful future and, in the words of one of the Sohlberg speakers, harbored “the 
sense that it must create something new, a goal worthy of its life.”314 Such a goal 
expressed the desire to sacrifice as much as had their forebears, the front generation, but 
with a more peaceful end in sight. 
The talks at Sohlberg were larded with the language of sacrifice. Marked by their 
reading of Henri Barbusse and especially Erich Maria Remarque—the Lewis Milestone 
film of Remarque’s bestseller All Quiet on the Western Front had just been released in 
May315—Sohlberg speakers recalled the service of veterans to their nations, while trying 
to determine an equally committed form of service for the next generation. Their 
sacrifice, however, would not be physical but emotional.316  
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Their outlook was less All Quiet or Under Fire (and even less Storm of Steel) than 
it was Ernst Glaeser’s 1928 novel Jahrgang 1902: “The war, that’s our parents.”317 Abetz 
was eleven at the outbreak of war; Luchaire, barely thirteen. In Luchaire’s newspaper 
Notre Temps, launched in 1927 and, like Sohlberg, devoted to the “new European 
generations,” the editors contended that the war had created a “gulf” between those “who 
lived before” and “those coming after.” The plight of the younger generation, according 
to Notre Temps, was to “search anxiously” for the kind of solidarity shared by their elders 
that had been forged in the trenches.318 At Sohlberg, Luchaire described more particularly 
the ways in which the war had shaped the individual experiences of the entire group:  
We who knew nothing of life, we saw rise near us the abominable image 
of death, of that death that struck our fathers and our older brothers. We 
who played with tin soldiers, we discovered the bloody game of true 
soldiers. We had never dreamed of the world—and the world was revealed 
to our eyes in complete dislocation. We had not yet dreamed of examining 
the house in which we seemed compelled to live when that house 
collapsed with a crash. This disappearance scarcely touched us. But at an 
age when childish amusement and school works constitute the only 
preoccupations, we were brought to preoccupy ourselves with what could 
be our house of tomorrow, that which peace could bring us.319  
 
Their shared experience had defined them, but it could also grant them a sense of 
purpose.  
Sohlberg leaders borrowed some of the epic grandeur of war and applied it to the 
project of moral and intellectual demobilization. Key was to cast peace-making in a 
heroic mold. From solemn ceremonies to the level of basic rhetoric, the leaders of these 
encounters pitched their mission as noble, comradely, and even a touch soldierly. At the 
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first meeting of Gufa, where he promoted the French group and the upcoming encounter 
at Sohlberg, Cécil Mardrus used the language of war to add a sense of urgency (and a 
dash of romance) to the venture: “We must have the power to discuss [the war] among 
ourselves, not grudgingly like diplomats, but as powerful people, with all our being. 
Youth has an immense need to educate itself. We must marshal the forces that will aid it 
in vanquishing the past, and this law of the eternal return.”320 Later meetings at Rethel 
and Mainz included pilgrimages to memorials and cemeteries to pay homage to soldiers 
of war, and in the case of a monument to Gustav Stresemann, soldiers of peace.   
Sohlberg participants found the experience of the encounter at least as meaningful 
as the content of their discussions.321 For many, sociability, in informal morning 
exercises, on afternoon hikes, around the evening campfire, in the hostels or tents 
(staying in tents cost participants a bit less) at night, provided an impetus to join the 
group and later served as a warm reminder of the experience.322 Singing and dancing lent 
an informal air to the proceedings and encouraged mingling, especially for those unable 
to speak the language of the other.323 Luchaire described French and German participants 
play[ing] together like children.”324 One participant remembered the experience as a sort 
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of high: “The discovery of friends from the other side of the border was intoxicating. We 
were moved, many of us were changed for life,” he explained.325 Bentmann felt a 
“prickly excitement.”326 And Abetz recalled that “private relations were not neglected, 
and more than one Yvonne or a François met a Heinz or a Hilda on the solitary footpaths 
of the Black Forest.”327  
Unfortunately, Abetz’s lone statement remains one of the only traces we have of 
relations between the sexes at Sohlberg or any of the circle’s later conferences. Suzanne 
de Bruyker, Luchaire’s secretary—and after 1932, Abetz’s wife—may be the only 
woman we know by name present at Sohlbergkreis encounters. No women gave talks at 
any of these summits. By the second conference, women representing the Foyer 
International des Étudiantes [International Women Students’ Foyer] and the Frauenliga 
für Frieden und Freiheit [Women’s League for Peace and Freedom] were in attendance, 
and it is clear from both brief descriptions of dancing at Sohlberg and a group sketch in 
Notre Temps that at least some women were in attendance already at Sohlberg. This 
represented a change from the typical outings of German youth groups, separated by 
gender. But nothing in the record—from primary or secondary sources—sheds light on 
young women’s perspectives of the Sohlbergkreis. 
Informed by the youth movement, the nature movement, and a certain admiration 
for the Romantic movement—Luchaire himself drew the comparison between the youth 
of 1930 and those of 1830328—the Sohlbergkreis emphasized the culture and élan of 
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youth as well as the mystique of the land. First-hand accounts of the conference wax 
rhapsodic about the verdant hills, the vastness of the Rhenish plane, and the majestic 
spire of the Strasbourg cathedral on the horizon line. On these points, the sky, the grass, 
the trees, there is little variation. The borderland setting and its spectacular beauty seem 
to have underscored the resemblance between the two nations to participants. No records 
indicate that this similarity enabled revisionist fantasies of this area united under one rule, 
whether German or French. The symbolism of a manufactured (and imperceptible) 
border, however, echoed widely. 
Although the Sohlbergkreis drew on elements of the Wandervogel movement and 
the Romantic movement, it by and large used them to enliven the week rather than as its 
main focus. The emphasis was less on physical culture than on coexistence and learning. 
If there were hikes (and some chose to do morning exercises before the discussions began 
at nine), some of the excursions were more social and cultural in focus. At the invitation 
of the DFG-branch in Stuttgart, for example, Sohlberg participants toured the city and 
lunched with locals interested in France. 
Indeed, a closer look reveals that the Sohlbergkreis melded a variety of traditions. 
At first glimpse, the woodcuts and line-illustrations in Notre Temps and later the 
Sohlbergkreis reflected a notion of primitivism. More careful observation, however, 
divulges how these depictions of the Sohlbergkreis also celebrated the modern. Electric 
lights are interspersed with trees, a ship and a plane cross a globe, and a deco car streaks 
through the night; the image could easily grace the cover of The Great Gatsby. On an 
outing from the wilds of Sohlberg, the group toured and admired the Weissenhof 
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settlement in Stuttgart, at the cutting edge of urban planning and architectural design.329 
Above all, a vaguely pagan ritual around the campfire stands out as an expression of 
Sohlberg’s eclecticism. In this ceremony, a German pastor threw a crown into the flames 
“to pay homage to our valiant French and German brothers.” All then seized hands, and 
he cried, “We swear to hear the heralds of liberty: in the assault, we will defend the 
sacred mountains. Humanity will be saved by the union of free and brotherly men. Then 
the earth will be truly free and happy!”330 Led by a German pastor who invoked the fire 
of both Prometheus and Henri Barbusse—as well as the fire he saw at the Chemin des 
Dames—the fire ceremony ended with spirited (and apparently spontaneous) renditions 
of the Marseillaise and the Deutschlandlied, as well as, for some, the Internationale.331 
This patriotic and internationalist, Christian and earthly, ancient and modern mash-up 
jumbled a variety of cultural traditions; it did not, as a passing glance might suggest, 
reflect a return to a mythical past. 
Although it is tempting to consider the Sohlbergkreis as part of a turn against the 
modern, this would be a serious distortion of the group’s forward-looking ethos. The 
Sohlbergkreis was clearly neither a back-to-nature movement nor an anti-modern project. 
The revisiting of the past—especially the medieval heritage (according to Friedrich 
Bentmann, a “common heritage”)—came balanced with a modern twist. Art historian 
Kurt Martin, for example, spoke at once to the shared past and the promise of working 
together in the future in his discussion of the “fruitfulness” of French-German contact in 
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the medieval era, with its most obvious product, Gothic art and architecture. The focus on 
young generations represented only the most obvious of these future-oriented impulses. 
Talks concentrated on contemporary France and Germany, whether in the realm of the 
arts, religion, or social welfare. The theme invoked by Bentmann to open the 
conference—the inevitability of supranationalism—likewise became a major topic of 
conversation.332  
Scholars have focused on the sociability and experience of Sohlberg to the loss of 
the content of the meeting.333 But the talks mattered, too. They represented a variety of 
views and offered serious, thoughtful accounts of French and German culture and society. 
At Sohlberg, participants discussed not so much short-term political conflicts, but broader 
cultural and social trends. The idea was to determine points of convergence between the 
French and the Germans. They thus steered around political minefields, often dodging the 
white elephant in the Black Forest. 
At the conference, young scholars and journalists gave paired talks on a given 
theme, to be followed by group discussion. Arnold Bergsträsser (1896-1964) of the 
University of Heidelberg (and the Mayrisch Komitee and the DFG) and the student Cécil 
Mardrus, for example, spoke about social issues in their respective nations, while Guy 
Crouzet of Notre Temps and the Karlsruhe writer Adolf von Grolmann lectured on 
contemporary literature. Theology professor Otto Piper (1891-1976) and Jacques 
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Chabannes, editor of Notre Temps, each offered thoughts on the role of religion in recent 
years. Other sessions covered art, architecture, and politics. Participants hammered out 
how youth from the two countries could lead the nations away from tensions and toward 
some form of toleration or collaboration. They spoke of the promise of youth, the future, 
and Europe, just as they berated older, misguided generations and their heavy ideological 
baggage.  
A focus on transcending national boundaries did not mean that thinking in 
national categories was taboo. Lectures by and large retained firm boundaries of national 
identity because they aimed to illuminate the peculiarities of national life; in so doing, 
clichés emerged. Although these stereotypes were not offensive, they reinforced a strong 
sense of difference at a congress for youth from both countries. While the apparatus of 
the encounter was clearly balanced and the speakers addressed the same topics, many of 
the lectures relied on capsule portraits of the speakers’ homeland. Kurt Martin, for 
example, focused largely on the “German spirit” visible in German art, from Grünewald 
to Grosz; in so doing, he fell back upon reified German national characteristics about 
depth, angst, and irrationality.334 Friedrich Bentmann managed to shade some of the 
conference’s black-and-white thinking by pointing to areas where the two nations 
overlapped and shared a “common heritage”; ironically, he explained, the seemingly 
French phenomenon of “integral nationalism,” for example, stemmed from German 
antecedents, namely Nietzsche and Fichte.335   
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 The initiators of Sohlberg believed in national difference—but they saw in the 
French and the Germans more similarities than differences. They were not heralding a 
worldwide community—even England remained, to their minds, much different. But 
France and Germany together represented the first step toward Luchaire’s longer-term 
goal, a United States of Europe. Nationalism was condemned as a fixture of the past, but, 
nations were not. Luchaire spoke of a “mutual spirit of tolerance” that indicated a belief 
that identities would remain separate, though the French and the German would live and 
work together in a “new order.”336 
 Speakers had perhaps taken to heart the words of Gustav Stresemann’s Nobel 
lecture, where he confronted what he saw as the simplistic notion that “national 
solidarity” and “international cooperation” were opposites. Instead, Stresemann 
contended that great men “break the bonds which bind them to their own nations, yet they 
are great only because their inspiration is so firmly rooted in their own countries. 
National culture can act as a bridge, instead of an obstacle, to mutual spiritual and 
intellectual understanding.”337 At Sohlberg, participants concentrated on the congruence 
of the individual, the nation, and supranationalism.  
But it was Aristide Briand who played the role of absent star at Sohlbergkreis 
events—just as he did for Luchaire’s Notre Temps, which his office helped subsidize. 
Although having elder statesman Briand serve as mascot for the youth-oriented 
Sohlbergkreis may seem incongruous, Briand represented the spirit of cooperation for his 
work alongside Stresemann and most recently, as the originator of the proposal for a 
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“United States of Europe.”338 If Stresemann’s imprint was less visible, his recent passing 
surely weighed heavily on the group. The relative quiet surrounding Stresemann, 
moreover, can be attributed to Luchaire’s virtual hold on the initial image of the group 
through the mouthpiece of Notre Temps. Abetz, then later his friend Friedrich “Fritz” 
Bran (1904-1994), another Karlsruhe teacher, would eventually gain the upper hand with 
the release of the review entitled Sohlbergkreis (and then the Deutsch-Französische 
Monatshefte/ Cahiers franco-allemands).339 For the first meeting of the Sohlbergkreis, 
however, Luchaire crafted its public image, one that mirrored the Briandist face of Notre 
Temps. 
The pages of Notre Temps bled the editors’ admiration for Briand, above all his 
project for a United States of Europe. Across the continent, debates raged around how to 
construct such an entity: the relative merits of an economic versus a political union, the 
place of Britain and the Soviet Union as well as the place of European colonies, the 
advantages (and drawbacks) of defining this Europe specifically against the power of the 
United States and/or the Soviet Union, the problem of sovereignty, and basic 
administrative questions. Poincaré had faulted Briand for his imprecision in describing 
such a Europe, whether “European group, federative organization of Europe, European 
cooperation, coordination of European activities, federal link between European states, 
best arrangement of a simplified Europe, regime of a federal Europe, and the rest.” The 
vagaries, according to Poincaré, were not merely an issue of vocabulary, but extended to 
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the entire project itself.340 Luchaire brought this already inchoate vision of a united 
Europe to the Sohlbergkreis though he had elsewhere elaborated precise arguments. Talks 
at Sohlberg, however, aimed to avoid alienating listeners and bring them closer together. 
Sweeping, even fuzzy statements left more room for consensus.  
Sohlbergkreis leaders did not discount the importance of what Jean-Baptiste 
Duroselle has called the “pactomania” of the 1920s,341 but they saw their effort as the 
flipside of the coin. In addition to political rapprochement, there needed to be a meeting 
of the two peoples. As much as he lauded Briand in Notre Temps, Luchaire stressed a 
very different sort of cooperation from such diplomacy at Sohlberg. Here, he proclaimed 
the triumph not of rapprochement but of “intellectual and sentimental nudism.”342 Such 
figurative “nudism” referred to naked truths—to a liberation from the social conventions 
of national biases, a state where national identity did not override individual free will, and 
a democratic ethos wherein all were equal. Sohlberg participants were to bare their 
feelings and attain what they saw as an authentic brotherhood. Notre Temps took as its 
main lesson from Sohlberg that the “surest way to rapprochement” was through 
individuals. 
Sohlbergkreis leaders were more than happy to align themselves with Briandist 
politics in Notre Temps. Only at the meetings themselves did they dissociate themselves 
from political efforts. This distancing was tied, on the one hand, to the desire to 
differentiate youth from their elders, and on the other, to celebrate the openness 
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associated with the youth movement (and for that matter, the nudist movement). Here 
was the difference between the rapprochement of politicians’ guile and a genuine work 
for understanding. It also marked the space between mere words and action. Luchaire 
explained, “we barely spoke of rapprochement—but rapprochement happened hour by 
hour in our most spiritual intimacy.”343 
Cécil Mardrus placed more emphasis on words and discussion to come closer to 
an understanding.344 But, he and other leaders of Sohlberg as well as subsequent meetings 
agreed that what mattered was the working toward synthesis, not achieving some sort of 
verdict. At all of the meetings, participants purposively avoided issuing resolutions, 
formulating joint declarations, or establishing committees. Instead, they cared about the 
slow, steady work of adjusting attitudes. More than negotiations, the Sohlbergkreis 
provided a space for youth to improvise their way toward rapprochement. By taking the 
reins, youth could control the course of the future; their grassroots activism could pave 
the way to societal reform.  
 Unlike those who felt that postwar camaraderie would strengthen their own nation 
and accelerate the demise of the French Third Republic or the Weimar Republic they 
despised, members of the Sohlbergkreis, French and German alike, saw in comradeship 
the potential for peace. For them, group solidarity did not so much offer a chance to lash 
out against outsiders—as was the case in many nationalist and paramilitary organizations 
in both countries at the time—but instead provided an opportunity to make friends on the 
other side of the border. Their generation’s search for community, they hoped, would 
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extend beyond the realm of the national.345 The international thrust behind the first 
Sohlberg Congress therefore serves as an important reminder that the youth movement in 
Germany was not exclusively inward-looking, volkisch, and reactionary.   
Moreover, unlike those German youth groups whose international outreach only 
extended to activities to promote and strengthen the Germanness of German minority 
populations abroad, the Sohlbergkreis’ international work revolved around transcending 
national difference. In the 1920s, the bulk of youth groups’ international efforts revolved 
around Volkstumsarbeit in central Europe, the Baltic, and other regions with significant 
German populations. The West, and France in particular, were not simply off their radar, 
but considered objectionable. In 1929, for example, only 12 out of the 1640 members of 
the Freischar movement who traveled abroad that year visited France.346 At Sohlberg, in 
contrast, participants from each country arrived ready to learn about life in the other.   
The conference at Sohlberg did not so much turn the nationalist instruments of the 
youth movement on their head, by exploiting them for the purpose of encouraging 
international friendship, as it overturns our own assumptions about the nationalist 
character of the nature and youth movements. Living together in the wilderness worked 
to build camaraderie, whether for the typically nation-based youth groups or the motley 
crew that was the Sohlbergkreis. Indeed, the spirit of comradeship was strong enough at 
Sohlberg that there was no need for the uniforms, badges, or flags associated with youth 
                                                          
345For the view of postwar camaraderie in Germany as aggressively nationalist, see, for example, George L. 
Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990), especially p. 167-169. For a look at contemporary French movements opposed to the Third 
Republic, see Soucy, French Fascism: The First Wave. 
 
346Walter Z. Laqueur, Young Germany: A History of the German Youth Movement (New York: Basic 
Books, 1962), 238-239; Tiemann, 96-97. 
 
 168 
activism of all political persuasions; to be sure, participants at times hardly wore any 
clothes at all.347   
A telling irony, pointed out years ago by Aline Coutrot about youth movements 
more generally, relates to the way in which such groups withdrew from the very society 
that they hoped to improve.348 In the case of the Sohlbergkreis, of course, this isolation 
from the real world and the political crises, myths, and stereotypes that shaped it, was the 
clearest way in which a civil conversation could be had—and, moreover, in which the 
two peoples could most easily see their affinities and ability to get along. Free from the 
conventions of everyday life—out in the wild, removed from familiar circles of family 
and friends, even in a kind of limbo between France and Germany—these youth could try 
to work out their differences (and determine their similarities) and see whether it was 
possible to erect some sort of ideal society, where they could live side-by-side, at least far 
removed from the everyday pressures of national life. But conducting a conversation in 
the safety of a “lab” environment was quite different from replicating these conditions 
elsewhere.  
 
Rethel 
Participants soon learned the impossibility of inhabiting a space outside of 
political reality and cultural preconceptions. They brought more of their prior 
assumptions and political frustrations to the Sohlbergkreis’ second major summit, held in 
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the summer of 1931 at Rethel. Here, amid the battlefields of the Ardennes—about 
halfway between Sedan and Reims—national preoccupations, often filtered through 
national stereotypes, rose to the surface.  At Rethel, the edges of the Sohlbergkreis began 
to fray, with some French participants decrying the mounting nationalism they observed 
in their German peers. If nationalist suspicions infiltrated even their own circle, surely 
they represented an escalating threat. Yet, for those at its center, such tensions signified 
the need to step up their efforts for cooperation. 
Much of the congress proceeded like the last. French and German speakers gave 
twinned talks on a variety of contemporary issues. The overriding theme, “German Youth 
and French Youth Face the European Duty,” echoed the discussions from the previous 
year. Participants paid homage to the war dead, in this case by conducting a requiem 
service and laying wreaths at both French and German cemeteries. As at Sohlberg, the 
Rethel group hiked, sang, and mused over the resemblance between the French and 
German landscapes. They met, moreover, with gracious locals who, unlike DFG-Stuttgart 
branch members, had little reason to welcome their former foes to the still pockmarked, 
run-down region.349  
Participants arrived at Rethel as envoys from various youth groups. Some, like 
Max Clauss, came from specifically Franco-German organizations like the Mayrisch 
Komité or the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft. Most attendees from France belonged 
to left-leaning (non-Communist) youth groups or confessional organizations; by and 
large, these organizations fell under the mantle of Luchaire’s new Comité d’entente. On 
the German side, an even wider array of associations, leagues, and clubs for young 
people came to the table. Moreover, Secretary General of the Reichsausschuss Deutscher 
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Jugendverbände Hermann Maass, who could claim to speak on behalf of four million 
constituents in over 100 youth groups, took part. Some Germans announced their 
affiliations by their uniforms, absent the year before at Sohlberg.350  
Once participants no longer claimed autonomy as at Sohlberg, but instead served 
as spokespeople for various causes and ideologies, the struggle for resolution became 
much more difficult. Bringing in representatives of such groups may have expanded the 
impact of the Sohlbergkreis, but it came at the cost of achieving any synthesis. If the first 
encounter at Sohlberg aimed for the rapprochement of ordinary French and German 
people—a dialectical exchange of ideas along with the promotion of the social, 
emotional, and physical bonds of fellowship—the terms of later meetings made it much 
harder for the two peoples to meet each other halfway. As representatives of 
organizations and parties, participants at Rethel and later at Mainz had little space to 
negotiate.  
The tense political and economic climate did not help matters. Anxieties about the 
economy (global and local) and the future direction of the German state, both in terms of 
Nazi electoral gains and plans for a German-Austrian customs union, suffused the 
conference. German speakers were clearly haunted by the economic crisis at home, 
though they also were surprised to see traces of destruction across the French landscape, 
from the fields to the towns; the region around Rethel looked particularly depressed. In 
fact, the recognition that both sides suffered proved one of the most important glimmers 
of hope for the conference.351 Meanwhile, the French worried about the rising specter of 
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nationalism on the other side of the Rhine. The elections of the previous September and 
the Grossdeutsch pretensions of the projected customs union were the most telltale signs 
of a growing problem, which, as they recognized, would only deteriorate with continued 
economic woes.  
At Rethel, several speakers exposed a certain defensiveness, as they tried to 
explain the legitimacy of their nation’s perspectives. There were attempts to tamp it 
down, and some peacemaker types like Pierre Viénot (and for that matter Luchaire), 
worked hard to call attention to common ground. But this defensive posturing 
characterized many of the sessions and frustrated listeners almost as much as the 
arguments themselves. In his discussion of the economic dimension of Europe, Max 
Clauss of the Mayrisch Komitee, for example, urged the audience to recognize that 
German destitution lay behind his country’s unwillingness to embrace the European 
union put forward by Briand. More generally, blame was placed at the feet of Versailles 
for encouraging the rise of the extreme right in Germany. Participants did not hide behind 
niceties: Germans resentfully called reparations “tribute payments,” and the French 
denounced what they considered the entire German worldview of Volk.  
Without a doubt, the sharpest disconnects accompanied discussions of the concept 
of Volk. French attendees could not seem to wrap their heads around the notion, at least 
not to the satisfaction of their German counterparts. Certainly, Volk seemed an alien 
concept at a summit based on building a new social community beyond the national; 
French speakers deplored the parochialism and retrogression of peering at the world 
through the lens of the Volk, whether the Volkspartei, Volksgemeinschaft, or Volksstaat. 
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Many Germans, in turn, were offended by such direct attacks on their cultural 
touchstones. 
Cynicism flowed in both directions at Rethel. Germans suspected that the French 
pursuit of a federated Europe cloaked national ambitions, a perspective privately shared 
by the German Foreign Ministry. In this view, the French and the Briand Plan more 
particularly used the language of cooperation to try to achieve French political goals.352 
In Germany more broadly, conservatives tended to see French aspirations for Europe-
wide hegemony embedded in various European projects, even Austro-Hungarian Richard 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Paneuropa.353 Of course, these precise accusations would come 
back to bite the Germans once the Nazis came to power. Skeptics on each side thus 
would see the other nation erecting a smokescreen out of the rhetoric of Europe. 
Some attempts at finding common ground simply misfired. Radical journalist 
Bertrand de Jouvenel (1903-1987), later famous for his 1936 interview of Hitler and his 
attempts to win court with the Nazis, showed himself eager to please the Germans at 
Rethel.354 As a way to kill two birds with one stone, Jouvenel suggested the Germans 
solve their Lebensraum problem through resettlement in French colonies in Africa; such a 
move, he contended, would also work toward the goal of Franco-German 
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understanding.355 Here was a baffling proposal neither they, nor the French, would 
approve.  
Luchaire diagnosed the problem at Rethel as, on the one hand, the German 
fixation with Volk, and, on the other hand, the French obsession with the “realization of 
Europe according to the French ideal.”356 This butting of heads was particularly apparent 
throughout the twinned talks by Walter Reusch and Pierre Brossolette on foreign policy. 
Reusch, speaking as a “right-wing intellectual” on behalf of the National Socialists, 
outlined in careful, calm language a thoroughly revisionist argument, addressing the 
issues of reparations, German minorities, and the Polish corridor/Eastern Europe. 
Socialist Brossolette, who wrote for Notre Temps, in contrast, used his platform at Rethel 
to discuss the possibilities for a European Union and the threat to such opportunities 
posed by the “theory of the Volk.”357   
Yet the ensuing clash of opinions did not simply break down along national lines. 
A German “socialist-communist” railed against Reusch’s platform, and was duly and 
enthusiastically applauded. Conversely, the left-leaning Notre Temps, likely in a bid to 
make Germans look less aggressive to French readers, made sure to point out that Reusch 
came across as “sympathetic and practical.” Here was one instance, to be repeated at 
future gatherings, of the ideological faultlines revealing themselves as deeper than the 
national. (Of course, this indicated, too, that cracks were appearing everywhere.) 
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Reusch’s shrewd placement of radically nationalist arguments within a European frame 
did not fool many. Contending that “our thoughts relative to the autonomy of minorities 
and the Anschluss are truly European conceptions,” was rather transparent, but it clearly 
seems to have lent the argument a necessary veneer of respectability; Reusch’s speech at 
Mainz the following year would prove even more divisive, particularly along national 
lines.   
Perhaps the oddest meeting of the minds, witnessed with great enthusiasm by 
Luchaire as a significant break with the past, involved the friendly relations between 
young French and German nationalists at Rethel. When Luchaire saw members of the 
Jeunesses Patriotes “conversing cordially” with young Nazis, he realized, in his words, 
the “immense resource of peace in our initiative because it succeeded in uniting in a 
mutual effort of comprehension young men, whom political logic would seem only to 
have designated to meet perhaps with arms in hand on a bloody field of barbed wire.”358 
There is no question the Nazis and the French nationalist paramilitary organization, 
whose leader Pierre Taittinger had decried Locarno, attacked the notion of allowing 
Germany into the League of Nations, and insulted Briand, made for strange bedfellows. 
By 1930, however, Taittinger’s escalating anti-Communism led to the Soviet Union’s 
displacement of Germany as enemy number one; then, too, the Jeunesses Patriotes 
enjoyed a brief period of relative restraint, until the left returned to power in 1932. Some 
conference-goers, to be sure, wondered what either group was doing at Rethel in the first 
place when both had made a habit of showing up to leftist meetings only to brawl. This 
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can perhaps in part be explained by Taittinger’s fascination with Hitler359 as well as 
general curiosity to see how the Germans were responding to the crisis of Weimar 
democracy. For their part, the Nazis and other German nationalists saw the Sohlbergkreis 
as an opportunity to advocate revisionism. 
As some participants beat a path to the right, others pushed in a new direction and 
parted company with the Sohlbergkreis. Frustrations at Rethel led the delegation from the 
“third way” Ordre Nouveau, the journal Plans, and their sympathizers to break off from 
the Sohlbergkreis to stage their own meetings geared toward fighting capitalism, 
nationalism, and more specifically Hitlerism. At Rethel, they declared a new Front 
unique de la jeunesse européenne. This revolutionary front not only battled the forces of 
the right, but also squared off against Briandism and what they saw (at best) as the 
ineffectual pacifism of the left. Shortly before the third Sohlbergkreis summit, these 
defectors, including Alexandre Marc, Philippe Lamour, and Harro Schulze-Boysen, held 
a conference for European youth in Frankfurt, with the aim of constructing a European 
New Order.360 
 Notre Temps did not try to sugarcoat what happened at Rethel, though surely it 
tried to offer hope. Even at the conference itself, Luchaire acknowledged the possibility 
that participants “were maladroit in the choice of our words, that something in our 
reciprocal intentions was lost in translation, or even that we did not know exactly how to 
express what we felt because our sensations, being still often confused in us and too fresh 
to be made precise, were difficult to express to ourselves.” Miscommunication had 
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impeded the discovery of the “common denominator of French and German youth.”361 
Erich Benz of the DFG saw a stark “want of confidence” among French attendees, 
similar to what their compatriots had exhibited after the war.362 From this perspective, the 
two sides did not even attempt to achieve commensurability.  
 One eager participant of the Sohlbergkreis left Rethel deeply disappointed. In his 
twelve-column letter to Jean Luchaire published in Notre Temps in three installments, 
François Berge (also of Notre Temps) lamented that Rethel had consisted of an 
“exchange of monologues” rather than true dialogue. Conversations had not always been 
productive, and a number of important topics were never broached. Berge resorted to 
praising trifles: The songs, the prayer service for the war dead, and an auspicious rainbow 
moved the entire group. Berge described this as a “mirage,” whose “power was stronger 
than any thought, any word. In an instant, we were all standing at the windows, mute. 
The marvel of nature had again renewed our common soul. At that moment also we felt 
that we loved each other, we felt this human vibration, which for resolute hearts is the 
most irreproachable stimulant to work and to understanding.” Berge meant, not that a 
week of talk had been for naught, but that, in fact, there was still room for hope.363 
Reading between the lines, we can see that participants were still struck by the 
symbolism of what they were trying to achieve and captivated by their own daring. 
There, too, lay a certain force for change.  
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 In spite of the conflicts at Rethel, some still found merit in the experience of 
coexistence. As part of a group of French travelers that met with a rump contingent from 
the Sohlbergkreis (fresh from Rethel) in the Black Forest resort village of Kniebis, the 
young French journalist Claude Bellanger (1910-1978) wrote to the editors of 
Sohlbergkreis in praise of their project. The simplicity of his comments is striking: 
French and Germans found ourselves together, living and chatting 
together. We sat at the same table and discussed current problems of great 
importance. No one minced words. Was this not more instructive than 
reading the sometimes quite contradictory news in the almost always 
tendentious newspapers? Here we could get to know each other through 
personal contacts and at the same time become conversant with the most 
disparate opinions because each of us is free to have different convictions. 
But mustn’t knowing each other [Sichkennen] soon turn into 
understanding each other [Sichverstehen]?364  
 
As much as cracks snaked across the surface of the encounter at Rethel, alliances still 
formed and personal relationships developed, sometimes in surprising places.   
The signal achievement of Rethel—viewed as a retreat by scholars and most 
participants—was to address points of contention head-on. Above all, this meant that 
discussions hewed to (or sometimes simply reverted to) the problems of Versailles.  
Although youth at Sohlberg had not ignored questions of reparations and war guilt, 
borders and prejudice, they worked together to try to come to terms with the other point-
of-view. At Rethel, in contrast, participants were eager to show they were not soft-
pedaling the issues, that they were not naïve dreamers who achieved little. 
Sohlberg and Rethel, then, represented two very different steps in the integration 
process. As a social experiment, Sohlberg gathered youth from both nations to live, play, 
and learn together. There, speakers focused on legitimating the contributions of both 
nations, participants worked to appreciate the other’s point-of-view, and all tried to 
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identify points of commonality. At Rethel, participants moved to confront the problems 
that menaced French-German relations. Not surprisingly, this yielded a bumpier ride.  
In the face of tensions at Rethel, Luchaire gave ground. For Luchaire, French-
German cooperation was an essential condition for European cooperation. Under 
pressure, however, he admitted the need to play down his longer-term goal in recognition 
that participants—much less, Europeans more generally—were not yet ready for a 
European federation. Luchaire therefore placed his cherished United States of Europe 
alongside a range of “false absolutes” such as “mythomania, megalomania,” and the 
dreaded Volk. Those seeking entente needed to throw aside dogma and try harder to meet 
each other halfway. Above all, heightened tensions meant a need for increased 
engagement. “All other roads would lead us,” Luchaire explained, “to the cemeteries that 
marked the limits of our friendly walks.”365  
 Years later, Abetz wrote that Rethel ended in a “big question mark.” For Abetz, 
the questions were multiple: “Could a good German renounce equality of rights for his 
people? A good Frenchman abandon his right to security? Or would there not be enough 
place in Europe for the development of two states, powerful and conscious of themselves, 
both in full economic prosperity?”366 All of these questions, of course, led back to 
Versailles and rehashed the same doubts, fears, and debates that had cast their shadow 
over the last decade.   
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Mainz 
 A giant poster calling, in French, “for the disarmament of nations” hung over the 
main hall of the citadel in Mainz for the third summit of the Sohlbergkreis in March of 
1932. Jean Carlu’s iconic photomontage of an enormous shell hurtling toward a shocked 
woman cradling a screaming baby did not sit well with all attendees.367 Some French 
participants had brought the poster, recently created on behalf of Carlu’s own Office of 
Graphic Propaganda for Peace and the Action Committee for the League of Nations, to 
the Franco-German congress. Its pacifist and universalist message—the heads of the 
mother and child were superimposed on a globe—clashed with the overall tone of the 
conference. Indeed, the citadel itself proved a more appropriate symbol of the conference, 
as the French and Germans each drew back toward their own camps to defend their 
national positions. 
 Barbara Lambauer suggests that one of the markers that “Sohlberg’s time had 
passed” by the encounter at Mainz related to the shift to an urban setting.368 While there 
is no doubt that, by 1932, the character of the Sohlbergkreis had transformed, the choice 
of locale mattered for quite a different reason than Lambauer has suggested. Her 
argument risks implying that Sohlberg had originally been anti-urban or even anti-
modern, which, as we have seen, it was decidedly not. The more germane issue regarding 
a change in venue relates to the fact that the third summit was originally slated for 
Aachen, not Mainz; we do not know why this plan altered. All sites considered for the 
Sohlbergkreis—Mainz’s citadel, Aachen, Strasbourg, Rethel, and to a lesser extent 
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Sohlberg itself—proved symbolically charged. French occupying forces had used the 
Mainz citadel as their base until they left the Rhineland in 1930.369 In the best light, the 
citadel represented the potential for equality and the end of dominance by one side over 
the other. A more cynical perspective would attribute the choice of Mainz’s citadel—then 
home to the Institut für Völkerpädogogik—as an assertion of bald-faced nationalism, 
especially when contrasted to traditional connotations of Aachen as a capital of 
Europeanness and French-German unity.370 
At Mainz, the Sohlbergkreis became a venue for asserting national differences 
and staking out national interests. Accordingly, from the perspective of cooperation, what 
mattered at Mainz was not so much the content of the arguments made—they were not 
particularly innovative and tended to replicate standard national or party stances—but the 
ways in which conference-goers debated. Though some conference-goers looked for 
openings to bring the two nations closer, many stubbornly proclaimed their nationally-
grounded arguments and held that line, leaving no room for maneuver. Tempers 
sometimes flared, leaving hope in the ashes. Participants hewed more to the spirit of 
Rethel than Sohlberg, and quite clearly had fallen sway to Gustav Mittelstrass’ idea of the 
group’s national agenda.  The meeting at Mainz involved more representatives of the 
extreme right—notably the addition of members of the Hitler Youth and Gustave Hervé’s 
National Socialist Youth—which without doubt shaped the sometimes-hostile climate.  
Indeed, attendees at Mainz violated the informal compact that had governed at 
Sohlberg: generational solidarity and the rapprochement of peoples. Although they paid 
                                                          
369After the Second World War, the citadel served as headquarters for the French High Commission’s 
Cultural Bureau.  
 
370Tiemann, 125.  
 181 
lip service to some of the ideas of Sohlberg, such as the “collective consciousness of 
youth” and “collective responsibility” for “Franco-German relations,” the language and 
the attitudes at Mainz showed a marked difference from the first encounter, above all 
through the hardening into national camps. Merely the emphasis on “relations” rather 
than solidarity (much less intellectual nudism) offered striking evidence of a sharper turn 
toward national sensibilities than at Rethel. The Sohlbergkreis issue devoted to Mainz 
opened with an expression of German national unity: “We felt in Mainz—from those on 
the right to those on the left—as the youth of one Volk and had therefore undertaken 
together the encounter with the other nation.”371 Even after enjoying concerts, attendees 
at Mainz resorted to discussing the place of the nation: was music universal such that 
there could be “international comprehension” or in fact was there “an absolute national 
stance” in musical composition?372 National solidarity seemed to trump international 
cooperation; the two were no longer mutually reinforcing. 
At Mainz, organizers had tried to balance the cultural and political. As at Rethel, 
discussions revolved around the most controversial issues of the day, including 
Versailles, reparations, and borders. But they also had incorporated more cultural 
events—from mounting a book fair and both French and German art exhibits to attending 
the Goethe anniversary festivities in Frankfurt. Planners had hoped these cultural 
activities, along with a passing fancy to restructure the meeting into small group 
discussions, might help avoid friction. But, in the end, the entire Sohlbergkreis gathered 
together to listen to talks on a variety of subjects and then argue over them.    
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The idea of rapprochement, however loosely used, fell to the wayside. Briand had 
passed away just a couple of weeks before the encounter, but the Sohlbergkreis held no 
memorial for him at Mainz. Luchaire’s absence due to a severe cold likely accounts for 
some of the lack of deference paid to the hero of Locarno, but the overriding atmosphere 
would not have been conducive to honoring Briand in any case. Rather than uniting the 
group, a pilgrimage to a monument to Stresemann had highlighted internal divisions (in 
this case ideological) when only left-leaning participants from both nations took part. 
Now, not only were they not talking about rapprochement as at Sohlberg, they were not 
practicing it either.  
The summit’s tone veered from hostile to courteous to conciliatory. A talk on 
German unemployment and poverty by socialist pastor Heinz Kappes, who had led the 
fire ceremony at Sohlberg, moved the French audience. A visit to a local work camp then 
consolidated sympathies for the German plight.373  Kappes’ efforts likely played more of 
a role in persuading some of the French to concede points on the reparations issue than 
did one German’s more vituperative rant that the Germans no longer wanted to be a 
“tributary slave people” to the French. Another German sharply accused the French of 
having launched an economic “war” against his people, then faulted the French for 
German suffering.374  
Representing the Nazi German Student League, Walter Reusch, who had touched 
off arguments at Rethel, managed to alienate even those French most inclined to mediate. 
Reusch proclaimed the need for the revision of Versailles, a new order, and Lebensraum, 
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but it was his contentions about Alsace that most aggravated French listeners. Reusch 
argued that Locarno had settled the Alsatian question on a political level, but that the 
French still had to give in on a cultural level so Alsatians could enjoy their place within 
the “German Kulturgemeinschaft.” Up in arms, the French retorted that Alsace was an 
issue of domestic politics only. In an artful understatement, one Frenchman pointed out 
that he thought he detected a note of pan-Germanism (in French eyes, an atrocity) in 
Reusch’s talk. In vain, German writer Hans Hartmann tried to find a solution amenable to 
all.375  
Angry outbursts were thus matched by attempts at negotiating and even 
understanding. François Berge, a lecturer at the University of Heidelberg who led the 
French contingent in Luchaire’s place, sought to rectify some of the problems he had 
rued at Rethel. To help avoid misunderstandings, for example, he advocated more 
rhetorical precision. To a similar end, the group proposed a concrete project to develop a 
specialized French-German dictionary of abstract, thorny concepts important for the 
issues of the day, including “Volkstum, Zivilisation, Heimat, sécurité.”376 With such a 
dictionary in hand, relations between the two nations, whether within the framework of 
the Sohlbergkreis or more broadly, would be easier to navigate. Some participants 
envisioned more elaborate plans, such the slow path to disarmament, or notably, a 
European army. Even Abetz showed qualified support for such a European army, but for 
him, the Germans first needed to secure equal rights with other states. Germans, 
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including Abetz, showed themselves to be revisionists, interested in overturning 
Versailles, though he surely came across as more moderate than most.377 
Without doubt, divisions in the Sohlbergkreis had deepened. The extreme right 
had not hijacked the organization, but these voices tended to drown out those seeking 
compromise. To be fair, two representatives of Hervé’s National Socialist Youth tried to 
show that some of the French population remained open to conciliation; they played a 
conspicuous role in accepting the bulk of the German nationalist platform. German 
nationalists, however, undercut the work of the Sohlbergkreis by their insistent demands 
and their refusal to negotiate. Notwithstanding such discord, plenty in the group still 
believed the effort worthwhile and earnestly strived to find common ground. Hans 
Hartmann, for one, thought that certain discussions on reparations and the revision of 
Versailles had yielded important compromises; due to participants’ political connections 
and their broader influence among youth in both nations, the Sohlbergkreis might wield 
the power to change the future. Moreover, both sides had learned much about the other’s 
culture in those few days at Mainz.378 In addition, living together side-by-side still held 
value. The tolerance Luchaire had championed since the first meeting at Sohlberg went a 
long way toward keeping the minds of some participants open, even as some came to the 
conference at Mainz already convinced of the superiority of their national perspective.  
  
1933: A Time to Adjust? 
 The 1933 Nazi takeover of Germany would lead to the further fragmentation of 
the Sohlbergkreis on the French side, and its consolidation on the German. For French 
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proponents of cooperation, the nagging question beloved by their adversaries—should we 
seek cooperation with our dangerous foe?—now suddenly seemed appropriate to ask. In 
an article in one of the last issues of the Deutsch-Französische Rundschau, Bertrand de 
Jouvenel made the choice look easy: “Democratic Germany is dead. Do we still want the 
French-German accord? We must do it with nationalist Germany. Is it easy? No. Is it 
possible? Yes.”379 But not everyone saw the merit in upholding the principles for which 
they had been fighting under these new circumstances. 
 Doubts about the venture struck even the Sohlbergkreis’ most diehard proponents. 
Secretary General of the Comité d’Entente André Weil-Curiel recalled telling his close 
friend Abetz—who was contemplating not only dropping the initiative but emigrating to 
France—that he needed to help the group stay the course:   
It’s not at the moment when Franco-German relations threaten to get 
spoiled that we should abandon our work, I told him. We don’t need 
another émigré here [in France], but men like you who can explain to your 
compatriots that the French are not all ogres who want to devour 
Germany, that we are happy to work for the redressing of the most glaring 
injustices Germany is complaining about and that cleared the way for 
Hitler. If we obtain satisfaction for you, we can hope to see your crisis of 
nationalism fade and the measures of defiance that Hitler is taking right 
now against the Jews (because he has nothing better to sink his teeth into) 
could without a doubt be rescinded. If you feel the courage to work in this 
way, it’s necessary that you stay.380  
 
Weil-Curiel’s advice did not go unheeded. Soon Abetz resumed arranging the next 
Sohlbergkreis conference, and he did not look backward. 
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 In short order, Abetz seemed to have forgotten his reluctance to continue the 
Sohlbergkreis and instead sought to expand it with the new regime’s stamp of approval. 
His ties to France had raised red flags with the Nazi administration, which presumed him 
to be a spy. Moreover, on 5 March 1933, Abetz was stripped of his duties as head of the 
confederation of Karlsruhe youth groups, in keeping with the regime’s nationwide 
absorption of most youth groups.381 Abetz accordingly moved quickly to assert his 
national loyalties, in particular by inquiring about the possibility of opening up the 
Sohlbergkreis to Belgians.382 The expansion of the enterprise to Belgium might assuage 
concerns that its (and his own) special relationship to France signified a dangerous 
connection to notions of liberty, equality, and fraternity, anathema to the new German 
regime. Furthermore, though seemingly paradoxically, lending the Sohlbergkreis a more 
European air would make it appear more geared toward a German nationalist project. 
Belgium was a particularly smart choice in light of Germany’s revisionist goals in Eupen-
Malmédy.  
 That spring, Abetz joined officials at the German Foreign Ministry and the Paris 
Embassy for a complex dance to determine the fate of the Sohlbergkreis. Abetz did not 
know what to expect from the new regime, which had yet to establish its strategies for 
foreign policy.383 In these first weeks therefore, the Sohlbergkreis’ place in the new order 
(if any) remained entirely unclear. It was Abetz who took the initiative to enlist support 
from Nazi officialdom, which conflicts, not surprisingly, with the account in his 
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memoirs.384 Although the Sohlbergkreis had scheduled an Easter encounter for Paris, 
German officials counseled Abetz to let the meeting drop because the timing was 
“inopportune;” moreover, they feared German participants might betray (unwittingly or 
not) a degree of dissension with regard to the new regime. Abetz, however, managed to 
convince the authorities that canceling with the French altogether might set off “alarm 
bells” that the Nazi regime wanted to put a stop to Weimar’s Verständigungspolitik. As 
Abetz played it, Germans had major public relations work ahead to show “the true 
character of the Hitler movement” and “today’s Germany” to the world.385 Together, 
officials and Abetz reached a compromise in delaying the Sohlbergkreis summit until the 
fall, and in the interim, holding a more intimate encounter in Paris in April.  
When it came to organizing the Paris meeting, Abetz went out of his way to 
please the Nazi administration. He quickly informed the German Embassy of his plan, 
one that pledged to forward official policy. “To avoid any misunderstandings” at the 
April Sohlbergkreis meeting, Abetz would personally select a crew of about ten Germans 
who “stand strongly behind the new regime.” These, Abetz assured the authorities, he 
would apprise of government guidelines prior to the meeting so there could be the 
appearance of a united German front. This small team would address a larger French 
contingent, made up of journalists, editors, and writers able to influence public opinion; 
in this way, Abetz hoped to forestall a smear campaign in the French press. These 
included a handful from Notre Temps as well as individuals such as Alfred Fabre-Luce 
(1899-1983), Pierre Drieu la Rochelle (1893-1945), and Bertrand de Jouvenel. In the 
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interest of maintaining “valuable connections to young France,”386 the Paris meeting also 
included French representatives of a variety of left-leaning or confessional youth 
groups—among them the French University Group for the League of Nations, Marc 
Sangnier’s Sillon, and the Ligue d’Action Universitaire Républicaine et Socialiste 
(Republican and Socialist League of University Action, LAURS). In addition, two 
members of Gustave Hervé’s National Socialist Youth took part.  
At the Paris meeting of the Sohlbergkreis, both the French and the Germans 
seemed on the surface amenable to new perspectives. The French side listened to 
information and corrections about the new regime “furnished” by the German contingent; 
the German side acknowledged the status of Alsace-Lorraine as French, stating that the 
new regime, like the old, accepted the Locarno accords.387 This Sohlbergkreis event 
unfolded as a (closed doors) press conference. Though it did not resemble the bilateral 
encounters of the past, the question and answer session served French attendees’ needs of 
the day. All present wanted to know what was transpiring across the Rhine, and why 
young Germans had turned to Nazism. 
The meeting in Paris demonstrated the degree to which Abetz and the German 
contingent had adopted the Nazi line wholesale. The information they spouted to their 
French counterparts—on rearmament, minorities and borderlands—clearly replicated the 
party line without apology. They made clear the regime’s aspirations to unite the German 
people in Austria, Danzig and the Polish Corridor, the Saar, and Upper Silesia into one 
state. They even explained resentment against Jews as a function of their association with 
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the “system of 1918-1933” seen as “an instrument of execution by the victorious powers 
of 1918.” But they also played up their peaceful intentions toward Europe (bashing 
pacifists—who made up a chunk of the French contingent—all the while). In the course 
of spinning the new regime to their French audience, the Germans took care to 
contextualize it with reference to the French revolutionary tradition; in the German case, 
however, revolution had been humane, “legal and bloodless.”388 
Abetz reported the Paris meeting as a success to the German administration. The 
French, he explained, listened carefully and seemed open to German ideas. What is more, 
the Sohlbergkreis could serve as a useful means by which to influence the French press in 
the future, whether via existing personal contacts, letters, or talks.389 In this way, he 
opened up the Sohlbergkreis to its instrumentalization. 
It is difficult to judge why Abetz drew the attention of Nazi officialdom to the 
Sohlbergkreis and its potential utility for the new regime. Was it a way to ensure the life 
of the project to which he had devoted the last few years of his life? Did he hope to serve 
the Nazi regime as effectively as possible? Or had he in fact always considered the 
Sohlbergkreis as a vehicle for promoting the German image abroad? In all probability, it 
was a combination of these factors; they need not be considered incompatible. Whereas 
there is no real evidence pointing to Abetz as a devotee of Nazism at that point, there is 
no doubt he chose to work alongside the Nazi administration from an early date. Where 
we see this as a momentous decision, he likely did not.  
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Abetz had likewise made clear to the Weimar administration his desire to serve 
German interests. In a private conversation which began as a quest for funds, the leaders 
of the German contingent revealed a purpose behind the Sohlbergkreis that would have 
stunned its French constituents. A couple of months before Rethel, Abetz sent a report to 
several government offices explaining that the Sohlbergkreis acted as a “false front” 
[Blendwerk] to mask its advocacy of German interests. The Sohlbergkreis therefore took 
on a public relations function in the West reminiscent of the Volkstumsarbeit other youth 
groups undertook in the East, whether in Central Europe, the Balkans, or the Baltic. The 
Sohlbergkreis would help present the German point-of-view to the French.390 Abetz 
thereby built on the precedent of Gustav Mittelstrass in trying to curry favor with the 
Weimar administration, at least when in search of monetary support. In similar fashion, 
Fritz Bran made sure to welcome the new German ambassador in Paris in 1932 with a 
letter introducing the work of the Sohlbergkreis. As he explained, the Sohlbergkreis did 
not follow “some formula for understanding” but worked “without illusions” for the two 
peoples to get to know one another. Bran spelled out the group’s utility, most particularly 
for the German government: “Our goal is the objective, sober instruction of young 
Germany for the reality of foreign affairs. It would be our pleasure to be of use to your 
great diplomatic mission.”391  
By the summit at Rethel, the organizers of the Sohlbergkreis had shown their 
adeptness at making cooperation palatable to wholly different groups. The leaders of 
Sohlberg did a masterful job creating a community around the notion of generational 
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solidarity to defeat Franco-German enmity. But they also managed to gain the nominal 
support of first the Weimar, then the Nazi authorities. A complex game of doubletalk did 
not preclude Sohlbergkreis organizers from being devout proponents of cooperation. Ties 
to both German regimes—and the wish to further national interests must not be seen as 
undercutting Abetz’s dedication to the Sohlbergkreis or better relations with the French. 
Abetz was and had been firmly committed to the revision of Versailles, the solidarity of 
the “realist generation,” and the potential for France and Germany to work together 
toward a better European future.392   
 Though scholars disagree on their overall evaluation of Abetz, they agree upon 
his political acuity and diplomatic panache. His flair for calibrating his language and 
actions to suit his interlocutors veil when, how quickly, (and, for some, if at all) Abetz 
turned into an avid supporter of the Nazi regime. But it is clear that, in France, those who 
began to object to the Sohlbergkreis in 1933 did not have Abetz in mind. To those who 
quickly made their case against the Sohlbergkreis public like Victor Basch, head of the 
French League of Human Rights, the problem with the organization lay in its openness to 
all voices from Germany, including the National Socialists. Infuriated, Basch decried that 
young Hitlerians returned to Berlin and could say that there is only one 
non-fascist country where they were cordially welcomed and understood 
with sympathy and that country is France, and in France [it is] the youth, 
and among those youth, the flower of the left and the pacifists! What an 
unexpected vindication and what magnificent encouragement to 
persevere!393  
 
In addition, the League of Human Rights issued a statement in May 1933 announcing that 
its members “could not conceive of useful collaboration between pacifist groups from 
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France and representatives of Hitler’s movement.”394 For now, the focus remained on 
those openly tied to the Nazi Party, which Abetz was not.  
 For those pacifists like Basch, who voiced their opposition to working with the 
Nazis at an early date, law, justice, and democracy trumped the value of peace.395 They 
had urged the Germans to turn away from fascism,396 but had been disappointed. 
Meanwhile, LAURS, with the full support of the French branch of the League of Human 
Rights, made clear its independence from the French half of the Sohlbergkreis. What is 
more, the Catholic Association of French Youth pulled out of the Comité d’Entente.397  
In contrast, Luchaire wanted to continue working for some sort of rapprochement 
with Germany. He believed that Germans, and particularly young Germans, had turned to 
Nazism because democracy had failed them; they were entitled to try something new, and 
above all, he wrote, “everyone is entitled to peace.”398 That same month, May 1933, 
Luchaire explained the need to spurn “the politics of barbed wire, of intellectual, 
diplomatic, and economic excommunication.”399 Interaction offered a smarter approach 
than isolation. Many agreed. Hoping to abide by the spirit of goodwill that had animated 
the Sohlbergkreis encounters, and (for many) in the belief that the National-Socialist 
government would prove short-lived, some French members believed they should stay 
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the course. It would be precipitous to put at risk the personal bonds forged in the crucible 
of Sohlberg, much less its spirit of inquiry and its model for seeking rapprochement 
between peoples.  
As the battle lines were being drawn, more changes ensued. Facing opposition at 
home for what Abetz called his “courageous” efforts on behalf of Germany in the French 
press, Luchaire was replaced by the relatively fresh-faced journalist and Sohlbergkreis 
alumni Bertrand de Jouvenel, a young Turk with ties to both the Radical Party and 
diplomatic circles, who was willing to welcome the French radical right to the nest.400 
That year, too, Abetz was replaced as director of the Sohlbergkreis by Friedrich Bran, 
newly of the Party, though Abetz would remain on board as its manager.  
On the German side, the Sohlbergkreis had gone from practicing rapprochement 
of peoples to engaging in rapprochement the way politicians saw it: conciliation in the 
name of one’s own national interests.401 The French contingent was more fragmented and 
simply unsure of how to handle the new Germany. Some supporters of French-German 
cooperation execrated the Nazi regime, and with it, the Sohlbergkreis which seemed to 
have fallen under its wing. Many adopted a wait-and-see approach, while others 
advocated the pursuit of peace. In this way, the cooperation pursued by the Sohlbergkreis, 
in the end, was not so different from the Mayrisch Komitee or the DFG; many sought 
cooperation on their nation’s terms rather than from a purely disinterested wish to 
mediate.  
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MacGregor Knox (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 157-180. 
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Conclusion 
The group’s first summit at Sohlberg had proved its highpoint. Scholars agree that 
each meeting of the Sohlbergkreis exhibited the growing influence of radical nationalism 
and the deterioration of French-German relations.402 They are not wrong, and a number 
of contemporaries similarly lamented what they viewed as a backward slide. The 
centripetal tendencies pulling together French and German youth—the memory of war, 
the idea of Locarno—were contending with the centrifugal forces of nationalism and 
economic collapse. Deepening divisions, internationally and domestically, politically and 
economically, did not bode well for the project of cooperation. Indeed, they underscore 
the immense challenge undertaken by these interwar groups (whether the Sohlbergkreis, 
the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, or the Mayrisch Komitee) in the first place.  
For the Sohlbergkreis more particularly, internal factors did not make this 
confrontation any smoother. The Sohlbergkreis had never coalesced into an ideologically 
united front; in fact, participants saw their diverse backgrounds as a strong suit. But 
precisely because it drew from such divergent sources, the group could not hold together 
well in the face of powerful external forces, and even its most basic platform of cross-
border youth solidarity never sufficiently gelled. If at first it was too broad-based, the 
Sohlbergkreis soon suffered from having too many participants coming from positions of 
intransigence. 
Created in 1930 at the end of the age of Locarno403 with its first meeting on the 
heels of the French evacuation of the Rhineland, the Sohlbergkreis exemplifies both 
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Locarno’s promise and its fragility. The replacement of Stresemann with von Bülow in 
the Foreign Ministry was perhaps the most obvious sign of the swing to the harder 
nationalist right in German foreign policy; this change in tone, of course, also echoed in 
the legislature following the September 1930 elections, six weeks after Sohlberg. But 
even though the policy of rapprochement was on the wane, the so-called spirit of Locarno 
was alive and well among many ordinary citizens in both France and Germany. 1930 not 
only saw the height of the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, but it also witnessed the 
birth of a group of youths devoted to bringing about rapprochement from the bottom up. 
At the same time, the growing involvement of openly nationalist youth in the 
Sohlbergkreis—ostensibly dedicated to the cause of European youth—revealed precisely 
how tenuous the Franco-German bonds of Locarno were.   
Equally important, the Sohlbergkreis demonstrates the flexibility and durability of 
the message of Franco-German cooperation, which did not disappear with the end of the 
Locarno era in 1930/1931. Although the succession of meetings became increasingly 
strained as national forces took hold, Sohlbergkreis participants persisted in their efforts 
even after the Nazi takeover in Germany. Objections to the nationalist turn within the 
Sohlbergkreis did not lead to its demise. Though some left the circle, numerous French 
participants felt encouraged to redouble their efforts. If anything, these changes attracted 
new blood. Within Luchaire’s “experiment” could be seen new elements and what future 
observers would describe as a more noxious odor. But the experiment carried on, with 
proponents of peace (of all persuasions) mixing and learning to live together, perhaps 
even to like each other.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
followed by a steep decline in Franco-German relations. See especially, Knipping, 220-224. Hermann 
Hagspiel has dated the end of Locarno Verständigungspolitik to 1929. See Hagspiel, 4-5. 
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Not only, then, did the Sohlbergkreis forge important personal bonds that would 
endure multiple tests, but perhaps more crucially, it stretched an already elastic notion of 
cooperation. Abetz and Luchaire, among others, remained so fixated on cooperation that 
they closed their eyes to the escalating problems within the group. In the face of adversity 
and evolving geopolitical circumstances, their focus on the goal, however, led them to 
accommodate new ideas and even reframe cooperation. Their conceptual recalibration 
created a flexible moral and intellectual framework, which, when readjusted for the 
realities of the German occupation, allowed these personal relationships to transform into 
collaboration.  
Luchaire rejoiced that at Sohlberg they discovered, “that the youth of France feels 
identical to the youth of Germany about many essential points—this is an exceedingly 
valuable, exceedingly substantial pledge of collaboration.”404 Only in retrospect, of 
course, can we see the irony in Luchaire’s excitement. It is important to remember that 
the term “collaboration” did not did not drip with contempt in either language until 1940, 
in the wake of Montoire.405 Luchaire’s report instead burst with hope for entente, and 
within it lay the kernel of Henri Lichtenberger’s message about finding common 
ground.406 In analogous situations, with similar perspectives and responses, the Germans 
and the French could find themselves working together. Like Lichtenberger, and above 
all Otto Grautoff, Luchaire pled for his audience to cease thinking in oppositions. Instead 
he encouraged Sohlbergkreis participants “to consider the characteristics that we saw 
                                                          
404PA-AA R98888 Press clipping. Jean Luchaire, “Une expérience franco-allemande: Deux jeunes 
générations qui se ressemblent,” La Volonté, 9 Aug. 1930.  
 
405Philippe Burrin, France under the Germans, 3-4. 
 
406Henri Lichtenberger, “Psychologie du Rapprochement Franco-Allemand,” Revue d’Allemagne, no. 23 
(Sept. 1929): 769-784. 
 197 
until now as opposed as complementary.”407 They could now abolish the abstractions of 
Frenchness and Germanness by meeting living, breathing young people, more or less akin 
to themselves, with similar anxieties and dreams.
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PART TWO 
 
Maintaining a Franco-German Community, 1933-1944 
 
 
 
 
Such is the generosity of the French people, so strong its faith in the eternal and 
indestructible nature of mankind, that it’s no surprise to see it, in all innocence, trusting in 
the eventual victory of humanity, continuing with the student exchange program, as if 
Germany were still Germany, the way France is still France, as if the language of the 
Third Reich were still a German language that one could and ought to learn—and not the 
barbarous stammering and whining it has become …. 
 
No, if French children want to learn German, there is a country where they’ve spoken 
good German since the days of Walther von der Vogelweide; and the country is 
Austria…. 
 
So let people set up a Franco-Austrian children’s exchange! In Austria the children of 
France will learn a true, a free German! And their young souls will not have to struggle 
with the weight of having seen a country that smells of arson and murder: an un-German 
land.—Joseph Roth408 
 
 
Shortly after Bertrand de Jouvenel advocated the continuation of Franco-German 
efforts at cooperation, the Austrian journalist Joseph Roth issued a withering critique of 
French-German exchanges in the German exile press. For Roth, it was a question of 
morality. Hitler’s rise to power had dramatically transformed the meaning and 
implications of French-German cooperation. If Franco-German cooperation was far from 
a natural inclination in the Weimar era, it became even more complicated after 1933. 
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While the Weimar-era project for cooperation had been fraught with doubts, fears, and 
tensions, the Nazi rise to power exacerbated these misgivings. The stakes, moreover, 
were higher. On the one hand, as Roth made clear, new moral qualms had entered into 
the equation; on the other hand, war seemed even more imminent. For the French at least, 
as Eugen Weber has written, the 1930s were a “nightmare of fear,” bursting with 
anxieties about a war to come.409 Cooperation thus held a certain allure. 
For the French, the issue had long revolved around whether seeking cooperation 
was appropriate; now, those who had championed French-German cooperation under 
Weimar had to ask whether it remained a righteous cause with the National Socialists in 
power. This question regularly surfaced among champions of cooperation throughout the 
1930s, only to take an even sharper edge once the two nations were at war, and especially 
after the French defeat. 
As early as 1932, a French army intelligence report broadcast to the Foreign 
Ministry and other government bodies the dangers posed by Hitler—citing, for example, 
a passage from Mein Kampf about how “the annihilation of France is the only way to 
ensure the greatest expansion possible for our people.” French intelligence issued 
similarly alarming reports on German rearmament and mobilization as well as domestic 
repression and indoctrination quite regularly after Hitler’s seizure of power.  Even Pierre 
Viénot, formerly of the Mayrisch Komitee, now a Radical Deputy, submitted a careful 
report to the Quai d’Orsay and the Chamber of Deputies’ Foreign Affairs Commission 
about the dangers to France of the German situation. The Nazis had turned Viénot away 
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from the pursuit of rapprochement.410 Those without access to internal government 
documents were also confronted with exposés and denunciations of the Nazi menace. As 
we have seen, some of the leading French pacifists, most notably Victor Basch, publicly 
decried Nazism from an early date.  
Yet, the resonance of such reports was weak. For many, including French 
Ambassador André François-Poncet, the foreign policy aims of Hitler’s state did not 
appear fundamentally different from those of other chancellors since Versailles. François-
Poncet remained supportive of attempts for French-German cooperation throughout his 
tenure in Berlin, which is to say through 1938. And French civilian leadership, in line 
with the bulk of the broader public, wished itself into believing this was so.411 The French 
thus adopted a wait-and-see, reactive approach toward the Nazis, which diplomats 
sustained throughout the decade.  
Warnings of the increasing aggression and escalating power of Nazi Germany 
poured out to the world: not just domestic assaults on freedoms following the Reichstag 
fire and outbreaks of violence such as the Night of the Long Knives, but also issues of 
more immediate relevance to the international scene, and of particular consequence to 
France, such as withdrawal from the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva and the 
League of Nations, the referendum in the Saar, the (re)introduction of compulsory 
military service, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, and German involvement in the 
Spanish Civil War. As the Nazi state’s extremist policies at home and abroad became 
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increasingly evident to the French—and seemed in no way to be letting up—the French 
continuously renegotiated their views of Germany (and of the idea of peace at all 
costs).412 French intellectuals and much of the French public remained inert, of two 
minds, resigned, or sure that Hitler was better than war—or, for some, Blum. In 1936, 
Henri Lichtenberger, then a member of the Comité France-Allemagne, wrote, “People 
here [in France] float between a thousand contradictory feelings ranging from decided 
horror, through mistrust and anxiety, to curiosity mingled with sympathy or regret that in 
France we do not have a ‘strong man’ of Hitler’s ilk.”413 The pacifist writer Roger Martin 
du Gard, famed for his cycle of novels on the Great War, explained his position during 
the Spanish Civil War: “Anything rather than war! Anything! . . . even Fascism in Spain . 
. . even Fascism in France: Nothing, no trial, no servitude can be compared to war: 
Anything, Hitler rather than war!” The following year, fellow writer and veteran Jean 
Giono offered an even more direct assessment: “What’s the worst that can happen if 
Germany invades France? Become Germans? For my part, I prefer being a living German 
to a dead Frenchman.”414 
Although punctuated by a few months of clarity—when the French and Germans 
were at war and efforts for cooperation were out of the question—during the late 1930s 
and early 1940s the French continued to be beset with the same confounding  questions. 
Was cooperation with the Germans in France’s interests? In Europe’s interests? The 
dilemma after defeat became, of course, once again thornier for the French. Cooperation 
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with an occupying power presented even more of a moral dilemma. But, just as some 
who had wanted to avoid another war found merit in the cause of cooperation, so now did 
those fearful of a harsh occupation or Nazi reprisals. Cooperation, for some, still 
appeared an attractive option. For others, this was the first time cooperation with 
Germany presented itself as an imperative for France’s or their own personal well-being.  
Groups like the Comité France-Allemagne and its German analog the Deutsch-
Französische Gesellschaft in the 1930s as well as the Groupe Collaboration in the 1940s 
helped make cooperation thinkable—even palatable—in the darkest of times. The 
following two chapters explore how these organizations both added force to and 
subverted the campaign for cooperation that began in the 1920s. They analyze the 
significant differences and the multiple continuities with what came before. And they 
address how activists managed to sustain the project for cooperation when, on a broader 
geopolitical plane, it seemed utterly doomed. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
A New Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft and the Comité France-Allemagne 
 
 
 
 
. . . since the end of the hostilities, our politics in Europe have been less a French politics 
than an anti-German politics . . . . In France, we have never, so it seems, conceived of 
what a purely French politics could be. We have automatically pursued anti-Germanism 
in some way. It was the politics of least effort; it was also bound to be a disappointing 
and sterile politics. After sixteen years in which the power and the prestige that gave us 
victory singularly crumbled away, we notice that everything is left to be done, that the 
problem of our security is not resolved, that we remain in the presence of “eternal 
Germany.”—Régis de Vibraye415   
 
Only understanding from people to people can bring about the reconciliation of French 
and German national interests and the unshakeable good neighborliness which both core 
members of Europe are duty-bound to achieve for humanity and for history after a 
thousand years of enmity.—Deutsch-Französische Monatshefte/Cahiers franco-
allemands416 
 
Is there a contradiction between this Germany that proposes peace to France and that 
Germany which arms itself to extremes against her? Or is this the same Germany, 
wanting to be strong in order to have better chats? Hitler and Goebbels pretend there is no 
contradiction.—Henry Berenger417 
 
Each time that we speak of Franco-German rapprochement, we must act very prudently. 
This problem, the most important for the two nations, is one that must only be 
commented about delicately. Also we should refrain from great enthusiasm as well as 
from any skepticism.—Jean Leroy418 
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In 1934, Otto Grautoff, who had emigrated to Paris the year before, published an 
impassioned plea in the French press in which he renounced any association to the 
Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft.419 With this repudiation, he effectively drew the line 
between his organization that had grown out of the spirit of Locarno and a group of the 
same name that appeared after the Nazi seizure of power. While Grautoff immediately 
distanced himself from what he saw as a new venture, his French counterpart Maurice 
Boucher remained silent. Boucher’s Revue d’Allemagne faded away in 1934, not quite a 
year after the final issue of Grautoff’s DFR. But Boucher, who had once described the 
Nazis as “beasts,”420 continued in the enterprise of Franco-German cooperation 
throughout the 1930s, and indeed into the 1940s. This continuity was by no means 
unusual, as many members of Franco-German societies from the 1920s and early 1930s, 
upon the dissolution of their own groups, transferred their loyalties to two other 
associations in the second half of the 1930s: the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft 
(DFG) and the Comité France-Allemagne (CFA). 
 Choosing cooperation with the so-called hereditary enemy had long been 
controversial for the Germans and the French alike, but new challenges arose with the 
Machtergreifung. German policy-makers (and, in their wake, German citizens) needed to 
determine the degree to which they would follow the anti-French line of Mein Kampf, 
which portrayed France as the Erbfeind, a stance directly in contradiction with 
organizations that sought French-German cooperation. Would such efforts be eliminated, 
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or could they find purchase within Nazi ambitions? For their part, the French had to ask 
whether working together with Nazi Germany contributed to the greater good—peace—
or whether it was simply morally repugnant. The answers to these questions remained 
unresolved throughout the 1930s.  
Even before Hitler took over Germany, the Mayrisch Komitee, the Deutsch-
Französische Gesellschaft, and the Sohlbergkreis all had found themselves on unstable 
ground. As we have seen, this was due to a combination of internal and external factors. 
Each group had struggled to stay together, and each confronted an uncertain European 
future. The three Weimar-era organizations hobbled along for awhile longer. One after 
another, however, they weakened, then faded out or quietly disappeared even though 
many members wanted to continue the work of cooperation. Numerous proponents of 
cooperation from all three groups accordingly joined forces with the CFA or a group 
known as the DFG, with mysterious, indeterminate ties to Grautoff’s group of the same 
name. This Deutsch-Franzosische Gesellschaft retained elements of Grautoff’s DFG, 
combined them with aspects of both the Mayrisch Komitee and the Sohlbergkreis, and 
wrapped them around a Nazi core. In different ways, the Comité France-Allemagne, 
which catered only to French members, also drew from earlier organizations while 
sustaining ties to the Nazis. 
The Nazis thus tapped into the networks established by the Mayrisch Komitee, the 
Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, and the Sohlbergkreis. Relying on preexisting 
international networks reflected the Nazi strategy to infiltrate, “marshal the resources or 
plug into” clubs, associations, and the press at home.421 For the Nazis, networks of 
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pacifists and Germanophiles offered potential contacts through which to mollify French 
public perceptions of Nazi intentions, especially with regard to foreign policy.422 Then, 
while pursuing a confrontational agenda, the Germans could profess to be extending a 
hand to France.423 Maintaining and even enhancing French-German relations through 
cultural organizations would help assuage fears that the new leaders of Germany posed a 
threat to French security.  
  That is not to say that ordinary members of the new DFG and the CFA were 
unwitting pawns. Members of French-German organizations actively and often 
enthusiastically sought out representatives of the current leadership in Germany. If some, 
like Grautoff, quickly turned away from outreach efforts on the part of the National 
Socialists, others took far longer to cut off ties, and many eagerly sought to carry on their 
work for cooperation, now with the new order. Maurice Boucher, for one, slid into a 
more accommodating stance by 1935, when he joined forces with the Comité France-
Allemagne; he remained a member of that group at least through January 1939.424 
Alongside Boucher, many students and intellectuals, as before, fervently desired French-
German entente. Some saw the Nazi regime as immaterial to the pursuit of cooperation; 
perhaps more viewed it as added motivation to work for peace.425 Particularly notable 
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after Hitler’s seizure of power was the degree to which veterans of the Great War 
plunged headlong into the cause for cooperation in the hope of avoiding another war.426 
 The new DFG and the CFA maintained a complicated relationship not only to 
Franco-German organizations of the past but to one another. The DFG and the CFA may 
have had their symmetries, and they seemed to work in tandem, but this was a lopsided 
enterprise. The CFA was a private effort with a relatively expansive, if elite, base. The 
DFG had a more geographically diffuse base, but it operated under the watchful eye of 
the Nazi administration and acted as a discreet arm of its paradiplomatic services. 
Ribbentrop’s bureau, in particular, undertook an international public relations campaign 
to quell French anxieties and shore up French public opinion in favor of Nazi 
Germany,427 a mission under which the DFG, and less directly if not less effectively, the 
CFA neatly fell.  
 It is then to this intersection of French desires for peace and the German state’s 
pursuit of an international information campaign that this chapter turns. For some, the 
allure of these twinned forces overrode the impact of an array of reports that suggested 
Hitler’s intentions were far from benign.428 
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Reincarnation  
 Between the summer of 1933 and the fall of 1935 a series of negotiations took 
place to determine how best—if at all—to proceed with the quest for cooperation. These 
discussions occurred at the official level, within individual organizations, between private 
citizens, with potential benefactors, and most visibly, in the press. Divisions and 
uncertainties marked all three Weimar-era groups as well as French society more broadly 
because it was exceedingly difficult to grasp what was happening across the Rhine. Many 
wondered whether the Nazi regime was merely a passing phase that would not—and 
could not—possibly endure. More confusingly, the Germans seemed to be sending mixed 
signals. On the one hand, Germany’s withdrawal from the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference and the League of Nations in October 1933 suggested contempt for 
diplomatic negotiations and the abandonment of international talks. On the other hand, 
Hitler and his representatives immediately and repeatedly sent reassuring, sometimes 
flattering, messages to the French.429 Most famously, in a two-hour exclusive (and 
sensational) interview with Fernand de Brinon in November 1933, Hitler expressed his 
wishes for peace and understanding with France; a rapt Brinon professed his belief in 
Hitler’s “sincerity.”430 
 Whereas the French right had traditionally struck an anti-German stance, it found 
itself more sympathetic to the Nazi regime than did the French left. And yet these 
generalizations did not always hold true, particularly in the 1930s. As Robert Michael has 
explained, a complicated political “realignment” emerged in mid-1930s France with 
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regard to foreign policy that pitted soft-liners (or what he dubbed “appeasers”) and hard-
liners (in his words, “resisters”). Each bloc consisted of individuals on the political left 
and the political right, and each wanted peace.431 If Michael’s loaded terminology 
perhaps obfuscates more than it reveals, the general thrust of his argument makes plain 
what other scholars have rendered very complicated by tracking individuals’ meanderings 
across the political landscape of the 1930s: left and right are not the most useful 
categories when trying to understand French attitudes toward Nazi Germany.432  
 As with politicians, French intellectuals’ responses to the new regime in Germany 
took a variety of forms and did not always conform to a clear left-right split. In a 
typically spectacular gesture, for example, André Malraux accompanied André Gide to 
Berlin in January 1934 to try to set free those imprisoned for allegedly having set fire to 
the Reichstag; both writers, moreover, consistently spoke out against fascism and Nazism 
more generally.433 Others associated with the left, such as Bertrand de Jouvenel434 and 
André Weil-Curiel, however, traveled to Germany with a more open mind and quite 
different intentions. The very month of Gide and Malraux’s voyage to Berlin, Jouvenel 
and Weil-Curiel attended a Sohlbergkreis summit in Berlin, made contact with 
representatives of the Hitler Youth, and toured the “new” Germany. Upon their return to 
                                                          
431Robert Michael, The Radicals and Nazi Germany: The Revolution in French Attitudes toward Foreign 
Policy, 1933-1939 (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), 3-7. 
 
432Indeed, scholars have been trying, in very different ways, to transcend the categories of left and right in 
their analysis of the Third Republic more generally. A volume of Historical Reflections devoted to the 
question recently appeared under the title, “Beyond Left and Right: New Perspectives on the Politics of the 
Third Republic.” See Historical Reflections 34, no. 2 (Summer 2008).  
  
433Jean-Michel Palmier, Weimar in Exile: The Antifascist Emigration in Europe and America, trans. David 
Fernbach (London: Verso, 2006), 193. 
 
434Jouvenel’s politics, to be sure, went through a complicated transformation as he changed from a position 
on the non-Communist left to become a member of Doriot’s Parti populaire français. As mentioned in 
chapter three, some have pegged him as a fascist.  
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Paris, they spoke to the League of Nations’ International Institute of Intellectual 
Cooperation about their positive impressions. Yet even within their touring group, 
opinions differed. René Georges-Étienne of the League of the Rights of Man, who had 
traveled to the Sohlbergkreis meeting alongside Jouvenel and Weil-Curiel, reported 
separately on his experience to the Institute. Georges-Étienne found to his dismay that 
German youth held completely incompatible views with those of the French; “building a 
bridge” to German youth would be, to his mind, impossible.435   
To court French public opinion, numerous Germans traveled to France to 
undertake the delicate task of public relations. For his part, Otto Abetz spent much of 
1933 and 1934 scrambling to keep the Sohlbergkreis alive. He met with a number of 
French organizations that had turned away from cooperation with the Germans and 
encouraged links between the Hitler Youth and French youth groups including the scouts. 
He pursued connections with cultural, artistic, and academic circles in Paris to campaign 
on behalf of Germany in an anti-Nazi milieu. In addition, Abetz planned for a future 
Sohlbergkreis summit at the Loire estate of Bertrand de Jouvenel’s father, Henry de 
Jouvenel. The Sohlbergkreis’ Fritz Bran and Carl Nabersberg of the Reichsjugendführung 
also worked hard to woo French youth groups to the side of the new Germany.436 Taking 
on a similar role of advocacy, student leader Johannes Maaß of the Deutsche 
Studentenschaft met with an array of French intellectuals to convince them to look to 
other German intellectuals than the émigrés. Maaß hoped to promote another expression 
of the German Geist as valid. Through blatant flattery, Maaß seems to have encouraged 
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numerous French intellectuals to read the so-called new German literature and visit 
Germany for themselves before making hasty judgments, or worse, launching a campaign 
against Nazi Germany. As he insinuated, a good intellectual does not judge until he sees 
for himself.437  
War veterans proved another crucial target of the German public relations drive. 
Abetz and Jouvenel laid the groundwork for bringing together the key leaders of the 
veterans’ movement in both countries. With their help and at the “instigation” of 
Ribbentrop, Hanns Oberlindober (1896-1949), head of the Nazi war victims’ organization 
[NS-Kriegsopferversorgung], was able to make contacts with the heads of France’s 
principal veterans’ organizations. He then campaigned heavily to win over the French 
community of veterans on both the left and right.438 Wounded in the knee in the First 
World War, Oberlindober joined both the Nazi Party and the SA in 1922, becoming a 
member of the Reichstag and head of the Party section devoted to disabled veterans in 
1930.439 Oberlindober, who thus helped obtain a critical constituency for the CFA, would 
become a vice president of the new DFG. 
 While these men worked hard to forge new bonds between the French and the 
Germans, and while Abetz and Jouvenel actively sought ways to continue the 
Sohlbergkreis, the DFG went into hibernation. Grautoff had abruptly fled to Paris in the 
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spring of 1933. The DFG’s “gloomy state” that summer—even members were uncertain 
whether it still existed—did not mean that they and others were willing to let it disappear. 
French members of the organization as well as Ambassador André François-Poncet 
sought out representatives of the German Foreign Office to discuss reviving or 
reorganizing the DFG. German Foreign Office officials showed mild interest, but proved 
reluctant on two counts. First, they believed the timing was premature. Second, the 
German Embassy still demanded reciprocity. If the DFG were to be resuscitated or re-
founded in some way, it would need a French counterweight.440   
As Geheimer Legationsrat Emil von Rintelen of the German Foreign Office 
discovered in November 1933, however, a short-term solution had been determined by 
forces outside of both the DFG and the German Foreign Office. At that time, Rintelen 
met with a representative of the Propaganda Ministry, who informed him of the 
establishment of an emergency committee for Otto Grautoff’s DFG, “to create it anew on 
a wholly changed basis.” Confused and surprised, Rintelen had thought “Herr Grautoff’s 
Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft was already definitively a thing of the past.”441 While 
it may have been defunct, the DFG had never legally ceased to exist since it was still 
listed on the books as a registered association. Therefore, a smooth transformation of the 
DFG could take place whereby the name and status of the group could stay intact while 
its substance was significantly modified.  
                                                          
440PA-AA R70555 No. e.o. II Fr 1925 Aufzeichnung. Rintelen to Köpke, Abt. VI; Herr V.L.R. Böhme, 
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Rintelen (21 Nov. 1933). 
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Rintelen, however, was more struck by the Propaganda Ministry’s solution to the 
problem of reciprocity. To Rintelen’s mind, the fatal flaw of the original DFG could be 
traced to its moment of conception. Created without a French counterpart to advocate for 
Germany, the DFG had developed incrementally into a mouthpiece for French ideas. But 
rather than creating a partnership of equals—as the Foreign Office had envisaged—the 
Propaganda Ministry representative (also a member of the DFG emergency committee) 
wanted to reverse the flow of ideas and thus radically alter its power dynamic. The 
primary purpose of such an association, he explained, lay in “pull[ing] the strings that 
control the other country.” The reconfiguration would occur all the more easily since 
(again to Rintelen’s surprise), the DFR’s Jewish publisher Walther Rothschild had 
already “ceded” his business to another publisher; the journal thus had already been 
aryanized. The Propaganda Ministry would keep the public and even for a time the 
Foreign Office in the dark as to the particulars of the DFG’s makeover.442  
The Propaganda Ministry envisioned the DFG emergency committee as a 
temporary solution to the challenge of bringing an international association in line with 
the “new Germany.” In fact, it was erected primarily to put in place a new organization, 
presumably a step removed from Grautoff’s venture. Once it learned of the existence of 
the DFG emergency committee, the German Embassy imagined the new possibilities 
opening up in French-German relations; here was an opportunity to remake the DFG 
according to its own recommendations from years ago. Above all, this meant the 
somewhat defensive attempt to reintroduce reciprocity. This time, there needed to be not 
simply two reviews, but two associations, one based in Germany and one in France. 
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Where Grautoff’s DFG had failed to produce an association to promote Germany in 
France, a fresh endeavor would be sure to set up both at once in the name of 
reciprocity.443 At this moment, the Foreign Office viewed the DFG emergency committee 
through the lens of Grautoff’s DFG and its shortcomings rather than through the lens of 
Nazi Gleichschaltung.  
The Foreign Office was not alone in eyeing the DFG with interest. In Grautoff’s 
absence, Max Ilgner of I.G. Farben—a member of the DFG since early 1932—planned to 
take over the DFG, “raise its standard,” and transform it into an umbrella organization.444 
Others who saw potential in Grautoff’s ill-conceived DFG likewise came to the German 
Embassy with suggestions and offers to help set it on the right track.445 Not surprisingly, 
however, it was the plans of Nazi officialdom that reached fruition.  
According to Christiane Grautoff, her father had known something of the 
Propaganda Ministry’s intentions toward the DFG. Convinced one member of the DFG—
formerly an employee of the Propaganda Ministry—had infiltrated the group as a Nazi 
spy, Grautoff believed his telephone and mail were under surveillance.446 After 
Ambassador François-Poncet warned of an impending visit from the Nazis, Otto Grautoff 
hopped on a train to Paris, with only a toothbrush in hand; even his wife stayed behind. 
Though Grautoff felt harassed by and uncomfortable with the new regime, his politics left 
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him an unlikely candidate for persecution. He may have considered himself a political 
refugee, but early on, he had shown himself willing to bow to pressures to strike Jewish-
sounding names from the Rundschau. In one case, he took the time to write a letter to fire 
a Jewish editor that did not so much excuse his actions, as state that the “voice of the 
times” did not favor Jews and suggest the editor was remiss in his duties anyhow.447 
Grautoff lived in a kind of limbo in Paris, where he maintained an ambivalent 
stance toward the German authorities and an uncertain position with regard to the DFG. 
Although he had taken flight, deemed himself a political exile, and purportedly assisted 
numerous German émigrés in finding posts in France,448 Grautoff still nursed ties to the 
Nazi state. He paid a courtesy call to the German Embassy in Paris, and more damningly, 
tried to contact both Goering and Goebbels regarding his work for French-German 
understanding. A representative of the German Foreign Ministry complained to a 
colleague about Grautoff wanting it both ways: to be considered a “political refugee” and 
to maintain regular contacts with the German authorities. While in exile, Grautoff 
incongruously expected German officials to grant him special favors. Just as he was not 
ready to cut off ties to the Nazi state, Grautoff did not fully give up the DFG. Though its 
activities had lapsed, Grautoff now provided a new address for the DFG, his Parisian 
boarding house. He had reportedly, moreover, volunteered his services from Paris to IG-
Farben’s Max Ilgner, still on the DFG board, to help promote French-German 
relations.449  
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Over a year after Grautoff moved to Paris, articles appeared in the French press 
that described the most recent meeting of the DFG in Berlin, over which Grautoff was 
imputed to have presided. Not only had the dormant DFG announced its dissolution, but 
Grautoff had allegedly drawn a connection between the end of his group and the need “to 
open the way to ‘the tendencies’ of the new Germany.”450 Though Grautoff had, to be 
sure, maintained an ambivalent stance toward the German authorities, he, as an exile, had 
hardly been present at a meeting in Berlin. Such inaccurate articles prompted his public 
statement: 
After my resignation, an executive committee was formed by constraint, 
against my will, and contrary to my convictions to “set right” the Franco-
German Society according to the Nazi spirit. It is quite possible that this 
emergency committee made decisions that had no connection to the spirit 
and activity of the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft as I knew it and 
directed it. Moreover, the continuity of my efforts in the cause for Franco-
German rapprochement that I have supported all of my life would prohibit 
me from pronouncing the words that are ascribed to me against all truth 
and probability. Not having wanted to open the Franco-German Society to 
the tendencies of the Third Reich, I retired a year ago so as not to be 
disloyal to my principles. The work that I was able to accomplish 
throughout my life and that summoned me to a lofty and weighty task 
obliges me to remain attached to ideas of liberty, generosity, wisdom, and 
reason, for which France continues to be the champion.451   
 
This letter lays bare Grautoff’s sense of betrayal, both by the National Socialists and by 
the French press, his disgust for the new state of the DFG, and his absolute renunciation 
of the Nazi mentality.  Above all, it points out that in his opinion, the extant DFG had 
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nothing whatsoever to do with the DFG he directed, and that it was, like so many German 
institutions, “coordinated” by the Nazi authorities.  
In fact, the DFG had officially dissolved on 12 July 1934 in a meeting run by 
Hans Draeger (b. 1896), a department head at the Nazi Party’s Wehrpolitisches Amt and 
head of the DFG emergency committee.452 Draeger had long served the cause of German 
propaganda as the manager of the Working Committee of German Associations, a 
powerful voice in the campaign for revisionism. As Holger Herwig has argued, Draeger 
and others in his circle managed to cloud the historical record on German war guilt until 
as late as the 1960s, and had thereby contributed to giving Germany a leg up in its case 
for the revision of Versailles.453 Draeger’s sudden incursion into a leadership role at the 
DFG had a similar end in sight: the reconceptualization of the DFG into a tool by which 
to advance Nazi aims abroad. Newly at the helm of the DFG, Draeger issued a press 
release, pre-approved by the Foreign Office, that explained, “this in no way means that 
we want to renounce the strenuous work of cultural relations between Germany and 
France. On the contrary, the disappearance of an association tied to the spirit of an earlier 
epoch clears the way for a reorganization of such efforts, which have as their object the 
rapprochement and intellectual exchange of the two great Kulturvölkern, Germany and 
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France.” In response to Grautoff’s protest, Draeger also acceded that the press had been 
mistaken; Grautoff had not been in attendance at the fatal meeting.454  
If the DFG emergency committee—with the support of the Propaganda 
Ministry—hijacked Grautoff’s DFG as the first step in creating a French-German 
organization more to their liking, the new effort did not simply grow out of the remains 
of the old DFG. Over the course of this chapter, the many debts owed to the both the 
Mayrisch Komitee and the Sohlbergkreis as well as to Grautoff’s DFG by the new 
DFG/CFA will be made clear. This argument contrasts with that of scholars who have 
painted the DFG/CFA as a successor to the Sohlbergkreis tout court or as a “mere shell” 
of Grautoff’s DFG.455 It also differs from the assessment of some members of the 
DFG/CFA, who purported that it was wholly original. The groundwork to create such a 
composite organization, including the forging of personal contacts, the wait for a 
propitious moment for the group’s unveiling, and above all the postponement for the 
realization of a French analog, meant that more than a full year passed between Draeger’s 
hostile (yet smooth) takeover and the DFG/CFA’s public debut. 
Like the DFG, the Comité France-Allemagne’s origins were far from 
transparent.456 In similar fashion, German officials played an important role in shaping 
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the ostensibly French organization. In the spring of 1935, Abetz and a number of German 
veterans, including most importantly Oberlindober, visited the German Embassy in Paris 
to report on the progress they had made in convincing prominent Frenchmen, from 
leaders of veterans’ groups to the writer Jules Romains, to join a French association 
parallel to the DFG. The Embassy urged them, however, not to rush the foundation of a 
French group, but to wait until it might attract more interest: when relations between the 
two nations might prove less tense and when those other than the usual suspects might be 
willing to lend their names to the effort. Indeed, the Embassy advised that the enthusiasm 
of these particular French personalities, “virtually stamped as specialists in French-
German understanding,” might dissuade others susceptible to the message from 
joining.457    
A host of French personalities had in fact shown interest in creating a Franco-
German society already in 1934, and many were willing to run such a group, but their 
competing egos meant that they each vehemently rejected the others for the top 
position.458  The DFG, which had been waiting for a reciprocal organization to be 
founded in France before it officially resurfaced, finally scheduled an inauguration dinner 
at Berlin’s Schloss Montbijou for 25 October 1935.459 Because, as Henri Lichtenberger, 
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pointed out, neglect to reciprocate might be seen as a “truly hostile act,”460 the embryonic 
Comité France-Allemagne scheduled its first event for less than a month thereafter.  
 To the public, the new DFG and the CFA emerged in more spectacular fashion, 
like Venus on her shell. The festivities surrounding the birth of the two groups, like many 
of their subsequent activities, were gala affairs.  If the Sohlbergkreis had celebrated the 
informality of youth, with its tents and dormitories along with its spartan meals, the DFG 
and the CFA, like the Mayrisch Komitee, catered to elites. At the first CFA event, held at 
the ritzy Hotel Georges V, members enjoyed lobster thermidor and Veuve Cliquot. The 
CFA was in large part peopled by the well-heeled. And the DFG aimed to spread the 
mission of “the creation and care of friendly relations between the leading personalities 
and the different organizations of public life from both countries.”461  
   
Continuity and Change 
At times, it was unclear whether the Nazi-era DFG was conceived, then redefined 
as an extension and refinement of the Weimar-era DFG, or whether it was considered and 
branded as something altogether new. Torn between a desire to assert the originality of 
the project and thereby rewrite the history of Franco-German cooperation (as in the 
interests of National Socialism) and a wish to lull the French into believing nothing had 
changed, the leaders of the DFG/CFA portrayed it inconsistently. This was such a 
complete makeover that some could hardly discern the original(s) beneath the new 
trappings. But others hardly seemed to notice (and certainly did not acknowledge) a 
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change at all. A decade later, one French newspaper made sense of the DFG/CFA’s 
relation to Weimar-era organizations by exclaiming, “The king is dead! Long live the 
king! It’s the same for the Comité ‘France-Allemagne.’ It was at the point of death in 
1934. It was reborn in 1936.”462 
The DFG and CFA capitalized on the experience of prior groups, all the while 
maintaining a clear distance from their associations with the discredited Weimar regime. 
The fact of the DFG’s coordination—at an organizational and philosophical level as well 
as in the realm of personnel—speaks directly to this ambivalence. As we shall see, 
elements of the DFG/CFA agenda more squarely placed the two groups as heirs to those 
of Weimar. What is more, the joint DFG/CFA journal, the Deutsch-Französische 
Monatshefte/Cahiers franco-allemands (henceforth DFMh)463 began as a direct extension 
of the Sohlbergkreis. In the case of the DFG, the Nazis successfully built upon and 
subverted the achievements of French-German groups launched in the Locarno era.  
Yet much needed to be done to transform Weimar-era groups and sensibilities 
into a type of French-German cooperation that would conform to the Nazi standard. 
Looking back on Grautoff’s Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, one Bruno Rieth found it 
contaminated by the presence of pacifists, leftists, Jews (much like France itself of late), 
and French political interests; the organization offended Nazi sensibilities in almost every 
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way.464 Régis de Vibraye of the Mayrisch Komitee similarly spoke of older groups 
having followed “an ideology of Jewish and Masonic inspiration;”465 presumably, he had 
Grautoff’s organization in mind. Eduard Wechssler, who ran a well-known French 
literature seminar at the University of Berlin and had twice contributed to Grautoff’s 
Deutsch-Französische Rundschau, contacted the Foreign Office to maintain that he had 
kept his distance from the “worldly” DFR, but hoped to continue his “totally different” 
involvement in French-German affairs should a new journal be born.466 The German 
Foreign Office shared Wechssler’s negative view of the Rundschau; it was “out of the 
question” to consider reviving Grautoff’s German-language journal.467 And so it was that 
the leadership of the new DFG pledged to look to Ribbentrop’s guidance.468 Surely, this 
step marked the most profound change from any of the prior organizations. 
At the opening gala of the DFG, Régis de Vibraye—who had headed the Paris 
office of the Mayrisch Komitee—made a point of stressing the group’s novelty. His 
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speech left the impression that no such organizations had ever existed to promote French-
German cooperation except those tainted by a certain decadence: “It seems less 
extraordinary that this society was founded just now than the fact that it did not exist until 
now. Because the goal of this society is the realization of entente and rapprochement 
between the two nations, [and it] signifies an enrichment of the entire Western world.”469 
As de Vibraye had persistently and eagerly pushed for the Mayrisch Komitee’s 
“understanding” of the new Germany, his pronouncement at the DFG gala can be 
understood as a way to distance himself from earlier efforts toward cooperation that had 
been less open to the Nazis. Of course, de Vibraye made no mention of his ties to the 
Mayrisch Komitee. More significant to his audience, however, was his suggestion that 
they were heralds of a new altruistic message of rapprochement. Others collapsed the 
ideas of novelty and hope into a near-religious sensibility; Fernand de Brinon (1885-
1947), a CFA vice president, deemed the group’s initial vision “apostolic.”470 
Not all associated with the new DFG or the CFA could in good faith dispute the 
links between them and the older organizations. Many showed a certain reluctance to 
acknowledge these connections, but others used them when convenient. The DFG 
president began the 1936 meeting of the full executive committee by comparing the DFG 
to past models of efforts for understanding. Whereas earlier stabs were marked by their 
“lack of success,” the DFG “which is based on the outlook of the Third Reich naturally 
has an entirely different impetus from earlier endeavors.”471 Thus, like Grautoff, the new 
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470PA-AA DBP 1049/1 B03951. Speech by Fernand de Brinon (29 Aug. 1936). 
 
471PA-AA R61397 Protokoll der Sitzung des erweiterten Vorstandes der Deutsch-Französischen 
Gesellschaft am 19. Mai 1936 um 17 Uhr.  
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leadership of the DFG—and therefore German officialdom—understood the DFG to be 
new, at least in regard to its successes and its strength. At least one CFA member 
perceived the disjuncture between the DFG/CFA and earlier groups as something to rue. 
Senator Gaston Henri-Haye wished there had been more continuity from the efforts of the 
Weimar era. At a 1937 CFA conference, Henri-Haye expressed regret that older Franco-
German groups had ceased their work and turned away from Germany.472 For Henri-
Haye, the problem was not that of the DFG/CFA’s novelty, but that some had given up 
and cut off their important international contacts. 
The words “re-organization” and “new foundation” appeared almost 
interchangeably in the correspondence and notes of German officialdom. This 
ambivalence was reproduced among DFG members and the broader public. Press 
coverage exhibited some of this confusion, with one paper noting the DFG “just revived 
after a long eclipse,” another noting that it wanted “to regain its former activity,”473 but 
others insisting upon its novelty. Interested individuals, who wrote seeking more 
information about the DFG and CFA, likewise had a shaky grasp of the details. An array 
of letters to the German Embassy in Paris attest to the fact that initial reports had aroused 
much curiosity, while leaving the public with only an impressionistic view. At first, many 
did not understand that membership to each group was based on nationality; Germans 
inquired about the CFA and French people tried to join the DFG. More notable is how 
many were under the impression that the DFG/CFA was the resumption of or somehow 
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linked back to endeavors from the Weimar era. One Paul Brauer, an employee of the city 
of Berlin who read about the CFA in the newspaper, assumed it was a French counterpart 
to the “recently revived” Deutsch-Französischen Studienkomitee, i.e. the Mayrisch 
Komitee.474 A prospective French member wrote to the German ambassador about his 
happiness regarding “the upcoming renaissance of the Comité France-Allemagne,” as if it 
had existed previously; it is not clear of which organization he was reminded.475 Years 
later, this sense of continuity would serve as a convenient excuse for an association with 
the DFG/CFA; once Nazism and collaborationism had been thoroughly discredited, 
individuals on trial or otherwise seeking to clear their names emphasized the CFA and 
DFG’s pre-1933 origins.476 
 
 
Personalities 
 
Examining the list of participants at DFG/CFA events and the available 
membership rosters further helps illuminate the Nazi-era groups’ overlaps with 
organizations from the late Weimar years; at the same time, these indicate quite clearly 
an influx of new members, whose links to the Nazi regime were unmistakable. As the 
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DFG’s and CFA’s identities began to cohere, many of the lines between the older and 
newer advocates of the cause for cooperation eroded.  
Numerous members of the Mayrisch Komitee—especially noteworthy in light of 
the Komitee’s small size and select nature—pledged allegiance to the CFA or DFG. 
Those who continued in the quest for French-German cooperation by making such a leap 
included those from both the Komitee’s “intellectual” and economic factions. Régis de 
Vibraye, head of the Komitee’s Paris office, played a starring role at the first CFA event. 
Sorbonne professor Henri Lichtenberger, probably France’s foremost expert on Germany 
who had been active in the Mayrisch Komitee and the DFR/Revue d’Allemagne as well as 
the Ligues des Études Germaniques, likewise came on board. Chemist Ernest Fourneau 
and psychologist Pierre Janet, both of whom had not joined the Mayrisch Komitee until 
1930, also became involved in the CFA; Fourneau immediately signed on to serve as one 
of the CFA’s vice presidents. Additionally, the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Maurice de 
Broglie joined the CFA along with his wife (who had, of course, not sat on the all-male 
Mayrisch Komitee). Emil Georg von Stauss, the former head of Deutsche Bank, lent a 
voice notably tinged with economic concerns and the importance of commercial relations 
to both the Mayrisch Komitee and the second incarnation of the DFG. The Cologne iron 
industrialist Otto Wolff had likewise belonged to the Mayrisch Komitee and now proved 
an important donor to the new DFG. On the French side, Étienne Fougère, President of 
the National Association for Economic Expansion, sat on the CFA’s Honorary 
Committee, and the industrialist Edme Sommier and his wife were members until at least 
early 1939.477  
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In fact, the many overlaps and connections between the two groups led to the 
Mayrisch Komitee folding itself into the DFG/CFA—a step that seems to have eluded 
scholars. Although Frank Rümelin, the German clerk at the Mayrisch Komitee office in 
Paris, remained skeptical, even suspicious of the CFA in its first months, he became more 
enthusiastic once its stability seemed certain. The German wing of the Mayrisch Komitee 
decided on group membership in the DFG and the French half followed suit by choosing 
to join the CFA.478 The Mayrisch Komitee, which had already shrunk—Viénot and 
Schlumberger, for example, had for all intents and purposes left—and had seen a 
significant downturn in its activity, thus diminished all the more. Formerly fleeting 
visions of adding a British sector looked like the only way to sustain the Komitee and 
grant it some purpose. The DFG/CFA instead swallowed the Mayrisch Komitee whole, 
which was exactly what Nazi officialdom wanted.479  
 Participants from the Sohlbergkreis lent their voices to the DFG/CFA journal, the 
DFMh. Otto Abetz (who also sat on the new DFG board), Jean Luchaire, Bertrand de 
Jouvenel, Cécil Mardrus, Adolf von Grolmann, and others contributed articles to the 
DFMh, though by 1939—the only year for which we have a full membership list of the 
CFA—none of these were considered members.480 Fritz Bran, Abetz’s childhood friend 
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and editor of the Sohlbergkreis, now directed the DFMh, likewise published by his 
father’s press. Erich Benz, who had participated in the Sohlbergkreis meetings and 
belonged to Grautoff’s DFG (and wrote for the DFR and Revue d’Allemagne), 
contributed the DFMh as well. For unknown reasons, Luchaire’s involvement petered 
away rather quickly; even his biographer could only speculate why, especially as 
Luchaire continued to serve as an intermediary between Abetz and prominent politicians 
and journalists in France, and his journal Notre Temps received subsidies from the 
German Embassy.481 
 Far fewer hailed from Grautoff’s DFG and its two journals. Most prominently 
were those already mentioned, Lichtenberger, Maurice Boucher, and Benz. Many other 
former DFG activists were Jews or democrats or otherwise disinclined or unable to 
participate in the CFA/DFG.  
Some of the most visible members of the CFA and the DFG were also new to the 
world of organized advocacy for cooperation. Journalist Fernand de Brinon, a CFA vice 
president, held the dubious honor of being the first Frenchman to interview Hitler as 
chancellor in 1933. The following year, he published France-Allemagne 1918-1934—
part collection of his reportage on Germany, part historical account, part plea for 
entente—which sealed his reputation as a proponent of cooperation and, like the Hitler 
interview, provoked an uproar.482 If Brinon had at least long been interested in Germany, 
the president of the DFG’s connection to France was less evident. Skeptics in France 
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characterized DFG president Achim von Arnim (1881-1940), the rector of the Technische 
Hochschule Berlin-Charlottenburg, as a “confidence man of the Führer,” and an SA-
leader “who today plays a humane professor of military studies.”483  
Many at the CFA and DFG came from the highest ranks of the veterans’ 
movement. Jean Goy (1892-1944) of the conservative Union Nationale des Combattants 
(National Union of Servicemen, UNC) and Henri Pichot (1884-1945) of the Union 
Fédérale (Federal Union, UF), which had supported Briandist attempts at rapprochement 
in the 1920s, served as CFA Secretaries-General; each represented around 900,000 
veterans. Conservative deputy Georges Scapini (1893-1976), head of the Union des 
Aveugles de Guerre (Association of the War Blind), became its president. At the DFG, 
Hanns Oberlindober of NSKOV spoke on behalf of over one million disabled veterans.484 
More generally, the CFA represented a wide swath of French, particularly 
Parisian, society and politics. Deputy Eugène Frot, from the moderate wing of the 
Popular Front (the Union Socialiste Républicaine), and several who identified themselves 
as members of the Croix de Feu, managed to find common ground at the CFA. Its 
treasurer, R.S. de Chappedelaine, had been linked to the Francistes.485 Other prominent 
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members included the journalist-politician Gustave Hervé, writer Jules Romains, and the 
composer Florent Schmitt.  
Previously unconsulted documents have allowed for a better understanding of the 
CFA’s composition. Most importantly, a list of over 700 individual members allows for a 
rough sketch of the group as it stood in August 1939, at the outbreak of war. Members 
hailed from a variety of professions: deputies and senators, journalists, engineers, 
doctors, military officers, and teachers—as well as students. Women constituted 16% of 
members. Almost all came from Paris or the Île de France.486 It is also thanks to this list 
that we can trace membership continuities from Weimar-era groups to the CFA. 
It is hard to pin down precisely who belonged to the DFG, however, because no 
comprehensive membership lists have been found. Those who spoke at DFG events or 
traveled with DFG tour groups to France came from the ranks of local or Party notables, 
lawyers, doctors, journalists, and so forth. Indeed, the socio-economic composition of 
both groups reflected a combination of the Mayrisch Komitee elites and old DFG 
Bildungsbürgertum—along with the almost 2.8 million veterans who notionally belonged 
to the DFG. 
The extended DFG board, however, consisted almost exclusively of Party elites. 
A handful came from Ribbentrop’s circle—besides Abetz, there was Heinrich Stahmer, 
Ludwig Freiherr von dem Bongart, Rudolf Schleier, and Hermann von Raumer.487 Others 
represented an array of Party offices from the Nazi Women’s League to the German 
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Labor Front. The honorary board included some of the most powerful men in Germany, 
including Goebbels and Ribbentrop, but as Abetz quietly explained to the real decision-
making board, the honorary board was just a “dummy” to impress the French.488 
The DFG gave the impression it had an expansive base due to its multiple 
branches and corporative memberships. Yet, in reality, the DFG, while powerful, 
remained quite small. Audits suggest the DFG only had 185 individual dues-paying 
members in 1939 and 200 in 1940, statistics which confirm a seemingly untrustworthy 
report by a nervous and dismissive agent of the Mayrisch Komitee shortly after the DFG 
began.489 The tiny membership base of the DFG—especially when considered in light of 
its relative power and the much larger base of the CFA—suggests it should have been 
named a committee, with the French side as the association. More importantly, it further 
underscores the degree to which the DFG, at least, was an instrument of Nazi 
officialdom. 
 
Peaceful Intentions 
 In retrospect, it is easy to condemn out-of-hand any attempt to work alongside the 
Nazis. As in the cases of Pierre Viénot, Victor Basch, and an array of contributors to the 
French and German exile press, so, too, were many eager to denounce such efforts from 
                                                          
488PA-AA R61397 Bericht über eine Arbeitsbesprechung am 18. Dezember 1935. Betr. Deutsch-
Französische Gesellschaft. 
 
489Cf. PA-AA R61345 No. 12055. Bericht der Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhand-Aktiengesellschaft 
Berlin über die bei der Deutsch-Französischen Gesellschaft, Berlin, vorgenommenen Prüfung des 
Abschlusses zum 31. März 1939; PA-AA R61346 Bericht Nr. 13865 und Anlage der Deutsche Revisions- 
und Treuhand- Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin über die bei der DFG, Berlin, vorgenommene Prüfung der 
Einnahmen und Ausgaben für die Zeit vom 1. April 1939 bis zum 31. März 1940 und des Abschlusses zum 
31 März 1940; PA-AA DBP 702c No. DBP A 03094 Letter from Rümelin to Nostitz (12 May 1936) [as 
forwarded from Rümelin to Forster (14 May 1936)].  
 232 
the start. But it is imperative to address why so many willingly signed on to the CFA (and 
to a lesser extent the DFG), and why they persisted in the endeavor throughout the 1930s. 
The Germans and the French joined—and remained part of—the DFG/CFA for a 
variety of reasons. And many members’ relations to the idea of cooperation did not 
remain static but evolved over the course of the 1930s. Some clung to the notion of 
cooperation despite the manifold indicators screaming caution. For many, fears of 
another war or of the dangers of Communism overrode any concerns they may have had 
about Nazism. Along these lines, some maintained a profound conviction that working 
for peace and conducting international outreach did not automatically signify their 
approval of the other nation’s domestic politics. Others joined expressly because they 
admired aspects of Nazi thought. 
 For some French members of the CFA, the choice to work for cooperation was 
tied to feeling deeply implicated in Germany’s turn to Hitler.490 Saddling the Germans 
with the burden of guilt, a tremendous inferiority complex, and enormous debt through 
Versailles had brought trouble to France’s own doorstep. It was therefore up to the 
French to try to right a wrong, and ideally ensure the peace along the way. For many 
French members, it was an obligation to make up for the past—as well as an intense 
desire to act preemptively to safeguard a better future. For the Germans, at least those 
spearheading the endeavor, the DFG/CFA project was about Germany’s potential to 
reverse the imbalance in the French-German equation. In other words, it also hinged upon 
overturning past injustices against Germany. 
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 Veterans, horrified at the prospect of another war, were especially drawn to the 
messages of peace and understanding. For veterans on the political left and right, it was, 
in Antoine Prost’s words, “a moral duty to resist war.”491 Negotiations with veterans’ 
groups—with Abetz as one of the primary mediators—had been underway between 
Draeger’s meeting to dissolve the old DFG in July 1934 and the emergence of the 
DFG/CFA in the fall of 1935. As a longtime proponent of French-German cooperation 
and the need to avoid another war, Abetz (though not a veteran himself) had been 
particularly moved when reading about a 1934 Rudolf Hess speech at Königsberg. Hess 
proclaimed the need for veterans of the Great War to “build a bridge of understanding 
from people to people when politicians cannot find a way.” Although Abetz reacted more 
enthusiastically to Hess’ speech than did a wary French public,492 it inspired him to work 
harder to sell French veterans to the cause. It was then Abetz began meeting with Henri 
Pichot, and in a creative fit, proposed that the two countries light bonfires along the 
length of the Rhine to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the start of war, a plan that 
was a bit too daring (and impossible to plan in mere weeks) for Pichot to agree to adopt 
on the spot.493 Abetz’s eager report on veterans’ understanding (which the Foreign Office 
dismissed) captivated Ribbentrop, who promptly hired him as an expert on France.  
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The heads of the major veterans’ organizations took on leading roles at the DFG 
and the CFA, a clear sign that, to them, cooperation might fulfill the dream of peace. 
Only one of these men, Commandant René Michel l’Hôpital, the provisional president of 
the CFA, found Hitler’s aggressive actions sufficient cause to leave at an early date. 
L’Hôpital promptly quit the CFA the day German troops marched into the Rhineland,494 
but he was easily replaced by another prominent veteran, Georges Scapini. Goy and 
Pichot each met with Hitler in late 1934, as did Scapini in the spring of 1935. And if they 
sometimes wavered in their enthusiasm and hesitated before making certain commitments 
that telegraphed their sanctioning of the regime, these veterans’ leaders nonetheless 
remained at the helm of the CFA throughout the 1930s. 
It is unclear from the records whether the millions of veterans who were nominal 
members of the DFG/CFA were avidly supportive, receptive, ambivalent, or even hostile 
to the notion of French-German cooperation espoused by the DFG/CFA. The glimmers of 
evidence seem to indicate that veterans’ attitudes ran the gamut. Just as l’Hôpital found 
the remilitarization of the Rhineland intolerable, ordinary veterans from the Union 
Nationale withdrew on that occasion from their plan to participate in a special French-
German commemoration of the 20th anniversary of Verdun.495 Then again, many veterans 
rallied around Pichot and Goy, some signaling their support by traveling to Germany or 
attending CFA talks by German personalities. Pichot even hand-delivered a letter of 
support from the Union Fédérale to Daladier at Munich. 
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Although it represented only the tiniest fraction of French veterans, the 
declaration of the Union Nationale Indépendente des Combattants (UNIC) helps explain 
in bald terms how the French, especially veterans, might find cooperation with Nazi 
Germany appealing. In a 1934 letter addressed to the French press, the Ambassador to 
Germany, and Hitler himself, UNIC’s director Eugène Napoléon-Bey welcomed Hitler’s 
call for a joint meeting of French and German veterans. “For a Franco-German 
collaboration, the mass of French veterans cries, down with war, long live the peace 
between the two peoples. Hail to German veterans and their leader Adolf Hitler,” he 
exclaimed.496 For Napoléon-Bey, veterans had a particular duty to work for peace and 
thus to work with Germany.  
Such ideas were not limited to the UNIC. Jean Goy of the mammoth UNC 
pursued a similar line with regard to Germany, a stance which contrasted strongly with 
the Union’s anti-Briandist position in the 1920s.497 In a 1934 interview with Jean 
Luchaire, Goy explained,  
See here: I am hostile to a stupid and sterile Germanophobia. I believe that 
the utility of direct contacts, of Franco-German explanations is no longer 
contestable. The declarations of Chancellor Hitler and those more recently 
of Minister Hess should not be passed by in silence. First, they steer 
German opinion in a direction favorable to détente between the two 
peoples. Next, they open up opportunities that we don’t have the right to 
stipulate. If, with such contact, there is a chance for peace for Europe, how 
could we shut our eyes and let it pass us by?498 
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Goy met with Hitler, who told him of his peaceful intentions and his support of Franco-
German rapprochement. Goy’s conservative Union Nationale, like the left-leaning Union 
Fédérale, would be folded into the CFA membership roster. 
 Others specifically feared the potential for conflict over various hotspots. The 
Saar question, for example, figured heavily into both French and German desires for 
cooperation. For the French, especially veterans of the Great War, it was not worth going 
to war over the Saar.499 In his book, 1935…Paix avec l’Allemagne, Régis de Vibraye 
spelled out the reasons why he did not want to go to war over Eastern Europe.500   
The writer Jules Romains later defended his own willingness to work with 
Hitler’s Germany—he after all had sat on the CFA’s Honorary Committee and met on 
numerous occasions with Ribbentrop, Alfred Rosenberg, and Goebbels—for three 
principal reasons. First, he had vowed to himself to “do everything in my power to 
prevent the outbreak of another war.” Tied to that oath to work for peace came a fierce 
conviction in the power of the engaged intellectual; Romains looked to Zola’s J’accuse 
as an example of the way he (and others) might be able to influence European public 
opinion.  Finally, he argued, “since we had let Nazism eat into her [Germany] bit by 
bit…it was necessary in 1934 to consider Nazi Germany as a fact, an established and 
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confirmed fact.” The path to peace, according to Romains, had to go through Nazi 
Germany, however unsatisfactory that option may have been.501 
In the face of public condemnation years later, Abetz expressed an important 
point about why some might bother trying to work with the Nazis. In his prison memoirs, 
Abetz explained that he “had the hardest time understanding” why French officialdom in 
the 1930s “had so little interest in French-German rapprochement initiatives in which 
members of the [Nazi] Party were engaged.” The self-serving nature of his comment 
notwithstanding, it speaks to a larger issue of why some French members of the CFA in 
particular may have placed so little import on the problem of making common cause with 
the Nazis, especially in the face of pointed criticism in sectors of the French press. 
Working with the Nazis, in this view, was the only way to secure the peace and have an 
impact on German public opinion. For Abetz—again in retrospect—the involvement of 
prominent Nazis was positive and a sure sign that cooperation, and with it peace, not only 
had a chance but might prevail.502  
To the argument that cooperation with Hitler or the Nazis was out of the question, 
members could resort to an easy answer. When Edouard Herriot told Friedrich Grimm in 
1937 he could not “befriend the Germany of Hitler,” Grimm responded that 
“understanding should not be a thing of regimes, it must simply happen from people to 
people.” There was a difference between working with Nazi Germany and with Germans. 
For Grimm, who signed onto the DFG board at the direct bequest of Ribbentrop,503 such 
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assurances were clearly calculating. But this also proved an effective way to rationalize 
the decision to work alongside the DFG/CFA.  
Interested citizens in the DFG and CFA, who had neither been affiliated with 
other friendship societies nor brought in by the Party, cited many reasons for their desire 
for membership. “No profound divergence in ideas separates our two peoples,” wrote one 
Jules Piquet to the German Embassy in Paris in 1935, “they must simply learn to look at 
each other with more confidence—that will be the task of all French people of good will. 
I ask you, your Excellence, to count me as of now, one of the first adherents of the new 
committee…”504 Whereas for Piquet the reasons were rather moral, for others it was more 
related to personal experience. A Parisian teacher wrote how he had spent his vacations 
for the last 15 years in Germany, “where I was always met with a friendly reception.”505 
Similarly referring to her biography as the root of an interest in the new “League” for 
rapprochement a French woman explained, “Since my childhood, my [German] uncle 
taught me to understand and love Germany; moreover, I spent three years of my youth in 
Darmstadt and Berlin and I retain unforgettable memories of the affectionate welcome I 
received there. It is therefore in my eyes a debt of gratitude to try to create links of 
friendship between our two countries.”506 The Munich Accords did not deter and seem to 
have prompted at least one individual, an accountant, to seek out the CFA and pledge “to 
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devote all of my activity to the rapprochement for which so many French people 
wish.”507  
One Pierre Lefèvre, involved in efforts for French-Italian rapprochement, gushed 
about joining the CFA for reasons that recalled the agendas of the Sohlbergkreis, 
Grautoff’s DFG, and above all the Mayrisch Komitee:  
Zealous partisan of French-German rapprochement (that must be rapid to 
have some influence on future European events!), I remain persuaded that 
aside from certain scientific or artistic rapprochements, the 
rapprochements of veterans and above all students (such as through school 
trips over vacations)—and adding to that the ease accorded here and there 
to tourist excursions—are those that are capable of giving the best results. 
With the essential condition that both sides cease all polemics in the press 
and all ideological quarrels!!!508 
 
Lefèvre, while citing the kinds of activities undertaken by the Weimar-era groups, 
nonetheless seems to have had a clear sense of the propagandistic nature of the CFA/DFG 
since he had pushed for such a group the previous year and still had advice to offer on 
how to create a “favorable atmosphere” for the Germans. 
Many succumbed to a wave of propaganda that served to buttress the French 
fervor for peace. From the upper echelons to the lower, the Germans tried to convince the 
French of their peaceful intentions; much of their audience heard what they wanted to 
hear. Once the January 1935 referendum in the Saar determined that 90% of locals 
desired the region’s return to Germany, for example, Hitler announced that Germany no 
longer had cause to fight.509 For the French, this could be convincing, as a parallel of 
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sorts to Alsace and Lorraine’s return to France at the end of the war. The DFG served as 
a vehicle for a similar message aimed at the broader populace, as did numerous attempts 
to captivate public intellectuals and journalists.  
Understanding German involvement is more difficult. French opponents of 
working with Nazi Germany explained German overtures as the rhetorical prong of their 
two-part strategy. As there was a rhetorical push for peace, there was a material push in 
the opposite direction, namely the build-up of the military, an argument that was duly 
noted by much of the French press. French challengers of cooperation fully believed the 
Germans did not spread this message at home. In other words, it was no secret that the 
Germans may have had ulterior motives. In a 1934 meeting, a skeptical Foreign Minister 
Jean-Louis Barthou saw right through Ribbentrop and reported that “the words are of 
peace, but the actions are of war.”510 More generally, French opponents of cooperation 
attributed German eagerness for rapprochement to duplicity, whether to have more 
freedom for maneuver in the Saar511 or to achieve concessions more generally. In 
retrospect, we can view with more certainty German veterans’ involvement—indeed 
leadership—within the movement for cooperation in light of Hitler’s tendency to tie 
aggressive actions to showy efforts abroad to promote peace.512 The work undertaken to 
found the DFG and the CFA came on the heels of the reintroduction of conscription. 
While many former members of Weimar-era groups simply stayed on without 
comment, some chose to excuse their past affiliation and make clear their current 
                                                          
510Jean-Louis Barthou as quoted in Bloch, 52. 
 
511PA-AA R70556 Press clipping. Henry Berenger, “Tirons la chose au clair,” Agence Économique et 
Financière, 27 Nov. 1934. 
 
512Diehl, 730-731; Weinberg, 169-171. 
 
 241 
intentions. One former member of the DFG branch in Württemberg wrote to the German 
Foreign Minister that he had only joined the Württemberg branch once Jews had left, and 
that the group rested on “national foundations.” Above all, he explained, a new DFG 
could act as a “useful element for understanding and fairness in the sense of the words of 
the Herr Reichs Chancellor and the Herr Propaganda Minister.”513 Even this member of 
the DFG—removed from the schemes of Nazi officialdom—understood that the DFG 
could advance a revisionist agenda, including the remilitarization that lay behind the 
euphemism of fairness. 
Sometimes, proponents of the new associations imagined they held broader 
appeal than the record shows. Before the re-founding of the DFG and the birth of the 
CFA, Abetz, for example, put forth the idea that Marshall Pétain might join, a notion one 
representative of the German Foreign Office even found absurd.514 Not only did this 
indicate a fundamental misreading of Pétain, but it reveals the conflation in Abetz’s mind 
of a desire for peace with Germanophilia.  
 
Reading for Rapprochement 
 The glossy bilingual DFG/CFA review, the Deutsch-Französische Monatshefte/ 
Cahiers Franco-Allemands (DFMh), acted as an important transmitter of the message of 
cooperation. Edited in Karlsruhe by a wholly German staff—led by former Karlsruhe 
teacher and Sohlbergkreis activist Friedrich “Fritz” Bran and overseen in Berlin by a 
representative of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop—the DFMh was a German project heavily 
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skewed toward a French audience; nonetheless, it gave the appearance of balance. 
Through a careful selection of texts that conveyed a pro-German message without being 
too overtly National Socialist—the journal, for example, avoided swastikas and tended to 
steer clear of a racialist discourse—its editors sought to mold French opinion. The DFMh 
reminds us of the meaninglessness of the phrase “empty rhetoric”; the language of the 
journal—even if devoid of sincerity—was one of the principal vehicles by which the 
CFA attracted and maintained members. Most importantly, it promoted a positive image 
of the new Germany.  
The journal largely consisted of sets of thematic articles, on subjects from farming 
to veterans to the arts. Just as there was one such article on each country, the review 
juxtaposed images of both countries to highlight their similarities visually: without the 
aid of the caption, it would be very difficult to make out the origins of the smiling 
peasants, gleaming industrial complexes, half-timbered houses, or rolling hills. Most 
striking, perhaps, was a juxtaposition of images of the eternal flames to the fallen at the 
Arc de Triomphe and the Neue Wache. With these images cropped so as to avoid any 
specific architectural references, and the shadows falling across the photographs at the 
same angle, even a casual reader could make the connection: both countries made heavy 
sacrifices during the war and mourn them still. The two nations were fundamentally the 
same. 
Circulation of the monthly was about 4,500,515 a figure which compares favorably 
to the Deutsch-Französische Rundschau until one takes into account that the bilingual 
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journal served two national audiences.  The DFMh cost significantly less in France than 
in Germany, a difference that suggests the copies headed to France were partially 
subsidized by the Germans.516 This price differential also makes it all the clearer that the 
journal was directed squarely at French readers. 
The first issues of the DFG/CFA journal revealed a certain ambivalence to its 
Weimar predecessors: these were at once something old and something new. The 
masthead made clear the journal’s ties to the Sohlbergkreis by listing Fritz Bran as the 
head of the Sohlbergkreis and its journal as well as Abetz as its manager. Even more 
notably, these early issues maintained the title Sohlbergkreis, but added a new subtitle, 
Deutsch-Französische Monatshefte/ Cahiers franco-allemands. The publisher, G. Braun, 
directed by Fritz Bran’s father, also stayed the same.517 The broader change in 
administration was made explicit in the DFMh; the editors noted (in both languages) that 
the “community of views and goals” of the review would remain the same as the 
Sohlbergkreis, but that DFG management would permit it to disseminate this message 
more effectively. The first issue opened with voices from the Sohlbergkreis, in the form 
of short contributions by Abetz, Cécil Mardrus, and Bertrand de Jouvenel; following 
these came alternating voices of peace from the leaders of veterans’ groups in both 
countries. The first issue even carried an account of French travelers in Germany who 
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spent their first day on an overnight pilgrimage to Sohlberg in honor of what happened 
there five years before.518  
After a full year of publication, however, the new review dropped the word 
Sohlbergkreis from its title and left the old group behind. Barbara Unteutsch has 
suggested that the Dienststelle Ribbentrop might have wanted to blot out the memory of 
the DFMh’s “origins in the youth movement” and perhaps liberate dedicated Nazis from 
the rumor that working for French-German understanding had “pre-revolutionary 
origins.”519 
Even at the most basic level of the journal’s dating and numbering system, the 
DFMh asserted a particular narrative about German history and the history of the 
DFG/CFA more particularly. For the DFG/CFA, symbols carried more weight than 
accuracy. The volume numbering of the journal does not conform with its publication 
history, but instead dates its origins to the beginning of the Nazi regime. The first issue, 
which appeared in October 1934, thus was labeled volume 2, issue 1. Like the French 
Revolution, a new calendar reconfigured the reality of time. The first issue also 
proclaimed the simultaneous births of the DFG and the CFA, symbolically useful, but a 
small fiction nonetheless. 
In terms of its content, the new journal resembled the DFR and the Revue 
d’Allemagne more than it did the old Sohlbergkreis. All had lengthy, substantive articles 
on a wide range of themes, often by distinguished contributors. Like the DFR and Revue 
d’Allemagne, it carried book reviews, press reviews, and an announcements section about 
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Franco-German contacts, events of interest, and firsts in the realm of cooperation. In 
February 1935, for example, the DFMh announced the first time a French scholar spoke 
at a plenary session of the German Academy of Law.  
Crucially, it went a step beyond the DFR/Revue d’Allemagne by maintaining the 
dialogue (or the appearance of dialogue) within the review. The French-German 
community, at least the French-German reading community, was one. French and 
German personalities from Emmanuel Mounier to Rudolf Hess contributed to the DFMh. 
By and large, French contributors’ articles appeared in German and Germans’ articles in 
French, to a rather dizzying effect. The idea was that readers would be able to understand 
authors from across the Rhine—presumably even better than their own compatriots.  
While praising Nazi Germany from the outset, the DFMh never grew to be 
especially effusive. In one early article, for example, journalist Claudine Chonez, who 
spent a week visiting a Pomeranian work camp, admired the rigors of camp existence—
the straw mats, the icy showers, “the grand sacrifice offered to the fatherland [patrie],” 
but found room to criticize other elements of her experience.  “Nothing is as depressing 
as a diet made up of bread and margarine and boiled potatoes,” she wrote. But she 
managed to slip in a far more cutting critique of the conformism hammered into young 
Germans’ minds so that they had an enviable “collective discipline” but were not “really 
free.”520 
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Defining Cooperation after Weimar 
The DFG and CFA relied on multiple visions of cooperation drawn from an array 
of Weimar sources. Members’ diversity further contributed to the blurring of what they 
meant by cooperation as well as to the groups’ inconsistency in their choice of target 
audience. Their diffuse message helped reach out to different constituencies. As we will 
see, the Nazis took advantage of the ambiguities about cooperation and the elasticity of 
its vocabulary to recast the terms of the discussion in their favor. 
Ostensibly, the two groups aimed, in the words of Fernand de Brinon, “to get to 
know one other in order to talk things over, to talk things over in order to understand one 
another.”521 These notions “se connaître” [sich kennenlernen] and “se comprendre” [sich 
verstehen] came straight from the arsenal of Weimar ideas on cooperation, above all from 
Grautoff’s DFG and its associate the Ligue des Études Germaniques, which had even 
named its bulletin Se Connaître. The notion of “mutual comprehension” popped up 
frequently: the CFA, for example, sought “the development of private and public ties 
between France and Germany in all domains…in order to contribute to the consolidation 
of European peace by better mutual comprehension.”522 Although the idea of a 
“European peace” also held a prominent place in the CFA’s mantra, this slogan did not 
translate to an open espousal of pacifism. Just as with the groups from the Weimar-era, 
peace could serve as an eminently useful catchword, but pacifism set off alarm bells.  
                                                          
521PA-AA DBP 1049/1 B03951 Speech by Fernand de Brinon (29 Aug. 1936). The first sentence reads in 
the original: “Se connaître afin de s’expliquer, s’expliquer pour se comprendre.” 
 
522This phrase appeared on numerous CFA materials and reports about the group; see for example, PA-AA 
DBP 1049/1 No. B 5230 V. 4 Sdb. Betr. Gründung eines Comité France-Allemagne. Report signed Forster 
to AA (6 Dec. 1935); PA-AA R70555 No. zu AA II Fr. 4389 “Discours du Commandant l’Hôpital, 
Président du CFA” sent by Kühn to AA (17 Dec. 1935). 
  
 247 
Like their predecessors, the DFG/CFA purported to steer clear of politics. Brinon 
proclaimed:  
We lay no claim to meddle in public affairs that belong to our 
governments. We know perfectly well that entente between France and 
Germany would not be enough to resolve all of the problems of our times. 
We are not dreaming of joint rule [condominium] dictating to the universe. 
It is nevertheless the case that an exact mutual awareness between our two 
countries and a collaboration born of practical settlements would have a 
supreme importance in today’s world.523  
 
As some critics duly noted, however, the DFG and the CFA certainly had a political 
purpose; they were simply reluctant to wear that on their sleeves. This strategy further 
served to shake off a bit of the Weimar taint by distancing the new associations from 
Briand and Stresemann’s legacy of rapprochement. Descriptions of the two groups thus 
avoided formulating a comprehensive agenda and instead stressed the importance of 
fostering personal connections. As those planning the CFA argued, “leave it to the 
responsible statesmen to judge if one day a political rapprochement will be possible. That 
is not the task of private individuals.”524 
Following the precedent of the Mayrisch Komitee, Grautoff’s DFG, and the 
Sohlbergkreis, leaders of the CFA and DFG championed the patriotic character of their 
organizations to the public. For l’Hôpital, “Love of the fatherland, the ardent love that 
should animate every citizen, does not preclude the incomprehension of other 
fatherlands.”525 Such patriotic principles, of course, were self-evident from the 
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credentials of many of the groups’ most visible leaders. In the DFMh, Abetz contended 
that only wounded veterans could have taken such an initiative,526 an argument worthy of 
notice given Abetz’s own role at the head of the Sohlbergkreis. To the German public, 
some also made sure to contrast this patriotic approach to working with the French to the 
so-called decadent betrayal by certain German intellectuals, such as the Mann brothers, 
who had exposed themselves as “descendants and imitators of French nationalists.”527 
Speeches at the first CFA event sought to channel French anxieties into desires to 
seek entente with Germany. The Rector of Berlin’s Technische Hochschule, SA-
Oberführer and DFG President Achim von Arnim struck a chord by bringing up the 
postwar population crisis—the French were after all in the middle of the so-called hollow 
years short of soldiers and without babies—and reminding them that Germany’s 
population saw no such calamity. Arnim cast French population worries in a more 
positive light, by reframing Germany’s more robust population growth as a source of 
strength for both countries against the rising tide of Communism. Germany possessed the 
strength, according to Arnim, to stand as a “bulwark” against the Bolsheviks and could 
thus protect the French from its true worst enemies. By all reports, this line, uttered less 
than a year after the February 1934 riots that pitted left versus right, brought a round of 
applause. 
Numerous rallying points pulled the DFG/CFA in different directions. Even in the 
space of one speech, members of the DFG or CFA could find themselves lurching from 
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one point to the next and could not seem to settle on a unified vision. At the celebration 
of Reichssportführer von Tschammer und Osten, for example, Arnim first hailed 
veterans, then called on “all social ranks, including the worker,” and finally alighted on 
youth as the most important targets in the work of French-German understanding. 
Singling out the worker, of course, was a stunt—geared not at all to the tony audience in 
the room but to the readers of the press coverage of the event. Deeming the workers’ an 
important voice for cooperation was also nothing new; Gottfried Salomon had pursued 
this line in the Weimar-era DFG, against Grautoff’s instincts, and to little avail. Arnim’s 
focus on youth in contrast derived from the Sohlbergkreis, but he linked this directly to 
the racial logic of the Nazis. “Above all, he argued, “we wish for youth to get to know 
each other. French youth should not be pushed away by our uniforms, which have 
nothing to do with a martial ethos. If we speak thusly for understanding, we are tying it to 
the [notion of] medieval solidarity of the European races.”528 Arnim—who as President 
of the DFG had no reason to be unsure of its agenda—seems to have used the concept of 
understanding as a receptacle into which he could toss whatever ideas tickled his fancy. It 
was broad enough to allow for competing interpretations: medieval notions of fighting 
the outsider-pagans (Muslims or Jews) as well as the image of Charlemagne 
harmoniously uniting the cultures of Europe. His talk was vague and hopeful and above 
all defensive of German intentions.  
As evident from Arnim’s speech, the DFG and CFA seemed torn between the 
allure of exclusivity and inclusiveness. They laid stress on the involvement of elites in the 
quest for cooperation, an emphasis clearly suggestive of the Mayrisch Komitee’s 
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example. According to its statutes, the DFG worked for “the creation and care of friendly 
relations between the leading personalities and the different organizations of public life of 
both countries.529 Members’ names (and in the French case, often addresses) attest to the 
elite base of the twinned organizations. And a multitude of extravagant functions 
reinforced to the public, if nothing else, an image of the DFG and especially the CFA as 
exclusive. In this sense, the new groups looked like a flashier version of the privileged 
Mayrisch Komitee, which had at least kept a low profile. Yet by reaching out to veterans, 
the DFG and CFA claimed a broader mandate and could purport to be of the people. Such 
inclusiveness became a point of pride. Fernand de Brinon, for one, refused to limit the 
endeavor to elites.530 One press account took pains to distance the CFA from earlier 
instances confined to “a narrow circle of society people;” the CFA instead worked 
“without pretension, or illusion.”531 Abetz recalled the DFG/CFA as a better incarnation 
of Grautoff’s DFG because it, on the one hand, captivated a broader public, and, on the 
other, retained a balance (because of its twinned nature) sorely lacking in the Weimar 
effort.532  
Following the precedent of Grautoff’s DFG as well as of the Sohlbergkreis, the 
DFG/CFA paid deference to the ordinary citizen. The DFG and CFA called upon 
veterans, young people, and journalists; they also beckoned to farmers, mothers, and 
workers. And like its three Weimar predecessors, the DFG/CFA recognized the 
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importance of promoting cooperation outside government channels. Indeed, its leaders 
claimed, “It is not financiers, nor politicians, nor diplomats even if they are well-
intentioned—who can change psychological fundamentals.” If people in positions of 
power were the ones who mattered least for the quest for cooperation—an idea 
fundamentally at odds with the Mayrisch Komitee model—the root of the problem, as the 
Mayrisch Komitee’s Pierre Viénot had argued a decade before, lay in psychologies. The 
French-German problem was at heart a “problem of passion.”533  
In hashing out the best ways to achieve Franco-German cooperation, and what 
this end-product would look like, the DFG/CFA took an all-encompassing approach. 
Deutsche Bank’s Emil Georg von Stauss (1877-1942), honorary president of the DFG-
Berlin and a board member of a range of firms from the Ufa film studios to Daimler-
Benz, for example, heavily stressed the centrality of economics.534 “Economic relations 
are the most primitive and the most natural connection between peoples,” he argued. 
“Even cultural exchanges between very developed nations,” Stauss continued, “are only 
possible on a base of healthy economic exchange. It is only there that the two sides gain 
something.”535 By making the cultural contingent on the economic, Stauss connected the 
DFG to the Mayrisch Komitee, which, with a large portion of its membership base drawn 
from the world of high finance and big industry, had regularly made similar appeals. The 
Mayrisch Komitee idea of cleansing the press of misinformation and 
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“Greuelpropaganda” would become a mainstay of the DFG and CFA. At a 1937 
conference, for example, members resolved to promote honest reporting, combat 
“tendentious news,” and correct any distortions and errors that surfaced.536 On a more 
cultural and intellectual level, the groups arranged tours, conferences, concerts, and film 
screenings, just as they furthered the expansion of exchanges and encounters. Its journal 
devoted much space to discussions of the arts, literature, and history.  
Framing the project in so many ways resulted in an unclear message. The Nazis 
were able to use the very nebulous nature of these discussions to begin recasting many of 
the key concepts of cooperation for their own strategic purposes. Ideas like difference, 
understanding, equality, and moral disarmament were granted new meanings as they 
became perverted and instrumentalized to help achieve Nazi aims. For some CFA 
members, the ideal of peace yielded to self-adjustment to this new vision of cooperation. 
Other French activists showed profound sympathy for these new arguments and 
committed themselves to their propagation.  
Loose translations can be especially revealing of the tensions within the 
organization’s visions of cooperation and shed light on the different messages broadcast 
to French and German audiences. One such article that appeared side-by-side in German 
and French, for example, slipped in an important distinction about the group’s goals. To 
the French, it purported to seek “to reveal and reconcile national particularities.” To the 
Germans, in contrast, the project was not described as about reconciling difference at all; 
instead, it revolved around the “portrayal and explanation of völkisch life” in the two 
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countries.537 Whereas for some the project involved an emphasis on national difference, 
for others it concerned a dialectical relationship—the project of overcoming the space 
between.  
At times, the DFG/CFA’s stress on national difference took other forms. A 
DFG/CFA conference aimed to show, “the contribution of our two countries to the 
cultural life of Europe . . . . In this clash of [our] mutual cultural values, is there not the 
hope of envisioning new perspectives to resolve the political problems that confront us at 
the current hour?”538 This argument echoed Grautoff’s principle of complementarity that 
suggested that the two countries’ dissimilar traits were a source of strength; together, 
their complementary natures comprised European civilization. At the same time, it 
emphasized the productivity of conflict more than it did the value of resolution. This idea 
of competition reflected the spirit behind one of the great celebratory moments for the 
DFG/CFA: the 1936 Olympics. 
Paying close attention to questions of national difference was not only a way to 
talk about conflict but also about the project of understanding. For the DFG and CFA, as 
for their predecessors, the notion of understanding did not entail the chiseling away of 
difference to yield two versions of the same thing, but the recognition of separate 
identities. Yet a subtle, but crucial shift marked the DFG/CFA. Whereas Weimar-era 
societies had underscored the importance of national particularities while nonetheless 
seeking common ground, the DFG/CFA agenda clearly privileged the importance of 
difference. As Henri Jourdan, director of the Institut Français de Berlin and cultural 
attaché at the French Embassy, explained in the DFMh, understanding meant “to be 
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aware of one’s own limits and to base good relations with other nations on such self-
awareness” [seine eigenen Grenzen erkennen und auf solcher Selbsterkenntnis ein gutes 
Verhältnis zur anderen Nation aufbauen].539 Even more tellingly, one contributor to the 
DFMh contended that “the primary condition for entente is once again the total 
acceptance of the nature of the other, an a priori recognition in a way . . . . Life side-by-
side for Germany and France is so intimate by its nature and history that we have the 
right to speak of it as a community of destiny equivalent to a marriage. To the extent that 
we have the intention to live in the future in a relationship that is not conjugal war, the 
obvious thing to do is to establish our relationship on the same base as any happy 
marriage: mutual recognition of each other’s spirit and lifestyle.”540 
Such arguments for respecting the character and “lifestyle” of the other nation 
pointed toward a more brazen argument about the need to recognize the rights of national 
sovereignty. Nations should let other nations do as they saw fit, a handy way to denounce 
Versailles and its regulation of German affairs as well as to advise the French to refrain 
from judging German politics. Conversely, Germans took umbrage at purportedly 
aggressive moves on the part of the French, an unacknowledged double standard about 
the DFG/CFA’s assertion not to take a stand against the decisions taken by another 
government.  
Contributors to the DFMh often blamed the French for their turbulent relationship 
with the Germans. Cécil Mardrus from the Sohlbergkreis drew attention to the fact that it 
was Hitler making overtures to the French, and the French, in turn, were reluctant to 
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cooperate. Abetz made a similar point by stressing French nationalists’ opposition to 
Germany as a form of intolerance.541 Not only, then, did DFMh writers paint the 
Germans as more open-minded and actively peace-seeking than the French, they also at 
times more directly held the French responsible for German actions. Even historical 
arguments sometimes took this form. One article in the DFMh, for example, explained 
that by considering Karl Freiherr vom Stein “the enemy of France,” Napoleon “created 
the climate in which Stein could act.”542 Less innocuously, this genre of argumentation 
permitted the DFMh to depict the French as aggressors, against whom Germany needed 
to defend itself.543 According to Jean Weiland, for example, the French “were playing 
with fire” by signing the Franco-Soviet Pact. Weiland thus helped his audience 
“understand” why German troops moved into the Rhineland: the French were at fault for 
having given the Germans motive.544 This was a very different notion of understanding 
from that of the Locarno years. Now it referred to the explaining and sanctioning (or at 
least the tolerating) of political or strategic actions on the part of the state. Such 
arguments gave the lie to the DFG/CFA’s self-portrait; the groups were only nonpolitical 
insofar as that meant that they had no place criticizing the domestic and foreign policies 
of the other nation (except at times when that other nation was France).  
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Hand-in-hand with an emphasis on German blamelessness came an appeal for 
equality. A pair of articles in the DFMh—one by the lawyer and DFG vice president 
Friedrich Grimm, who had defended German nationalist saboteurs during the French 
occupation of the Ruhr, and one by Weiland, an employee of Henri-Haye—considered 
the gaping inequality between the two nations through the lens of Versailles. Together, 
they left the impression that Versailles had shackled Germany and thereby made a 
hypocrite of France. Grimm subtly prodded readers to question how the birthplace of 
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity could see a land in chains and not wish it freedom.545  
At the first CFA event, Achim von Arnim hinted at what kind of cooperation 
suited the age of Hitler. Although he employed the usual vocabulary—above all, 
rapprochement and entente—his insistence upon the German people’s (and Hitler’s) wish 
for peace veiled a subtler message about military parity and rearmament. His code was 
not terribly difficult to crack. “Rapprochement and entente,” he explained, “are only 
possible between peoples enjoying the same rights and sufficient means for defense.”546 
Dressed up in a language of equal rights—a language which the French themselves loved 
to invoke—was a revisionist plea that might sit more easily with a French audience. 
Grimm reiterated this message in a passionate article about German desires for “equal 
rights” as the only way to guarantee French security.547 
By Munich, the language of peace deployed by the DFMh had changed 
dramatically. Veterans now were lauded for their mutual respect and their bravery, but 
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not in a pacific or brotherly framework. The DFMh still recognized the “spirit of the 
veteran” as the banner under which the DFG/CFA had marched from the start. Yet it also 
drew a more soldierly image of these veterans: “This reciprocal sympathy and 
spontaneous love of peace of two nations-in-arms, known as courageous warriors, are the 
great sensation of today’s Europe.”548 No more were veterans solemnly declaring the end 
of war together and jointly commemorating the fallen at Verdun as they did in 1936; that 
much was clear. But the DFMh seemed to rejoice in this turn of events. It had drifted at 
last into an open celebration of martial values. 
After what it considered the triumph of Munich, the DFMh looked back to the old 
argument from the 1920s of “moral disarmament,” an idea veterans of both countries had 
revisited in 1935.549 Whereas the idea of moral disarmament (or in Lichtenberger’s 
phrasing intellectual demobilization) had originally put forward the importance of 
destroying an ethos of war alongside the material disarmament that was already 
underway, the DFMh of 1938 promoted something else entirely: moral disarmament 
without material disarmament. By focusing very carefully on the need for moral 
disarmament, the editors steered around the question of remilitarization. The article 
asked, “Have we, French and Germans, done everything in our power so that moral 
disarmament gains ground in the hearts of our two peoples as we owe it to the millions of 
dead…on this twentieth anniversary of the armistice?” Through the lens of moral 
disarmament, the French were to blame for harboring fears of a German menace. By 
holding onto old prejudices against their neighbor, the French had put at risk the 
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realization of a “moral armistice.”550 Certainly, this was a perversion of Lichtenberger’s 
1922 premise, but, then again, an article of his had appeared in the DFMh earlier that 
year. 
By the late 1930s—despite the geopolitical turmoil—the DFG/CFA took comfort 
in not only having seen a slew of successes on an interpersonal front, but in also having 
contributed to what they saw as concrete political victories. Jean Weiland privately 
expressed his certainty, and that of many colleagues, that his group had helped pave the 
way to Munich.551 In December 1938, Ribbentrop told the CFA at a celebratory reception 
that they had “brought a precious psychological contribution” that enabled the Franco-
German Declaration just signed by himself and Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet.552 
   
A Misleading Partnership 
 Though they looked like mirror images of each another and acted as partners, the 
DFG and CFA remained vastly different associations from the start. The politics of Nazi 
Germany gave the DFG a more complicated history than that of its sister society in 
France. A key tension lay in the fact that, on the French side, private citizens had 
mobilized to form an independent association; whereas, on the German side, state power 
had invaded the civic space. The Comité France-Allemagne consisted of activists who by 
and large subsidized the groups through membership fees and donations. The DFG also 
consisted of activists, but relied upon the direction and funding of Nazi officialdom to a 
degree only guessed at until now. The two societies thus outwardly shared the same 
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goals, but not the same resources. This distinction would help the DFG hold a more 
dominant position, as it ran the publication both groups shared and managed to found 
seven regional branches. German authorities, in effect, acted as the motor of the DFG, 
which meant that they, in turn, also helped drive the CFA. 
Although the complete records of the DFG and the CFA no longer exist, more 
files than have been previously acknowledged are available for consultation.553 These 
records do not revolutionize our understanding of the organization, but they provide 
concrete evidence to support vague suppositions, and in so doing, spell out the degree to 
which Nazi officials steered the organization. Surviving minutes of DFG board meetings 
reveal that decision-making, down to the level of minutiae, came from the top. Following 
the Nazi doctrine of the Führer principle, Ribbentrop was invested with ultimate authority 
within the DFG.554 A series of financial audits of the DFG illuminates details most 
obviously about its financing, but also about membership numbers, circulation of the 
DFMh, events hosted by the DFG, and the relative successes of each of the DFG 
branches—as well as how these conditions changed over the period from 1938 to 1942, 
the years covered by these audits.555  
Although the money trail has until now remained hidden, certain aspects of the 
DFG’s connections to the Nazis have long been evident. Most obviously, numerous 
                                                          
553Unteutsch, who generally provides an unusually specific listing of details in her study, for example, 
explicitly notes the lack of files about the finances and memberships—as well as of the details of the two 
groups. Instead, she draws hesitant conclusions from the leaders’ connections and from the reports in the 
DFMh.    
 
554PA-AA R61269 Revers (Statement of adherence to Führerprinzip by DFG). Signed by Abetz, von 
Arnim, Bran, Heinrich Stahmer, Friedrich Grimm, and von Cossel [on behalf of Oberlindober] (20 Nov. 
1935). 
 
555The audits were conducted by the Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhand- Aktiengesellschaft on behalf of 
the Stiftung Deutsches Auslandswerk. 
 
 260 
members of the DFG were well-known members of the Nazi establishment. The DFG 
board maintained close ties to numerous German government and party agencies. From 
the start, reports in the British press that trickled down to some French papers had 
announced that the DFG was the creation of “Nazi agents,” more particularly the 
Propaganda Ministry.556 
The DFG aimed to project an image of itself as the equal of the CFA. But behind 
the scenes, puppetmasters including Arnim and Abetz as well as representatives of the 
Propaganda Ministry, the Reichsjugendführung, the various foreign policy offices—the 
Foreign Ministry, Ribbentrop’s Dienststelle, the Party’s Aussenpolitisches Amt, and the 
Party’s Auslandsorganisation—sketched out the grand outlines of the DFG. At one such 
closed meeting, Arnim announced the need to tap the major occupational groups in 
France (alongside French youth groups and veterans that had already proved receptive) to 
unite them against “the influences hostile to Germany of the government, the parties, the 
press, and anonymous powers” and ensure they were “mobilized for an understanding 
with Germany.”557 This fight against hostile propaganda perverted the two-sided struggle 
of the Mayrisch Komitee to combat negative propaganda and misinformation on both 
sides of the Rhine. No wonder this proclamation occurred in closed session, without even 
ordinary DFG members present.  
In July 1936, the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft joined with a number of 
similarly-styled associations aimed at the “care of friendly relations abroad”—among 
others, the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, the Deutsch Ibero-Amerikanische 
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Gesellschaft, and the Deutsch-Japanische Gesellschaft—in an umbrella association of 
international organizations, the Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbände und 
Einrichtungen, under the purview of Goebbels, Ribbentrop, and the Nazi Party’s Stiftung 
Deutsches Auslandswerk.558  
Financial security and an opulent setting for DFG events were some of the 
“positive” changes gained by Nazi support. Whereas Grautoff could not get approval for 
a DFG house, the DFG’s new leaders purchased one and outfitted it with furniture from 
the New Palace in Potsdam, art on loan from the Kaiser-Friedrich Museum, and a piano 
from the Bismarck collection of the Chancellery.559 Audits reveal that the downpayment 
on the house in Berlin came from Ribbentrop’s Dienststelle as did the DFG Secretary 
General’s salary and funds for telephone bills and other basic administrative costs. The 
Dienststelle Ribbentrop and the Vereinigung der zwischenstaatlicher Verbände und 
Einrichtung both contributed money for events as well. In 1938 alone, the Vereinigung 
der zwischenstaatlicher Verbände und Einrichtung donated more than two-and-a-half 
times as much money to the DFG as came in to the DFG-Berlin branch as membership 
fees and private donations; the Vereinigung’s funds subsidized half the cost of the DFMh 
and some was shuttled to the various DFG branches.560 The following year, the 
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Vereinigung gave a substantial sum to help pay off the DFG house.561 Put simply, the 
Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft relied heavily on the Nazi regime’s paradiplomatic 
services. These budgets belie Abetz’s postwar claims that the DFG had remained wholly 
independent from Reich ministries and the Party apparatus.562 
By 1939, the DFG held an enviable financial position. Whereas the Sohlbergkreis 
and especially Grautoff’s DFG worried about money, the DFG of the late 1930s enjoyed 
a budget surplus. Funds from the Dienststelle Ribbentrop and the Vereinigung der 
zwischenstaatlicher Verbände und Einrichtung (along with income from various events) 
kept the organization flush. From a financial standpoint, membership fees and private 
donations were simply an added bonus; their principal value lay in maintaining the 
illusion of the DFG as privately-funded and privately-operated. The CFA, in contrast, 
lived largely off membership fees—though, to be fair, its membership base was much 
larger. Although the CFA seems to have received a degree of funding from the Quai 
d’Orsay,563 it saw nothing along the lines of what the DFG accepted from the Germans.  
Thanks to its financial situation and powerful friends, the DFG eventually opened 
seven regional branches. We know (as yet) very little about the individual branches of the 
DFG located in the Hanseatic cities, the Rhineland, Southwest Germany, Baden, the 
Rhine/Main region, Württemberg, and Austria.564 We do not know exactly who or how 
many joined. Statutes from the seven branches closely resembled those of the main 
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association based in Berlin and indicate that the central DFG in Berlin controlled them 
all. These branches looked to the Berlin DFG, which in turn looked to Ribbentrop.565 
Budget reports reveal that the various branches represented only a tiny fraction of the 
DFG’s overall income and expenses.566 While the branches did not have permanent 
homes, their members made use of the lavish facilities in Berlin, and they still managed 
to host many events, from talks to trips, in the regions.567 Occasional reports tell of local 
concerts and talks—Henry-Haye in Cologne, the writer Alphonse de Châteaubriant in 
Karlsruhe, Jacques Bénoist-Méchin in Stuttgart. Some DFG branches tried to foster 
special relations with specific cities in France, for example, the DFG-Hanseatic Cities 
with Bordeaux and Württemberg/Stuttgart with Lyon.  
The CFA was, in contrast to the DFG-Berlin, both more independent and a more 
peripatetic creature, with three Parisian addresses over the course of its short life. The 
CFA was independent of both the French authorities and the German authorities. For the 
CFA, the impulse to create branches came from below. Although there was only one 
branch office of the CFA in Lyon, some had made stabs at founding groups in Nice and 
Algiers. Deeply impressed by a conference they attended in Hamburg and favorable 
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reports by area folklore groups of their trip to Germany, interested parties in Nice, 
deemed “undoubtedly earnest” about the cause of “rapprochement” by the local consulate 
in Marseilles, tried to found a local CFA chapter.568 In this case, networking had created 
local interest in the Paris-based society. The bid for expansion in Algiers demonstrates its 
roots to have been more firmly grounded in political outlook: a prominent local 
businessman, known by its consulate as having a “strong pro-German 
[deutschfreundliche] stance as well as an animus against Jews” likewise attempted to 
begin another CFA branch beyond the metropole.569  
  
Pomp and Circumstance  
Although the two associations were each nationally grounded, the DFG and CFA 
created many opportunities for the groups to mingle or otherwise forge cross-border ties. 
Whether at fancy galas or small receptions, concerts or talks, or on organized tours, 
members of the two organizations became acquainted and learned about life in the other 
land.  
Of particular interest were meticulously and cleverly orchestrated travels through 
Germany that offered only the most limited view. Visitors were certainly shielded from 
the more disturbing aspects of Nazi Germany. This is no mere judgment in hindsight. In 
1934, one Sorbonne professor refused to travel to Germany precisely because he did not 
want to be used; he explained that the tours looked no different from such propaganda 
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efforts put on by the Soviets.570 Welcoming and leading these tours seems to have been 
one of the primary functions of local German DFG branches. 
Because such travels and events were back-and-forth, they were trumpeted as 
examples of reciprocity. A couple of months after the Parisian banquet in honor of Hans 
von Tschammer und Osten, for example, a CFA delegation traveled to Berlin for the 
opening of the Olympics. Members of the DFG showed them around Berlin including a 
tour to the Ufa movie studios, and Oberlindober and von Stauss hosted banquets in the 
French visitors’ honor. By a lucky coincidence, they were also able to attend Foreign 
Minister Constantin von Neurath’s annual diplomatic dinner, where they met Rudolf 
Hess, Ribbentrop, and Hitler himself. Hitler reinforced their positive impressions by 
reportedly telling them, “in a largely relaxed atmosphere, the two countries that have 
contributed so much to one another, in all domains, to civilization, should not only co-
exist but get along. If France and Germany can finally agree, it’s Europe as a whole that 
will be saved! And what a relief for the two peoples!”571  
This particular trip served to pass along an important message to the French 
public, one played up on occasion in the DFMh. Not only did Hitler abominate war and 
seek accord with France, as in fact de Brinon had reported in 1933, but the Germans 
worried about potential aggressors. Georges Pineau, the Union Fédérale representative 
sent to Berlin, wrote in its journal to an audience of French veterans, “From this quick 
voyage to Berlin we report the very distinct impression of a profound desire on the part of 
Germans to draw nearer to France. The German Führer, the German people want nothing 
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less right now than to be our friends. And if something scares them it’s to see us turning 
toward the East . . . 1936 Germany has a phobia—to an unhealthy degree—of 
encirclement (like in 1914) and of Communism.”572   
Another big CFA/DFG event, once again full of photo opportunities, brought 86 
Germans—about half of whom belonged to the Hamburg DFG branch—to the 1937 
World’s Fair in Paris. Once again, receptions, banquets, and tours filled the program. Yet, 
on this occasion, the CFA actually extended a hand to non-elites by hosting a luncheon in 
honor of the workers who helped construct the German pavilion. One day, Henry-Haye, 
the mayor of Versailles and member of the CFA’s Honorary Committee, invited the 
German contingent to tour the chateau. In this symbolically charged moment, Henry-
Haye told the group he hoped the word “Versailles” thereafter would lose some of its 
association with the terrible war.573 Largely planned by businessman Rudolf Schleier, an 
expert on France for the Nazi Party and vice president of the Hanseatic DFG, the itinerary 
catered to a variety of tastes, a smart choice in light of the participation of well-known 
politicians—senators, mayors, and Gau representatives—as well as businessmen, 
lawyers, journalists, doctors, and teachers.574 The group thus paid visits to Notre Dame, 
the Palais de Justice, the Institut Pasteur, a couple of printing presses, and a hospital. The 
26 women (by and large wives and daughters) who were excluded from the veterans’ 
gathering and a reception at the German Chamber of Commerce instead toured a 
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perfumery and the fabled Lanvin fashion house.575 The Hanseatic visitors thus hobnobbed 
with all sorts of prominent Parisians and discussed pressing social issues together, from 
the benefits of the Organisation der Frauenarbeit in Germany, to the modernity of 
French housing developments for workers. In most respects—the chosen destinations, the 
occupations of the visitors, the mix of socializing, touring, and learning—this trip closely 
resembled the tours planned by Grautoff’s DFG.  
In addition, the DFG and CFA were involved in a few larger initiatives. About 
1,000 children of French veterans spent their vacation at Hitler Youth ski camps in 1938 
upon the invitation of Baldur von Schirach,576 a trip that on the surface at least resembled 
Sohlbergkreis efforts on a far bigger scale. More spectacular was a gathering of 30,000 
veterans (of whom, granted, only 500 were German) at Verdun to commemorate its 
twentieth anniversary. Together, they mourned their losses and spoke out for peace. 
From the DFG’s perspective, the two groups also made a crucial, if often indirect 
impact on developments and opinion in France. Whenever CFA members spoke out on 
behalf of Germany in the Chamber of Deputies or published books on Germany, as in the 
cases of Fernand de Brinon and Jules Romains, the DFG saw its own influence at work. 
Moreover, it encouraged (and took a degree of credit for) DFG board members’ efforts to 
reach out to the French within their own ministries and offices. Thus, a plan by a 
representative of the Reichsmusikkammer for a joint conference program between 
Potsdam and Versailles, an ambition of a Reichsfrauenführung representative to set up 
homestays for French and German youth, and a successful exchange program undertaken 
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576AN AP 411/1 Press clipping. “Le Rapprochement des Jeunesses Franco-Allemandes,” Ouest Éclair, 21 
Jan 1938.  
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by the Reich Ministry of Transport for 160 French and German children of railway 
workers, all could be traced back to them.577    
 
Resistance to Cooperation: The Battle over Hearts and Minds in the Press and Elsewhere 
Not surprisingly, the French press offered a more nuanced examination of the 
CFA and DFG during the 1930s than did the German press. German newspapers either 
provided neutral chronicles or acclaimed the societies’ attempts at bridging the cultures.  
The French press was largely split along party lines, with the left-wing press contributing 
more frequent and damning editorials and the more right-oriented papers lauding efforts 
for peace. The German exile press viewed the CFA/DFG in a particularly negative light. 
Any press debates tended to coincide with the most prominent events of either the 
associations or of European politics in general: the launching of the DFG and CFA, 
Brinon’s trip to a Nuremberg Party rally, and, not surprisingly, Germany’s aggressive 
moves on its Eastern borders all prompted the publication of critiques of the two Franco-
German associations. 
From the start, the left-leaning press in France bristled at the new CFA. One 
important arena for criticism revolved around whether the CFA/DFG was, as it claimed, 
not political. At Vendredi, André Chamson—who would later show his colors by 
volunteering in the Spanish Civil War—asked after the first CFA gala whether “we are 
really in the presence of rapprochement with a cultural character and not an operation to 
support a whole political maneuver.”578 Chamson thus questioned one of the CFA’s 
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578PA-AA DBP 1049/1 Press clipping. André Chamson, “La Société des Esprits: Le Comité France 
Allemagne vous prie de bien vouloir assister au Dîner qui sera donné en l’honneur du Reichssportführer M. 
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fundamental claims about the style of cooperation it pursued. Though the group professed 
to steer away from politics and stick to the realm of culture (as, of course, had its 
forbears), Chamson saw through the façade. Working together with representatives of the 
Nazi regime was inherently political and the French associated with the group were 
leaving themselves open to exploitation.  
Anxieties about such manipulation were tied to accusations that the CFA and 
DFG merely maintained an illusion of reciprocity. Those who questioned whether the 
two associations were in equilibrium and sought an evenhanded form of cooperation 
focused on the relative control of the overall organization. One journalist, noting the all-
German editorial staff of the DFMh, argued, “But what surprises me, is that French 
people accept, under the guise of rapprochement, collaborating on a review in which in 
terms of direction and control Germany has all and France has nothing.  Free for others to 
call that rapprochement; I call it abdication.”579 In this light, the DFMh represented a 
broader submission to German domination. Such fears of a lack of reciprocity had 
plagued both German and French officials throughout the 1920s, but the CFA made plain 
that it was now the turn of the French to submit to German hegemony.  
Others considered the entire venture a form of fraud, with the French as its dupes. 
In light of the difference between the soft diplomacy of the DFG and the aggressive 
politics of Hitler—and more particularly between the peace-seeking rhetoric of Arnim 
toward the French and his bellicose lessons to his students at the Technische Hochschule, 
one Strasbourg newspaper recalled an old line, “The German is a kind of bicephalus. He 
                                                                                                                                                                             
le Baron von Tschammer und Osten, le Vendredi 29 Novembre 1935 à 20h.30 dans les salons de l’Hôtel 
Georges V,” Vendredi, 29 Nov. 1935. 
 
579AN AP 411/1 Undated press clipping. Albert Bayet, “La Moralité de l’Affaire Brinon,” Lumière. Bayet 
was a pacifist Radical, writing for the left-wing Lumière. In this article, he professed that he had originally 
believed the DFMh to be “genuinely Franco-German” and was shocked to learn otherwise.  
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thinks and dreams with one head; he conducts himself and acts with another.”580 
Journalist Louis Lévy warned dramatically about the Nazis’ subtle euphemisms that hid a 
more treacherous design:  
And only naïfs can be taken in by appearances. Hitler and his 
collaborators do not cease to speak of Franco-German rapprochement, of 
psychological détente, and to use their jargon, ‘cultural’ exchanges. But as 
soon as one coldly examines the heart of the matter, one notices that the 
aims of the 3rd Reich survive….the France of the Popular Front has 
proclaimed many times that it wants peace with all peoples regardless of 
the form of their government. But it would be childish to remain closed off 
from realities: Hitler’s Germany refuses to reenter into the collectivity of 
pacific nations.581 
 
The Germans were laying a thick web of deceit that the French should be able to 
recognize and try to resist. 
Others saw as the fundamental problem, not cooperation itself, but the company 
the CFA kept. Whereas the CFA consisted of private individuals, the DFG was 
something else entirely:  
Public opinion should be put on guard: Berlin’s Germany-France 
Committee is a committee of Nazi functionaries, official or unofficial 
agents of Hitler’s propaganda . . . . By the fault of the Third Reich, there is 
no longer a common language between the French and the Germans. The 
Germans with whom we can get along on intellectual, scientific, political, 
etc. terrain are today in concentration camps or in exile. The Nazis with 
whom the Comité France-Allemagne wants to fraternize burned the books 
of our thinkers, boycotted Zola, Anatole France, etc. and boast of being 
adversaries of our civilization based on the revolution of ’89 and the rights 
of man. This committee is founded on a pernicious equivocation. The 
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French who only know the Germany of Goethe, Schiller, Heine, and 
Nietzsche will know nothing of its activity.582  
 
Harsher still, one editorial argued that it was unacceptable to converse with the Germans 
until they resumed their ties to the League of Nations. As it stood, the Petit Provençal 
(whose editor, the Radical deputy Vincent Delpuech actually belonged to the CFA), 
presumed the Germans had ulterior motives in courting the French. First they could use 
the French to get close to the Russians, then they would betray the French. “We are big 
enough boys,” wrote the anonymous author, “to detect the perfidies and traps if the kiss 
we are offered is only a kiss from Judas.” The following week, an op-ed piece took the 
opposite tack; the CFA and the DFG—which the author asserted 4,000 Germans had 
already requested to join—could “open the true path that leads to rapprochement between 
the two nations.”583 And while such articles make for less dramatic and more 
homogeneous reading, they certainly were common. Much of the press in France—and of 
course, all of the highly regulated press in Germany—took the groups at their word. 
Germans followed the “order of their hearts” not orders from on high.584 
The rift between supporters and detractors of the CFA/DFG grew wider as 
Hitler’s aggression became bolder. A longstanding feud between the CFA’s Fernand de 
Brinon and the conservative deputy and journalist Henry de Kérillis illustrates in 
dramatic form the sheer magnitude some placed on the question of cooperation. In a 
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series of articles after the Munich Accords he had opposed, Kérillis accused the CFA—
which he had condemned from the start—of “contributing to the chloroforming of a 
group of high society Parisian elites when Germany, wanting to gain time and not yet 
having thrown off its mask, had an interest in spreading so many illusions and lies about 
its true designs regarding our country.” A press war between the two, who quickly added 
to their mudslinging new nicknames for each other, von Brinontrop and Kérilliskof, 
culminated in Brinon’s unanswered call for a duel.585  
Such colorful articles condemning the two societies did not stop other newspapers 
from applauding Brinon and the CFA for their successes in working toward European 
peace. One Fredo Lehrer wrote personally to Brinon in 1938 to laud his courage to wish 
for rapprochement at this point. On both sides of the Rhine, some newspapers 
enthusiastically recorded the successes of Brinon and the CFA. Others offered the more 
reluctant praise of desperation. In 1938, one Alsatian paper remarked how developments 
in Europe seemed to have led the French Foreign Ministry “to the conviction that French-
German rapprochement is the only way to avoid the catastrophe that is generally admitted 
to be imminent. It would thus be criminal not to try and approve the attempt of this last 
chance.”586 
The German exile press, though catering to a limited and self-selecting circle, 
ridiculed and scorned the CFA. German exile journalist Kurt Caro (pseud. Manuel 
Humbert) from the exile journal Pariser Tageblatt described how, at a CFA/DFG event at 
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the Hotel Georges V, his thoughts drifted back to a similar event in 1931 Berlin 
headlining Aristide Briand, near death, and speaking of an “eternal theme: French-
German understanding.” Both Briand and the speaker of 1935 were guilty of harboring 
“illusions.” But the current organization merited more scorn and was, according to Caro, 
full of doubletalk. He maintained the rhetorical efforts of the DFG/CFA—“a repertory of 
bluffs”—sounded like the “cooing of turtledoves.”587  A similar article cut away the 
rhetorical flourishes to uncover “a whole club sent forth to bluff to foreigners.”588 
If the German exile press acted as a mere thorn in the DFG/CFA’s side, a more 
pernicious opponent from the exile community surfaced elsewhere: the Deutsch-
Französisches Union. The Nazis saw in this new organization founded by Willi 
Münzenberg a dangerous adversary as well as a competitor. In October 1938, 
Münzenberg and Arthur Koestler along with a group of well-known German émigrés and 
French leftists launched a short-lived, irregular newspaper Die Zukunft (The Future), 
around which they built up a group called the Deutsch-Französisches Union. The Union 
upheld the tradition of seeking French-German cooperation, while subverting its more 
recent Nazi incarnation. Die Zukunft and the Franco-German Union aimed to unite the 
German exile community worldwide around antifascism.589 Tied to this notion was a 
desire to rehabilitate the banished as the true voice of Germany. The DFG saw the union 
as an attempt by “circles in France hostile to Germany [deutschfeindlich]” “to thwart and 
nip efforts for a Franco-German understanding in the bud.” To be sure, the DFG claimed 
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the Franco-German Union was “usurping” its idea with a “fantasy-construction of a not-
National Socialist Germany” to be connected to France.590 What it meant was that the 
Nazis did not hold a monopoly on initiatives for French-German cooperation. 
The group around the union hardly needed to steal from the new DFG to dream 
up a project for cooperation; Thomas Mann and Fritz von Unruh, who had both served on 
the board of Grautoff’s DFG, as well as Pierre Viénot all contributed to Die Zukunft. 
More to the point, the Deutsch-Französische Union, its name notwithstanding, was really 
not at all in the same vein as other groups for French-German cooperation. Its main focus 
was to fight Nazi propaganda and battle the forces of evil in Germany. Consisting largely 
of writers and politicians based in France, it really did not advocate a French-German 
union, but the union of left-leaning forces against fascism and Nazism. In this respect, it 
resembled the republican émigré journal, Pariser Tageblatt (from 1936, the Pariser 
Tageszeitung) or Paris’ Institute for the Study of Fascism, more than it did organizations 
first and foremost geared toward cooperation.591 And between its modest beginnings and 
the crackdown against those antifascists who supported it, the Union and Die Zukunft 
barely lasted more than a year.592  
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Another End? 
 International affairs in the spring of 1939 put the DFG and CFA in a state of 
limbo. Although there had clearly been numerous political and diplomatic disasters that 
had tested the DFG/CFA, it was not until the invasion of Czechoslovakia that the two 
groups tottered. In March 1939, Hitler’s “brutal violation of treaties,” led the Lyon 
branch of the CFA to ask the central committee of the CFA in Paris to cut ties to the DFG 
and take a firm position against the Reich.593 A couple of days later, the executive 
committee of the CFA decided to suspend its activities and call a meeting of the General 
Assembly to dissolve the CFA altogether. A “prominent” member of the CFA explained, 
“We continue to believe that the German people desires to live in peace with France, but 
we are obliged to note that the politics of Hitler’s government finally has brought Europe 
to the edge of catastrophe!”594  
German officials still held out a degree of hope for the two groups. A 
representative of the German Embassy in Paris put the situation in different terms just 
before the CFA meeting. For him, “If it comes down to dissolution, then a new 
committee would be founded—excluding the elements which have recently been trying 
to bring politics into the CFA—and it will surely prove to be resistant.”595 This official 
thus clung to the very tactic that had launched the DFG/CFA in the first place: kick out 
the old dissenters—or let them fall away of their own volition—and continue on with the 
consensus view. As for the DFG, though its activities had lapsed, the group endured. In 
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April, officials from a variety of Party offices, including the Propaganda Ministry and the 
Foreign Office, decided to maintain the DFG budget as before for one more quarter 
before re-assessing its stability and perhaps then slashing the DFMh budget.596 The 
DFMh, however, was instead knocked off balance when the French Ministry of the 
Interior banned it in the summer of 1939.597 
That May, the CFA General Assembly had met to vote on dissolution. While it 
unanimously opted to cease activities for the moment, a majority, but not the needed 2/3 
majority voted for complete dissolution. Veterans, including a strident Goy and a more 
tempered Pichot, led the charge for dissolution.598 Although the General Assembly 
announced the “sterility” of its current relations with the DFG, all in attendance agreed 
that “they hoped circumstances would allow, one day, the pursuit of their effort for 
entente between the German people and the French people, the only way to guarantee the 
peace in a lasting way.”599 Political circumstances may have momentarily impeded the 
project, but the French still held onto the idea of continuing their work at a later date. 
Goy explained to his Federal Union, “We had hoped otherwise for this collaboration […] 
We were wrong.”600 
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Conclusion  
Viewing the DFG as a composite of Weimar organizations infused with a Nazi 
sensibility helps clarify the disconnect others have identified between Grautoff’s DFG 
and the DFG of the mid-to-late 1930s. Ina Belitz, for one, has called the second iteration 
of the DFG an “empty shell” of the first, with only “symmetries” not continuities with its 
predecessor.601 Yet these mere “symmetries,” when seen in combination with its parallels 
and imbrications with both the Mayrisch Komitee and the Sohlbergkreis, take on more 
importance. The DFG of the Nazi-era drew on crucial aspects of each of these Weimar 
predecessors. And though it retained fundamental differences from these groups as well, 
many activists saw their involvement in the DFG/CFA as an extension of their earlier 
work on behalf of French-German understanding. The similarities certainly made it more 
thinkable simply to carry on. 
Coopting the language and strategies of the Weimar-era organizations for French-
German cooperation and playing on rampant anxieties about the possibility of war made 
for a savvy strategy; yet, that is not to say that those involved were simply pawns. Some 
may have been “blind,” “naïve,” “Nazi henchmen,” or may “without having desired 
it…facilitate[d] the installation of the apparatus of Nazi propaganda in France beginning 
in 1934,”602 but such dismissive interpretations do not really help us come to terms with 
members’ goals or their conceptions of cooperation. They also end up papering over 
essential differences between the DFG and the CFA as well as within each group—above 
all, what motivated individuals to get involved in the project and what kind of 
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cooperation they envisioned. These were activists generating the rhetoric, contributing 
articles and giving speeches. And they ranged from idealists in search of peace and 
cooperation to revisionists looking for so-called equal rights; some were even a bit of 
both. 
The two associations embraced a multiplicity of forms of cooperation from the 
economic to the political. Although some scholars have cast the members as little more 
than social butterflies, significant for their networking alone,603 it is equally important to 
take seriously their ideas. Their numerous conceptions of cooperation neither indicated 
fickleness nor did they undermine one other. Instead, their very diversity appealed to 
many, from members of the three Franco-German associations of the Weimar era to a 
new public. Moreover, this diversity of visions enabled some French members to 
discount the flurry of articles in the French press denouncing cooperation with Nazi 
Germany. From this perspective, such articles seemed knee-jerk reactions to what was 
really an open forum seeking solutions to the Franco-German problem.  
If the DFG/CFA faced virulent criticism, resistance to Franco-German 
cooperation was nothing new. Franco-German societies in the 1920s had also 
encountered much opposition to their projects for entente. The critiques remained 
basically the same: lack of reciprocity, fears of rising German power, and worries about 
German nationalism. In tone, the criticism may have become more frantic, but even in the 
1920s, prominent personalities published very harsh critiques of the Briand-Stresemann 
accords and the work of Franco-German societies. 
This chapter has shown the ways that civil society was usurped, perverted, or 
even corrupted by the Nazis. But the National Socialists could not go the full distance 
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they went at home to collapse civil society and the state. In this case, the Nazis were not 
simply duping people, and the DFG/CFA was not simply a matter of straight-up 
instrumentalization. Some Germans believed in the project, as did most French adherents. 
The changing vision many embraced shows the malleability and flexibility of notions of 
cooperation.    
The many types of cooperation embraced by DFG/CFA members did not die with 
the associations but continued to resonate through the Occupation/Vichy period, in some 
cases even to the present. By carrying these ideas not only through the 1930s, but into the 
1940s and beyond, these Franco-German mediators became far more than socialites; they 
become central to understanding the motors of cooperation, and in the near term, of 
collaboration. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The Groupe Collaboration 
 
 
 
 
. . . Franco-German rapprochement is the condition to safeguard Western Civilization.—
Adrien Marquet, Mayor of Bordeaux604 
 
There are no other people on earth who were as destined to live with and quarrel with one 
another as Germany and France. Between no other peoples does such an intimacy with 
esteem and contempt, with love and hate prevail. History has reunited the Germans and 
the French in good as in evil. Each generation is newly confronted with the problem of 
the German-French relationship. With the tremendous political caesura of the year 1940 
this problem lost nothing of its urgency. On the contrary: since then, the question of how 
to organize German-French relations is posed with greater acuity and more profoundly 
than ever. But the magnanimity of the victors has opened new horizons. For the first time, 
the hope has awakened that the German-French relationship could be resolved other than 
by the periodic return of man-eating wars. For the first time since the end of the Middle 
Ages, the idea of a common continental mission in which Germany, Italy, and France 
helped by the other nations of Europe will work side-by-side for the task of peace has 
reemerged.—Karl Epting, Head of the German Institute in Paris605 
 
. . . In the interest of France in Europe and of Europe in the world, we should all group 
ourselves behind Marshall Pétain and President Laval, and without hesitation or evasion, 
accept the hand that our former adversary extended to us, aware that in so doing we do 
nothing against national honor, but cooperate in a moral, political, and social Revolution 
of incalculable significance.—Charles-Albert Reichen, vice president of Groupe 
Collaboration, Nice606 
 
We never hid from our French friends that we wanted the national and social unity of our 
fatherland [patrie], but we believed it was completely compatible with a sincere Franco-
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German collaboration [his emphasis]. Mutual comprehension is developing more and 
more.—Fritz Bran607 
 
 
 
In July 1940, not long after the French had been routed by the German army, one 
Lucien Bourot wrote to the German Embassy about his intentions to “re-form” a Comité 
France-Allemagne: “I have always advocated rapprochement between our two peoples on 
this basis [cultural, artistic, political]. Well before 1938 and even during the war—though 
mobilized—I did not hide my sentiments on this subject, which evidently cost me some 
trouble. I want to turn your attention to the psychological importance that such an 
organization could have in the always difficult period in the aftermath of war. In my 
opinion, it’s necessary to begin immediately . . . .” The German Embassy thanked Bourot, 
but rebuffed his effort.608 
In this instance, French willingness to cooperate not only preceded the efforts of 
the German authorities (as well as German unofficial mediators), but even was deemed 
premature by German officials. This was not the only time that French proponents of 
cooperation with the German occupier outpaced German expectations—and, on occasion, 
even went too far in their eyes. The initiative undertaken by Bourot to seek to work hand-
in-hand with the Germans so soon after defeat reflects a broader trend on the diplomatic 
and political levels first discussed by Eberhard Jäckel and Robert Paxton. Unlike earlier 
histories of France under the Occupation, Jäckel boldly demonstrated that the French had 
enjoyed choices in diplomacy and that French negotiating strategies revealed more than a 
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degree of compliance by French elites. According to Jäckel’s argument, then, while 
Hitler’s vision propelled Franco-German diplomacy during the first half of the 1940s, the 
French leadership often chose to meet him halfway. In Robert Paxton’s daring, damning 
classic Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944, he argued that the French 
were more than just complicit with Nazi demands; they increasingly anticipated them. 
The Vichy government not only developed its own domestic program for change, but also 
it more than willingly executed tasks the Nazis set before it.609 The case of Bourot also 
makes clear that not all who sought cooperation with the Germans were new to the effort. 
If the Vichy regime, both to bolster its domestic agenda and its position in a 
German-dominated new European order, engaged in morally suspect actions, average 
French citizens were forced to negotiate difficult—and at times crisscrossing—paths of 
resistance, accommodation, and collaboration. Within the morally blurred landscape of 
the Vichy South and the Occupied North, proponents of cooperation had to take a deep 
pause to reconsider the relationship between France and Germany. While many former 
advocates of cooperation left the fold, others, drawn by ideological affinities, 
opportunism, cynical realism, or even misplaced idealism, sought to engage or renew 
cultural ties with the German occupiers.   
Although Bourot’s wish to pick up the Comité France-Allemagne where it had 
left off in 1939 was not realized, a new organization with similar aims and a significantly 
larger base soon emerged.  Founded in the fall of 1940 and registered as an association 
the following February, the Groupe Collaboration both extended and further perverted the 
notion of cooperation put forward by the DFG/CFA. Jean Weiland, vice president and 
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director-general of the Groupe, considered it a continuation of the CFA, in which he had 
likewise been active.610 Building off French-German networks put into place by earlier 
Franco-German organizations enabled the Groupe to assert an important place for itself in 
the “new order” quickly and fluidly.  
By promulgating the idea of Franco-German entente and a Europe united under 
the Germans, the Groupe Collaboration explicitly aimed at sustaining the politics of 
Montoire. It organized and sponsored popular lecture series and cultural functions 
throughout the occupied and unoccupied zones. Given by both Nazis and French 
proponents of collaboration, the propagandistic talks were then published. In several 
senses, the Groupe was the most extreme of the organizations in this study. Its language 
was the most vitriolic and its version of cooperation the most overtly imbalanced. It also 
commanded the largest audience.  
While the Groupe comes across as radical compared to earlier French-German 
organizations, it appears relatively tame compared to its contemporaries. The Groupe 
Collaboration bears the reputation, somewhat deserved, of having presented the polite 
face of collaboration to the public. Bertram Gordon has called its members “parlor 
collaborators.”611 Certainly, the presence of many well-known personalities—members of 
the Académie française and the Institut de France, as well as Cardinal Alfred Baudrillart, 
head of the Catholic Institute, lent the group a veneer of respectability. Members did not 
wear uniforms, goosestep, or salute. And the language used by some of the more famous 
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Groupe Collaboration members, as well as their general comportment, retained a degree 
of civility lacking in the coarser collaborationist groups such as the Parti Populaire 
Français (PPF). Yet the Groupe Collaboration harbored a zealous core, many of whom 
became increasingly fanatic and aggressive. Moreover, a number of those self-same 
upright personalities also served on the Honorary Committee of the Légion des 
Volontaires Français contre le Bolchévisme (Anti-Bolshevik Legion or LVF), a group of 
French volunteers in German uniform who served on the Eastern Front;612 many ordinary 
members also belonged to the PPF. The Groupe Collaboration’s youth contingent, the 
Jeunes de l’Europe Nouvelle (Youth of the New Europe, henceforth JEN), was 
particularly militant. And from the first, many Groupe representatives spouted the racist, 
anti-Semitic, anti-Anglo-American, anti-Masonic language favored by the most rabid 
“collabos.”  
Philippe Burrin has identified four themes that colored arguments for 
collaboration. First, it served France’s national interests. Next, collaboration would help 
“end the cycle of Franco-German wars and . . . establish concord between neighbors.” In 
addition, collaboration would allow for the creation of a “new Europe,” that would 
defend Europe’s civilization and economic welfare. Finally, collaboration would help 
defeat “common enemies.”613 It is in the first two themes that we can most clearly see the 
philosophical overlaps between the Groupe Collaboration and its predecessors—
especially if we swap the word collaboration for the more neutral term cooperation. The 
context in which cooperation was to take place, of course, was astonishingly different, 
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but the ways in which arguments were mounted remained remarkably similar. The idea of 
a new Europe or defending Europe had appeared in earlier French-German organizations 
as well, though to a lesser extent. The Groupe added that final, more antagonistically-
framed theme of fighting enemies (both internal and external), one that some members of 
earlier organizations had touched on in the past, but which now ran through every text.  
This chapter looks to how the scope of cooperation was readjusted in the process 
of focusing on a fresh object: a new Europe. The new object of activists’ gaze represented 
a substantial distortion of the cooperation imagined by most of its proponents in the 
1920s and 1930s. But, in the Groupe Collaboration, we can still see the traces of those 
older ideas (and even some of those ideals). And if the cause for cooperation had lost 
some of its champions in the context of war and occupation, the skeletons of the networks 
established by earlier organizations remained; in some cases, the activists did too.  
As with the rest of this study, this chapter explores a particular iteration of 
French-German cooperation; it therefore does not claim to speak for all types of wartime 
collaboration. Scholars have considered an array of thoughts, stances, and actions as 
instances of collaboration(ism); Pascal Ory even reasoned that “taken to the extreme, all 
the French who stayed on territory occupied by the German army or depending on its 
goodwill had to a degree collaborated.”614 This chapter thus is not about the black market 
or “horizontal collaboration” (sleeping with German officers), nor is it about the work of 
bureaucrats, police officers, railroad employees or others directly complicit in mass 
deportations. In other words, it is not about functional collaboration. Working with the 
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Germans or Vichy (itself operating with attention to German concerns) could, as in these 
examples, stem from very different motives than those discussed here, or be tied to 
simple questions of fate, such as those neatly captured in Louis Malle’s film, Lacombe 
Lucien. Instead, this chapter revolves around a certain form of collaboration—often 
ideological—but fundamentally concerned with French-German cooperation in the new 
context of occupation. Looking at this subset of collaboration, not just as collaboration, 
but as a product of years of efforts for cooperation, helps us to remove the brackets that 
separate our examination of the Vichy years from the rest of French history. 
 
Founding Principles  
As Sartre reminds us in his celebrated postwar essay What is a Collaborator?, “it 
would be an error to confuse collaborator and fascist, although each collaborator had to 
accept on principle the ideology of the Nazis.”615 The Groupe was not explicitly fascist, 
though, to be sure, many fascists and Nazi sympathizers did belong. Tied to notions of 
Pétain’s National Revolution, Europeanism, and most obviously collaboration with 
Germany, the Groupe set out its primary goals. First, it would bring together those who 
“sincerely wish to establish a New France in a New Europe” to conform to Pétain’s 
wishes. It would also strive to “sustain” Pétain’s foreign and domestic policies as outlined 
in his speech of 10 October 1940. Finally, it had a specifically Franco-German goal: “to 
establish this spirit of collaboration as it was defined and recommended at the Montoire 
interview and to acquaint the French better with the real Germany.” This last objective 
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brought together the notions of collaboration—and specifically that as modeled by 
Pétain—and the notion of “mieux connaître,” which subtracted out the reciprocal quality 
from the organizations of the 1920s and 1930s. Rather than “getting to know one 
another” [se connaître], the Groupe Collaboration set out on a one-way street of 
knowledge [connaître]. The French would get to know the Germans, but not apparently, 
the other way around. 
Adherence to the Groupe Collaboration was a decidedly political act, far more 
than for any other organization in this study. This is not only a retrospective verdict. 
Collaboration was expressly written into the Groupe’s statutes as a political gesture to 
support and maintain the policies of Pétain. Moreover, involvement in the Groupe was 
interpreted as a political act, as seen most obviously in the violent actions against Groupe 
members undertaken by resistants. 
Yet, like its predecessors, the Groupe considered itself non-political. In this case, 
however, political connoted the taint of the divisions of the Third Republic. The auxiliary 
bishop of Paris, for one, expressed his interest in the Groupe with the understanding that 
it was not political, “in the divisive and odious sense it had had for too long in our 
country.”616 Because it was also not deemed a political party on the official level, the 
Groupe could operate in both the free and the occupied zones. 
Considered France’s largest collaborationist movement,617 the Groupe 
Collaboration began in Paris, but soon established local chapters throughout the Occupied 
Zone. In November 1941, Darland authorized the Groupe to operate in the Free Zone as 
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well. Eventually, the Groupe Collaboration had branched into towns and villages 
throughout the metropole, even extending to Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, and the 
Ivory Coast.618 If the Groupe attracted more members—both relative to contemporary 
movements and to the French-German organizations of the past—it was not open to all. 
Its statutes required the board to approve all members, and Jews and Freemasons were 
explicitly denied membership.619 
The Groupe Collaboration had no true partner in Germany. Though numerous 
Germans were involved in the Groupe and took part in its activities, it was fundamentally 
a French organization. At times, it allied with Karl Epting’s German Institute to co-
sponsor events. Established in 1940 by the German Embassy, the Paris-based Institute, 
which promoted German culture, served as an instrument of German cultural politics. 
Created by Abetz, and directed by Karl Epting (1905-1979), former head of the Parisian 
branch of the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), the German Institute 
packed its calendar full of special events: concerts, lectures, soirées, and theater. The 
Institute’s successes led to the foundation of numerous German Institutes throughout 
France. Some 30,000 people enrolled in their popular German language courses, though 
many potential students had to be rejected because the classes were too full. The German 
Institute, according to Eckard Michels, was the “most visible form of the seduction 
tactic” employed by the Germans as part of their policies toward the French; its 
propaganda was subtle, but no less devoted to the establishment of German hegemony.620 
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In addition to its loose association with the German Institute, the Groupe Collaboration 
maintained casual ties to the DFG, which had a new mandate, to be discussed below. In 
this way, the Groupe followed the tradition of the CFA, albeit to a diminished extent. 
 
New Roles in a New Order 
The French defeat and ensuing occupation touched off changes on the German 
side of the border as well. While the Groupe Collaboration emerged from the strongest 
holdouts of cooperation as the phoenix from the CFA’s ashes, the DFG found its role 
recast.  The DFMh and the DFG, while continuing to push for cooperation, moved well 
off the track laid by previous groups for French-German cooperation.  
The DFMh dropped the German portion of its title; now called the Cahiers 
franco-allemands, its name fed the illusion that it was neither German, nor Franco-
German, but fully French. The Cahiers targeted French prisoners-of-war and French 
workers in Germany, and it was no longer sent to Germans (in the DFG or otherwise). It 
served as a propaganda tool by which to publicize the merits of working in German 
factories, namely contributing to continental unity to fend off the Bolsheviks and Anglo-
Saxons and thereby help usher in a European peace. In this way, too, the Cahiers—still 
under the direction of Fritz Bran—aimed to encourage French workers in Germany to 
keep up their productivity. The Cahiers thus became part of a constellation of 
propagandistic newspapers sent to the French in Germany such as Le Pont and Le Trait 
d’Union and veered away from the legacy of past Franco-German journals.    
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In similar fashion, the DFG modified its agenda to focus on the care of POWs and 
the French work force in Germany. The DFG, for example, helped establish 
“universities” in POW camps and staged small celebrations for POWs able to return 
home in exchange for French volunteer laborers.621 Though more narrowly conceived 
than in the 1930s, the DFG as well as the Cahiers targeted a much larger audience. 
Money from German bureaus came pouring into the DFG after France’s swift defeat, 
with the Dienststelle Ribbentrop contributing almost double in 1940/41 what it had the 
year before.622 But the DFG had shed much of its civic, associational identity as it 
adopted more of an institutional form; its partners in France were administrative offices 
relating to POWs and labor conscription. 
 If German victory had transformed French-German organizations like the DFG, it 
also had an impact on the careers of longstanding Franco-German mediators. Many 
previously involved in French-German initiatives found that their connections whether to 
the occupying or occupied country, as well as their familiarity with it, positioned them 
well in the new order. While the extent of Abetz’s power has been disputed, there is no 
question he was generally assumed, as German Ambassador, to be at the heart of the 
German administration in Paris. Fernand de Brinon of the CFA, now the figurehead at the 
top of the Groupe Collaboration, served as Vichy’s “General Delegate of the French 
Government in the Occupied Territories, ” essentially Vichy’s ambassador to occupied 
Paris. The Sohlbergkreis’ Jean Luchaire ran the French press syndicate. Others worked 
closely on POW issues. The Scapini Mission, known more formally as the Service 
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Diplomatique des Prisonniers de Guerre (Diplomatic Service for Prisoners of War), 
charged veteran leader Georges Scapini of the CFA with coordinating POW affairs. 
Friedrich Bentmann of the Sohlbergkreis organized Wehrmacht propaganda aimed at 
French POWs. Fritz Bran, too, worked on propaganda, in his case by encouraging POWs 
to join the cause of collaboration; in addition, Bran helped set up the Amicales des 
Travailleurs en Allemagne, which arranged leisure activities for French workers in 
Germany and was sponsored by the DFG.623  
 
Personalities 
The founder and president of the Groupe Collaboration, the writer Alphonse de 
Châteaubriant (1877-1951), had won the Goncourt Prize some thirty years earlier for 
Monsieur de Lordines, a novel with a decidedly conservative, anti-modern cast. 
Fascinated by the feudal world, Châteaubriant, according to Sartre, later “considered 
himself the liege of Hitler.”624 Certainly, he styled himself in the mode of another age, 
both in appearance—complete with bushy beard and walking stick—and in his writing—
with his Christian, mystical, florid prose. In 1936, Châteaubriant toured Germany, where 
he spoke as a guest of the CFA and attended both the Olympics and the annual 
Nuremberg rally, the latter as a guest of honor. Soon thereafter, Châteaubriant penned La 
gerbe des forces, where he expressed his awe of Hitler. Most notoriously, he wrote, “If 
Hitler has one hand that salutes, that reaches toward the masses in the way with which we 
are familiar, his other hand, unseen, does not cease clasping the hand of He who is named 
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God.” In February 1939, the author spoke at the DFG-Berlin on his book, recently 
translated into German and promoted by the DFG. During the Occupation, 
Châteaubriant’s popular weekly newspaper, La Gerbe, created and funded with German 
help, was loaded with vitriol against the Jews, the Bolsheviks, the bourgeois, and the 
other usual suspects.625  
Although Châteaubriant led the Groupe and the CFA’s Fernand de Brinon held an 
honorary position above that, most of the day-to-day tasks at the national level were 
undertaken by three other men. Jean Weiland, who served as the Groupe’s vice president 
and director-general, came to the Groupe Collaboration having spent years addressing the 
German question. He had worked for the Inter-Allied Commission in the Rhineland in the 
1920s, and as we have seen, played an active role at the CFA in the 1930s. Weiland 
claimed to have known Ribbentrop for twenty years,626 though he did not specify whether 
they had met during Weiland’s time in the Rhineland or whether it related to business: 
Weiland was a wine merchant and exporter, and Ribbentrop had sold champagne. Both 
Weiland and René Pichard du Page (b. 1896), the other Groupe Collaboration vice 
president, worked in Versailles. Weiland had served under Mayor Henry-Haye (also of 
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the CFA), and Pichard du Page—a cousin of Châteaubriant—was a conservator at the 
Versailles library. The writer Ernest Fornairon served as Secretary General. 
Numerous Groupe members were well-known figures in France. Several had seats 
in the Académie Française or the Institut de France, and member Maurice Gabolde 
(1891-1972) was named Vichy’s Minister of Justice. Groupe subcommittees on such 
themes as literature, the arts, science, and law were administered by such luminaries as 
the composer Florent Schmitt (1870-1958), plastic surgeon Charles Claoué (1897-1957), 
chemist Ernest Fourneau (1872-1949), and the sculptor Paul Belmondo (1898-1982)—all 
formerly of the CFA. Others included the director of the Opéra Comique, the curator of 
the Musée Rodin, the artist Othon Friesz (1879-1949), and Minister of Education Abel 
Bonnard (1883-1968), whom Laval called “more German than the Germans.”627   
But, as with the other organizations under review, not all associated with the 
Groupe were Germanophiles. Honorary Board member Cardinal Alfred Baudrillart, for 
example, who served as a devoted member of the Groupe until his death at 82 in 1942, 
saw cooperation with the Germans as a necessary last resort; he had made clear his 
animus against the Germans during the First World War. Baudrillart cited 
Châteaubriant’s La gerbe des forces as instrumental in convincing him to see 
“rapprochement” with the Germans favorably.628  
The Groupe was large, both relative to its predecessors and to other 
collaborationist organizations of the time, but it is difficult to gauge its precise size. 
Scholars have turned to quite different sources: the probable boasts of Groupe activists or 
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officials interested in showing signs of French tractability cannot be expected to yield the 
same results as depositions from the postwar purges. In June 1942, Abetz reported the 
Groupe at 38,000 members.629 Seven months later, Weiland claimed it had over 100,000, 
with 70-75,000 in the occupied zone, 10,000 in Paris, and another 25-30,000 in the newly 
occupied zone. Philippe Burrin cites a figure for May 1944 of 42,283 members; it is not 
clear whether this represents a major decline due to the unpopularity of the cause at that 
late date—a problem the Groupe certainly faced—or whether this is a sign that the 
100,000 figure was markedly inflated. Yet others have even put the figure as high as 
200,000.630 As with other collaborationist organizations, membership in the Groupe was 
not evenly distributed throughout France. In Clermont-Ferrand, 95 individuals were 
known to belong, in the Gard—primarily Nîmes—there were approximately 270 
members, and in the Calvados, the Groupe peaked between 300 and 350 members, where 
it proved the most active propagandist of any of the collaborationist groups.631 In 1942, a 
regional delegate of the Groupe in Corsica bragged that, in areas formerly known as 
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“fiefs of the Popular Front,” the Groupe Collaboration had more members than had the 
Socialist Party in its heyday.632  
Members of the Groupe hailed from a variety of backgrounds. From a nation-
wide sample of records from the postwar purges, Philippe Burrin has determined that 
about 60% of Groupe members had come from the political right. About 14% were 
employees, 10% shopkeepers, 8.6% had no profession, and just over 7% came from the 
liberal professions. Few from this sample were teachers, civil servants, workers, clergy, 
police, or part of the military.633 From this portrait, we can see that though the Groupe 
included a significant proportion of the educated middle classes—the heart of both DFGs 
and the CFA—it catered more to the popular classes than any of the organizations 
examined thus far. Indeed, in the Marseilles region, including Nice, Cannes, Toulon, and 
Nîmes, the Groupe reported that only 10% of its members were professionals, whereas 
60% were workers or low-level employees.634  In one department, 16% of members were 
women.635 
Membership did not preclude involvement in other organizations. Many Groupe 
figures also belonged to other collaborationist groups, which, as John Sweets has pointed 
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out, has often led scholars to overestimate the numbers of active collaborationists in 
France. The head of the Clermont-Ferrand chapter, for instance, also helped run the local 
Doriotiste Parti Populaire Français, served as secretary of Clermont’s Cercles Populaires 
Français, and led the Légion Tricolore at the departmental level.636 In the Calvados, 55% 
of Groupe members were involved in another collaborationist movement as well; of 
these, 65% belonged to the Parti Populaire Français, 30% to the Rassemblement National 
Populaire, and 15% to the Mouvement Social Révolutionnaire.637    
 While many members thus testified to their political engagement—and showed 
their political stripes—many chose to join the Groupe out of other considerations. One 
study has shown that, at least in police interrogations after the war, Groupe Collaboration 
members tended to explain their adhesion to the group as an issue of ideology, a claim 
which generally matches those made by members of other collaborationist organizations. 
But in the case of the Groupe Collaboration, members were more likely to point to that 
ideology as pacifism or a desire for cooperation with Germany than were those, for 
example, in the Parti Populaire Française or the Mouvement Social Révolutionnaire. 
Anticommunism, former members of the PPF and MSR tended to report, had driven them 
specifically to those organizations. Such interests in pacifism and cooperation situate the 
Groupe closer to the specifically French-German organizations of the past than were 
many of its contemporaries. Groupe members also more commonly mentioned a wish to 
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follow Pétain. One former veteran described his sorrow after the German victory; he 
decided the best step forward was to follow his “old leader from Verdun.”638 
 Infighting at a meeting of the Pau chapter in January 1944 pointed to another 
possible motive to belong at that late date to the Groupe: for profit. The Secretary 
General of the Groupe Basses Pyrénées and the leader of that chapter of the JEN accused 
each other of pilfering food and gas vouchers meant for Groupe Collaboration events and 
cloth intended for JEN uniforms in order to sell them on the black market.639 Although 
joining out of greed or to advance private interests seems to have been a decidedly rare 
occurrence among Groupe members—especially relative to other collaborationist 
groups640—the Pau incident was hardly the first. The head delegate for the North African 
chapters, a businessman “with a dark past,” was dismissed in September 1942 because he 
had apparently pocketed money from the ticket sales for a Groupe lecture and, more 
generally had “treated collaboration as a business.”641 Worse yet, the seemingly talented 
Groupe representative in charge of organizing all talks for the Southern Zone turned out, 
much to Weiland and the rest of the Groupe administration’s surprise, to have been a “big 
swindler,” whom they suspected had embezzled between 40 and 50,000 francs.642 Those 
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who expected their affiliation with the Groupe Collaboration to lead to personal gain, 
however, found their wishes unmet. Writer Ernest Fornairon, the active Secretary General 
of the Groupe, called in a favor to German officials to try to have a film contract 
authorized and found to his dismay that he was given no special treatment, even as a 
dedicated activist for French-German collaboration.643 
 
Talking about Collaboration 
 
 Throughout France, the Groupe Collaboration arranged lectures on the task of 
collaboration. In Paris, such talks generally took place at the Maison de la Chimie, run by 
former CFA vice president Ernest Fourneau, who now sat on the Groupe’s subcommittee 
on scientific relations. With the support of the German Embassy, the Groupe sent well-
known speakers on lecture tours. Scientist Georges Claude, for example, gave his 1943 
address, “Frenchmen, We must understand!” in 51 towns throughout France.644 To give 
the impression of the independence of such initiatives from German influence—as well 
as to underscore the notion of their popularity—the Groupe charged small fees to attend. 
Groupe leaders hoped these fees would lead attendees to believe the organization they 
were supporting was fully autonomous and not an instrument of German propaganda.  
 This fiction followed the German design645 to keep secret the degree to which the 
German administration supported such collaborationist orrganizations. Embassy officials, 
for example, reprimanded Weiland for sending them a telegram about a flare-up within 
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one of the local branches; instead, he should have wired Vichy.646 At the same time, the 
Embassy generously funded the Groupe; in 1943, it raised its subsidy to 450,000 francs 
and then again to 500,000 francs per quarter—a substantial amount that, according to 
Weiland, scarcely covered the growing Groupe’s expenses.647 Vichy also supported the 
Groupe. In a meeting with Laval, the Groupe’s Secretary General for the entire Southern 
Zone unflinchingly requested a million francs a month from Vichy, a demand Laval 
instantly dismissed.648 But with Laval in power, the Groupe was granted funds from the 
Vichy Ministry of Education.649 
 If much of the Groupe’s funding came from the Germans, its primary impetus and 
support came from the French. Friedrich Grimm recalled that the popularity of his first 
talk at the Maison de Chimie led to a request from Rouen that he speak there as well. 
Soon, Grimm found himself a regular on the Groupe Collaboration lecture circuit. 650 The 
audiences for such talks were large—hundreds, sometimes thousands of people—and 
typically included regional and municipal officials, who sometimes introduced the 
visiting speakers. Reports about these talks often note packed auditoria, and in some 
cases—particularly with Philippe Henriot—the use of speakers to reach the thousands of 
people crowding the streets to listen.  
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Not all Groupe Collaboration speakers met such an enthusiastic response. Some 
towns—especially in the North, where the German presence was most palpable at first—
were unwelcoming. But local organizers’ anxieties about negative responses to Groupe 
speakers sometimes proved misplaced. The head of the German Institute in Dijon, who 
was arranging a Groupe Collaboration talk by the scientist Georges Claude, decided to 
cancel the 1942 event for fear of trouble; Abetz intervened, and the event not only went 
off without a hitch, but managed to make the largest auditorium in town feel cramped.651  
Speakers at Groupe events came from France and Germany alike, and they, like 
the Groupe’s ordinary members, came at collaboration from different directions. Some 
had long been involved in efforts for Franco-German cooperation, some were advocates 
of Pétain’s National Revolution, some were devoted National Socialists, and some united 
all three elements. Régis de Vibraye, Max Clauss, and Fritz Bran had each become active 
in the quest for French-German cooperation around 1930. Reichstag member and 
attorney Friedrich Grimm, one of the Groupe’s most popular speakers, had been active in 
the Nazi-era DFG, but his relationship with France stretched back much further. Even 
more celebrated for his talent as a speaker was Philippe Henriot, who would come to 
serve as the head of propaganda for Vichy France. Jacques de Lesdain, a political editor 
at L’Illustration given that position by Abetz652 as well as the organizer of the 1941 and 
1942 “La France européenne” expositions, went out of his way to explain to his 
audiences why he chose to be a Nazi. According to Groupe vice president Pichard du 
Page, one of Lesdain’s great merits, like that of the Vienna-born German globetrotter and 
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fellow Groupe speaker Colin Ross (1885-1945), was the capacity “to expand their 
national field of vision [to capture] the measure of the world.”653   
 
How Did They Define Collaboration? 
 
Like the organizations that preceded it, the Groupe Collaboration had no unified 
view of what cooperation signified, though it generally limited itself to one term to 
describe its programs and goals: the collaboration of its name. Some representatives of 
the Groupe focused on a pro-German message, others on an explicitly National Socialist 
position, and still others leaned more toward a pro-Vichy, pétainiste argument. The 
banner of a “new Europe” allowed the Groupe to recast the French-German relationship 
as a partnership—however uneven—in common cause: combating Bolshevism and other 
shared enemies and fighting for a nebulous notion of a common European civilization.  
The elasticity of the term collaboration has historic roots. Before the war, it was—
in French, German, and English—neutral, more or less an exact equivalent of the way I 
have been employing the term cooperation. In the immediate aftermath of war, as Robert 
Paxton noted, it “was to become a synonym for high treason.”654 When Pétain shook 
hands with Hitler at Montoire and pledged to collaborate, he had in mind a bland sort of 
diplomacy, talks and agreements, primarily in the realm of the economy.655 Though he 
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used the word collaboration—a term which later became inextricably linked to that fatal 
handshake—Pétain and Hitler did not hammer out precisely what that would signify or 
sign any formal agreements in the train car. 
While the Groupe claimed from the outset to follow the path of Pétain, it did not 
champion what is known as “Maréchalisme,” that is to say the hero-worship of Pétain. In 
vowing to support Pétain, the Groupe’s emphasis lay not on the man, but on the moment 
of Montoire, the handshake itself, and the notion of collaboration. The Groupe 
Collaboration did not contribute to the myth-making around Pétain, with the enormous 
placards, the children’s books, the memorabilia.656 The Groupe instead rallied primarily 
to the cause of working with the Germans. Some members who later abandoned the 
Groupe regretted that it had not revolved more around the Maréchal, as it seemed to 
promise; others who left noted their disappointment with a collaboration that meant 
working for the Germans more than working with them.657 
The Groupe Collaboration followed out of that October 24, 1940 Hitler-Pétain 
meeting at Montoire.658 In its statutes, the Groupe Collaboration explicitly acknowledged 
its origins lay in Montoire, and it vowed to help carry on its work. Leaders of the Groupe 
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quickly made clear that they supported not only the notion of working with the Germans, 
but also agreed with Pétain, Laval, and Hitler that France’s involvement in the war had 
been a mistake.659 Fritz Bran argued that Montoire opened new “perspectives” for the 
pursuit of French-German cooperation, especially since the Third Republic had been so 
hostile toward Germany. Now they had a better chance, he implied, to achieve 
cooperation.660   
In addition to citing the importance of Montoire, the Groupe’s statutes explicitly 
singled out Pétain’s speech of October 10, 1940, where, alongside his appeal for 
international collaboration,661 the Maréchal condemned (without condescending to name 
it) the Third Republic and called for a national revolution. This, then, was the two-part 
agenda the Groupe claimed to support and defend.662 Identifying collaboration with 
nationalism and with peace, Pétain argued that it was a choice, on both the part of the 
Germans and the French. By a national revolution, he had foremost in mind the French 
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nation. In his speech, Pétain in fact slipped between revolution and renovation: “A 
revolution is not made only by the provisions of law and decrees. It is accomplished only 
if the nation understands it and calls for it, that the people accompany the government 
along the path of necessary renovation.”663 This line underscores the important point that, 
for all his talk of revolution, Pétain had a national project in mind, one situated on the 
political right and better represented by the term “renovation.”664 
 Building off Pétain’s call, the Groupe’s slogan “French renovation, Franco-
German reconciliation, European solidarity” tunneled outward. It asserted an agenda that 
started at home but extended—through the Franco-German cause—to the European 
framework. Groupe vice president René Pichard du Page explained how these nested 
goals fit together. Members of the Groupe Collaboration, he argued, harbored an 
allegiance to a cause greater than themselves—Europe—without giving up their notion of 
the patrie. Pichard du Page argued that the Groupe Collaboration and its associates 
consisted of partisans of “Franco-German entente, the solid and only possible base for 
this ‘European patrie,’” who at the same time were French or German patriots.665 
Although Europe played a much larger role in the imagination of Groupe members than it 
had for most of their predecessors in Franco-German organizations, Pichard du Page’s 
insistence on the maintenance of national loyalties reveals that his conception of the new 
Europe, at least, may have expanded the size of the field of cooperation, but still relied on 
enduring shibboleths.   
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 Yet as with earlier Franco-German organizations, Groupe representatives’ notions 
of identity, borders, and how to bridge them were neither fixed nor easy to articulate. The 
bestselling German travel writer Colin Ross seemed to advocate the dissolution of 
borders and other barriers and the formation of a truly unified community. He reminded 
his audience of an argument he had put forward in 1928 not simply championing 
rapprochement, but “Franco-German fusion,” a notion which he acknowledged would not 
sit well with his government. “In speaking now of a fusion that goes beyond simple 
rapprochement,” Ross argued, “I am conscious of not having been very happy in my 
choice of words, but I don’t want to change the expression I chose in 1928. Perhaps they 
haven’t yet forged a word to designate what I am conceiving.”666 Publisher Bernard 
Grasset expected that Groupe Collaboration speaker and renowned author Friedrich 
Sieburg might talk about a new age of “alloys” to replace the age of alliances, a view 
which would have infuriated Hitler and Pétain alike. Indeed, it also would not found 
favor with earlier advocates of cooperation such as Grautoff, who had strongly opposed 
the idea of French-German “unity brew.” Sieburg was quick to repudiate such a vision of 
collaboration as melting pot.667  
For Sieburg, collaboration merely implied giving up “part of your sovereignty in 
favor of the community we will form together.” For the French, this should only have 
been the smallest of sacrifices, since they, as he pointed out, had previously been subject 
to threats on their autonomy by “the League of Nations, Anglo-Saxon capitalism, the 
evangelism of the Popular Front, and Jewish, Communist, and masonic forces.” Whereas 
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these forces had weakened France, collaboration would strengthen it. In this reading, 
German occupation was no threat to sovereignty, but could enable France to go beyond 
its state of complacency (as it tried to preserve its “charming” lifestyle) in order to 
become part of something greater than itself.668 
Self-sacrifice proved a common theme. While Pétain spoke of sacrifice, most 
famously in his grand gesture on the afternoon of 17 June 1940, when he intoned, “I 
make to France the gift of my person to attenuate her misfortune,”669 this phrase also 
found resonance elsewhere. Karl Epting, for example, advised the French not to let their 
hopes for peace become unrealistically high: “The moral and political storm that gave 
birth to the war of 1939-1940 did not build up in one day. The Franco-German peace will 
also not be made in one day. It cannot result from an isolated act. It will only be attained 
thanks to a constant effort, to an important and relentless work, to the gift of the self and 
to sacrifice.”670 Representatives of the Groupe Collaboration often tied this theme of 
sacrifice to the fight against complacency and the importance of engagement. While 
praising the energies of the few, Marc Augier chastised his 1941 audience for their 
general lassitude: “The masses, the majority, the unanimity refuses to carry out the gift of 
themselves!” Augier appealed to the romantic impulses of the young—he began with 
stories of his own mountain-climbing adventures—to sacrifice themselves on behalf of 
the greater good of Europe. In his earlier work for Vichy’s youth corps, the Chantiers de 
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Jeunesse, (as well as in his involvement with the French youth hostel movement)—
Augier believed he “had lit the little spark of adventure” in his recruits.671  
The most obvious instances of sacrifice on behalf of collaboration—assiduously 
promoted by the Groupe Collaboration—were  the relève (relief) and later the Service du 
Travail Obligatoire (Compulsory Labor Service or STO), which sent French workers to 
Germany, at first as volunteers, then as conscripted labor. Efforts such as these, Groupe 
representatives argued, not only served to unite the French and Germans in common 
cause on behalf of Europe, but also acted as a bridge between peoples. Like the French-
German encounters staged by earlier organizations for cooperation, they would bring the 
French and Germans (young people, in particular) into close contact. Living abroad 
would help the two peoples “get to know one another better.” Fritz Bran argued that these 
French “civilian workers,” along with French POWs and volunteers for the Anti-
Bolshevik League “together form the avant-garde of French integration into the new 
Europe . . . . these young French people will be the best pioneers of Franco-German 
reconciliation” [emphasis his].672 Work in the name of Europe would forge a new 
French-German solidarity no matter the inequality of the relationship. 
More so than any of its predecessors, the Groupe Collaboration framed 
cooperation as a project to band together against outsiders. While it encouraged the 
bridging of national borders, those were generally limited to the continental. 
Representatives of the Groupe relied on some of the same notions we have come across 
so often—rapprochement, entente, mutual understanding—but invoked them to help 
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consolidate an international community in its fight against the Eastern menace, the 
rapacious British, and the greedy Americans. In this way, they operated in similar fashion 
to nationalist groups that harnessed anxieties about and hatred of others as a way to 
strengthen the bonds within the community. In the case of the Groupe Collaboration, 
however, the framework of the community had been expanded to the Franco-German and 
even continental European level. There were also forces to be battled that transcended 
national boundaries and existed both within the continent and outside of it: capitalism 
(and “trusts”), communism, democracy, Jews, blacks, Freemasons, and so forth.   
Key was to draw attention away from the French-German antagonism by focusing 
on other, shared enemies. As Jacques Schweizer argued, “It’s not Germany that’s 
France’s hereditary enemy, it’s England!”673 From the Opium War and the Boer War to 
the British Blockade and Mers-el-Kébir, the British had announced their will to dominate 
Europe and the wider world. Groupe Collaboration speakers also played into long-held, 
very real anxieties about the United States eclipsing Europe, or the Bolsheviks overtaking 
it. Colin Ross expressed the fear that Europe might one day become a colony.674 
Following the prevailing winds in both Germany and France, Groupe members laced 
their arguments with denunciations of Jews, Freemasons, and blacks. Blame for the 
Franco-German enmity, for the war, and for France’s humiliation was laid at their feet. 
And as was commonly the case, these arguments became so twisted together—the 
Popular Front, American capitalism, and the Bolshevik threat all were somehow riddled 
with Jews—that they made no sense at all. 
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In addition to trying to consolidate a Franco-German community against their 
shared enemies, Groupe members tried to locate more positive common ground. This 
strategy proved less fruitful than the promise of fighting enemies or constructing Europe. 
Though perhaps a distant hero, Charlemagne proved someone both nations could admire. 
The occasion of his 1,200th birthday in 1942 gave cause to celebrate. While Charlemagne 
remained a contested figure in old debates over the French and German heritage, the 
Groupe Collaboration invoked him rather differently. In this venue at least, the Germans 
seemed willing to share his legacy.675  
To convince French audiences of their good-will, Germans who spoke at Groupe 
Collaboration events often opened their remarks by establishing their pedigree as 
defenders, even promoters of France. Passing over his days representing in court those 
who had tried to sabotage the French occupation of the Ruhr, Friedrich Grimm told 
French audiences of the work he had undertaken to defend Frenchmen called before the 
German military justice system during the Great War. He also referred to his efforts 
representing French industrialists against their German counterparts after the armistice. 
Others, like Friedrich Sieburg, author of the 1929 Gott in Frankreich?, published in 
several editions including the French Dieu est-il français?, emphasized their expertise in 
(if not always admiration for) French culture. Jean Weiland outdid his German associates 
by making a more general argument about German goodwill toward France. It was 
important for the French to realize, explained Weiland, that Nazi leaders had conducted 
an “intense propaganda” campaign at home “to lead German public opinion to consider 
                                                          
675Ross, 50. On the contested place of Charlemagne during the Occupation years, see Ory, 159; Geiger, 
273-276. Still today, Charlemagne is commonly invoked as a symbol of French-German cooperation as 
well as of the European Union. Consider the Charlemagne Prize, tied to the European project, bestowed by 
the city of Aachen. 
 310 
the French no longer as the hereditary enemy.” They had succeeded in instilling in the 
Germans the idea that “entente with France was the goal of German foreign policy.” To 
support this claim, Weiland made note of Hitler, Ribbentrop, Baldur von Schirach, Abetz, 
and the late Achim von Arnim (who had died on the battlefields of Northern France); he 
also underscored the way in which the DFG (though he did mention its name) had 
warmly welcomed French visitors to Germany and worked hard to forge better relations 
between the two peoples.676     
If the Germans had embraced the French, Groupe speakers made clear that the 
French had traditionally shown themselves hostile toward the Germans. The French, they 
argued, had tried at best to circumscribe Germany’s power, at worst to split the nation 
apart. Here, the unstated connection, of course, was to France’s current plight. Divided 
into zones, France was facing no worse a fate than had the Germans, multiple times, at 
the initiative of the French. Versailles and the Rhineland occupation, not surprisingly, 
offered obvious instances of French desires for hegemony, but older examples often came 
to the fore. A favorite for Friedrich Grimm was Richelieu, whom he blamed for setting 
the French on a long quest to keep Germany divided; he therefore traced the problem of 
hereditary enmity back to the Cardinal. Both Grimm and Jacques de Lesdain also invoked 
the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.677 In this way, they sought to establish that France had 
been the one to foment the idea of a hereditary enemy, just as it had historically been the 
French who aimed to impede the national unity of their neighbor (and not the other way 
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around). The unspoken message hinted that what was transpiring in France was part of a 
longer story, in which Germany had previously played the role of victim. Posing France 
as the aggressor in this way was a strategy that went back to the pages of the DFMh. 
Groupe speakers—French and German alike—thus took great pains to show how 
magnanimous the Germans were in extending a hand to the French, who had historically 
not behaved as well to the Germans. Collaboration, in this view, was a gift of sorts. Not 
only did it offer the promise of future peace and the end to unnecessary divisions that 
stretched back three centuries (or more, since some even alluded to the 843 Treaty of 
Verdun), but it was a “formula” devised from empathy. Collaboration was, in Grimm’s 
words, “desired and realized by those who understood for having [themselves] suffered.” 
Here, he catalogued a long line of German woes: Versailles, the Rhineland, the Ruhr, the 
Saar, Upper Silesia, the Polish Corridor, Austria, Danzig, the Sudetenland.678  
Colin Ross likewise found promise in the idea of French-German empathy. 
Having a shared (if not coterminous) experience should help them better understand one 
another. “Where I see the great, the unique possibility for our two peoples to reach a 
definitive comprehension,” he explained, “it’s in the fact that in the course of one 
generation, we both suffered the same fate, having each been both victors and 
vanquished. We can understand your situation and you can understand ours!”679 This 
view of understanding took Viénot’s idea of “leaving the self” to a different level. The 
Germans and the French had actually taken each other’s places as victor and vanquished. 
On the one hand, Ross left the impression that the Germans would be merciful in their 
rule. On the other hand (and rather perversely), he implied that, as former victors, the 
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French were theoretically well-positioned to empathize with Germany’s current position 
and could take a certain solace in their newfound victimhood.  
The French, in effect, were getting more than they deserved. Weiland was baffled 
that after Hitler had expressed that he wanted “to bury the hatchet” as early as 1935, the 
French nonetheless chose war. Once again, he found himself bewildered when, in defeat, 
“the victor again proposes entente and reconciliation. And we would refuse it!”680 As he 
had at the CFA, Weiland posed the French as intransigent and the Germans as peace-
seekers—even once they were conquerors. 
While they often admonished the French for their hostility and obduracy, a 
number of speakers went out of their way to flatter the French as a way to package their 
message in a more appealing manner. Jacques de Lesdain reminded audiences that other 
European nations would look to France’s example. It was therefore up to France to be the 
first to turn to Europe, though Germany would be, in its “role as driver” the first overall. 
This was an odd sort of flattery in that it did not try to mask France’s post-defeat 
weakness and humiliation. France would be the first among losers.681   
According to this line of thought, collaboration with the Germans, in fact, had 
much to offer the French. It would ensure peace with Germany, and thus put an end to 
France’s old bugbear, security. It would also act as that important first step toward the 
unity of continental Europe. Germany could safeguard Europe from the Asian menace, as 
it had selflessly done in the past when the other European powers had run off in search of 
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empires. It would also achieve “the eviction of England from the continent.”682 On the 
economic level, it offered guaranteed markets and plentiful resources through its plans 
for European autarchy. Resources and finished products would be pooled across Europe 
to yield the most efficient results (the real meaning of Lebensraum, explained Jacques de 
Lesdain). Lesdain’s curious portrait of Lebensraum reflected that of a mural at the 
Exposition France Européenne, which he had planned. The mural showed farmers hand-
in-hand across a map of continental Europe. The caption read, “French peasants united 
with Central and Eastern European peasants to feed Europe.” Finally, this vision of 
French-German collaboration in the framework of a united continent would allow for 
each nation to conduct domestic politics as it saw fit once peace had arrived. Overall, it 
was a rosy portrait of European unity, certainly better than the “dark years” in which 
France currently found itself. In the meantime, France needed “severe moral, mental, and 
physical discipline” to pick itself up again.683 
This European-centered message clearly had an effect on tenacious advocates of 
French-German cooperation. Régis de Vibraye, who had contributed to earlier 
discussions of French-German cooperation at the Mayrisch Komitee and the CFA, now 
described a vision like that of Pichard du Page which placed Europe at the top. While he 
had argued in 1930 for the nobility of patriotism and what he called the “persistence of 
patries,” he had also advocated a federated Europe, a federation that would start with 
partnership between France and Germany. In 1930, de Vibraye had made clear that his 
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conception of Europe “would not be centered on Germany to our own [French] 
detriment.”684 In 1941, he showed himself willing to let that condition slide: 
The time has come to transcend our patriotism, to integrate our traditional 
patrie into a wider patrie. Without renouncing the ardent love that we 
have for our respective countries, we must open our hearts to a new 
sentiment that alone will permit us to overcome the problems of the hour 
and tackle them in a spirit of confidence and total assurance, the sentiment 
that we all bring to a great European patrie.685  
 
The “cruel trials” of the war, as he put it, had led de Vibraye to a new perspective. 
 In light of the present gloom, Groupe representatives tried to show that the 
promise of a new Europe burned bright. Some speakers expressed a sense of hope not 
that far removed from the way advocates had felt in the wake of Locarno, several years 
after the war’s end: a cautious, but no less sincere, idealism. Jacques de Lesdain, perhaps 
the most virulent and openly racist of the Groupe speakers, ended his bleak plea for 
sacrifice almost sweetly:  
Where it concerns Europe, it’s the collective soul that should prevail in us. 
It’s a new mentality that we should create. I’m convinced that each of you 
will advocate the sacrifice of the self to the community which will give 
rise to our security and be worth the joy of leaving to our sons a better 
world than the one in which we will have lived.686 
 
The enthusiastic (if similarly rabid) regional delegate from Corsica painted French defeat 
in a positive light, because with it came the possibility to create a new Europe. “Out of 
our defeat, which is not that of the French people, but that of the evil forces that led it, 
has sprung an immense hope,” he argued. “From the Vistula to the shores of the 
Mediterranean, men are thinking that at last a unique opportunity appeared, that their 
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children, ceasing to hate each other, will find a fraternal and fertile entente.”687 It was 
Montoire that had opened that door to cooperation in a new Europe. 
 
Collaboration as Continuity? 
In light of the huge rupture of the war and occupation, the Groupe Collaboration 
tried to impose a sense of continuity. Its representatives sought both to insert the Groupe 
into a longer narrative of organizations seeking French-German cooperation and to code 
the word collaboration itself as part of that same story. Key was to depoliticize the 
concept of collaboration, or, better yet, render it palatable. 
Whereas the DFG and CFA had by turns embraced, by turns abjured their ties to 
organizations from the Weimar era, it was in the Groupe Collaboration’s interests to 
emphasize its links back to the CFA and DFG. Weiland advertised the Groupe’s 
connection to the CFA to the general public through a broadcast on Radio-Paris.688 At a 
1942 talk, JEN leader Jacques Schweizer introduced Fritz Bran of both the Sohlbergkreis 
and the Nazi-era DFG as “an artisan of the first hour for Franco-German 
rapprochement.”689 And Bran, too, tended to pay his respects to the role of the CFA and 
especially the Sohlbergkreis.690  
Representatives of the Groupe thus not only looked back to the DFG/CFA as a 
precedent, but also turned to the legacy of Weimar-era organizations. Régis de Vibraye 
introduced Groupe speaker Max Clauss to the audience for his May 1941 address. Over 
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the years, he told the audience, they had worked together at the Mayrisch Komitee and at 
European conferences to pursue “Franco-German friendship” and peace; today they met 
again to address similar themes.691  Jacques Schweizer and Fritz Bran tied JEN’s origins 
to the Sohlbergkreis.  
Some went a step further by relating the saga of French-German cooperation as a 
story of progress. Werner Rheinbaben noted in a 1941 speech how efforts for 
rapprochement between 1924 and 1939—including his own—had failed. Rheinbaben re-
configured collaboration as a way to achieve what rapprochement between France and 
Weimar had failed to realize. He thus cast war-era collaboration as the apotheosis of post-
Versailles efforts for peace. Whether or not collaboration was something new (that is, the 
result of the exigencies of the war), in Rheinbaben’s rendering it was explained as the 
fulfillment of Locarno-era goals.692 In similar fashion, Bran praised the more general 
legacy of past efforts, while acknowledging their failure. Collaboration would ensure that 
“the pre-war oeuvre will not have been completely in vain” [his emphasis]. Bran then 
singled out the contributions of, among others, Jacques Schweizer (of the CFA), Jean 
Luchaire, Fernand de Brinon, Georges Scapini, Alphonse de Chateaubriant, and Jean 
Weiland.693  
In retrospect, after the ignominy of the Nazis and the collaborators was 
universally recognized, it behooved former Groupe Collaboration members even more to 
stress such links to earlier efforts. In his postwar memoirs, for example, Friedrich Grimm 
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contended that in his first speech to the Groupe Collaboration in 1941, he argued 
“fundamentally nothing different from what I had said already in 1937 in Lyon, 
Marseilles, and Besançon [at CFA events].”694  
Cooperation, some of its proponents reminded their contemporaries, had always 
been controversial. Then as now, it represented a wise doctrine, whose merits had often 
gone unrecognized. Karl Epting wrote that “rarely have we devoted to an idea more faith, 
but also more incomprehension, doubt, and ill-will than to the idea of Franco-German 
entente.”695 Surely, Epting had in mind the sometimes (and increasingly) intense 
opposition to collaboration and to Germans like himself. Friedrich Grimm argued that in 
the France of the late 1930s, some had feared “collaboration” with Germany. But as we 
have seen, however the merits of cooperation with Germany may have been sharply 
contested in those years, the arguments had not pivoted on the term “collaboration,” and 
even when that word appeared, it was employed as a value-neutral synonym for 
cooperation. Grimm was trying to divorce the notion of collaboration from the specific 
context of the occupation and assert that this was the same underrated phenomenon as 
ever. “I always advocated collaboration, despite all the difficulties . . . . And I continue to 
advocate it,” he declared. The next paragraph of his speech then proceeded to slip back 
and forth between the word of the moment—collaboration—and the older term—
rapprochement—as if to emphasize their interchangeability.696 Bran echoed this 
sentiment by trying to gloss over the difference between the “New Germany” and the 
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Germany of 1930. Note the slippage: “Because the new Germany has always desired and 
practiced rapprochement between European nations. It was in this spirit that, since 1930, 
we have, for example, organized Franco-German conferences, trips, ski camps.”697 This 
was an argument that could only be made before a French audience. 
 
Desperate Passion 
 
Emotions ran high both within the Groupe and among its opponents. Groupe 
members articulated their desires for cooperation in more expressive, sometimes zealous 
terms than had their predecessors. Their forerunners may have acted as dedicated 
advocates of their cause, but Groupe members brought a new emotional vitality to the 
task. At times this was a sign of passion, at others of desperation. The energy of Groupe 
members was matched by that of their opponents. Championing cooperation in this form 
and in this context could be a matter of life and death. 
The Groupe’s spirited approach most resembled that of the Sohlbergkreis, but its 
tone had even more in common with the leagues or other politicized groups of the time. 
Groupe members in Lyon pledged to “give their whole heart” to the cause.698 At talks, 
audience members might find themselves in tears. After a two-hour lecture by celebrated 
speaker Philippe Henriot, one of its organizers explained, “No doubt his fluency 
sometimes rose to theatrical pathos, but his words were not only oratorical gestures. One 
felt behind them the overwhelming power of an apostle, who, out of fervent love for his 
fatherland, searches for a way out of the abyss and preaches collaboration out of rational 
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considerations. Seldom is a speaker so often interrupted by true storms of applause.”699 
Even part of the Groupe’s slogan—“Franco-German reconciliation”—had a more 
sentimental resonance than words like rapprochement or even understanding.  
To attract new members, boost its popularity, and energize the existing base, one 
avid member wrote a “Song of Collaboration.” In the belief that music served as “one of 
the most powerful means of propaganda,” bandmaster Captain L. Laurenceau offered the 
anthem to Fernand de Brinon, a childhood friend, in the name of the Groupe. Laurenceau 
hoped his song about “the rapprochement we work for with all our soul” would receive 
daily play on the radio, as a way to introduce the day’s news and any announcements 
related to collaboration. Laurenceau likely took his inspiration for a song about 
collaborating with the Germans from the success of the rousing pétainiste anthem, 
Maréchal, nous voilà!700 Certainly, his Chant de la Collaboration relied on a more 
visceral approach geared toward stirring up allegiance than the more cerebral approach of 
Grautoff’s DFG.    
That Groupe members ratcheted up the tone is apparent at the most basic levels of 
language, where both a higher emotional register and a new emphasis on taking action 
were in evidence. Speakers and writers on behalf of the Groupe (even members in their 
basic correspondence) were liberal with the exclamation point.  Relying heavily on verbs 
like “act” and “combat,” representatives of the Groupe Collaboration prodded members 
to engage. In its confidential bulletin, the more forceful JEN proclaimed to its members, 
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“Don’t moan anymore . . . ACT!” and “Ready for combat.”701 This new tone can be 
attributed to the general context of war and occupation, the heightened emotionalism of 
politics of the era (from Hitler to Mussolini to Jacques Doriot), and some representatives’ 
prior or current affiliations to the leagues, the Nazi Party, or parties sympathetic to the 
fascist cause.  
The passion of leaders of the Groupe Collaboration at times led them to pursue 
goals that even the German authorities deemed excessive or premature. Weiland, for one, 
wanted to “enlighten Catholic milieus, generally so resistant to our ideas, about the true 
connections between National Socialism and the Catholic Church.” German officials 
found such gestures imprudent, both when Weiland first suggested it in early 1942 and 
when he resumed his entreaties in the autumn of 1943.702 
The most dramatic testament of passionate devotion to the cause for Franco-
German collaboration came from Groupe speaker Georges Claude (1870-1960), chemist, 
engineer, and member of the Institut. A decorated veteran of the First World War, Claude 
had long been a conservative, sympathetic to the Action Française and opposed to 
universal suffrage. As the inventor of liquid air and neon lighting, Claude had become 
wealthy; at his postwar trial, the prosecution made sure to underscore that Claude had 
collaborated out of “political passion” rather than from desire for “lucre.” Due to his 
wealth as well as the fact that he was pushing seventy at the start of the occupation, 
Claude enjoyed the leisure time to dedicate himself full-time to collaboration. Though he 
claimed at his trial that he had never been a dues-paying member of the Groupe 
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Collaboration, Claude’s intense involvement with the Groupe cannot be denied. He sat on 
its Honorary Board as well as its subcommittee on scientific relations. More importantly, 
Claude went on numerous lecture tours for the Groupe throughout France’s different 
zones, where he pled repeatedly and feelingly for the French to pledge their support to 
attain German victory.  
One month after the Allied landing in North Africa, Claude hatched a plan to 
show the entire nation the importance he attached to French-German collaboration. 
Accordingly, he decided to create a spectacle at one of his talks in Bordeaux, in the 
conviction that reports of his “theatrical gesture” would find their way into every 
newspaper in the country. Without warning to his family, conference organizers, or the 
press, Claude conceived a scheme he hoped would serve as the “equivalent of jumping 
from the top of the Eiffel Tower into a nest of serpents.” He planned to swallow a vial of 
poison twelve times the mortal dose to end his talk on collaboration in dramatic 
fashion.703  
In his third-person narrative of a suicide note—intended as a press release and 
written one hour after he drank his brew of strychnine and arsenic (plus two cubes of 
sugar)—Claude “expressed the hope that the Führer would accept this sacrifice as the 
ardent expression of his confidence, that . . . a France regenerated will receive a place 
worthy of her in this new Europe that she will without doubt help to form and organize.” 
For Claude, at this moment, the prospect of “Anglo-Saxon and Bolshevik victory” struck 
him with fear for the future of France. Not hopelessness, but a desire to snap the French 
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public out of its apathy had led Claude to sacrifice himself. From its “inertia and doubts,” 
the public might come to see “that all should be done for the victory” of the “new 
Europe.”  
Claude’s gesture in support of collaboration was an utter failure. In his 
excitement, he garbled his words such that the audience did not understand what he was 
saying. People imagined he was taking medicine. Then, nothing happened; it took a full 
half hour for any symptoms to take effect, by which time he had already returned to his 
hotel, where he collapsed in intense pain. Quietly carted off to the hospital, Claude made 
a remarkable, if uncomfortable recovery. And despite his efforts to the contrary, the 
Germans did not permit the press to publish accounts of the incident for fear of 
encouraging public despair. This was precisely the reaction Claude hoped to avoid; he 
wanted to attest to the gloriousness of the cause and demonstrate that it was worthy of 
martyrdom. At his postwar trial, an unrepentant Claude, who clearly still relished telling 
this tale, intimated that he had outdone Pétain by “really making the gift of my life to 
France because I made the gesture that should have been irrevocable” [my emphasis]. 
With this literal gift of his person (however manqué), Claude had aspired to prove his 
credentials as a hero of collaboration. His was a spectacle intended both on behalf of 
France and on behalf of Germany. The fact that Claude continued give lecture tours for 
the Groupe indicated that he still had not lost faith in collaboration.  
While Claude’s case is unique, Groupe members’ activities also sometimes 
shifted into higher gear, moving from the realm of words to that of action. The Groupe 
Collaboration in the Marseilles region boasted of its offerings to the Sicherheitsdienst 
(SD); Groupe members had shared valuable information, including the location of 
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weapons depots, and had pointed them to “very dangerous terrorist leaders” (i.e. 
resistance fighters).704 And at least one German official noted that, in their eagerness to 
help collaborate, Groupe members often approached them with well-known, if 
unsubstantiated rumors or other unreliable information; they tried to be of use to the 
Germans, but failed.705  
Denunciations, whether true or false—as well as a more general disgust for the 
Groupe—led some in turn to take action against the Groupe Collaboration.   Although 
resistance to the Groupe was initially expressed quietly, hostility toward the Groupe 
Collaboration eventually took a far more extreme form—in fitting with the larger 
context—than did opposition to earlier organizations in favor of cooperation. Yet, given 
the circumstances, challenges to the Groupe Collaboration remained covert. We cannot 
know precisely who the Groupe’s antagonists were, but we have a very clear sense of the 
degree to which they despised it.  
With the press in both nations highly controlled, the Groupe Collaboration did not 
face public excoriation or even mild criticism in the press. Attacks with the pen were only 
an option when anonymous and unpublished. A stash of anonymous letters sent in 1941 
to the head of the Groupe Collaboration in Caen, a right-wing furniture dealer who had 
numerous enemies even well before the war, reveal an array of reasons why individuals 
refused to join the association. Some simply expressed a crude Germanophobia, the 
language of boches and Huns. Others grounded their arguments in a real sense of 
Germany’s exploitation of French resources and their own corresponding dismay, 
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disgust, or outrage. Some proved sympathetic to certain Nazi ideals—and showed their 
blatant hostility toward the Soviets, British, Americans, and Jews—but nonetheless could 
not stomach cooperation with their subjugator. Others still provided critiques of Nazism 
or of the notion of collaboration. One particularly clear-eyed note read: 
You ask France to collaborate with Germany. Do you think that a 
conquered people can collaborate with a conqueror? And to collaborate to 
what end? To help Germany in its work of conquest and destruction, to 
help it institute the new German order throughout the world, which is to 
say the obligation of abandoning all man’s rights and fundamental 
liberties? We see too well what constitutes this collaboration. For us, it is a 
synonym for humiliation, for abasement, for cowardice in associating with 
enterprises as criminal as those of the Germans. What will Germany do to 
collaborate? It will send emissaries of the Gestapo here to organize 
espionage, spying, [and foster] mistrust and thereby create division among 
the French. It will steal all our products that will serve the needs of its 
army while the French will see rationing . . . The Germans persecute the 
Jews, and you shout really loudly, “Death to the Jews.” The Germans 
would like to see the French help them in Russia, and immediately you try 
to constitute the volunteer corps to get them killed there in the great 
European crusade against bolshevism, the “battle for civilization.” What 
civilization? 
 
For this Caen resident, collaboration meant not merely compliance, but eager submission. 
These arguments, however they may have stung, did not receive a public airing. More 
powerful, though harder to document, were whisper campaigns and rumors. One member 
of a new Groupe section in Villers-sur-Mer worried about the talk generated by a press 
release about his group; it was enough to make him fear reprisals.706 
Opposition to the Groupe often surfaced as small acts, such as a prominent local 
citizen not coming to hear a Groupe lecture or a child of a Groupe member being picked 
on in class. A talk by Jacques de Lesdain in Amiens proved a “complete fiasco” when the 
prefect made his excuses for not attending, and the police serving as guards seemed to be 
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blocking entrance to the hall. After 500 invitations had been sent and an announcement 
placed in the newspaper for a special mass in honor of victims of Allied bombs hosted by 
the Groupe Collaboration-Bassin de la Sambre, the abbot refused to conduct the mass 
unless it could be for all civilian victims (including Russians). Bolder actions likewise 
became common: smashed windows of Groupe Collaboration or JEN premises, a Gaullist 
Croix de Lorraine painted on the doors of Groupe members’ homes and businesses, the 
more alarming delivery of tiny coffins that opened to reveal an even smaller axe and 
noose to Groupe members in Nantes.707 Soon, many members found themselves in mortal 
danger. 
 By 1943, violence against Groupe members had escalated. That October, Weiland 
reported assassination attempts on “a good dozen” Groupe members, most of them 
successful, along with an attack on the headquarters of the Pau branch.708 Months earlier, 
one woman had advised Groupe leaders of the pressures she and her husband faced in 
their village in the Yonne and expressed her dismay that the authorities had not come to 
their aid: 
 
My husband and I have the honor to lend our sincere support to 
COLLABORATION, but alas! a really disappointed support until this day 
[because the authorities had still not responded to their complaints], 
though not discouraged, oh! no, not at all, because we are confident in our 
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final victory. Unfortunately, as I’ve already pointed out several times, we 
sustain loud insults, threats, etc. every day. We very often erase vulgar and 
mean inscriptions with death threats, such as most recently, a large 
gallows 0.5 meters high in tar stuck to our houses . . . . 12 inhabitants of 
Ravières suffered the same situation . . . 709  
 
In her note, this Madame Scordel proceeded to condemn the local priest as anti-German, 
a teacher as a Communist, the local police as neglectful (and thus perhaps even anti-
Pétain), and the mayor for encouraging youth to dodge German labor conscription orders. 
Five months later, gendarmes found Madame Scordel’s body, riddled with eight bullets, 
each of a different caliber. Her husband, a gardener, managed to defend himself with a 
cudgel and escape, but two other Groupe members in Ravières were killed that day: a 51-
year-old woman whose husband was working in Germany and a 58-year-old retired 
postal worker.710 Other villages saw violence against Groupe Collaboration members as 
well. The Haute-Saône/Belfort branch saw both the Raddon mayor, an associate member 
of the Groupe, and at least one other member shot at, and the Secretary-General’s 
apartment was bombed.711 That November, Fornairon reported that ten Groupe members 
had been murdered and four wounded; other attacks included eight bombings and the 
plundering of Groupe Collaboration offices in St. Brieuc, Saintes, Montpellier, and Vichy 
itself.712  
                                                          
709PA-AA DBP 1121/2,3 Letter from Mme B. Scordel to Collaboration (4 May 1943) [her emphasis]. 
 
710PA-AA DBP 1121/2,3 Unlabeled press clipping with dateline Auxerre, 8 Oct. 1943. “Trois attentats sont 
commis à la même heure dans un village de l’Yonne.”  
 
711PA-AA DBP 1121/2,3 Letter to Directeur Général signed Barrey-Didier (Collaboration, Comité Haute-
Saône-Belfort) (5 Oct. 1943) [forwarded from Weiland to Brinon (13 Oct. 1943) and to Schleier (16 Oct. 
1943)]; Letter from Barrey-Didier to Directeur Général (8 Oct. 1943) [forwarded from Weiland to Brinon 
(13 Oct. 1943) and to Schleier (16 Oct. 1943)]. 
 
712PA-AA DBP 1121/2,3 Letter to Ernest Fornairon to Dr. von Bose (19 Nov. 1943). 
 
 327 
 Many Groupe members, in search of more than soothing rhetoric, demanded 
action from their leaders. Members complaining of threats tended to deplore the 
inadequacy—and often unwillingness to help—of their local police forces. Often such 
complaints came laced with aggravated accounts of local officials’ former connections to 
freemasons, Jews, or leftists. At least one member who claimed to have escaped an 
assassination attempt and bemoaning the inadequacies of the French government (both 
local and national) to protect him, asked for German help. “To what extent,” he asked, 
“can Germany substitute for the impotence of the Government?”713 This desperate 
member from Luxeuil thus looked to Germany rather than France for strong leadership, 
an indication that he, at least, had fully absorbed some of the Groupe’s implicit messages.   
In the face of these complaints, Groupe Collaboration leaders worked hard to try 
to offer their constituents a sense of security. In addition to attempting to placate them by 
reinforcing the righteousness of their cause, Groupe leaders sought to attain the right for 
their members to bear arms. Frustrations, Weiland explained to the German authorities, 
stemmed from the fact that members, who understood themselves to be “aiding 
government action, realize with bitterness that the French administration more often 
considers them as a nuisance or even worse.”714 By mid-October 1943, approximately 
400 Groupe members in the Southern Zone had requested authorization to carry a 
weapon.715 The head of the Groupe for the entire Southern Zone pled with the German 
Embassy in Paris for permission to establish “protection groups,” uniformed and armed 
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security squads, a call that met some resistance (especially with regard to the 
uniforms).716 Select “German-friendly” members were nonetheless granted authorization 
to bear arms.717   
 
JEN 
 
 In June 1941, the Groupe Collaboration launched a youth section, which soon 
became, in the words of one of its leaders, Marc Augier, “a veritable movement” (a 
description that at the time had more to do with its high energy than with its size, one 
might add). Under the name, “Jeunes de l’Europe Nouvelle” [Youth of the New Europe], 
this movement brought together 6,400 youth from ages 12 to 25 to rally them to the 
project of collaboration.718 Fritz Bran’s slogan for these youth, like the motto for the 
Groupe Collaboration, broadened its scope from the local to the international: “social 
responsibility, national honor, European order!”719 
Under the eyes of Augier and Jacques Schweizer, however, JEN took on an 
identity more in tune with its two leaders’ backgrounds and its enthusiastic core of youth. 
Before joining the Groupe Collaboration and taking over the reins of JEN, the lawyer 
Jacques Schweizer (1904-1981) had been a member of the CFA as well as a leader of the 
youth section of the right-wing league, the Jeunesses Patriotes. Marc Augier (1908-1990), 
known as Saint Loup, an avid mountain-climber and outdoors adventurer, had launched a 
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secular youth hostel movement in France in the 1930s and had worked on youth and 
leisure issues in the Popular Front government. But Augier’s romanticism had brought 
him from the left to the right. In the early 1940s, he worked for Châteaubriant’s anti-
Semitic newspaper La Gerbe and the Anti-Bolshevik League’s La France Combattante.  
 According to Augier, JEN’s choice of name, with its emphasis on Europe (rather 
than Germany), indicated members’ “will to extend beyond the frame of simple 
collaboration.”720  Augier craved a more important role in the new order: 
At a newspaper, the collaborator is the musician who from time to time 
furnishes an article for which he’s badly paid. He is not part of the 
editorial team, he’s a poor relation, he plays second fiddle. We want to be 
part of the European team, sharing its responsibilities and its risks, its 
successes and benefits for the future. It’s because youth should be the 
vanguard of a country that when they propose to us collaboration, we 
reply alliance.721 
 
Augier saw in collaboration an implied subservience; he wanted to do more to fashion 
and sustain the new order. He was not so much interested in France receiving a bigger 
slice of the pie, so much as he wanted his country—and especially his vanguard of 
youth—to be leading the charge side by side with the Nazis.    
Initially, JEN shared some common ground with the Sohlbergkreis. Jacques 
Schweizer claimed that “all that has been realized in the domain of youth in the Franco-
German arena for ten years” they owed to Otto Abetz and Fritz Bran. Drawing on the 
legacy of Sohlberg, “that hill” and its journal, Schweizer saw the beginnings of his JEN 
as well as the contemporary iteration of the Sohlbergkreis, the Cahiers franco-
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allemands.722 JEN arranged a joint French-German ski camp as well as a summer camp. 
Like the Sohlbergkreis, moreover, it could claim that it had an unusually international 
perspective for a youth group. JEN considered itself the only French youth movement of 
the time to maintain contacts with youth from other nations in Europe.723 Like the 
Sohlbergkreis at its very end, the groups with which JEN interacted were fascist groups 
of a piece—from Italy to Romania.   
JEN combined play and work. The group screened movies (from “Romania in 
War” to “The Ski and the Canoe” to “The Young Hitlerian and the March toward the 
Führer”) and maintained a choral society. Members also distributed pamphlets and 
assorted propaganda about the task of collaboration. In addition, they maintained contacts 
with French laborers in Germany. In 1941, Augier had proposed a program whereby 
French youth would volunteer for public works projects throughout Europe: building 
canals, clearing away the rubble of war, repairing railroads, planting trees. These projects 
would at once serve the public interest and foster a European spirit. This was, in effect, a 
more European version of the way the Germans would later market labor conscription to 
the French. But it really was more like an extension of the Chantiers de Jeunesse to the 
entire continent. The public works scheme, however, never took off, in part because it 
was proposed just a few days shy of the German invasion of the Soviet Union.724 The 
girls’ section—which was notably large725—visited wounded members of the Anti-
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Bolshevik Legion and wrote letters to legionnaires and Waffen-SS men to keep up their 
spirits.  
In the spring of 1943, JEN began to pull away from its international outlook to 
focus more on issues at home. In this way, it came closer to resembling other French 
youth groups and increasingly differentiated itself from the Groupe Collaboration.726 JEN 
adopted an agenda that was primarily “revolutionary” and European and shed its 
specifically French-German character. 
 Organized via the Führer principle, JEN’s structure looked nothing like the 
Sohlbergkreis. The leader of JEN directed the movement and had the power to rid the 
group of those who lacked the necessary drive, or conversely, those who were 
overzealous. Such a structure, Augier believed, served as a prototype for the ideal state. 
Echoing Augier, Jacques Schweizer laid stress on the importance of the leadership 
principle, particularly where youth was concerned. The example of the leader, he 
maintained, inspired courage, and an ideal leader should “give words of order that will 
lead to action.”727 
JEN took a militant line in keeping with a stronger National Socialist perspective. 
In the pages of its bulletin, one delegate declared the “genius” of Hitler and another 
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described JEN as working to “assure the triumph of the National Socialist ideal.”728 
Schweizer had no qualms about embracing violence. Calling the attacks on Groupe 
Collaboration and JEN members a sign of “the efficacy of our action,” Schweizer argued, 
“far from discouraging us, they multiply our ardor tenfold. It is not our intention to 
receive strikes without returning them, and my comrades are not waiting for me to give 
them orders of this kind.”729 For him, the doctrine of JEN was unambiguous: “today, each 
must prove by his acts whether he is for or against a policy that abroad collaborates in the 
creation of Europe, and which domestically, must exterminate the Communist peril.”730  
 Prove their devotion they did. JEN members sported navy uniforms with black 
ties and a Y-shaped figure, an abstract rendering of a man opening his arms to the light 
and the future, on its badge. They repeatedly asked authorities for the right to bear arms. 
Eventually, “protection groups” were established to help with security; less glamorously, 
they also helped clear the wreckage from air strikes. In addition, JEN members were 
granted permission to serve in the milice.731 Just as they had to wait for guns, they held 
out for the right to parade, a right which was granted to them in January 1944.732 De 
Gaulle’s Intelligence Service reported that, at least around Nîmes, JEN helped the 
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Gestapo locate those who had dodged the labor draft.733 Members volunteered or were 
conscripted to work in Germany or joined the ranks of the Anti-Bolshevik Legion to fight 
in the Soviet Union. Marc Augier had made the latter choice and thus left his JEN post; 
later, he enlisted in the Charlemagne Division of the Waffen-SS. 
 The notion of French-German cooperation was so elastic that in JEN we cannot 
even recognize it as such. Holding onto the idea of European cooperation, the French-
German issue got lost altogether. 
 
Winding down 
 
The fate of the Groupe Collaboration was, of course, intimately tied to the fate of 
the French and German nations. There could be no such organization with German 
defeat, just as there could be none without the occupation of France. The end of the 
Groupe, unlike that of the other organizations in this study, was therefore swift and 
unambiguous. Along with an array of other groups, including the milice, Doriot’s Parti 
Populaire français, and the Légion français des combattants, the Groupe Collaboration 
was officially dissolved with a decree by the provisional government under de Gaulle on 
10 August 1944. With that same gesture, the provisional government re-established the 
French republic.  
The course of the war made clear well before August 1944 that the Germans 
would not triumph and that the French who had collaborated would not find themselves 
on the winning side of history. It therefore comes as little surprise that de Gaulle’s 
Central Bureau of Intelligence Information and Action [BCRA] noted growing problems 
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within the Groupe. In February 1944, the Creuse branch found itself immersed in a 
discussion about the imminent landings and the expected British and American victory. 
The Marseilles branch saw a decrease in its activities.734 The BCRA learned that the 
Vichy branch of the Groupe Collaboration experienced a swift decline in membership, 
from 180 paying members in 1943 to just 40 the following year.735 The Montpellier 
chapter had trouble meeting in the spring of 1944 due to rumors of the need to evacuate 
the Mediterranean coast. More to the point, they had begun to recognize that “the game is 
up, that we no longer can hope to conquer the majority of decidedly rebellious minds.” 
Nonetheless, the Montpellier branch expected to persevere in its efforts “to which despite 
everything we have until now remained loyal.”736  
This tenacity in the face of ruin revealed the degree to which, even in the spring 
of 1944, some members of the Groupe still held fast to a bit of Georges Claude’s 
dedication—perhaps enough to give the gift of their bodies. That April, Joseph Garrette, 
the Groupe’s administrative secretary general for the Southern Zone who had advocated a 
more violent approach, became a target of the maquis, who peppered his car with bullets 
outside the town of Thonon without managing to touch Garrette himself.737 Rather than 
cave, Garrette continued, as militant as ever. As many flocked to the resistance (or at 
least fled to the hills to avoid labor conscription), Garrette and other members of the 
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Groupe Collaboration had become, like many “ultras” in 1943 and 1944, in the words of 
Bertram Gordon, “more defiantly strident.”738 That insistence on holding the line (and 
also on denouncing others) did not serve them well. In June of 1944, Abetz reported that 
100 members of the Groupe Collaboration, along with hundreds of other collaborators, 
had been assassinated.739 
 
Conclusion 
 Members of the Groupe Collaboration, much like the wider spectrum of 
collaborationists across France, met often ignominious ends. Those who had dedicated 
the war years to working for cooperation found themselves condemned for it. Those who 
had held visible national positions, not surprisingly, were punished. Brinon and Luchaire 
were executed. Abetz was sentenced to 20 years. Some members of Groupe 
Collaboration also met difficult fates. Jacques Schweizer received a death sentence, 
though he was eventually amnestied, and René Pichard du Page was condemned to ten 
years of forced labor. Georges Claude received a life sentence. Grimm was imprisoned. 
Châteaubriant hid under a false name in Germany, then Austria, and thus received his 
death sentence in absentia. Likewise condemned to death in absentia, Marc Augier had 
fled to South America, where he served as Eva Peron’s ski instructor. Weiland hid out 
near—but not in—Sigmaringen with the final hold-outs, then stayed for awhile in 
Austria. Max Clauss had gone to Portugal in 1943, where he lived for a decade in 
voluntary exile. Colin Ross committed suicide on 30 April 1945 in the home of Baldur 
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von Schirach.740 Fritz Bran, in contrast, went free, and, in the early 1950s, again picked 
up the mantle of French-German cooperation. 
 The perception was that these activists were opportunists or fascist fellow 
travelers. Indeed, some had knowingly and willingly engaged in propaganda activities on 
the part of the National Socialists. But most of them would have had trouble 
distinguishing between propaganda and their own perverse idealism, one that sought 
constantly to adjust their hopes (and illusions) about French-German cooperation to the 
post-defeat circumstances. Most notably, this recasting of the French-German 
relationship found its highest expression in the concept of a new Europe, in which France 
stood alongside Germany as an active, if junior partner. It was within the matrix of this 
perverse idealism that associates of the Groupe Collaboration could not just see merit in 
elements of the new order such as the STO, but even could celebrate those virtues.  
 This was not only a matter of psychological adjustment by the vanquished or 
outright manipulation on the part of the victors. For many involved in the Groupe 
Collaboration, their wartime experiences fit into the arc of their careers working for 
French-German cooperation as well as into a larger narrative of organizations and 
rhetoric geared toward effecting a better Franco-German relationship. They looked back 
to the precedents—in many cases, precedents they themselves had set—of the CFA and 
the DFG, and even further back to the Mayrisch Komitee and the Sohlbergkreis and saw 
(or at least purported to see) a reflection, perhaps a shade less bright, of the work they 
were currently undertaking.  
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 As we have seen before the war, cooperation took many paths. In the morally 
ambiguous world of the war and occupation, cooperation became collaboration. This 
form of cooperation may have been the black sheep, but that does not make it any less of 
an heir to the cooperation of the 1920s and 1930s. And despite its troubling nature, it 
surprisingly did not destroy all attempts for future French-German reconciliation. At the 
end of the war, we see a negative continuity taking shape, whereby postwar advocates of 
cooperation looked backward not only in search of successes or models on which to 
build, but also in consideration of the lessons of the failures and failings of wartime 
cooperation in its collaborationist guise. Franco-German organizations after the war 
would set out to reclaim, redeem, and reinvent cooperation with these lessons in mind. 
  
 
 
 
PART THREE 
 
Reconciliation and Redemption, 1945-1954 
 
 
 
 
Ute Frevert has recently argued that increased contact through war leads to greater 
transnational familiarity and connectedness.741 In the case of the French occupation of 
Germany after World War II, such familiarity did not merely breed contempt. New 
Franco-German organizations tried to sidestep the mindset of war and occupation in an 
attempt to foster reconciliation. In an attempt to reconfigure their tortured histories, 
German and French activists elided problematic episodes from the past, allayed 
perceptions of an imbalance of power in the present, and projected a path of Franco-
German harmony for the future. The following chapters examine how advocates for 
cooperation tried to untangle and reweave the complex ties between Germany and France 
after the war. In particular, this section focuses on how Franco-German activists 
introduced a new moral urgency into the postwar drive for cooperation by injecting it 
alternately with an ethos of Catholicism or of Resistance. What they sought was a new 
transnational moral community.  
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Of course, the most common tale of the French-German relationship in the first 
decade or so after the war revolves around the nations’ increasing economic 
interdependence, epitomized by the Schuman Plan. The cultural side of the story is far 
less well-known and has often gone by unnoticed. But these were parallel, 
complementary efforts. The postwar occupation of Germany was pregnant with 
possibility and presented an opening not only for political and economic cooperation, but 
for reconciliation between the two “hereditary enemies.”  
This version of postwar reconciliation was peculiar to the French-German 
situation and did not apply to the other Allied zones of occupied Germany. For the 
French, it was particularly necessary to set up special channels through which to re-
imagine a new set of relations between occupier and occupied in a way that did not 
happen with the Soviets, the Americans, or the British. Neither the Soviets nor the 
Americans had such a long legacy of enmity with the Germans as did the French. And if 
the Germans and the British had nursed a longstanding rivalry,742 the British at least had 
not just emerged from an occupation. The Soviets conducted cultural diplomacy with 
their zone with similarly styled, but rather coercive associations heavy on propaganda.743 
The best-known private organizations for German-American exchange, like the Atlantik 
Brücke [Atlantic Bridge], did not get a start until the early 1950s, five years after CFEAN 
and seven after BILD.744 
                                                          
742Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980). 
 
743Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995), 398-464. 
 
744The well-known Amerika-Häuser, which began in 1946, functioned as information centers and were not 
associations. They served as a locus for the transfer of American culture and values to the Germans and not 
the reverse. On the Atlantik Brücke and the Amerika-Häuser, see the following three articles in Detlef 
Junker, ed., The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1968. A Handbook, vol. 1. 
 340 
Chapter six focuses by and large on the French zone of occupied Germany; here, 
the nascent Cold War was less palpable than in the other western sectors, much less 
Berlin or the Soviet zone. For this reason, as well as due to the longstanding French-
German enmity and more particularly the recent occupation of France, the members of 
the Bureau International de Liaison et de Documentation [BILD] concerned themselves 
far more with the French-German relationship than with the Cold War. Put simply, we 
can see a greater preoccupation with the aftermath of the war, than a leap forward to the 
next round of concerns for Europe: the Cold War and European integration.745 The inside 
back cover of each issue of BILD’s journal Documents explained the birth of the 
publication, “On the day after the conflict that opposed the peoples [of the world], we 
feel the need to resume cultural exchanges that were for too long interrupted.” This 
publication thus claimed to be a product of the Second World War; its explicit mission 
was to bridge the divisions triggered by the war. 
 In similar fashion, the Comité français d’échanges franco-allemands (CFEAN), 
the subject of chapter seven, was gripped by the legacy of the war, even as it tried to plot 
a new course for the future. Chapter seven centers on a French conception of a “new 
Germany,” one that had shaken off the remnants of the Nazi legacy. For CFEAN, both 
postwar Germany and France were in desperate need of renewal. 
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Elitism and Educational Reform: German-American Exchange Programs, 1945-1970,” 415; Rebecca 
Boehling, “U.S. Cultural Policy and German Culture during the American Occupation,” 389-390; Jessica 
C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “American Cultural Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany,” trans. Robert 
Kimber and Rita Kimber, 404-405. 
 
745Tony Judt has similarly underscored the ways in which the legacy of the Second World War marked the 
next half century in his recent Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005).  
 
 341 
The Cold War, of course, was by no means absent from cultural efforts for 
cooperation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Postwar French-German efforts for 
cooperation without doubt contributed to the Federal Republic’s far from inevitable 
integration into the West.746 Moreover, the Cold War allowed activists to frame their 
efforts for French-German cooperation in a newly promising way: around a notion of 
Europe. If they only did so periodically at first, this strategy took on increasing resonance 
and served to distance them from recent attempts to promote a united Europe under the 
aegis of the Nazis.  
To be sure, European integration also played into postwar Franco-German 
activism (and to be fair, even into interwar activism). But it was not until later—the 
1960s or even the 1970s—that European integration and French-German relations were 
operating on the same track. Until then, these were two (often parallel) but largely 
separate phenomena. 
                                                          
746Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995 Trans. by Brandon Hunziker (New 
York: Oxford, 2006), 103-129. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
BILD 
 
 
 
 
They fear each other because they don’t know each other, or only know each other as 
soldiers. The father carries the fear to the son, and there will be no end. 
 
Now, though, the weapons are still and now the opportunity is here to appeal to the 
reason and insight of the fathers, to the impartiality or of necessity the distant yearning  
of the sons and to lead them over the borders of their (oh-so-small) nations, to show them 
that in the other country dwell not monsters, but men: men, indeed with another way of 
life, but with the same talent to live, to love, to work and perhaps also to pray to the same 
God….The more people lose this fear, the more affection and sympathy will grow, and 
the sooner the rising generation will see the neighbor no more as a faceless collective but 
as people—like you and me . . . —Eitel-Victor Couchoud747 
 
If the Franco-German enmity . . . is not recognized and overcome as anachronism, then it 
will be a noose, choking the lives of both peoples and the life of Europe.—Alfons Erb748 
 
 
 
1945 stands as a Stunde-Null not only for the history of Germany, but in many 
ways, for the quest for Franco-German cooperation. The legacy of the war, occupation, 
and collaboration had embittered the Franco-German relationship and seemingly 
undercut the project. The Germans experienced a harsh first few months of military 
occupation by the French.749 In both France and Germany, efforts were underway to 
                                                          
747AOFAA AC 302/1b E.V. Couchoud, “Gedanken über internationale Begegnung und übernationale 
Zusammenarbeit,” Jahresbericht 1953, 33.  
 
748Alfons Erb, “Deutsche und Französische Schriftsteller in Royaumont,” Dokumente no. 1 (1949): 3.  
 
749On the early months of military occupation, especially the abuses under General de Lattre’s 11-week 
watch, see F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 
67-91. 
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purge the ranks of those who had worked with the Nazis. Collaborationism had poisoned 
the notion of cooperation. In this hostile atmosphere, long-term proponents of 
cooperation were in no position to continue their work or even to resume their pre-1933 
agendas. Pierre Viénot had just died of a heart attack in London, where he had worked 
alongside Charles de Gaulle. Otto Grautoff had died in exile, and Otto Abetz languished 
in prison. Jean Luchaire, too, sat in jail, where he would be executed by firing squad the 
following year for having collaborated with the Germans.  
But another Jean would take up the torch in 1945. Though French priest Jean du 
Rivau was a newcomer to the cause of Franco-German cooperation, his efforts recalled 
those of the Locarno era. At the same time, they also were inextricably tied to the legacy 
of the war and occupation. As founder of the umbrella organization the Bureau 
International de Liaison et de Documentation (BILD), du Rivau tailored the long-term 
project for French-German cooperation to the needs of the postwar era. Once again, 
Franco-German mediators created an organization by which to tear down prejudice, 
replace it with knowledge, promote dialogue, and ease the route toward friendship. In the 
aftermath of war and in the midst of occupation, however, du Rivau insisted on the moral 
obligation to achieve reconciliation. For him, European recovery and a promise for peace 
could only be sustained through the spiritual renewal of the German and French 
communities. By building and tending a new moral community of “Europeans,” BILD 
helped French and German citizens assuage their anxieties, foster contacts, and prepare 
themselves for a European future.  
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Several scholars have argued that a moral language of “reconciliation” between 
France and Germany first emerged in the early 1960s.750 Although this may apply to 
politicians like Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle, the notion of reconciliation—
complete with all of its moral and theological underpinnings—lay at the heart of the 
BILD enterprise from its conception in August 1945. In this sense, postwar associational 
initiatives toward reconciliation preceded those of the French and German governments.  
Reconciliation went beyond the notions of cooperation explored by earlier groups. 
If, for example, there was a loose spiritual and a strong moral component to Henri 
Lichtenberger’s goal of “demobilization of esprits” after the First World War, BILD’s 
position on reconciliation after the Second World War was based expressly on these 
values. Moreover, reconciliation entailed taking steps beyond demobilization, and even 
normalization, to try to “forgive and forget.”751 Although the postwar occupation-era was 
replete with tensions between the French and the Germans, BILD, in part by dint of its 
independence from officialdom, maintained a steady push to bring France and Germany 
from a vague penitence to reconciliation to salvation. 
After the Second World War, any attempts at cooperation faced overwhelming 
challenges on both sides of the Rhine. Those interested had to find ways in which to 
navigate the storms of the present, from the Saar question to the denazification debate. 
Both also had to find useable ways to negotiate their pasts—their shared past as 
                                                          
750See Corine Defrance and Ulrich Pfeil, “Der Elysée Vertrag und die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen: 
eine Einleitung,” in Der Elysée Vertrag und die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1945-1963-2003, ed. 
Corine Defrance and Ulrich Pfeil (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2005), 29-30. 
 
751For definitions of “reconciliation” in the political sense, in particular its moral-theological dimension and 
its “essential societal dimension,” see Lily Gardner Feldman, “The Principle and Practice of 
‘Reconciliation’ in German Foreign Policy: Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic,” 
International Affairs 75, no. 2 (April 1999): 333-356; Ann L. Phillips, “The Politics of Reconciliation 
Revisited: Germany and East-Central Europe,” World Affairs 163, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 171-191. 
 345 
“hereditary enemies” and their more recent past under the Nazi stranglehold. Moreover, 
they had to come to terms with their back-to-back occupations.  
French occupiers engaged in an aggressive set of strategies to tame the German 
beast politically, economically, and culturally. Security topped the list of French priorities 
in Germany. To minimize the chance of a future German threat, French officials leapt at 
any prospect of detaching the Rhineland, the Ruhr, or the Saar from Germany. French 
occupiers expressly pursued a policy of economic exploitation of their zone through 
reparations and requisitions, and even when they helped reconstruct German 
infrastructure, this rebuilding was carried out in the name of increasing exports to 
France.752 The French waged a campaign of deforestation, dismantled factories, and 
enjoyed a luxurious standard of living relative to locals. Exaggerated reports of such 
inequality only heightened the animus toward the French occupier.  Cultural policy, too, 
played a significant role, but it is in this realm—from reeducation to artistic offerings—
that French policy was relatively successful.753  
Nonetheless, several private groups chose to pursue their own cultural agenda 
independent of the occupation authorities so as to downplay the power disparity and 
interact on more equal footing. Associations like BILD and the Comité d’échanges avec 
l’Allemagne nouvelle (chapter seven) explicitly aimed “to supplement the deficiency of 
                                                          
752Willis, The French in Germany, 109-146. 
 
753These efforts were successful relative to those of the other Western occupiers as well as relative to 
French cultural policy in the occupied Rhineland after the First World War. For overviews of the debates 
on the role of French cultural policy in occupied Germany see, Corine Defrance, La politique culturelle de 
la France sur la rive gauche du Rhin 1945-1955 (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1994), 
22-23; Stefan Zauner, Erziehung und Kulturmission: Frankreichs Bildungspolitik in Deutschland 1945-
1949 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1994), 9-18. See also Martin Schieder, Expansion/Integration. Die 
Kunstaustellungen der französischen Besatzung im Nachkriegsdeutschland. Passerelles, vol. 3. (Munich: 
Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2003). 
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French public powers.”754 In this sense, the groups relied on the occupation 
administration as a foil. Rather than operating with security as the centerpiece of the new 
French-German relationship, these private organizations attempted to locate cultural, 
social, and moral affinities as the basis of mutual understanding. In the case of BILD 
more specifically, French and German activists extended the hand of friendship across 
the border to work together in a partnership of equals. In this sense, BILD promoted 
learning, but in an entirely different sense than that of French (or other Allied) efforts at 
reeducation.  Rather than overhauling what was seen as the “Prussian,” militarist mindset, 
BILD aimed to show how the French and Germans could learn from one another. Such 
efforts necessitated a thorough overhaul of the imagination. What these groups sought 
was the creation of a new moral community that transcended the national. 
 
Origins: Myths and the Reality of Occupation 
One version of a well-known story begins in the summer of 1945 overlooking the 
Rhine at the industrial city of Ludwigshafen. There, the Rhine marked the border 
between the French and American zones of occupied Germany; further south the river 
separated France from French-occupied Germany. Along the southern stretch of the river, 
the French not only dominated but predominated: all Germans had been evacuated from 
the port town of Kehl, across the river from Strasbourg, thus rendering both banks 
effectively French. Toward the end of the war, the river itself had been strewn with the 
                                                          
754Alfred Grosser, “Le Comité a-t-il encore un sens?” Allemagne no. 17 (February/March 1952): 1, 3. 
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remains of 50 bridges and rendered unnavigable.755 Contact across national borders as 
well as across zonal borders was minimal.  
Legend has it that, amid the ruins of Ludwigshafen, one of the most damaged 
areas under the purview of the French, Jean du Rivau (1903-1970) met a young 
compatriot about to cross the bridge into Mannheim. Du Rivau, a Jesuit chaplain of the 
French garrison at Offenburg, asked the young soldier what compelled him to defy the 
rules and attempt entry into the American sector. This Frenchman famously responded 
that, as a Communist, he sought his comrades wherever they might live so that they 
might work together. The idea of embracing Germans in common cause so soon after the 
war inspired the priest, despite his distaste for Communism. Shortly thereafter, a German 
clergyman further spurred du Rivau to action by arguing that the most critical task for the 
French occupiers was to “inform” the Germans, who had been bombarded with Nazi 
propaganda for the last twelve years. Du Rivau had an epiphany: he reclaimed the 
Communist’s quest for brotherhood as a Christian effort; it would operate primarily as an 
information campaign. He thus established an institute in Offenburg geared toward 
promoting French-German contact. In this way, two simple encounters begat thousands 
more between the French and the Germans.  
This legend appears with variations in most accounts of the BILD. The 
discrepancies, however, point to the ways in which the myth has eclipsed the man. 
Whereas most iterations of the story locate du Rivau’s epiphany in Ludwigshafen in the 
summer of 1945, both translator and editor René Wintzen (1924-) and editor Eitel-Victor 
Couchoud situate it in Strasbourg. Wintzen recalled BILD journals Documents and 
                                                          
755David A. Meier. “French-German Relations: The Strasbourg-Kehl Encounter, 1945-1955,” European 
Review of History 11, no. 1 (2004): 55-65; Willis, The French in Germany, 128. 
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Dokumente being conceived at the end of 1944 in Strasbourg, whereas Couchoud traced 
BILD’s origins to 1945 when, in his telling, du Rivau spotted a group of French and 
German civilians, arm in arm, singing the “Internationale” on the bridge to Kehl. 
According to Jean-Charles Moreau, who as head of the “Youth and Popular Culture” 
office in the French military government and the subsequent French High Commission 
worked closely with du Rivau, the priest, in contrast, drew his inspiration from a 
Communist hitchhiker.756  Since the early 1960s, when BILD’s success was assured, such 
stories have run rampant, and du Rivau has been lionized as a pioneer of French-German 
cooperation, usually without reference to historical context or precedent. Some have 
called du Rivau a prophet, but this reverence loses sight of the realities of the postwar 
landscape as well as of the ambivalence felt toward du Rivau in the early years of his 
venture.   
Du Rivau founded the twin journals Documents and Dokumente in August 1945 
along with the Centre d’Information et de Documentation Économiques et Sociales 
(Center for Information and for Economic and Social Documentation) (CIDES); this 
center evolved into the organizations that would come to be known as BILD and the 
Gesellschaft für übernationale Zusammenarbeit (Society for Supranational Cooperation) 
                                                          
756Michel de Guervel, “Le fondateur Jean du Rivau” Documents 6 (1974); René Wintzen, “Le role des 
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(GüZ).757 As an umbrella organization geared toward improving Franco-German 
relations, BILD arranged lectures, conferences, study tours, scholarships, internships, and 
charity drives. Catering to a broad social swath, it favored exchanges and what it dubbed 
encounters—among students, laborers, artists, journalists, mayors—that underscored 
participants’ similarities of class, profession, confession, or generation despite their 
national differences. Of prime importance were its journals: Dokumente and Documents. 
Dokumente began as an informational service, publishing German translations of articles 
about France appearing in the French press. Its counterpart, Documents, translated 
German articles about Germany for the French public. These translated articles served as 
a means to peek “on the other side of the wall” as the first issue of each journal 
proclaimed in August 1945. Both journals gradually began to incorporate original articles 
on contemporary themes.758 In addition, BILD operated a Franco-German bookstore, a 
small publishing imprint, a liaison office to organize Franco-German contacts, and a 
study bureau frequented by graduate students, who conducted research and compiled 
dossiers on contemporary issues such as unemployment, refugees, and the Ruhr 
statutes.759   
                                                          
757CIDES was rechristened the Centre d’Études Culturelles, Économiques et Sociales (Center for Cultural, 
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as BILD. That year, GüZ, which referred to the German half of the organization, became a registered 
association in Germany. The distinction at the time between BILD and GüZ, however, was by and large a 
function of their budgets (i.e. for funding sources such as the occupation government and issues of currency 
and exchange).  For the sake of simplicity, and in the interest of following custom, all of these groups will 
be referred to collectively as BILD.  
 
758Verlag und Redaktion der Dokumente, “An unsere Leser!” Dokumente no. 6 (1947). 
 
759In 1953, for example, three graduate students came from France, two from Germany, and one each from 
Belgium and the Netherlands. Sometimes, students hailed from farther afield, whether from Spain or the 
United States. 
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Scholars have pointed to the fact that BILD’s name avoided referencing its 
Christian (much less its Catholic) ethos or its Franco-German mandate.760 A religious 
reference might have perhaps been too limiting. More importantly, in the aftermath of 
war and the midst of occupation, “Franco-German” might appear too divisive. Instead, 
the organization favored “international” in the case of BILD and “supranational” in the 
case of GüZ. But it is clear that BILD began with a French-German sensibility that only 
proceeded to grow stronger. This style of naming applied equally to the organization’s 
publications. If Documents and Dokumente did not expressly use the term “Franco-
German” in their titles, a quick perusal of their table of contents made their goals clear. 
Dokumente’s first subtitle “Internationale Beiträge zu kulturellen-sozialen-
wirtschaftlichen Fragen” (International Contributions to Cultural- Social-Economic 
Questions) proved noticeably broad—the economic part would quickly be dropped just as 
it was from C.E.C.E.S.—but the subtitle would eventually turn to “Zweimonatschrift im 
Dienste übernationale Begegnung” (Bimonthly in the Service of Supranational Meeting) 
a more explicit nod to its transnational mission. Documents, subtitled “Revue mensuelle 
des questions allemandes” (Monthly Review of German Questions) not only directly 
referred to Germany, but in fact, drew on a more nuanced view of Germany than that 
shared by many in France. Simply pluralizing that bugbear, the German question, 
indicated a novel approach. 
Although BILD claimed to operate independently from the occupation authorities, 
it received much of its funding from the Directorate of Public Education (later, the 
                                                          
760Marie-Sophie Guisse, “Naissance et Émancipation d’une revue: Documents, revue des questions 
allemandes, des lendemains de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale à nos jours” (master’s thesis, Institut 
d’Etudes Politiques de Rennes, 2002), http://www.rennes.iep.fr/IMG/pdf/Guisse.pdf, 8-9; Henri Ménudier, 
“La revue Documents et le BILD. Les articles des années 1945-1955,”in Passerelles et Passeurs: 
Hommages à Gilbert Krebs et Hansgerd Schulte, ed. Bernard Bosredon et al. (Asnières: PIA, 2002), 239-
240. Ménudier also notes the lack of reference to Europe or politics. 
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Cultural Affairs Bureau) as well as the Information Bureau of the occupation 
administration.761 Moreover, BILD—located at the time in Offenburg—took advantage 
of the perks of its location in the French zone: property was requisitioned for the 
premises and staff housing; utilities and even a cook were paid as “occupation costs,” 
borne by the German population.762 Offenburg itself was overrun with French soldiers.763 
Nonetheless, BILD retained a large degree of freedom from occupation authorities; some 
of this independence should be attributed to the complexities of the occupation 
administration itself, with its overlapping and competing offices that left wiggle room for 
independent agencies.764  
BILD’s beginnings mere weeks after the French zone of occupation had been 
established likewise contributed to the organization’s autonomy. Du Rivau launched the 
two journals in August 1945 before French occupation policy had been set; in this way 
                                                          
761The Direction de l’Éducation Publique (DEP) was charged not only with education in the zone, but also 
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762Per capita, Germans in the French zone paid more in occupation costs than did their compatriots in the 
British or American zones. On the economic policy of the French occupiers, see Willis, The French in 
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belonged to a Jewish exile living in Baltimore. 
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764Occupation officialdom could be divided into the following camps: planners in Paris, the military 
government of General Pierre Koenig, and the civil government of Emil Laffon. Despite their differences, 
the question of security always remained at the front and center. On the conflicts within the French 
occupation administration, see for example, Willis, The French in Germany, 22-91; F. Roy Willis, France, 
Germany and the New Europe, 7-53; Alain Lattard, “A propos de l’occupation française en Allemagne 
1945/1949: Le conflit Laffon/Koenig” in Sept décennies de relations franco-allemandes: Hommage à 
Joseph Rovan, ed. Gilbert Krebs (Asnières: Institut d’Allemand d’Asnières, 1989), 227-262. 
 
 352 
they were independent in both conception and execution.765 Indeed, du Rivau neglected 
to contact the occupation authorities about his reviews until the fall of 1946 and was 
compelled to remind them of his organization several months later.766 Until then, neither 
journal fell under the eyes of the censors. Although historian Martin Strickmann faults du 
Rivau for pandering to the authorities and voluntarily handing his independent reviews to 
the occupation censors,767 it is clear that BILD needed the financial support of the 
authorities to survive. To be sure, until the summer of 1947, Dokumente and Documents 
were precisely that—a bundle of individually (and cheaply) bound documents in a folder. 
Once known to the French administration, BILD received money as needed, whether 
directly from General Koenig, from the various cultural bureaus, or the Information 
Bureau; such subsidies by and large were kept off the books. Both this irregularity and 
extemporization reflected BILD’s accounting more generally; an administrator noted that 
when du Rivau “lacks money in one account, he takes from another, and he counts on 
Providence to stop the gaps.”768 This patchwork understanding remained in place until 
the French High Commission decided in favor of a more systematic arrangement in the 
                                                          
765Jacqueline Plum, “Französische Kulturpolitik in Deutschland 1945-1955. Das Beispiel der 
Jugendbewegung und privaten Organisationen” (Ph.D. diss. Universität zu Bonn, 2005), 148. The 
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early 1950s.769  Though BILD relied heavily on the French occupation administration for 
funds, du Rivau was satisfied that the organization operated independently enough that it 
“was never considered an official foundation of the occupation by the Germans.”770    
BILD’s openness after the war represented a bold gesture. The pervasive mood in 
both France and Germany was far less cordial. In August 1945, a poll showed 78% of the 
French favored breaking up Germany and 71% wished it to become an agrarian nation.771 
Such resentments were not reserved for Germany as a state, but extended to the German 
people as well. In May 1946, for example, the French occupation government requested 
that the Sorbonne reserve slots for German students in its Cours de Civilisation program 
for foreign students; this was conceived not as an expression of liberality, but rather as 
another tool for denazification and reeducation. Even so, this request was deemed 
premature and ill-advised because many students there “must have retained rather vivid 
memories of German occupation—the Dutch, Norwegians, Czechs, Serbs, [and] Polish.” 
A German presence would thus harm “the success of these courses as well as discipline 
and order at the Sorbonne.”772 More generally, BILD would have to overcome another 
obstacle to friendship; by 1947, polls showed the French by and large exhibited 
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770AOFAA AC 53/3 Jean du Rivau to M. Rivain (27 Nov. 1950). 
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indifference toward Germany.773 In Germany, attitudes toward the French were more 
mixed. If Edgar Wolfrum has pointed to the sheer amount of resentment toward the 
French, F. Roy Willis has convincingly argued that French occupation policy was more 
criticized in France itself than in Germany.774  Regardless, many proved open to French 
influence and culture.  
In general, the French zonal administration approved of du Rivau’s efforts. 
General Koenig consistently supported BILD, and over time du Rivau won over everyone 
from the French Ambassador to the Vatican to High Commissioner André François-
Poncet to Konrad Adenauer. Such approval, coupled with BILD’s later successes, helped 
forge du Rivau’s reputation as a “pioneer” and a “prophet,” but these designations mask 
the controversies that du Rivau engendered in the years before he became the first French 
recipient of the Bundesverdienstkreuz, a Chevalier in the French Legion of Honor, and 
the first beneficiary of the Prix de l’Europe in 1956.  
Du Rivau was neither one to follow protocol nor to comply with official 
guidelines; in light of his independent spirit, he happily referred to himself as a franc-
tireur. If administrators agreed, it was not out of admiration. A Communist member of 
the French occupation administration pointed out that du Rivau possessed a “certain 
revolutionary ferment that worries conservatives and traditionalists” within the Church 
and administration. Indeed, wild rumors flew about du Rivau’s loyalties. Some assumed 
him to be a pawn of the pope; some French administrators, firm believers in laïcité, 
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disapproved of the degree to which the priest pursued a Catholic agenda that touched on 
the political realm. Others, even in the Church, saw him as an untrustworthy renegade. 
The conservative Archbishop of Freiburg, for example, prohibited Badisch clergy from 
participating in one of BILD’s conferences for writers. Police reports accused him of 
inciting the formation of autonomous unions, most notably a Christian-Socialist one, in 
the French zone.775 Even his Church superiors sent du Rivau off packing to Brittany in 
1949 as the new rector of the Collège Saint-François Xavier in Vannes. To be sure, this 
office was an honor, but it also was a way for the Church to extricate du Rivau from his 
profane activities at BILD. Du Rivau took the change in stride and continued to commute 
to Offenburg; this became easier once he was moved to the École Sainte-Geneviève in 
Versailles in 1953. 
Although du Rivau steered away from partisan politics, he leaned toward a 
peculiar blend of conservatism, anti-materialism, and populism, an engaged and 
religiously-infused politics reminiscent of Marc Sangnier or Emmanuel Mounier.776 A 
colleague remembered him as no fan of the Third Republic777 and he served the Vichy 
state, but du Rivau would also prove himself to be a champion of the poor and the 
dispossessed. Born in Le Mans to a well-to-do family, du Rivau joined the Jesuits in 
                                                          
775See correspondence in AOFAA Bade 118, for example, No. 4395/SPJ Confidential note to M. le 
Gouverneur from Deshayes (10 Sept. 1947); No. 5246/PR Confidential Letter from Adminstrateur de 4e 
classe Robert, délégué pour le G.M du cercle (Offenburg) to Délégué Supérieur pour le Gouvernement 
Militaire de Bade, Cabinet, Fribourg (10 Sept. 1947); Letter from Inspecteur en Chef Marcel Guerrini to 
Commissaire de Police Beronneau/Chef de Securité de Lahr with police report (24 Oct. 1947). 
 
776It is not clear with what party (if any) du Rivau’s political sympathies lay. One Communist French 
official pegged du Rivau as a left-leaning Catholic. Joseph Rovan recalled that du Rivau distrusted him 
precisely because of his connections to that official and to the French Communist Party more generally. Cf. 
AOFAA Bade 118 No. 4395/SPJ Confidential note to M. le Gouverneur from Deshayes (10 Sept. 1947); 
Joseph Rovan, Mémoires d'un français qui se souvient d'avoir été allemand (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 
1999), 289-290. 
 
777François Bourel, “Jean du Rivau,” Documents no. 1/2 (1970); also reprinted in the 50th anniversary 
edition of Documents no. 4 (1995): 157-164. 
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1921. Du Rivau’s first job was as chaplain to the Faculté de médecine in Paris. During 
the war, he served as a lieutenant in an artillery unit of North African soldiers, until he 
was captured. After a month as a German prisoner, du Rivau managed to escape.  He then 
became a chaplain for the Chantiers de Jeunesse, where he led youth in outdoor projects 
for the Vichy state. In the final stages of the war, du Rivau returned to the military to 
serve as a chaplain; in this capacity, he would become the military chaplain of French-
occupied Offenburg. Unlike most of the activists in this study, du Rivau showed no 
interest in things German prior to his stint in Offenburg; indeed, he did not speak 
German, even after his years at the helm of BILD. 
The BILD team in many ways represented a break with past Franco-German 
associations. The initial staff had not been active members of earlier groups devoted to 
the Franco-German question; to be sure, most ranged between only 20 and 25 years old 
and thus had been born after the Great War. In the case of the Germans, their youth 
meant that they had spent much of their education in Nazi-era schools. In the case of the 
French, it signaled that most had backgrounds in either Vichy’s Chantiers de la Jeunesse 
(like du Rivau) or the Resistance. Both milieus, of course, had fostered French 
camaraderie, but neither led intuitively to sympathy for Germany. Such prior affiliations 
would inform BILD’s team-based approach to work, both on the reviews and in their 
charitable ventures. Moreover, the anti-materialist spirit of the Chantiers permeated 
BILD’s “missionary” work, and its cult of the outdoors would feature clearly in the 
choice of venue for many of BILD’s conferences. The team’s core consisted of a handful 
of French Jesuits along with a number of French and German journalists, educators, and 
translators. Two representatives of the evangelical church also sat on the board.   
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On the level of personnel, BILD retained astonishingly few links with past 
organizations.778 Indeed, BILD’s intersections with members of earlier French-German 
groups were namely incidental. Maurice Boucher and Frau Benedikt Schmittmann from 
Cologne were the sole “ordinary members” of BILD’s association with a direct affiliation 
to the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, Boucher as the editor-in-chief of the Revue 
d’Allemagne and Professor Benedikt Schmittmann as a member of the DFG. Boucher, 
like former Mayrisch Komitee member (and current CFEAN member) Jean 
Schlumberger, participated in BILD’s Franco-German conference for young writers in 
the spring of 1953.779 Such a tremendous break with prior organizations—again in terms 
of people, not in terms of structure, goals, or rhetoric—reflects the youthful leadership of 
BILD. Tied to that, and perhaps even more importantly, it shows the desire to begin anew 
from the ashes of war. As we shall see in the following chapter, other groups retained 
much tighter links to pre-1945 circles. 
Instead of alumni from previous French-German organizations (whether of the 
Nazi era or the interwar years), du Rivau’s French comrades included a number of Jesuits 
and other young altruists. Luc-Antoine Boumard (1920-1999), the first editor-in-chief of 
Documents, had entered the novitiate before the war, though he was not ordained until 
1952. With a year in the Chantiers de Jeunesse and year of forced labor in Germany 
under his belt, Boumard took over the fledgling Documents in the fall of 1946. His 
editorship of the journal counted toward his service to the Society of Jesus. Jesuit Roger 
Heckel (1922-1982), an editor of Documents, eventually became prominent enough to be 
                                                          
778Unfortunately, subscriber lists whether to Documents or Dokumente have not been found. 
 
779AOFAA AC 302/1a “Lettre aux amis du B.I.L.D.” no. 5 (July/Aug. 1953). 
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next-in-line to be bishop of Strasbourg. Jean Weydert (1920-2006), too, would become a 
Jesuit and devote most of his life to Catholic activism and European questions.   
Many BILD activists explained their involvement as part of their longstanding 
personal connectedness to the other nation: as émigrés, as Alsatians, as POWS or soldiers 
stationed abroad, as academics and journalists. Many claimed a background in the 
Resistance, whether French or German. Alsatians Roger Heckel (1922-1982), Antoine 
Wiss-Verdier (1919-1974), and Jean Tschieret (1924-2005) shared the advantages of 
bilingualism (though Alsatian René Wintzen did not), proximity to Offenburg, and a 
lifetime—including the war years—between France and Germany. Later BILD activists 
included émigrés, most famously scholar Joseph Rovan (né Rosenthal) and former 
participants in BILD events, such as Rovan, François Bourel, and German student Franz 
Ansprenger.780  
If the French half of the team at first namely consisted of Jesuits, the German half 
was more diverse. Georg Smolka (1901-1982), the first editor of Dokumente—and about 
two decades older than most of his colleagues—had a particularly ambiguous relationship 
with the Nazi past and no apparent ties to France before joining the group. His connection 
to the Catholic Church, however, was longstanding; in his youth, Smolka belonged to the 
Catholic youth movement Quickborn and eventually planned to take up the cloth. Instead, 
Smolka trained as a historian specializing in the migration of Germans; he carried out a 
project on German-Americans at the Library of Congress for several years and then 
turned to Ostforschung, geared toward the legitimization of massive territorial gains in 
the East. As a translator for the North-East German Research Community [Nordost-
                                                          
780Rovan was very involved with BILD in its early years through his work with the French administration. 
Bourel attended several BILD conferences as a student in Lyon; his first was at Überlingen in 1947. He was 
surprised to be the only one from his class waiting for the train to Germany. See AOFAA AOR 7/1 Bourel. 
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Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft], founded in 1933, Smolka continued to contribute to 
this cause;781 he additionally penned his own articles for Ostforschung journals. Born in 
Breslau, Smolka’s early inclinations faced East not West. 
Jakob Laubach (1917-2001), the successor to Smolka and charged with the 
cultural sections, similarly had been raised in a strongly Catholic milieu, most notably as 
a member of the youth group Bund Neudeutschland. Editor Alfons Erb (1903-1983) 
instead shared Smolka’s connection to the East. Better known for his later work on 
German-Polish reconciliation, Erb, editor of the Herder Korrespondenz, likewise had no 
strong connection to France. But it was perhaps a 1949 request from a Dokumente reader 
that eventually inspired Erb to transfer the BILD mission eastward, where, at least in this 
reader’s mind, the legacy of hatred ran deeper.782   
Comparatively little has been written on the German half of BILD, whether on the 
team itself or on the review Dokumente, which it edited. Although du Rivau’s influence 
was paramount to the group—and other French members like Jean Tschieret likewise 
shaped the groups’ activities—the German members also played an important role. But 
their willingness to work for Franco-German cooperation is harder to understand than 
that of the French staff. Much of their enthusiasm must be attributed to a general desire to 
improve the standing of Germany after the war. Here, then, is a realm ripe for future 
research. The paucity of scholarship relating to Dokumente is likewise difficult to 
explain, especially given the relatively meager circulation of its counterpart Documents.  
                                                          
781On the Nordost-Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft more generally, see Michael Burleigh, Germany 
Turns Eastwards: A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 70-77. On Smolka, see Christian Handschuh, Georg Smolka: Von der ‘Ostforschung’ zum 
‘Abendland’ (Münster: Aschendorff, 2003); see also, his personnel file and associated correspondence, 
AOFAA AC 191. 
 
782Dokumente no. 3 (1949): 277-280. Erb led a Pax Christi tour to Auschwitz in 1964. 
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Very quickly, Dokumente began to flourish. By November 1946, circulation had 
reached 40,000; the bulk of these readers resided in the French zone. There were, 
nonetheless, an impressive 9000 readers in the British zone, 7000 in the American zone, 
2500 in Berlin, and another 1000 in Austria.783 According to Martin Strickmann, 
Dokumente had 65,000 readers by 1947-1948.784 Its French counterpart Documents, 
however, never saw such success, though its exact circulation remains contested. It is 
clear that the occupation government regularly swept in to cover Documents’ debts. In 
the early 1950s, BILD entreated Documents’ readers to point out the journal to their 
friends; “Documents,” it explained repeatedly, “is not enough known!” More privately, 
BILD noted that, though the French journal’s readership was growing, it was still only 
read in “milieus preoccupied by German questions, milieus which at the moment are still 
rather circumscribed.”785 The lowest figure, mentioned by Marie-Sophie Guisse, is an 
initial print run of 2,000, rising to 5,000 in 1949, and generally falling between 3,000 and 
4,500.786 Strickmann cites a circulation of 5000, still, of course, a significantly higher 
figure than for earlier journals such as the Revue d’Allemagne. Martin Kretzschmar 
claims, in contrast, that whereas Documents had 6500 readers by 1946, there were 12,000 
                                                          
783AOFAA AC 33/2. Unsigned overview of C.E.C.E.S. (8 Nov. 1946); Fiche pour le Général Chef des 
Services de Direction from Sous-Direction des Affaires Culturelles et de l’Information (8 Nov. 1946). Cf. 
letter of endorsement from Msgr. Picard de la Vacquerie to General Koenig (8 Nov. 1946), which notes 
30,000 readers for Dokumente.   
 
784This figure cannot be confirmed, as the document to which Strickmann referred, was not found in the file 
he cited. According to Strickmann, Dokumente had more readers in the American zone than in the French 
and British zones combined. See Strickmann, 130. 
 
785AOFAA AC 53/3 Note au sujet du financement du B.I.L.D. pour l’exercise 1952. 
 
786There is no documentation of the provenance of these figures. See, Guisse, 65. 
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readers in the first half of the 1950s.787 At that point, 20% of Documents readers were 
educators, 12% military, and 10% priests; an additional 10% went straight to libraries.788 
But, as we will see, participants in BILD’s programs proved far more diverse in their 
occupational and familial backgrounds than subscribers to its journals. 
The journals’ nation-centered, but reciprocal format recalled earlier efforts, such 
as the Weimar-era Deutsch-Französische Rundschau and its French counterpart, the 
Revue d’Allemagne.789 Like their predecessors, BILD’s reviews asserted their 
independence from any political party, but unlike earlier efforts, Documents and 
Dokumente originally were comprised entirely of previously published texts in 
translation. In this way, the editors’ claim to authentic representation of the other country 
rang loud and clear; a French reader would see Germany directly from a series of German 
perspectives and vice versa. Henri Ménudier has underscored the degree to which the first 
issue of Documents revealed only a limited ambition in terms of its goals of serving as “a 
tool, an information” source, its scope (the Church), and its longevity over the coming 
months;790 its German counterpart began with a similarly small mission. Their stated goal 
was “to peek over the wall” not to tear down the mental wall between France and 
Germany. 
                                                          
787Cf. Strickmann, 130 and Martin Kretzschmar, “Die Deutschlandbilder der Zeitschriften La Revue des 
Deux Mondes, Esprit, und Documents, Revue des questions allemandes, 1945-1999 (Ph.D. diss., University 
of Heidelberg, 2002), 43. It is not clear where these statistics were found.  
 
788AOFAA AC 302/1b Jahresbericht 1953. Both journals, of course, had the potential to reach much 
broader audiences in that their subscribers were largely educators, clergy, libraries, etc. 
 
789Cf. bilingual journals such as the Deutsch-Französische Monatshefte/Cahiers franco-allemands of the 
1930s considered in chapter four. 
 
790Henri Ménudier, “La revue Documents et le BILD. Les articles des années 1945-1955,” 245-246. 
 
 362 
By its tenth issue, Dokumente no longer aimed solely to transmit reports. It now 
proclaimed the importance of reconnecting ties that had been so long broken—and here it 
emphasized, not the ties between nation-states, but between peoples and the renewed 
need for cultural exchange. Several months later, the two journals incorporated original 
articles; in this way, “foreign authors would speak directly” to readers on contemporary 
themes on the assumption that “direct contact is so much the more fruitful.”791 Thus, the 
journals quickly shifted their role from the unidirectional flow of information to a more 
interactive, complex conversation between the Germans and the French. By that point, 
BILD more broadly had accrued a mandate of an even more interactive nature, by 
fostering contacts not only in the imagined space of the magazine’s readership, but also 
by sponsoring so-called “encounters” and exchanges among French and German clergy, 
writers, students, and so forth.   
Even once original articles were added to the journals, their very nature as 
compendia and forums permitted diverse currents to peek through the lines of the texts. 
As with a sourcebook, the onus of interpretation largely rested on the shoulders of the 
reader, though, of course, the selections and omissions revealed editorial biases.  BILD 
chose to compile barely mediated documents to promote the formation of educated 
opinions. In this respect, Documents and Dokumente placed an enormous amount of trust 
in their readers to formulate unbiased attitudes on their own, in contrast to, for example, 
the efforts of the Mayrisch Komitee to regulate the press from above. If the inundations 
of cultural propaganda in both countries during the war had cultivated distrust, a more 
“democratic” format made sense. It was nonetheless remarkable to trust French readers in 
1945 to think about Germany without prejudice and the reverse.  
                                                          
791Verlag und Redaktion der Dokumente, “An unsere Leser!” Dokumente no. 6 (1947). 
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  Under the first four years of occupation, that is, until the founding of the Federal 
Republic, both Documents and Dokumente avoided criticizing—or even discussing—
policies of the occupation regime. No articles focused on deforestation or the dismantling 
of German factories. Rather than dealing with contemporary Franco-German relations, 
these journals ignored them and centered instead on the spiritual consciousness of the two 
peoples. In other words, the best way to foster understanding and dialogue during an 
occupation was to pretend the power differential did not exist, to communicate in eternal 
truths, not the day’s woes. 
Both Dokumente and Documents, like BILD more generally, gradually shed their 
religious thrust, which had initially been the heart of the enterprise. The first few issues 
of the two journals consisted almost exclusively of pastoral letters, guidelines from 
bishops, and other Church texts. Soon Dokumente broadened its scope to include articles 
from Emmanuel Mounier’s Esprit, the Jesuit newspaper Études and even the Dominican 
newspaper La Vie Intellectuelle. On occasion, articles even appeared from the University 
of Notre Dame’s Review of Politics. A range of Catholic opinions were thus taken into 
account, alongside an increasing number of secular pieces culled from, among others, Le 
Monde. Conversely, Documents originally selected articles from German clerics, and 
increasingly, from German periodicals including the Catholic Rheinischer Merkur and 
Eugen Kogon’s Frankfurter Hefte as well as from secular newspapers such as Die Zeit 
and the Kölnische Rundschau. By the late 1950s, the religious aspects of BILD had toned 
down significantly; today, Dokumente, Documents, and BILD survive, but as wholly 
secular ventures. In its first decade, however, even as the organization increasingly began 
 364 
to emphasize its European orientation, BILD and its journals remained at heart a 
Christian venture.  
Only rarely did the journals raise red flags among the administration. Smolka’s 
article on the execution of Alsatian autonomist Joseph Rossé ruffled feathers at the 
French High Commission for its criticism of French policies on regionalism; Smolka 
found French insistence on a Germany of the Länder hypocritical. The head of the 
cultural division of the French High Commission, complaining that “on the one hand 
[Smolka] wants to get hold of French money while on the other hand, to maintain the 
latitude to attack France,” called for his dismissal and later denied funding for the 
purchase of the BILD premises when BILD did not follow suit.792 Alsace was a forbidden 
topic, according to this administrator. Yet both Documents and Dokumente, as they 
expanded their purview beyond religious issues, discussed topics as divisive as German 
rearmament, the Saar, Algeria, and the Oradour trials. On occasion, the French High 
Commission scolded Documents for its supposedly anti-French—or exclusively German 
perspectives.793 But most French administrators—particularly those involved with 
French-German relations—raved about BILD’s activities and, on occasion, reminded the 
editors of Dokumente that they exercised the power to help reshape German public 
opinion by praising or “stigmatizing” various attitudes toward the French.   
To its benefit, BILD’s agenda remained multifaceted and open; this allowed many 
to project their own visions of cooperation onto the organization. To the French 
                                                          
792BILD sought to purchase the requisitioned property in which it was housed. AOFAA AC 53/3 no. 
359HC/DC Note à l’attention de M. le Directeur Général from Chef du Service du Livre (11 Jan. 1952); 
AOFAA AC 53/3 HC/DC No. 04860 H. Spitzmuller to Bourel (10 April  1952). For the offending article, 
see Georg Smolka, “Wofür starb Joseph Rossé?” Dokumente no. 6 (1951). 
 
793AOFAA AC 302/1b Spitzmuller to du Rivau (6 March 1954); AOFAA AC 302/1b François-Poncet to du 
Rivau (12 Aug. 1954).  
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occupation administration, BILD contributed to French rayonnement culturel, and both 
the BILD staff and its allies who endorsed the organization often took the opportunity to 
remind the French administration of this perspective. Even General Koenig, military 
governor of the French zone, considered BILD part of France’s effort for pénétration 
culturelle in Germany.794 Indeed, BILD’s French staff was included on a list of 200 
people “classed as indispensable to the goal pursued by the occupation.”795 Early on, 
BILD (at the time C.E.C.E.S.) emphasized not only its goals of informing Germans and 
“reveal[ing] our spiritual and intellectual riches,” but also its function as a “necessary 
counterpart to Nazi propaganda.”796 Later, in the throes of the European movement, 
BILD spun itself as part of the project for European unity. 
 
Looking for a Savior amid the Ruins 
Informed by his faith, du Rivau created a transnational space in which religion 
would act as the unifying factor. Both Documents and Dokumente initially culled texts 
primarily from Catholic sources because through the Church, the mission “to create the 
unity of all peoples in a spirit of peace and love” could be pursued.797 Indeed, du Rivau 
believed the Catholic Church held the power to renew both nations. Defeat represented a 
moment of opportunity for German Catholics. However painful, it marked the 
                                                          
794See, for example, AOFAA AC 33/2 Msgr. Picard de la Vacquerie to General Koenig (8 Nov. 1946); 
Note pour M. l’Adminstrateur Général adjoint pour le G.M.Z.F.O. (Direction de l’Information) from de 
Varreux, Cabinet Civil (23 Nov. 1946). 
 
795AOFAA AC 53/3/Cabinet No. 4435 HC/CAB/INF. P. Rivain to M. Schwartz (2 July 1952).  
 
796AOFAA AC 33/2. Unsigned overview of C.E.C.E.S. (8 Nov. 1946). 
 
797J. du Rivau, “Zur Einführung!” Dokumente no. 1 (Aug. 1945): 2.  
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“liberation” of the Church from its “oppressors.”798 The Vatican likewise saw in 1945 the 
potential to strike out against secularization. Pope Pius XII allegedly told du Rivau that 
“Germany is the apple of my eye in regard to the future of the Church in Europe.”799 
Thus, although the Church’s influence had been curtailed under the Nazis—for example 
by the eventual prohibition of Catholic youth groups—the Church retained high hopes 
that it would soon regain its foothold.800 Du Rivau claimed to have been personally 
inspired by a declaration of the pope that “one could not reconstruct the new world 
without the Church.”801 While many French occupation administrators did not share this 
clerically-minded view of reconstruction, even the Communist head of the Bureau of 
Sports and Youth acknowledged, “we must be realists and recognize that in a land like 
Baden, where the Catholic Church still constitutes a great power and where religious 
traditions are still very alive, this policy…could have excellent results. Democratization 
of the Land of Baden cannot be accomplished against the Churches, nor outside the 
Churches.”802     
For the Church to take on the enormous task of spiritual reconstruction, the 
Church as a body needed strength and unity. Du Rivau, more generally, was suggesting 
that the heart of the Church needed to steel itself from falling apart at the end of war, for 
it was the task of the Church to bring renewal to both Germany and France. For the 
                                                          
798AOFAA AC 33/2 Confidential Report, “Les Catholiques d’Allemagne en face de la situation actuelle” 
(Jan. 1947). 
 
799As cited in Richard Gilmore, “France’s Postwar Cultural Policies and Activities in Germany: 1945-
1956” (Ph.D. diss., Université de Genève, 1971), 179. 
 
800A recent dissertation points to the massive growth of the German Catholic youth movement in the French 
zone; see, Plum, 83-94. 
 
801As cited in Gilmore, 178. The Vatican supported du Rivau’s project. See AOFAA AC 33/2 Jacques 
Maritain, Ambassade de France près le Saint-Siège to General Koenig (28 Nov. 1947). 
 
802AOFAA Bade 118 No. 4395/SPJ Confidential note Deshayes to M. le Gouverneur [10 Sept. (1947)]. 
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Church to be able to pick up the pieces, it was essential for the faithful to believe in it as a 
body. 
To this end, it was essential to view the Church in a positive light. At once 
seeking to resurrect the Church’s reputation in Germany and in France after its 
compromises during the war, du Rivau tended to emphasize the Church’s role in the 
Resistance in both countries. He thus tried to offer it up as a role model to Christians.  
The French “myth of the Resistance” (so popular in the 1950s) that he seized upon most 
likely also turned many toward joining his project.803 The Church, according to du Rivau, 
had emerged from the war with dignity, with its reputation largely unscathed. In this way, 
he echoed many leading voices of the Church in Germany.804 To French readers, du 
Rivau explained that the Church was “the sole social body remaining in Germany that 
energetically fought Nazism” and was therefore in the best position to report accurately 
on contemporary Germany.805 BILD pursued no inquiry into the connections between the 
Church and the Nazi state.806 It did not dwell on the past. 
Because du Rivau relied on the notion of the Catholic Church’s incorruptibility, 
BILD adamantly opposed the concept of collective guilt:  
The term ‘collective guilt’ is itself poorly chosen. It makes it sound as if 
all Germans are morally culpable, which is evidently not the case. For 
those in particular who resisted Nazism, like the Catholic Church through 
its most genuine leaders and representatives, their responsibility is a 
responsibility of solidarity. 
 
                                                          
803Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944, trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
 
804Mark Edward Ruff, The Wayward Flock: Catholic Youth in Postwar West Germany, 1945-1965 (Chapel 
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805J. du Rivau, “En guise de présentation” Documents no. 1 (Aug. 1945): 2. 
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This was indeed a loose definition of resistance. Catholics, according to BILD, “were the 
first to suffer the excesses of Nazism and to condemn them courageously; they do not 
understand that one could find them responsible alongside the Nazis.”807 In this way, du 
Rivau portrayed Catholics as the first victims and important resisters; Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Communists, and Jews remained unmentioned.  
It was not surprising that German Catholics would want to cling to the idea of the 
German Church’s victimhood and opposition to Nazism—especially in light of the 
widespread broader narrative of German suffering in the war.808 But it was certainly 
remarkable for a group of Frenchmen, several of whom claimed a connection to the 
Resistance, to adopt such a stance in the mid-late 1940s. Du Rivau had in fact unhinged 
the Nazi past from its national moorings (Germans are bad) to frame the Nazis instead as 
a specific political movement whose victims included Catholics on both sides of the 
Rhine. Not only did BILD take this rather radical position on the German Church, it also 
embraced a more broadly exculpatory view. BILD did not ignore Nazi crimes, but in its 
first years, it addressed them in sweeping gestures. Germans should, it contended, be 
penitent as a people, for having shared the same culture and background as Nazi leaders. 
Germans therefore should be “supplicant;” such vague, all-encompassing penitence, it 
implied, gave further grounds for absolute forgiveness of the population.  Likewise, 
                                                          
807AOFAA AC 33/2 Confidential report. “Les Catholiques d’Allemagne en face de la Situation actuelle” 
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808Robert G. Moeller, “Remembering the War in a Nation of Victims: West German Pasts in the 1950s,” in 
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BILD did not dwell on the issue of collaboration in France. Through universal 
penitence—though without the burden of universal guilt—lay the path to salvation.  
Historian Martin Strickmann has called du Rivau’s faith in the Church’s 
resistance a “mistaken assumption,” but du Rivau’s language—and his larger project—
seem to indicate that a shrewd strategy underlay his stance on the Church.809 Indeed, just 
after its first anniversary (when it still operated under the name C.E.C.E.S.), the 
organization’s own overview announced its assault against Nazi propaganda which had 
“impregnated even Catholic milieus.”810 Standing by the Church did not mean that BILD 
wore blinkers. Instead, it suggests that BILD recognized (at least to a degree) Catholic 
collusion with the Nazis—and acknowledged it when advantageous, for example, in 
trying to secure support from the French administration. But it behooved BILD to present 
Catholic history rather differently to the broader public.   
In fact, du Rivau was quite conscious of the power of memory in shaping the 
future. At a BILD conference in 1948, du Rivau openly acknowledged the utility of 
letting go the past. He stated, “They say in a pejorative sense that peoples sometimes 
have a short memory. Today we congratulate ourselves about that.”811 But, as historian 
Robert Moeller reminds us, “remembering selectively was not the same as forgetting.”812 
This was a strategy to avoid further alienating the Germans living under occupation. At 
the same time, it was a firm expression of hope for French-German friendship. 
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As it defined its mandate—both alongside and against officialdom—BILD faced a 
similar question as the occupiers: Who deserved a voice in the postwar community? The 
Allied occupiers agreed that Germans should be denazified and reeducated to yield good 
German citizens. BILD sought to reach out to anyone in the occupied zone or in the 
broader French and German reading public who showed interest. For BILD, all contact 
contributed to greater transnational understanding and constituted a sign of good faith. 
BILD sought to rescue the whole rather than merely work with the saved, and in this way, 
BILD redefined for itself who should represent the national, and by extension, the 
binational community. In contrast, the Comité Français d’échanges avec l’Allemagne 
Nouvelle (see chapter seven), construed active participation in the Franco-German 
community more restrictively: neither Germans nor French collaborators could join their 
board. BILD instead embraced everybody to be able to build a new future together.  
Rather than fixating on the tortuous past, BILD took on the issues of the present 
in the desire to move forward. As du Rivau himself explained,  
It has nothing to do with going backward . . . We are horrified of the 
negative . . . The past only serves to illuminate the future, but it is only the 
future that interests us. It is about constructing, not finding fault.813  
 
Accordingly, the gaps in the journals tell us almost as much about BILD’s perspective on 
reconciliation as does the reviews’ content. Dokumente and Documents drew up “an 
accounting of the motive powers of the times, the forces for good as for evil.”814 These 
balance sheets, however, reveal a strong sense of presentism and concern for the future. 
Although BILD did not hesitate to engage in debates about controversial issues—from 
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condemning questionable French occupation policies to deliberating over German 
rearmament, it did not tend to reckon with the past. French officials in Baden understood 
du Rivau’s initiative as he himself had explained it to them: BILD “collaborate[d] in the 
spiritual and moral rapprochement of populations, in the realm of Christian ideas.”815  In 
the face of a legacy of hatred, violence, and death, BILD alluded to martyrdom and 
salvation, but dwelled on a hopeful enthusiasm for a new world to come. 
 BILD crafted a Franco-German narrative of mutual resistance to the Nazis and 
Christian duty to embrace the future. By reaching out to Germans without probing the 
recent past, BILD in effect skipped over truth to get to reconciliation. Despite its mandate 
to inform and “to peek over the wall” this was at first realized only in a limited capacity. 
But, in this way, BILD sought to abjure the ghosts of the past and arouse a new spirit of 
cooperation.816 The martyrdom of the Church—combined with universal penitence—
could thus lead toward forgiveness and reconciliation. And reconciliation stood on the 
path to redemption. In the end, reconciliation could permit the forging of a joint Franco-
German community; BILD would look to youth as the means by which to achieve this 
salvation.  
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Border Crossings: Students, Missionaries, and Refugees  
In light of its rejection of collective guilt, BILD cleared youth of blame and 
placed its highest hopes in them to emancipate the French and the Germans from the 
conventions of nationalism and the pattern of hate. For this reason, BILD placed a high 
priority on exchanges, particularly among youth, so that they could rebuild the Franco-
German relationship on a more positive foundation. BILD especially took pains to 
underscore the innocence of children because “a child is never responsible for his 
miserable existence. He has borne no weapon, and did not side with one cause or the 
other. He is a victim. The sorrows he must experience and that almost shattered him are 
the result of human stupidity.”817 Between 1946 and 1947, the Western occupying powers 
had each issued a general amnesty to absolve German youth of guilt. But like official 
French reeducation policy—itself more extensive than that of the other Western 
occupiers—BILD concentrated on reintegrating German youth into the community of 
democratic nations.818  BILD, however, tried to achieve this integration through 
reciprocal efforts. 
BILD facilitated Franco-German exchanges, predominantly for individuals to stay 
with families across the Rhine, but also for paying guests and au pairs; in addition, it 
placed interns in companies abroad. The exchange program grew such that in 1953 alone, 
BILD had helped arrange almost 1,000 trips. About 75% of the exchanges in both 
countries involved students; the remainder included employees/workers, educators, and 
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interns. Whereas French and German applicants to go abroad numbered about the same, 
95% of French requests could be filled versus only 45% of German requests. This 
discrepancy may in part be reflected by the fact that 1,400 French families at the time 
were hosting German refugees through another BILD program, discussed below. Less 
explicable were gender discrepancies: 74% of French travelers through BILD were male, 
while German travelers were 60% female. As with the exchanges, the intern program 
functioned unevenly, with far greater success placing French interns in German firms (in 
particular in the mines of the Ruhr) than the reverse. Indeed, BILD at most managed to 
place a dozen German interns in French companies, in large part due to French union 
regulations and the 1953 strike. On occasion, BILD matched pen pals, but this 
represented an extremely limited effort, especially in comparison to the thousands of 
French and German pen pals arranged through the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft in 
the Weimar-era.819  
In addition to individual exchanges, BILD planned more ambitious educational 
tours to France and Germany. Themed trips matched, for example, syndicalists, art 
critics, laborers, or Church leaders with their counterparts across the Rhine. Through 
guided tours, discussion groups, and simple hobnobbing, participants learned about the 
other country and its people. Often, the tours revolved around topical themes. A group of 
vocational students from Roubaix, for example, traveled to mills and factories in a 
handful of German towns to observe the manufacture of textiles. One tour involved 
German architects intent on learning about reconstruction efforts in Normandy so that 
they could apply these techniques to devastated areas at home. Another brought German 
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workers and entrepreneurs to heavily industrial areas of France to study French 
manufacturing successes;820 this tour proved particularly timely in light of Robert 
Schuman’s proposal to pool the production of coal and steel two months thereafter.  
BILD differentiated between study tours and the many Franco-German 
conferences it sponsored each year that similarly brought together groups like students, 
writers, or economists. Whereas the tours hinged upon the transfer of ideas across 
borders, the conferences encouraged the exchange of ideas through French-German 
contact. In 1950 alone, BILD reported that 1200 people had stayed in Offenburg as its 
guests for various programs and initiatives.821 But many programs took place elsewhere; 
BILD’s earliest Franco-German encounters occurred at more scenic sites in the Black 
Forest and along the shores of the Rhine and Lake Constance. Franz Ansprenger, a Berlin 
university student who hitchhiked to the 1947 Franco-German meeting at Überlingen, 
recalled few details about the content of the discussions he had. For him, what 
resonated—and indeed later compelled him to join the BILD team—was “the fact of 
singing together, of bathing in Lake Constance, of eating . . . and drinking together . . . . 
The bonds of friendship remain . . . . These constitute for me the cornerstone of the great 
edifice formed of Franco-German rapprochements, European collaboration, and the 
democracy of our part of Germany.”822 
The content, of course, did matter and further connected BILD to earlier efforts. 
In his opening speech at BILD’s Franco-German Writers’ Conference in Lahr, du Rivau 
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called for the end of borders. He explained, “Just as an evolution took place from clan 
consciousness to tribal consciousness, from tribal consciousness to national 
consciousness, we must arrive at the idea of a human community that overcomes border-
ideology and is realized above and beyond the borders.”823 Thus, at BILD’s first 
specifically Franco-German conference in the summer of 1947, du Rivau made sure to 
underscore the group’s transnational purpose. A conference for sociologists and 
economists in Lahr followed the next month, along with a conference for students in 
Überlingen. At a subsequent meeting at the scenic abbey at Royaumont, du Rivau 
clarified his stance on borders and identities. His argument could have come directly 
from the lips of the DFG’s Otto Grautoff:  
I would therefore like to dispel a misunderstanding right away. You are 
Germans, we are French . . . . It is not about the French becoming 
Germans or the Germans becoming like the French . . . . We are what we 
are, the one and the other. It is not about changing, it is only about 
working together and wanting to work together for the common good.824   
 
Crossing, and even overcoming, borders did not signify some sort of European 
assimilation. Otto Grautoff’s notion of a “Franco-German unity brew” was no more 
welcome in du Rivau’s postwar Europe than it had been in the Weimar era. Such a vision 
of French-German cooperation entailed little more than the rebottling of old wine, though 
the nationalist bouquet had been toned down a notch. Here was a basically essentialist 
view of national identity and a strong faith in national difference. The key distinction 
involved the leap from the Weimar-era concept of “understanding” to a more active 
priority of “working together.” “Working together” clearly fit with BILD’s scheme of 
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encounters; it also would dovetail with the growing international conversation about 
European unity.    
Some conferences suffused an emphasis on the transnational—and the 
European—with the religious. At Überlingen (1949), writers discussed contemporary 
Europe in light of such themes as “Christ in the World of Today,” “Christ and Science,” 
and “Christ and Politics.”  At Maria Rosenberg, for the second convention on pastoral 
care, 40 German and 40 French priests discussed the need for rapprochement and the 
construction of a new Europe grounded in Franco-German friendship.825 At another 
convention, Catholic journalists discussed whether Catholics had a special role in 
building a united Europe.826 
BILD’s conference program also included specifically “confessional encounters,” 
which routinely brought together church officials and youth from both sides of the Rhine 
to reinforce the message of Christian brotherhood.827  From pilgrimages to Chartres, 
Maria-Laach, Birnau, and Le Puy to conferences for clerics to discuss pastoral work, the 
organization made sure to inflect internationalism with religious experience. Seeking to 
attract participants to a Franco-German youth conference, Dokumente exhorted: 
As Christians, we are bound in particular ways to work with all men of 
good will on this rapprochement of all territories . . . . Faith in the unity of 
mankind in Christ means that cultural, political, and social unity, which is 
only a temporal projection on the level of history, must become from now 
on an open and concrete unity. Therefore we reject all divisions and the 
formation of all closed and aggressive blocs. All strength must be 
collected against these so that the Christian mission of people and society 
will be united.828 
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Reaching not only across national but also Christian confessional lines, the organization 
thus implied the possibility of a heaven on earth, through the unity of all peoples. BILD 
had the potential to bring disparate societies into contact, teach them to understand one 
another, and unite them in their love of God. Such unity could be achieved through faith, 
effort, and will. Dokumente announced that the creation of a European humanity would 
serve as the “fulfillment” of “Western Christendom”—and it was precisely this notion of 
the “spirit of Western Christendom” that resonated with local clergy.829  Due to their 
prominence within local communities, church officials—like journalists and educators—
could emerge as mouthpieces for BILD after having participated in an encounter.  
 Like exchanges and encounters, Christian charity could help draw people 
together; moreover, charity served as a clear way to incorporate non-elites into the 
movement for cooperation. Beginning in 1950, BILD dispatched French youth on 
“missions” to refugee camps in Northern Germany. Each summer and each Christmas, 
international teams composed primarily of French 18 to 30-year-olds (but including many 
Belgians, some Germans and even the odd Japanese or Vietnamese youth) flocked to the 
barracks of Kiel, Flensburg, and elsewhere to generate hope among the expellees from 
the East. The missionaries worked, ate, and slept among the refugees, so BILD made sure 
to warn potential participants that camp life would be arduous. Nonetheless some 
workers spent their entire annual vacations in the camps, and all missionaries had to pay 
to participate; anywhere from 100 to 150 did so each year. In what was at once a jab at 
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modern materialism and a reminder of the first Christmas, BILD told winter volunteers 
that their reward would be a “real Christmas, made of real joy and real poverty.”830  
 The missions comprised three different strands that BILD tried hard to braid. 
Most visibly, this was a charitable venture. Second, like BILD’s other efforts, the 
missions revolved around the idea of building bridges between France and Germany. 
Missionaries spent most of their time visiting with camp residents, whether informally or 
more formally through children’s activities, festivities, or discussion groups with youth 
on social, moral, and sexual issues. In this way, the French visitors and the displaced 
German “hosts” could each learn about the other’s culture, mores, and opinions and 
befriend one another. In a similar spirit of fostering knowledge and camaraderie, female 
missionaries helped refugee women cook, clean, and babysit, while male missionaries 
joined the German men in making repairs, chopping wood, and working in the fields. 
These shared activities accentuated generational connections and gendered codes that cut 
across national lines. Individual relationships, moreover, were nurtured over time; 
returning missionaries made sure to visit former residents of the camps in their new 
homes to demonstrate that personal ties mattered as much as the charity itself. Finally, if 
these missions revolved around the notion of fraternity, they were grounded in a far more 
spiritual sense of fraternity than any of BILD’s other ventures in the 1950s. 
Even rhetorically, BILD called attention to the religious underpinnings of its 
charitable action. BILD, for example, relied heavily upon Christian language merely to 
describe the naming of its charitable ventures: it had “baptized them ‘missions.’”831  Yet, 
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organizers soon acknowledged that the term “mission” led to misunderstandings because 
it “risks [. . .] implying an idea of proselytism that we do not have.”832 In his effort to 
distance his project from conversion efforts, organizer Jean Tschieret (1924-2005), who 
had previously headed a German youth hostel, nonetheless continued to deem them 
missions; he did not instead invoke the more neutral term “service” as had, for example, 
the German Evangelical Committee for Service to Israel three years earlier.833 If the goal 
of BILD’s missions was not proselytizing per se, it certainly was the revival of the 
Christian—and preferably the Catholic—faith. BILD promoted “enlivening existing 
Christendoms” whether Catholic or Protestant, but it expressed particular concern for 
Catholic expellees, isolated in the traditionally Protestant North.834 Although Protestants 
participated in the charitable action, each team always included a Catholic priest to 
conduct daily mass. The relief effort also temporarily replaced camp priests with French 
counterparts so that they could take a six-week vacation from their exhausting duties. A 
cheerful confessional presence could contribute, BILD hoped, to a renewed sense of 
spirituality in the camps.835  Moreover, such action would invigorate the Catholicism of 
the missionaries themselves.  
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By focusing on the spiritual aspects of the missions, BILD President François 
Bourel (1924-2004) and Tschieret hoped to conquer potential temptations in the camps 
that ranged from materialism to nationalism to apathy. The main goal of the missions, 
they argued, was to help refugees “forget their hardheartedness, their love of prosperity, 
and their bitterness even if only for a few hours; overcome what separates them, 
especially the differences of ‘national’ mentalities; learn to see above all what unites 
them: the love of Christ that exceeds all knowledge [Erkenntnis].” In this way, the two 
organizers managed to link all three aspects of the missions. But they emphasized that the 
missionaries did not provide material aid—thus discounting the notion of humanitarian 
work altogether—and indeed argued that “its goal is much more the testimony for the 
kingdom of God.”836 By 1955, the missions had proved successful enough to launch a 
reciprocal venture in France. BILD now called upon German volunteers to travel in so-
called “gypsy wagons” to the impoverished bedroom communities of Parisian workers. 
Ruins of churches in the Marne Valley attested to its once religious atmosphere; German 
youth were to renew that spirit to build a “living Church” in the heart of France.837 By 
underscoring moral rather than material succor in both Germany and France, Bourel and 
Tschieret battled the spirit of materialism as they tried to construct a new Franco-German 
community of faith.    
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As a counterpoint to the missions, displaced German children were invited for 
summer homestays in France beginning in 1951. These seven to twelve-year-old 
children, many of whom had lost at least one parent in the war, had languished in refugee 
camps for most of their lives. BILD framed the increasingly successful program in the 
language of Christian mercy and charity.838  In 1953 alone, some 1400 refugee children 
were put up in France, though four times as many French families had volunteered to 
host.839 By focusing on the innocence of children and the sanctity of the family, a step 
would be taken toward integrating those “expelled” into the Christian family of 
Europeans.  
The success of the Flüchtlingsaktion, however, was not assured. The Minister in 
charge of Heimatvertriebene in Schleswig-Holstein underscored the degree to which the 
work of BILD was “exemplary” for its success and sheer extent, but more particularly in 
light of the initial risk: “Coming six years after a terrible war, the call that you issued at 
the beginning of 1951 to welcome German refugee children into French families 
represented—I understand it perfectly—a gamble.”840 Whereas BILD’s Bourel suggested 
the program arose from “completely natural” charitable sentiments to aid children, the 
German official rightly pointed out that there was nothing natural about promoting 
Franco-German friendship in the early 1950s when resentments still ran high. Indeed, 
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after the foundation of the Federal Republic, the French Foreign Ministry had responded 
to requests for exchanges by German mayors with caution because it feared French 
hostility at the local level.841 Many BILD host families in fact reported that they were 
“‘taken for dreamers or fools,’” and many more noted neighbors’ initial disapproval of 
lodging German children. Had assisting refugee children been the only thrust of the 
effort, BILD duly acknowledged, it “could have chosen an easier way than through 
France.”842  
French officials subsidized BILD’s work with refugees from the East for several 
reasons. Above all, the occupation administration and later the High Commission had 
helped fund BILD projects since the French government became aware of its existence. 
BILD was classed with a range of independent French-German associations and clubs 
likewise promoted by the administration as part of the cultural bureau’s mandate. In fact, 
BILD received more financial support from the French cultural administration in 
Germany (DGAC) between 1950 and 1954 than any other group.843 The refugee program 
in particular could bring sorely needed good press to the French in Germany; much of the 
High Commission’s interest seemed to stem from the positive impact of BILD’s program. 
Indeed, the refugee program seemed to invite photo opportunities. High Commissioner 
André François-Poncet, for example, volunteered his private plane to help fly refugees in 
Berlin over zonal borders to France.844 Finally, a whiff of Cold War sensibilities surfaced 
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in official correspondence about funding BILD. An administrator noted, “In fact, the 
International Bureau of Liaison and Documentation, which works in close cooperation 
with my Services, sets a fair price on and attaches considerable importance to the 
development of France’s contacts not only with Germans from the Western zones, but 
also those compelled by events to leave eastern Germany, and who perhaps more than 
any others, need to be informed of our country’s position regarding German 
problems.”845 Yet BILD itself did not make a point of discussing the Cold War in these 
years; instead it focused on the French-German relationship and Christian duty to the 
unfortunate.  
    Even as BILD harbored broader intentions of fostering Franco-German 
fellowship, the refugee campaign was framed primarily as a charitable mission. Though 
the campaign made frequent mention of the international basis of the effort, BILD tended 
to temper the specific allusions to Germany in favor of a more universal message. BILD 
advertised in over 50 French newspapers that like “poverty, charity knows no borders.”  
Participants assumed their efforts would be considered in a “universal, human, and 
religious context,”846 though not surprisingly, neighbors did not always interpret their 
gesture through this lens. Hosting a German child who had been expelled from the East, 
in BILD’s perspective, represented a timeless, apolitical gesture of humanity that 
superseded temporal concerns such as the Cold War or old grudges against Germany.   
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If the campaign was loath to dwell on the burdens of the past and present, this did 
not prevent it from suggesting the possibility of a brighter future through the force of 
good will. Privately, in a request for government support, BILD addressed the enormous 
challenge posed to Europe by the refugee crisis. BILD could smooth the way to 
resettlement through its public relations work. Its appeal for funds hinged on the albatross 
of public opinion: “If it is true that one of the remedies resides in intra-European 
emigration, it is clear that the ex-enemy countries of Germany are not ready to receive 
Germans, even refugees.”  Hinting that its refugee program and painstaking work to win 
over public sentiment dovetailed with France’s concrete political needs, BILD laid out 
the broader stakes. “The peace of Europe was in play,” it averred.847 BILD thus inscribed 
the refugee campaign into the effort to build a new Europe. 
To the public, BILD stressed a different facet of this new Europe. BILD 
seamlessly reshaped Christian notions of universalism into notions of supranationalism. 
Organizers contended that the Flüchtlingsaktion served as “a way to awaken the love of 
the individual for his neighbor on the other side of the border, for his fellow brother in the 
Christian sense, for his fellow sufferer in the European sense.”848 The concepts of 
Christian fellowship and the fellowship of Europeanness—of having survived the war 
and its aftermath however painfully—thus became inextricably linked; the Christian term 
Leidensgenossen [fellow sufferers] defined what it meant to be European. Such lofty 
ideals took on a practical twist: “only our love will generate the ‘European Bürgersinn,’ 
which is indispensable for the durability of a European federation.” According to this 
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logic, hosting a German refugee was a pragmatic step on the way to a new, more unified 
Europe.  
 In addition to casting the French and Germans as fellow sufferers, BILD’s 
campaign took the far more daring step of painting the Germans as victims. According to 
BILD’s campaign rhetoric, “our conscience as men, as Christians forbids us from 
remaining indifferent before the heart-rending distress of these victims of hate and its 
consequence.”849 Hosting refugees would thus help consolidate the community of 
victims, French and German. BILD’s plea was a triumph. By accentuating the importance 
of Christian duty and humanitarian principles, BILD managed to arouse French sympathy 
for Germans. Indeed, compassion came from all corners: 26% of hosts had white collar 
backgrounds, 20% were farmers, 18% were craftsmen and shopkeepers, 12% were in the 
“liberal professions,” and 9% each were civil servants and workers.850 Such diverse 
backgrounds, and above all the surprisingly high participation rate among non-elites, 
marked a decided shift away from earlier Franco-German groups’ hold on the educated 
classes alone. Hosts, moreover, hailed from all parts of France; 43 convoys carried the 
children from the train station in Strasbourg toward Lille in the North, Brest in the West, 
Pau in the Southwest, and Nice in the Southeast.851  
 The desire to forgive Germany for the crimes of the past or the wish to avoid 
future war motivated many French families to host a German refugee. Some cited 
experiences in forced labor service, in POW camps, or even in concentration camps. 
                                                          
849AOFAA AC 302/1a 1952 Brochure “Les Réfugiés de l’Est.” 
 
850AOFAA AC 302/1a Jahresbericht BILD 1952. Another 6% had no employment or were retired. 
 
851For help with logistical issues and other support in this effort, BILD turned to Secours Catholique, the 
Red Cross, and some Protestant charities.   
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“M.T.” from Montauban, for example, explained, “‘my personal intentions in receiving 
this child were those of Christian forgiveness to Germany. I am the mother of a 20-year-
old son who died of exhaustion at Buchenwald because of blows, inhuman labor, and 
undernourishment pushed to the extreme.’”852 Housing a German guest represented a test 
of character. Others referred to their experiences in the Resistance as the springboard for 
their engagement; hosting a refugee represented another step in the march to a better 
future. Such stories attested to the desire for reconciliation as a form of Christian 
forgiveness (or pacifism) rather than as an avowedly political gesture. But if many 
attributed their participation to a desire to stop the cycle of war, none claimed to be 
atoning for French misdeeds during the war.  
 Published letters about the program in Documents and Dokumente—as well as in 
BILD brochures—evoke the organizations’ aspirations to foster a transnational moral 
consciousness.  A woman who had encountered local opposition when deciding to host a 
refugee, found to her great delight that “‘this child worked miracles.’” Amazed, the 
woman reported how little Ursula’s departure at the end of the summer caused her 
greatest foe to cry.853 Similarly, a wounded French veteran and former POW described 
how Barbara had conquered the hearts of even his most anti-German neighbors. Devoted 
to his German “daughter,” this veteran—whose patriotism was implicit—began to 
question his own past:  
Our little Barbara’s father died in captivity in Belgrade. I’m terrified to 
think he could’ve been among the Germans I killed at Rethel on the 9th of 
June 1940! How many men like him there were among them. Never again 
                                                          
852AOFAA AC 302 Report “établi par le Secretariat du B.I.L.D. d’Offenbourg, au sujet du séjour en France 
de jeunes réfugiés, au cours de l’été 1951” Signed Tschieret (1 Nov. 1951). 
 
853Jean Tschieret, “Neuf cents enfants et leurs hôtes,”Documents no. 1 (Jan. 1953), unnumbered 
supplement. 
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such horror! I am wholeheartedly with you on the work you have taken on 
for Peace. It’s incredible how effective it is.854  
 
The voices of participants thus appealed to readers’ desires for future peace and 
demonstrated the practical ways in which hosting a refugee led to reversals of the heart 
within the family and beyond. Ideally, both the German and the French families “learned 
to see the human being first, and to consider his nationality only as one of his 
attributes.”855 Such stories—and there were many—played on French pacifist 
sensibilities.  
Willingness—and even enthusiasm—to host sometimes went hand-in-hand with 
reticence to admit any predilection for Germany. A host in Strasbourg, for example, 
underscored his family’s Christian humanitarianism, while clearly distancing himself 
from Germany. “S.” explained, “The presence of a German little girl did not pass 
unnoticed, especially in Alsace, where the Franco-German question arises with great 
intensity. Several people showed their disapproval, although they could not reproach us 
for being Germanophiles (my wife is from the Ardèche and I am a French civil servant). 
We were only anxious to show that Christian mutual aid does not have to pay attention to 
nationalities.”856 This host’s stress on humanitarianism demonstrates one of the strengths 
of BILD’s program for Franco-German understanding, namely framing the exchange 
program in universalist terms that bridged national differences and allowed BILD to 
fulfill its more narrow mission.   
                                                          
854AOFAA AC 302/1a Jahresbericht 1953; AOFAA AC 302/1b Jean Tschieret, Fraternité sans Passeport 
1953. In the annual report, the girl is referred to as Berta. 
 
855AOFAA AC 302/1a Jahresbericht 1953. 
 
856AOFAA AC 302 Report “établi par le Secretariat du B.I.L.D. d’Offenbourg, au sujet du séjour en 
France, de jeunes réfugiés, au cours de l’été 1951” Signed Tschieret (1 Nov. 1951). 
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This insistence on universalism, however, did not guarantee happy results. Indeed, 
BILD did not shy away from revealing tensions created by the refugee campaign—from 
mundane homesickness to the occasional emergency. About 3% of the children and hosts 
registered formal complaints to BILD, most due to homesickness or the refugee’s 
unrefined manners. On occasion, such complaints targeted not the individual child, but 
German society more broadly. One host, for example, grumbled, “Gretel is very proud, 
she refuses to learn French, and at every opportunity makes disparaging allusions….I find 
it abnormal that after such a cruel war, they have not changed the schooling on the other 
side of the Rhine.”857 Some complaints were laden with stereotypes, such as one about a 
German boy “who only likes brutal games.” Rather incongruously, a few French hosts 
voiced their disappointment that the refugees, though malnourished, arrived in a better 
condition than expected. BILD’s advertisements had thus been misleading; hosts’ good 
deeds turned out to be less extravagant and their beneficence less appreciated than they 
had hoped.858 Finally, a few children protested that they had been exploited by their hosts 
and put to work as farmhands.   
A couple of more serious cases merit mention. One involved a French boy sent to 
Germany on the corollary program discussed below. The instant Michel set foot in the 
host family’s house, he had a severe panic attack and was sent home. His parents, 
unfazed, attributed his breakdown to the fact that “Our poor Michel still lives with the 
terror that the Germans inspired in the Vosges in 1944!”859 Why they chose to send their 
son alone across the Rhine for the summer went unmentioned. The other disaster was the 
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tragically ironic case of Wolf Preissner. Nine-year-old Wolf suffered critical wounds to 
his stomach and legs and had to have his right arm amputated because an old German 
mine exploded when he was playing in his host family’s yard in Compiègne. BILD 
managed this tragedy gracefully with an impassioned, but far from maudlin plea for long-
term peace.860 What could have erupted into a public relations disaster for BILD in fact 
roused the sympathies of the town for the child and served as a reminder to both nations 
of the fruitlessness of war. Even Wolf himself remained a life-long friend of BILD; it was 
he who penned Tschieret’s obituary in Dokumente in 2006. 
All told, this charitable mission, framed around the notion of “Christian duty” was 
a success story. The achievements of the Flüchtlingsaktion can be measured in several 
ways. At an anecdotal level were stories such as that of the refugee Heinz S., who gained 
11 kilos during his summer in France.861 More telling, perhaps, was the fact that so many 
host families invited their guests back summer after summer. By 1954, all 700 children 
were returning for their second or third visit to their surrogate families in France.862 In 
one year alone, twenty families requested formal adoption.863 And every year, far more 
French families requested a German guest than the program could accommodate. At an 
                                                          
860See, for example, AOFAA AC 53 Draft of telegram from BILD to Bremen Consulate; AOFAA AC 298 
“Le Bureau international de liaison et de documentation.” AOFAA AC 302 b Newspaper clipping Freie 
Presse, Bielefeld (30 Oct. 1952). 
 
861AOFAA Bade 676. Press cutting no. 205. “1400 Flüchtlingskinder aus Frankreich zurück,”Offenburger 
Tageblatt (5 Sept. 1953). 
 
862This figure represents a sharp downturn—a full 50%—in the number of participants from the previous 
year’s effort. Because of budget cuts, in particular due to the withdrawal of the French High Commission 
from Germany, BILD decided only to include children who had been invited back (and had not grown too 
old). The program cuts can also be attributed to an emergency action taken by BILD to send 200 young 
victims from the Passau flood to France that summer. Finally, BILD subtracted from its Flüchtlingsaktion 
fund to be able to launch a new reciprocal venture to send French children to Germany (see below). 
 
863Jean Tschieret, “Quatre Cents Enfants Refugiés Découvrent la France,” Documents no. 12 (Dec. 1951): 
1304-1308. In 1951, 36 % of the refugees had lost at least one parent. 
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organizational level, BILD managed to extend its fingers beyond the French zone into the 
farthest reaches of West Germany, as well as into towns throughout France. BILD also 
deepened its influence through this program; host families in the North of France became 
so intimate that they founded the Committee of the Friends of BILD in Lille to help 
BILD with outreach and the coordination of future efforts.  Pleased with the results of its 
programs, BILD copiloted the Rural Establishment Project to resettle German refugee 
families on abandoned French farms and launched another project to send French 
children to Germany.864  
 Whereas the children’s campaign was a resounding success in France, the 
reciprocal effort in Germany did not find equal purchase. In the fourth year of the 
Flüchtlingsaktion—a year that BILD had coordinated an emergency action to send 200 
young victims of the flood in Passau to stay with French families in addition to its regular 
program—BILD experimented with a relatively modest campaign in Germany. Germans 
in Baden-Württemberg were summoned to host 300 French children, whose parents could 
not afford to take them on vacation.  In Baden, this call was met with a “wall of silence.” 
In dismay, Tschieret scolded the French occupation authorities for having caused such 
rancor in the region.865 So few volunteered to host in the French zone that BILD felt 
compelled to expand the campaign to Bavaria, which as we have seen, was not 
historically a hotbed of efforts for Franco-German cooperation. In the end, over 1500 
                                                          
864On the farm program, see AOFAA AC 302 “Etat des Prévisions d’activité du BILD d’Offenburg pour le 
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Bavarians offered to host, so that 32 children were placed in Baden, 16 in Württemberg, 
25 in Westphalia, and 247 in Bavaria; almost all of the hosts were Catholic.866 Unlike the 
missionary work, however, the broader children’s campaign did not have a Catholic 
thrust; approximately 1/3 of the German refugee children sent to France, for example, 
were Protestant. 
By focusing on the young—whether exchange students, French missionaries, 
German refugees, or children—BILD sought to banish traditional hatreds before they 
took hold, plant a healthy curiosity about neighbors across the border, energize the 
movement for cooperation and grant it longevity. As an advertisement for hosting French 
children asked, “How can Europe arise if people do not personally and privately come 
closer to each other?”867 Homestays for students and refugees encouraged them to 
consider Germans and French as part of the same family of Europeans. Not only did the 
missionary movement help shape this community of Europeans, but it sought to bring 
them into the Christian fold. BILD understood both communities as necessary pillars of 
the contemporary moral universe. Moreover, by focusing on children—whom BILD 
deemed innocent—BILD managed to focus its energies on building a community of 
Europeans not saddled with the burdens of the past. With youth, there was no need for 
rehabilitation.  
 
 
 
                                                          
866AOFAA AC 302/1b. Fraternité sans passeport 1954. Bavarians’ eagerness to participate may in part be 
explained by BILD’s efforts to aid the residents of Passau. 
 
867AOFAA AC 302/1b “Ein Beitrag zur Überwindung der Grenzen!” (May 1954). 
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Conclusion 
BILD’s wishes for Franco-German reconciliation were inflected with the desire to 
fight the dechristianization of Europe. The concept of a Western Christendom served as a 
convenient vehicle by which to address both the issues of spirituality and a certain form 
of European unity. Through its journals and activities, BILD aimed to convince the 
French and the Germans to “think of nationality last” and thereby promote a more 
engaged, humane, and Christian perspective. In combating apathy, both social and 
spiritual, the organization sought to prevent another war and the turning away from God. 
BILD was battling wars that were being fought in both nations against materialism, 
against nihilism and on the side of engagement and renewal.  
BILD’s activities served as a way not only to regenerate the Church, but also to 
regenerate the Germans—and less obviously perhaps—to regenerate the French. Émigré 
intellectual Joseph Rovan, who would decades later become the President of BILD, 
emphatically argued in the autumn of 1945 that the new Germany “would be the measure 
of [France’s] worth.” He explained that “the occupation is one of the new French 
Revolution’s questions of conscience. It will be, in the eyes of European spectators, a 
touchstone for our capacity for renewal.” 868 Rovan was referring to France’s renewal—
but of course renewal was at issue on both sides of the Rhine. In the efforts of BILD we 
see the revolutionary desire to forge a new moral consciousness that transcended borders 
and regimes, as much as those borders and regimes necessarily had driven those desires 
in the first place. 
It may be that, with the birth of the Federal Republic and with it, the diminished 
presence of French occupiers, BILD had to work all the harder and launch more 
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ambitious programs to proceed in its efforts for French-German contact. Certainly, most 
of the cultural administration’s files in the archives of the French occupation seem to 
indicate that, by 1952, almost all French-German organizations in the zone had seen a 
diminution in strength. A Konstanz industrialist, one Dr. Paulssen, who had worked with 
a number of Franco-German groups in Baden, lamented: “Often the French, who had 
given life to the Franco-German clubs, leave. It is hard to have a Franco-German club 
without French representatives.”869 But this does not mean, however, that cooperation 
was more popular under the French occupation than it was in the early 1950s. As the 
refugee program illustrates, BILD redoubled its efforts and success only grew after the 
occupation ended. In establishing a stable organization, with ties to government, private 
associations, and the Church, BILD hoped its efforts would not remain quixotic and 
abstract wishes for a better future, but would act instead as a “concrete work for 
peace.”870 
Of course, BILD’s efforts did not generate instant goodwill. As we have seen, 
BILD’s program to bring needy French children to vacation in the French zone did not 
find success. A similar-minded program spearheaded by the governments of Baden-
Württemberg and France, “Christmas of the Soldier,” met an equally disappointing fate in 
1953. The effort called for Germans to invite French soldiers stationed in the area to 
spend Christmas with their families. Although the French administration tried to put a 
pleasant spin on the program by focusing attention on those towns with an unusually high 
rate of volunteering, the overall picture in Baden looked grim. While one mayor and 
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870AOFAA AC 302 Jean Tschieret, Report “établi par le Secretariat du B.I.L.D. d’Offenbourg, au sujet du 
séjour en France, de jeunes réfugiés, au cours de l’été 1951” (1 Nov. 1951). 
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Landrat representative called for German hosts to welcome French soldiers “who are 
fulfilling their duty to protect the Western world,” some newspapers cried foul. The 
French occupier, it seems, had not treated the Germans as equals. In Kehl, the situation 
had been deemed poor enough that the city was not included until the second year of the 
venture.871 Still, in 1953, 858 French soldiers were invited to celebrate the holidays at a 
home in Baden. Clearly, relations between residents of the French zone and France 
remained uneven, with soldiers, as the embodiment of the occupation regime, more 
resented than civilians.   
In 1954, a poll found that 54% of the French favored rapprochement, while 23% 
opposed it.872  If these numbers appear low, they represented a stunning reversal from the 
immediate postwar years and a remarkable ray of hope for the French-German 
relationship. Even four years earlier, only 21% of Germans expressed a belief in a 
“hereditary hostility,” whereas 70% considered that an “out-of-date sentiment.”873 There 
is no doubt that BILD played a part in improving French perceptions of the Germans, and 
indeed, German perceptions of the French. As a testament to BILD’s influence, it would 
be Jean du Rivau who would conduct the 1967 memorial mass at Notre Dame for Konrad 
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Adenauer, who himself had judged his role in French-German reconciliation—especially 
the 1963 Elysée Treaty—as his crowning achievement as chancellor.874
                                                          
874In contrast, Germans judged the return of the last POWs in 1955 as Adenauer’s most important legacy. 
See, Moeller, 96. For Adenauer’s self-assessment, see Henri Ménudier, “Adenauer, de Gaulle, und der 
Élysée Vertrag nach Alain Peyrefitte,” in Der Élysée-Vertrag, ed. Defrance and Pfeil, 93. 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
The Comité français d’échanges avec l’Allemagne nouvelle 
 
 
 
 
If there were errors in the past, if the attempts at rapprochement did not succeed, that is 
no reason not to try again. One can never do enough for peace, and those who have 
served in war know it better than others.—Lucien Tharradin875 
 
What nation, especially with its spiritual and political avant-garde, would be more in a 
position to provoke a humanization of our relations than France? It depends almost as 
much on you [the French] as on us that Germany ceases to be a separate problem, that the 
Germany of today never again becomes the Germany of yesterday but truly a conciliatory 
and tolerable partner, perhaps even one day a well-regarded partner in the European 
community.—Eugen Kogon876 
 
 
 
Many paths led through the tangled thicket of postwar animosities toward 
international cooperation in general and Franco-German engagement more specifically. 
Founded in 1948, the Comité français d’échanges avec l’Allemagne nouvelle (the French 
Committee for Exchanges with the New Germany, hereafter CFEAN) put forth a vision 
of Franco-German cooperation attuned to the spirit of the Resistance. The members of the 
Comité, limited to those not tainted by collaboration and including many who had served 
in the Resistance, possessed the moral stature to communicate a more nuanced 
understanding of Germany to a broader French public, to salvage the notion of 
cooperation from the wreckage of collaboration(ism), and to stand as a critic of French 
                                                          
875Lucien Tharradin, “Rencontres de maires français et allemands à Stuttgart,” Allemagne, no. 8 (Aug./Sept. 
1950): 3. 
 
876Eugen Kogon, “L’Allemagne d’aujourd’hui,” Allemagne, no. 2 (June/Aug. 1949): 5. 
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occupation policies that undercut opportunities for French-German cooperation. In 
contrast to BILD, CFEAN offered not a redemptive vision of reconciliation, but rather a 
more complex, cautious mission to enlighten.  
More public relations task force than any French-German organization since the 
Mayrisch Komité, the Comité hoped to paint for the French a more complete picture of 
contemporary Germany than that produced by the harrowing memories of war and 
occupation, which had only served to exaggerate longstanding clichés about German 
character and exacerbate ill-will. Just as the Mayrisch Komitee and the Deutsch-
Französische Gesellschaft had tried to demonstrate the complexities of Germany and the 
diversity of Germans after the trauma of the First World War, CFEAN sought to refine 
the image of Germany after the cataclysm of the Second. Although the Committee’s 
statutes averred its goal was to improve reciprocal knowledge [connaissance] between 
France and Germany, it was firmly planted in one nation: France. Its name alone made 
that mission clear. The Comité hoped to foster the French-German relationship by 
targeting the French public; to the victors went the responsibility to pursue 
understanding.  
Like others before it and BILD alongside it, the Comité counted on the 
transformative power of knowledge and the primacy of cross-border contacts. 
Accordingly, it acted as an intermediary to connect individuals to various organizations 
and events. Often in tandem with public and private efforts, the Committee organized 
conferences as well as informational trips to France and Germany. In similar fashion, 
CFEAN acted as a clearinghouse both to help match individuals for exchanges and to 
find French speakers for German events. In addition, the Comité helped enhance study 
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abroad efforts, first by acting as a welcoming committee to visiting scholars from 
Germany, and second by offering guidance to German students in France. The group also 
harnessed the media to advance its agenda, briefly through a radio program on 
Südwestfunk and above all through its French-language bulletin, Allemagne: Bulletin 
d’Information du Comité d’Échanges avec l’Allemagne Nouvelle.  
While the Committee tried to expand French horizons about Germany, it 
simultaneously shrank the circles welcome to superintend the French-German 
relationship. In this way, the Committee construed active participation in the construction 
of a postwar Franco-German community more restrictively than did BILD. Germans, 
regardless of their relationship to the Nazi state, were precluded from membership. The 
pointed exclusion of Germans reflected the skepticism of Committee leaders, no less the 
French public, toward the German population; it had no political legitimacy. Just as 
CFEAN drew the line as to who could represent Germany after the war, it likewise 
attempted to delineate those who could speak for France. The statutes of CFEAN 
indicated that all “members” had to be French, with full political and civil rights; those on 
the board could not have been “condemned for acts of collaboration with the enemy.”877 
In fact, several had storied careers in the French Resistance. Finally, the Comité barred 
from its ranks representatives of the French Foreign Ministry, the occupation 
administration, and the French Commissariat for German and Austrian Affairs. 
The Committee’s membership restrictions and its patent reliance on veterans of 
the Resistance both made it unique and buttressed its claims to change. Here was an easy 
way to distance itself from the ugly legacy of collaboration. Only by drawing this line 
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could the organization claim to be different from what came before. The implication, 
moreover, was that only the purest souls—those true representatives of France—could 
reach out to Germany to redeem it. With a postwar public wary of any ties to Germany, 
these men could lend such a mission legitimacy and moral authority. Such an 
unmistakable association with the spirit of the Resistance would likewise (ideally) garner 
attention in a crowded postwar landscape teeming with new political parties, journals, 
and interest groups, each clamoring for attention and promising renewal.  
A broad coalition of French citizens united around the desire to build a 
democratic, humane Germany, CFEAN was committed to fostering a more 
knowledgeable, less polemical Franco-German conversation. Its statutes referred to the 
importance of information and the need to encourage the emergence of a “new 
Germany,” but the group followed no clear manifesto; indeed, a manifesto would have 
impinged upon its pluralism. Members’ loyalties lay with different political parties, and 
their stances toward Germany were far from uniform. This diversity of perspective 
marked a clear departure from Franco-German organizations during the war, but also left 
the group with a rather wooly mission. As its Secretary General Alfred Grosser 
explained, “It was never a question of the Comité preparing new political structures, nor 
even at heart of creating an emotional climate. One could say the Comité does not seek to 
create the positive but to destroy the negative constituted by ignorance, prejudice (or even 
yearning for the Nazi past).”878 With one foot in the past and one foot in the future, 
CFEAN deliberately grounded its mission in the legacy of war and occupation, while 
looking forward to both a “new Germany” and a new France. 
 
                                                          
878Alfred Grosser, “Le Comité a-t-il encore un sens?” Allemagne, no. 17 (Feb./March 1952): 1. 
 400 
Origins 
The Comité emerged from the remnants of what Michael Kelly has called the 
“humanist consensus” that transcended French party lines after Liberation.879 In the 
immediate postwar period, the values of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen were paramount;880 they had both come to stand for the ideals for which the 
Resistance had fought and to epitomize Frenchness. Applying the humanist logic to 
Germany after the war, however, was not instinctive. It took over three years for a French 
organization informed by these ideals to crystallize around the German question, and 
members, not surprisingly, would sometimes find themselves at odds with the occupation 
administration. But Committee members considered such values—above all human 
dignity, individual freedom, and social justice—to be universal and therefore equally 
applicable to Germany as to France.881 In this way, Committee members took a civic 
idealism and civic responsibility born of the spirit of resistance and broadened them to 
the transnational sphere.  
With the end of war, many in both France and Germany saw an opening for a 
radically new beginning. Although the hopes of many Resistance figures to intervene in 
and redefine postwar French politics—even to usher in social revolution—had been 
dashed not long after Liberation and were followed by a period of dissension and 
disillusionment, a second (and secondary) wave of such hopes arose in the late 1940s 
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among so-called Resistance intellectuals.882 In 1948, during this second wind, a number 
of intellectuals developed the political movement the Rassemblement Démocratique et 
Révolutionnaire (RDR) to rally the French; that same year, a small group (some of whose 
members overlapped with the RDR) began to focus more closely on the German question 
and, in that spirit, created CFEAN. Both groups sought to transcend party lines and to 
breathe new life into the postwar order. CFEAN, though less well-known, proved more 
enduring. If its members had lost the opportunity to transform their own country, they 
realized they could perhaps play a part in transforming its relationship with Germany.  
By the foundation of CFEAN, these men of the Resistance had brooked 
disappointment in the postwar order in France. When a grander revolution at home had 
failed to materialize, they turned instead to other, more modest goals geared toward re-
shaping the French-German relationship. With their initial post-Liberation enthusiasm for 
the future of France dimmed, CFEAN members took on the German question with 
prudence and more than a touch of resignation. They did not, however, relinquish the 
badge of political engagement that they had proudly worn since they enlisted in the 
Resistance. 
At the war’s end—both despite and because much of the world, not least France, 
viewed Germany as unimaginably evil—a number of French intellectuals pled for the 
reasonable treatment of Germans and Germany by the Allied occupiers. Writers such as 
Joseph Rovan and Jean Schlumberger hoped for a careful management of the occupation 
and believed it was the responsibility of the occupiers to rehabilitate Germany without 
resorting to retribution. Better to exhibit justice coupled with a sense of humanity than to 
wreak vengeance upon the vanquished, no matter how monstrous they had shown 
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themselves to be. France and the other Allied occupiers had a moral obligation to help 
return Germany to the community of nations. France should, in this perspective, offer 
itself as a model for German emulation and by no means replicate the type of occupation 
recently imposed by the Germans. 
Several intellectuals had already publicly voiced their commitment to such ideals 
before joining forces to establish the Comité. As we have seen, émigré and former 
Buchenwald prisoner Joseph Rovan penned a series of articles beginning in October 1945 
about France’s accountability for postwar Germany.883 Rovan’s muscular petition 
grabbed the attention of many; indeed, a number of French-German activists, both 
official and unofficial have cited these articles as the source of their future involvement in 
French-German relations. Months earlier, the Alsatian Jean Schlumberger, formerly of 
the Mayrisch Komité, had broken the ice. As early as March of 1945, Schlumberger put 
the onus on France. Rather than seeking revenge or passively letting postwar Germany 
“stew in its own juices,” France needed to take the more challenging route to re-educate 
the “inconvenient and invading nation that trouble[d] Europe for 80 years.” 
Schlumberger’s “courageous question” asked not what Germany would next “invent to 
disturb the order” but, “What will we [the French] invent to create order?”884 If belatedly, 
the Committee attempted to answer Schlumberger’s question.  
Journalist and German teacher Élie Gabey, who eventually served for a year as 
CFEAN’s Secretary General, likewise urged the French and the international community 
more generally to end Germany’s “moral isolation.” Gabey justified his stance by 
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thinking in the long-term: “So that Germany ceases to be a home of decay, it is 
indispensable that it can resume contacts with the progressive elements of the world.”885 
Gabey made a clear case for the postwar integration of Germany into the democratic 
community of European nations. 
Such willingness to move beyond vengeance sprang from two convergent 
sources. First, there was the (at times implicit) hope that the mistakes of Versailles and 
the 1920s could be avoided. The shunning of Germany, it was believed, had helped set in 
motion the rise of Nazi Germany. Second, there was the pervasive hope for a future 
peace. Such sentiments often intersected with the desire for a united Europe, which 
Resistance leaders had contemplated even during the war.886 Improving French-German 
relations could put a stop to the cycle of wars and advance the European cause.  
 As a way to help nurture any impulses, initiatives, or developments that promised 
a break with the past and a more humane future for Germany, Catholic philosopher 
Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950), best known as the founder and editor of the review 
Esprit, created the Comité. Mounier was not new to the world of controversial political 
and moral idealism. John Hellman has shown how, in 1945, Mounier believed the 
moment of revolution had arrived for France. For him, like so many others, Liberation 
marked an opening for fundamental change.887 It is not difficult to see how this view 
could be extended to Germany and to French-German relations more broadly.  But this 
was not the first time Mounier saw an opportunity for the renewal of France. In 1936, he 
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looked to the Popular Front, and then in 1940, under the shadow of French defeat, 
Mounier stood alongside Pétain’s National Revolution.888 Then, too, his hopes were 
moral in focus.  
Hellman has sketched a man more in love with revolution than with a particular 
cause. The habit of rushing into political minefields—and remarkably different ones at 
that—has led scholars to debate vigorously whether Mounier sympathized with the 
fascists, the communists, neither, or both.889 Mounier considered himself above all a 
Catholic and a personalist, a philosophy he helped establish that placed primacy on the 
person, not as individual but as part of humanity; indeed, personalism spurned 
individualism, materialism, and “bourgeois liberalism.”  
Ambiguities within Mounier’s philosophical writings, his personal history, and 
his review Esprit have fomented the debates over Mounier’s political loyalties. Esprit 
faulted the French for appeasing Hitler at Munich, but then seemed to shift with the 
political winds by taking a more tolerant position toward Nazi Germany. More damning, 
Esprit continued to publish under Vichy until 1941, and at times lauded the regime and 
its National Revolution. In this regard, too, scholars have disputed whether the review—
and Mounier along with it—were complicit with the regime or whether, as Mounier 
argued after the war, such articles had acted as a form of “indirect resistance” that proved 
detrimental enough to Vichy that the government banned the review in 1941. Regardless, 
by the foundation of CFEAN, Mounier had become known as a Resistance hero. Arrested 
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in 1942 because his name had been linked to the Resistance group Combat, Mounier 
spent several months in prison, where he carried out a well-publicized hunger strike that 
burnished his image as a Resistance figure. He spent the rest of the war in hiding.  
Although Mounier had expressed a clear interest in Germany before the war—an 
interest that has led some scholars to tag him as sympathetic to the Nazi regime or to 
fascism more broadly—the philosopher placed a far more sustained concentration on 
German politics after the war than before it. Mounier, unlike many members of CFEAN, 
held no particular expertise about Germany, and indeed did not speak German.890 But in 
the belief that the future of Germany would drive postwar Europe, Mounier turned his 
sights to the neighboring land. In the winter of 1946-1947, Mounier traveled throughout 
Germany alongside Jean-Charles Moreau, an administrator in the French occupation 
administration, to determine for himself how contemporary Germany was dealing with 
the postwar order. Mounier met with a number of German intellectuals, including Walter 
Dirks and Eugen Kogon, loosely associated with BILD. Shortly after this expedition, 
Mounier launched a series of articles on the defeated nation and its prospects in Esprit, 
the first French review to resume publication after Liberation.891 Tellingly, Mounier also 
published an article in Figaro Littéraire entitled, “Germany, France’s Responsibility” 
that followed the basic thrust of Rovan’s and Schlumberger’s arguments.892  
That summer, Mounier began to meet with French intellectuals who might be 
interested in forming a French organization devoted to the German question. The 
contours of this group had at least in part materialized thanks to two BILD conferences. 
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Mounier strengthened his relationship with Eugen Kogon and Walter Dirks at BILD’s 
1947 Writers’ Conference at Lahr, where Mounier had spoken on the importance of 
political engagement (itself associated with the Resistance spirit).893 Though membership 
restrictions precluded Kogon and Dirks from CFEAN membership, they would come to 
play an active role in the organization. Another BILD conference may have brought more 
into the fold. BILD’s Jean du Rivau and Mounier helped organize the next Franco-
German Writers’ Conference at Royaumont in early October of 1948, where they 
encountered Germanists Edmond Vermeil and Robert Minder as well as the student 
Alfred Grosser. Three weeks later, CFEAN, which included all of these men, was born at 
a public meeting at the Sorbonne. There, they hammered out the organizational details, 
including the selection of five co-presidents—Mounier himself, Vermeil, Rémy Roure, 
David Rousset, and Henri Brunschwig—with Grosser as Secretary General. 
As was the case after the First World War, the fraught atmosphere between the 
French and the Germans after the Second World War had not been conducive to the 
immediate creation of a group promoting cooperation.894 But most Comité members were 
used to working on behalf of an unpopular cause. During the trying years of the war, 
French resisters, in the words of Claude Bourdet, one of their leaders and a member of 
CFEAN’s board, “needed to believe that the improbable was possible.”895 Resilient 
optimism came in handy for their involvement with the Comité.   
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Personalities 
 
 Like the Mayrisch Komitee, the Weimar-era Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, 
the Nazi-era Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft/Comité France-Allemagne, and the 
Groupe Collaboration, CFEAN boasted a roster of celebrities as its public face. Well-
known literary figures such as Jean Bruller (pseud. Vercors) (1902-1991), Jean-Paul 
Sartre (1905-1980), and Jean Schlumberger (1877-1968) and scholars like Raymond 
Aron (1905-1983), Robert d’Harcourt (1881-1965), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-
1961) lent their names to the board. At least as valuable were several giants of the French 
Resistance, including Henri Frenay (1905-1988), Claude Bourdet (1909-1996), Rémy 
Roure (1885-1966), Pascal Copeau (1908-1982), André Philip (1902-1970), and Jean 
Gemahling (1912-2003). Many such icons of civic courage had survived the horrors of 
camp life or spoken out in some way to defy Vichy or the German occupation. They (and 
others more so after the war) had made their mark through littérature engagée, a 
commitment to political engagement they would continue through their membership in 
the Comité. All had been profoundly marked by the war and the Nazi years.  
Many had spent part of the war in German camps, whether as POWs (in both 
world wars) or as political prisoners; others had wives or children imprisoned in German 
camps. The Gestapo had arrested Bourdet, co-founder of the Mouvement de Libération 
Nationale, leader of the movement Combat, and a director of the Mouvements Unis de 
Résistance; he was eventually sent to Neuengamme, Sachsenhausen, and Buchenwald. 
David Rousset and Rémy Roure had also been at Buchenwald; Roure’s wife died in 
Ravensbrück. Sartre, of course, had been a prisoner of war in Trier. 
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 Some on the Comité board had a more longstanding (and less negative) 
connection to Germany. Géraud Jouve (1901-1991), Robert d’Harcourt, Edmond 
Vermeil, Robert Minder (1902-1980), Henri Brunschwig (1904-1989), Joseph-François 
Angelloz (1893-1978), and Maurice Colleville (1894-1989) (who joined the CFEAN 
board in 1951) were trained as Germanists.896 Jouve, Élie Gabey, and Pascal Copeau had 
served as press correspondents in Germany in the 1930s. Some had specific ties to prior 
Franco-German groups. Raymond Aron, Henri Brunschwig,897 Géraud Jouve, and Sartre 
had each conducted research at the Institut Français de Berlin, also in the 1930s. In 
addition, Jouve had served as the treasurer-secretary of the Ligues d’Études 
Germaniques, the teachers’ organization associated with the Weimar-era DFG; Germanist 
Edmond Vermeil had sat on LEG’s board. Vermeil and Alsatian writer and co-founder of 
the Nouvelle Revue Française Jean Schlumberger had belonged to the Mayrisch Komitee. 
Vermeil, Minder, and René Lauret had written for the Revue d’Allemagne. Only three 
years earlier, Jean du Rivau had founded BILD.  
 In contrast to the Catholic thrust of BILD, the Comité was characterized by 
religious diversity. Although Mounier was an ardent Catholic, the Committee retained no 
formal ties to the Church and indeed was not imbued with a Catholic (or even noticeably 
Christian) ethos. Both Mounier and Robert d’Harcourt were renowned Catholic 
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intellectuals—d’Harcourt had been elected a member of the Académie Française just two 
years before—and du Rivau, of course, was a Jesuit. Du Rivau’s Dominican counterpart 
on the Comité, Jean-Augustin Maydieu (1900-1955), had known Mounier from their days 
at the Vichy leadership school at Uriage, and had a strong connection to Catholic 
intellectuals from his experience co-directing the review Sept with Jacques Maritain in 
the 1930s. Their Protestant counterpart (and, like du Rivau, a former military chaplain) 
Pastor Albert Finet (b. 1899) had founded the Protestant review Réforme, where he had 
rejected blind patriotism by condemning the deplorable conditions of German POW 
camps in France. Raymond Aron and Brunschwig were Jewish, and Alfred Grosser, 
though born Jewish, was an atheist, as were the Protestant-born Schlumberger and 
Vermeil, and, more famously, Sartre.   
 The membership stricture against those in the French Foreign Ministry or in the 
occupation administration did not preclude politicians or the politically active from 
joining the Committee. The board included deputies and former deputies alike. Among 
them, André Philip also served as president of the Socialist Movement for the United 
States of Europe, whose platform included an insistence on German participation in a 
future Europe. Henri Frenay was a leader of the Union of European Federalists (as was 
Eugen Kogon, friend to both CFEAN and BILD). Members thus represented different 
strands of the European movement, just as they represented competing political parties. 
 Committee members’ political activism (often coupled to only fleeting political 
success) lay bare their desire to shape postwar France. Barthélémy Ott had served as a 
deputy (MRP) in the provisional government, but lost his seat in 1948. Pascal Copeau, 
Secretary General of the Movement of National Liberation, had sat on the provisional 
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Consultative Assembly, then the first and second Constituent Assemblies, representing a 
Resistance platform. Bourdet served as vice president of the provisional Consultative 
Assembly.  Géraud Jouve, in turn, represented the socialists in the National Assembly. 
Frenay had helped found the Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance; Rousset 
and Sartre had allied in their short-lived leftist (and anti-Stalinist) political movement, the 
Rassemblement démocratique révolutionnaire (1947-1949). David Rousset later emerged 
as a vocal activist, not in a political party per se, but as a denouncer of Stalinist atrocities.  
On a superficial level, it may have looked like, as one French occupation 
administrator later explained, “it was the people who suffered at the hand of Germany, 
who were the first to say we must open the doors to young Germans.”898 But the attitudes 
of those early postwar activists were far more complex and varied than such a supposition 
allows. Claude Bourdet (1909-1996), who sat on the board of the Comité and had 
survived both Oranienburg and Buchenwald, may have initially embraced cooperation, 
but at heart held a less than forgiving attitude toward Germany. Upon signature of the 
1955 Bonn accords, Bourdet returned his Resistance ribbon and his Croix de Guerre to 
the French government as a protest against German rearmament; he remained, however, 
on the Comité. From the start, Vercors did not think the path to cooperation would be 
easy. At a speech at the French unveiling of the University of Mainz in 1948, Vercors 
declared he would not “‘suggest falsely that former enemies can now simply 
embrace.’”899 And Germanist Edmond Vermeil, a member of the Mayrisch Komitee, a 
contributor to the Revue d’Allemagne, and then after the war, a member of CFEAN, 
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remained ever wary of Germans. Indeed, it was he who helped draft French re-education 
policy in the occupied zone. For Vermeil, some Germans could never be unschooled in 
the ways of Nazism, and even for those young enough to be remolded successfully, it 
would be a long road because “one does not throw off Nazism like a garment that has 
gone out of style.”900 
The diversity of members’ backgrounds—whether religious, political, or 
occupational—extended not only to their experiences with Germany but also to their 
outlook on that nation. Even as they worked to enlighten the French public about 
Germany, some CFEAN activists resorted to stereotypes and inveterate fears. Some, like 
Barthélémy Ott, firmly believed in Germany’s ability to revert to old ways, and for that 
reason, expressed the wish for a long occupation both “in Germany’s own interests and to 
preserve it, as it were, from itself, from the eternal temptations that whisper to it of an old 
secular dream that already drove it twice to the edge of the abyss.”901 In his brief stint as 
Secretary General, Élie Gabey proved skeptical of German ambitions. While 
acknowledging the vast majority of Germans opposed remilitarization in the framework 
of a united Europe, Gabey nonetheless put emphasis on former SS and Wehrmacht 
officers who wanted to resurrect the German military under German command.902 And 
Vermeil, even as late as 1954, was recommending “a certain vigilance” to ensure that 
Germans’ “spirit of domination” did not again rear its ugly head.903  
                                                          
900As quoted in Willis, The French in Germany, 163. 
 
901Barthélémy Ott, “Des malentendus à dissiper,” Allemagne, no. 2 (June/Aug. 1949): 8. 
 
902Élie Gabey, “A propos de la rémilitarisation,” Allemagne, no. 10 (Dec. 1950/Jan. 1951): 1-2. 
 
903Comité de Liaison de la Résistance, L’Accord Culturel franco-allemand du 23 octobre 1954 (Paris: 
Publications de Documentation de la Résistance, 1955), 5. 
 412 
 Not everyone agreed to join forces with the Committee, and some members chose 
to leave. Initially—having survived camp life and having immediate family who had 
not—Rémy Roure found the proposal for the Comité horrifying. When he heard of 
Mounier’s stewardship, however, Roure not only signed on, but agreed to serve as a co-
president.904 According to Secretary General Alfred Grosser, Nobel Prize laureate Roger 
Martin du Gard, famed for his cycle of World War I novels, was the only candidate to 
refuse membership. Martin du Gard excused himself with the simple statement: “I hated 
them too much.”905 Those who left—most notably Merleau-Ponty, Vercors, and David 
Rousset—had become too engrossed in other outlets of political and intellectual 
engagement to keep on with the Comité; their departures were amicable.906  
In light of the presence of several of his Germanist colleagues on the board of the 
Comité, Maurice Boucher’s absence stands out as surprising. It is not entirely clear why 
Boucher did not join his fellow Revue d’Allemagne alumni at the Comité. Boucher still 
traveled to Germany regularly to give talks, including at the Deutsch-Französisches 
Institut in Ludwigsburg, a frequent partner of CFEAN; indeed, Boucher’s name appeared 
more than any other on a list of French professors’ postwar voyages to Germany and 
Austria.907 Likewise, Boucher participated in French-German encounters, such as the 
1953 Franco-German Young Writers’ Meeting in Paris, sponsored by, among others, 
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BILD and CFEAN.908 Boucher was associated with BILD and had even passed the role 
of Franco-German activist down to his son André, who as a delegate of the French High 
Commission, for example, organized a 1951 trip to France for 30 German youths.909 We 
can only speculate that Boucher père, compromised by his contributions to Franco-
German organizations during the occupation years, was not welcome within a group 
insistent on distancing itself from cooperation reminiscent of collaboration. 
Some of the most famous CFEAN members showed minimal involvement in its 
day-to-day affairs; their prime utility lay in their names. Just as the Mayrisch Komitee 
hinged upon the tireless efforts of its secretariat in the shape of Pierre Viénot and to a 
lesser extent Gustav Krukenberg (and their eventual replacements Max Clauss and Régis 
de Vibraye)—so, too, did CFEAN rely upon an unknown, Alfred Grosser, to undertake 
virtually all of its heavy lifting. Grosser served at once as the Comité’s architect, 
standard-bearer, head writer, editor, grant writer, and secretary; officially, he worked as 
Secretary General of the Comité and director of its bulletin. What Grosser could not 
accomplish, his mother often did in a largely unofficial capacity. In 1950, after Mounier’s 
sudden death from heart failure at age 45, Grosser became recognized as the core of the 
entire enterprise. But unlike the Mayrisch Komitee after the death of Emil Mayrisch, 
CFEAN did not experience turbulence with its founder’s death. Though his spirit 
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continued to guide the group, Mounier had by no means been its driving force.910 That 
label belonged to Grosser. 
Born in Frankfurt in 1925 to a family of non-practicing Jews, Alfred Grosser left 
his homeland at a young age. The Grossers fled Germany in 1933 when Grosser’s father 
Paul faced a double rejection, first when he was deemed no longer eligible to practice 
medicine at his hospital, and second, when he was shunned by his veterans’ association. 
Thanks to his years at the Lycée Français de Berlin, Paul Grosser spoke fluent French; 
accordingly, he brought his family to the outskirts of Paris, where he set up a children’s 
sanatorium in Saint Germain-en-Laye. Paul Grosser died shortly after their arrival, but 
according to Alfred Grosser, his father’s death likely aided his own assimilation process. 
Alfred accelerated rapidly in French schools, became active with a Protestant scouting 
group, and quickly began to perceive himself as French. In the fall of 1937, along with 
his mother and older sister, Alfred Grosser became a French citizen.  
Throughout the war, Grosser managed to slip through the cracks. During the 
exodus from Paris, Grosser fled to southern France, where he resumed his studies in 
relative calm. After passing his baccalauréat, he briefly served as a math teacher in Saint 
Raphaël. Because, as a Jew, he was rejected from Marseilles’ Faculté des Sciences, 
Grosser gave up his plan to study electricity in favor of German studies and literature. 
Grosser took courses at Aix and Nice and received a certificat in both literature and 
philology, but was then compelled to adopt a false identity. The non-believer took cover 
among a community of Marxist priests, who insisted upon his baptism. At their school in 
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Marseilles, the Catholic convert then taught a wide array of subjects (with the exception 
of German) through the end of the war. Grosser received a commendation for his 
participation in the Resistance, but his involvement was limited—as he duly (and 
embarrassedly) acknowledges—to helping clear bodies from the wreckage of bombarded 
Marseilles. Indeed, he neither participated in the Resistance nor the armed forces. As part 
of the “forgotten class” of 1945, Grosser was never conscripted. A bicycle accident put 
an end to his passing thoughts of enlisting at the end of the war.  
Instead, Grosser resumed his studies and became a military censor in Marseilles. 
He then began to work as a journalist, and wrote for a number of papers, including the 
Wochen-Kurier, the French Ministry of War’s journal for German POWs. On behalf of 
this paper (and by extension the French government), Grosser returned to Germany for 
the first time in August 1947 for a six-week tour. There, he traveled throughout the three 
Western zones and interviewed as many people as he could, from mayors to expellees. 
Upon his return to France, Grosser met with an editor of the celebrated Resistance journal 
Combat to propose a series on German youth. The articles that resulted brought Grosser 
to the attention of two future leaders of the Comité: Emmanuel Mounier and Henri 
Brunschwig, who asked Grosser to give broadcasts for Radiodiffusion française in 
Germany on Südwestfunk.  
When Grosser joined the Comité as its Secretary General and director of its 
bulletin, he was working on his thesis under fellow Comité member Edmond Vermeil.911  
Although Grosser never completed his thesis on the pietist Philipp Jakob Spener (a topic 
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suggested by Vermeil, but of limited interest to Grosser), he continued to publish on other 
themes, beginning with a scholarly article on Goethe. But above all, Grosser would 
become known as a specialist on contemporary Germany. In January 1953, Grosser’s first 
book, the well-known L’Allemagne de l’occident, 1945-1952, appeared, while he still sat 
at the helm of CFEAN.912 In the meantime, he was teaching German at the Sorbonne. He 
would continue his teaching career at several schools and serve as a commentator for a 
number of French newspapers as well as for both French and German television and 
radio.913  
If Grosser recognized his privileged position as bilingual and well-versed in two 
cultures, he attributed his abilities to his education in France rather than to his émigré 
background. Indeed, Grosser so wholly insisted upon his Frenchness that he did not 
acknowledge his special status as émigré, as both French and German.914 He has since 
maintained that his 1947 trip throughout Germany only served to reconfirm his sense of 
Frenchness. But as a German exile in France, Grosser still straddled the two sides. 
Grosser did not leave his Germanness behind, but always mediated between the two. On 
a personal level, his German past and French present were in constant dialogue, and, on a 
much broader level, he conducted a more important conversation between postwar 
Germany and postwar France.   
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913Biographical information from Grosser, Vie de Français; Noël Copin, Noël Copin interroge Alfred 
Grosser. La passion de comprendre (Paris: Le Centurion, 1977); Emmanuelle Picard, “Médiation franco-
allemande ou intégration réussie? Le cas de Joseph Rovan et d’Alfred Grosser,” Cahiers d’études 
germaniques, no. 43 (2002): 65-73. 
 
914Emmanuelle Picard has argued that Grosser, like Joseph Rovan, only returned to a “dual identity” as both 
French and German in the 1970s as a way of reinforcing his increasingly public role as “mediator” between 
the two societies. Picard, “Médiation,” 71-72. 
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Although Grosser felt French, others did not always see him in that light. Grosser 
purports to have passed as French to the French and German to the Germans. On 
occasion, French interlocutors asked him whether he was Alsatian. The feat of passing as 
a native allowed Grosser to appear as “one of us” to whomever he was speaking.915 His 
statements, at least spoken word, would not have seemed warped by foreign bias, and his 
opinions would be taken more seriously in both nations. Yet, at the same time, it risked 
looking like betrayal to straddle both worlds, if assumed to belong only to one. Grosser 
did not claim a false identity (except briefly during the war), but he does not seem to have 
gone out of his way to correct mistaken impressions. The risk, of course, was far greater 
that he appear German. Grosser has expressed his belief that had a German accent been 
detectable, it would have compromised the entire venture; as a German, he could have 
been seen as an infiltrator. As a Frenchmen, however, he had more breathing space in 
French circles, and Germans were simply grateful that he was working on their behalf.916   
  Grosser, in some ways, had come as close as possible to Pierre Viénot’s dictum of 
“leaving the self.” This path was most evident in his status as émigré and sometime-
chameleon, but it also emerged as Grosser’s signature technique in working for 
cooperation. Frequently and most memorably, Grosser’s style of arbitration approximated 
that of the agent provocateur. Rather than look to complementarity or trying to find some 
common ground between the two peoples, Grosser instead sought to challenge each 
side’s preliminary point-of-view. In debates and articles, Grosser encouraged his French 
or German audience, not to transform the other nation, but to refine its own stance toward 
                                                          
915Copin, 20. Yet Grosser failed the written section of the German concours to get into the École Normale.  
 
916This analysis draws on Grosser’s telling of his own story; see Grosser, Vie de Français; Copin, 20-21; 
Picard, “Médiation,” 65-73. 
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that nation. To a group of Germans, for example, he stressed German deficiencies, rather 
than discussing the shortcomings of the French administration that his audience wanted to 
hear. Conversely, before the French, Grosser invoked, not German crimes of the past, but 
French errors of the present. In this way, Grosser—and the Comité more broadly—
confronted both the German and French publics with uncomfortable truths.    
Behind the scenes, Grosser’s mother was the only Comité associate to pull down a 
full-time salary. As secretary, Lily Grosser has generally gone unnoticed by scholars. Yet 
not only did she conduct much of the Comité’s correspondence (sometimes smoothing 
out feathers her son had ruffled), she also could be seen as the only German at the heart 
of the Comité operation. Unlike her son, who had arrived in France at age eight, and who 
considered himself French not long thereafter, Lily Grosser had immigrated at age 39 
with “limited” French language skills and did not go through the assimilating experience 
of school. Before serving as secretary to the Committee (as well as personal secretary to 
her son, by typing his manuscripts), Lily Grosser had managed a small children’s home 
upon her husband’s death, and during the war, worked in a number of offices. Her work 
at the Comité, though “modest,” without question allowed the Comité to survive on such 
a small budget and with such an outspoken Secretary General as her son.917 
If the purely male composition of the Comité board reflected a certain idea of the 
Resistance, it also revealed a rather old-fashioned notion of political activism.918 Women 
                                                          
917On Lily Grosser, see Alfred Grosser, Vie de Français, 19, 33, 57-58; Copin; and Paul Frank, “Die 
höchste Form der Hoffnung: Verfolgt, gejagt, aber unbeirrt im Glauben an die Aussöhnung” Die Zeit, no. 
43 (29 Oct. 1968): 4. According to Frank’s obituary, Lily assembled and managed CFEAN’s large file 
cabinet of contacts. In addition, Lily’s hand is evident throughout the CFEAN files at the AOFAA. In his 
memoirs, Alfred Grosser states his mother only earned a part-time salary, but budget records indicate 
otherwise. 
 
918This appears especially retrograde in light of French women’s recent (and long overdue) acquisition of 
the right to vote and appearance on the ballot. The Constituent Assembly, for example, saw 33 women 
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had played a major role in the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft twenty years earlier, 
and women had regularly figured among the crowd at events hosted by the second 
incarnation of the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft and its twin, the Comité France-
Allemagne in the second half of the 1930s as well as those held by the Groupe 
Collaboration. Not surprisingly, women had most often been active in the movement for 
cooperation as it related to education and student exchange or as it took the form of high 
society functions (except when explicitly excluded as with many Mayrisch Komitee 
events). Perhaps the Comité’s dismissal of functions perceived as frivolous or elitist kept 
them from including women (or kept women away). But the Comité was well aware of 
the potential of women as well as of the interest of many in French-German relations: 
several women served in prominent positions in the French occupation administration of 
Germany, including Geneviève Carrez, who as the head of the “International Encounters” 
division of the Cultural Bureau, controlled the levers on French government funding to 
the Comité. What is more, the Comité made the effort to organize talks about women in 
contemporary Germany.  
Aside from the board, which included over the years a total of 37 people, 28 of 
whom served more than two years,919 it is not possible to determine much in the way of 
specifics about CFEAN’s broader membership. In contrast to the records of several other 
organizations under review, no membership lists to CFEAN have been located. Budget 
records from the early-mid 1950s report 1,800 “active members” as well as between 
1,000 and 1,200 student members. These 3,000 or so French members enjoyed free 
                                                                                                                                                                             
elected in October 1945. See Hilary Footitt, “The First Women Députés: ‘Les 33 glorieuses’?” in The 
Liberation of France: Image and Event, ed. H.R. Kedward and Nancy Wood (Oxford: Berg, 1995), 132. 
On the “cult of virility” in the Resistance, see Julian Jackson, 507-508. For the postwar minimization of 
women’s roles in the Resistance, see Kedward, France and the French, 315-316. 
 
919Indeed, many stayed on through the end. Albrecht, 180. 
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admission to all CFEAN events and an annual subscription to Allemagne, the CFEAN 
bulletin. In addition to these French members, budgets indicate 1,000 to 1,250 foreign 
(i.e. German) “corresponding members,” who received the bulletin but were not 
considered full members. Finally, there were at most 300 “benefactors” of unspecified 
nationality, who contributed at least 1,000 francs annually to the organization.920 
Membership numbers probably remained relatively stable in light of the steady print run 
of the bulletin. If anything, the Comité witnessed some growth since the French 
administration noted with approval that CFEAN’s membership and income were on the 
rise.921   
 
Coopération à la Résistance  
 
Notwithstanding the predominance of résistants in the Comité, it sometimes 
proved a challenge to differentiate its vision of cooperation clearly from the collaboration 
of just a few years before. Slippery rhetoric did not help matters. Moreover, the 
Committee did not settle on a unified, concrete definition of the cooperation it sought. On 
occasion, it resorted to negative definitions—finger-pointing at past and present instances 
of objectionable cooperation. This could serve to reinforce the notion that working with 
Germans was to be condemned. But, of course, the Comité had taken a different lesson 
                                                          
920For membership statistics, see the following ledgers and budget reports: AOFAA AC 237. Alfred 
Grosser, Projet de Budget pour 1953 (1 May 1953); AOFAA AC 380/7 Alfred Grosser, Projet de Budget 
pour 1954 (13 Feb. 1954). The 1954 budget records reveal some inconsistencies from page to page in terms 
of expenses as well as income from both benefactors and associated members. The most significant 
discrepancy relates to the amount of subscription money flowing in from German corresponding 
members—400,000 versus 500,000 francs, hence the difference between 1,000 German readers and 1,250. 
 
921AOFAA AC 159/35 No. 1608 HC/DC/RI. Carrez to Chef des Services Administratifs de la DGAC (25 
March 1954).  
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from Vichy. Rather than turn away in disgust from all Germans, members sought to 
reclaim French-German cooperation from the collaborationists. 
Though the act of collaboration with the Germans was still roundly condemned, 
(and, in fact, even CFEAN had to ward off criticism from those who believed the group 
to be unpatriotically collaborating with the enemy) the word collaboration did not (yet) 
carry a sting. Surprisingly, the term collaboration had not fallen out of use in France after 
the war. In 1948, for example, Vercors lectured at an international youth conference 
about the promise of future collaboration with the French should the Germans show signs 
of reform. He argued, “if Germany turns over a new leaf and shows its intentions for a 
loyal collaboration, it could find itself on France’s side.”922 The Comité’s René Lauret 
invoked the term collaboration to praise the second annual meeting of French and 
German mayors in Switzerland in 1949, an early opportunity for municipal leaders from 
the two nations to interact.923 Lauret’s positive use of the word “collaboration” between 
the French and Germans appeared in the bulletin directly above the usual box that listed 
membership fees, the organization’s leaders, and the fact that these leaders had not been 
condemned for “acts of collaboration with the enemy.”   
Such unexpected juxtapositions reveal that the vocabulary of cooperation was as 
inconsistent and interchangeable as ever. A representative of the city of Paris expressed 
concern at a 1950 meeting of French and German mayors that, “One cannot suddenly 
present the French people with the fact of a close collaboration with Germany.” 
Montbéliard mayor Lucien Tharradin responded, “But who dares still deny the necessity 
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923René Lauret, “Rencontre en Suisse de maires allemands et français,” Allemagne, no. 2 (June/Aug. 1949): 
3. 
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for rapprochement? . . . In the darkness of the current hour, we must seek a common path 
of mutual comprehension.”924 Here, collaboration and rapprochement became exact 
synonyms, and even mutual comprehension seemed no different; Tharradin’s argument 
depended not on these interchangeable nouns, but the verbs and adverbs—the difference 
between seeking and suddenly placing the French before a fact. The French needed to 
move gingerly in order to overturn the general opposition to cooperation. The problem 
was not so much the goal, but how hastily to pursue it.  
The Comité’s task proved challenging because of the dubious involvement in 
postwar Franco-German societies by former Nazis and Nazi sympathizers; to be sure, this 
development helps explain the Committee’s exclusionary terms for membership.925 The 
head of the Propaganda Staffel in Lille—then forbidden from entering France—quietly 
slipped into the role of Secretary General of Hamburg’s Gesellschaft Cluny der Freunde 
deutsch-französischer Geistesbeziehungen after the war.926 Similarly, a former editor of 
the occupation-era Pariser Zeitung served as co-president of the Deutsch-Französische 
Gesellschaft in Steglitz.927 More notorious incidents drew the Committee’s ire. CFEAN 
excoriated a Maison de France event to launch a new French perfume because the 
                                                          
924Lucien Tharradin, “Rencontres de maires français et allemands à Stuttgart,” Allemagne, no. 8 (Aug./Sept. 
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925Indeed, a similar problem plagued the French occupation administration itself. Representatives of the 
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926The Cluny Society nonetheless was generally assessed quite positively. AOFAA AC 343/2b. Rapport sur 
la Cluny Gesellschaft—Société franco-allemande de Hambourg (24 March 1953).  
 
927AOFAA AC 343/2a 342 MC-HG/HM, Henri Grange to M. Pechoux (3 March 1952).  
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company’s publicity chief in Germany made an appearance: former deputy to Goebbels, 
Hans Fritzsche, fresh from Nuremberg. While Allemagne duly acknowledged the 
importance of “Rouge-Baiser” for “French radiance” abroad, the journal denounced 
Fritzsche’s involvement that “legitimately scandalizes those German and French people 
who conceived of contacts between the two cultures in another perspective!”928 
Allemagne likewise issued a sharp condemnation of talks in Stuttgart and Düsseldorf by 
collaborationists Maurice Bardèche and Alfred Fabre-Luce; its critique extended to the 
occupation authorities who let the offending intellectuals into Germany to unleash their 
self-serving propaganda. Collaboration and its attendant idea of Europe, Allemagne 
stressed, “had nothing in common with the democratic Europe that Western nations are 
trying to achieve today in the face of another totalitarian menace.” The editors explained, 
“It still seems to us that the mission of the Allies in their zones of occupation in Germany 
is not to resurrect Nazism, even as a form of apologism for collaboration in France (. . . .) 
Former collaborators with Hitler’s Germany should not be ‘articles for export.’”929 Here, 
the legacy of back-to-back occupations became apparent as an obstacle to reconciliation. 
Despite repeated efforts to distance itself from Nazi influence, CFEAN was not 
immune to similarly articulated—if more specious—attack from the French. Not 
surprisingly, cooperation efforts writ large were rendered suspect by some French 
nationalists. The moderately right-wing L’Époque accused CFEAN of forming “cabals” 
among what it dubbed “new collaborators.” It argued, “The Committee is in favor of 
exchanges, in favor of love—and having hanged the fathers at Nuremberg, it invites the 
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929Le Comité Français d’Échanges avec l’Allemagne Nouvelle, “Un scandale,” Allemagne, no. 10  
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sons for friendly chats.” L’Époque proceeded to tie the spirit of CFEAN to that of the 
infamous Nazi-era Comité France-Allemagne.930 Cooperation with Germany after the 
war was thus tantamount to collaboration with Nazi Germany; Germany was always, in 
this logic, the “bad Germany” of militarism and nationalism.931 At the same time, this 
article pointed out the hypocrisies and “short memory” among CFEAN members who at 
once condemned the collaborators of old and yet were falling into a similar pattern. They 
had, according to the article, “taken the first step from rue Jacob,” site of their office, to 
Fresnes, the military prison that housed collaborators. This rather confused argument 
pitted the traditional “eternal Germany” thesis against the more hopeful wishes of 
CFEAN to find a better future in cooperation. 
In the face of such critiques, the Comité struggled to justify its stance on 
cooperation; it was compelled to disentangle the notion of cooperation from that of 
collaboration. To do so, it stressed the idea of working with and toward a “new 
Germany.” The “new Germany” the Committee referred to had much in common with 
the 19th century notion of the “good Germany,” yet it also sounded a strikingly modern 
note. Indeed, CFEAN’s “new Germany” was expressly conceived as a force to combat 
postwar enemies. The Committee statutes explained that it aimed “to support Germans 
disposed to participate in a work of reconstruction in the international community in their 
battle against residual and renascent elements of Nazism.”932 Rather than focusing on 
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“Attaques et mises au point. Le Comité au pilori,” Allemagne, no. 2 (June/Aug.1949): 6; Verdurin, “Plus 
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reconciliation, the Comité focused on constructing Germans anew and “fight[ing] the 
return of demons.”933  
Neither synonymous with the German Democratic Republic nor the Federal 
Republic, CFEAN’s “new Germany” represented an ideal. Even more than a decade after 
the war, the Comité maintained that the “new Germany” and the Germany of old still 
“cohabit and fight each other” as evidenced by the return of former Nazis to prominent 
positions in the Federal Republic.934 The Comité, like the French press more broadly, 
observed alarming instances of militarism, nationalism, and frustration in the Federal 
Republic. But in pointed contrast to the French press as a whole, the Comité considered it 
a duty to take note of the strides taken by the so-called new Germany, from efforts 
toward democratization to the multiplication of contacts with the French.  
Even some who wanted to work with the new Germany still harbored reservations 
about the Comité. CFEAN had to defend itself from those who saw it as “politically 
obsolete” in the wake of European initiatives such as the Schuman Plan. Surprisingly, the 
Comité agreed with the overall assessment that “everyone is for exchanges with Germany 
today,” a statement that flew in the face of BILD’s struggles as well as the Comité’s own 
political and financial problems. Perhaps this argument aimed to call attention away from 
the still controversial aspects of its agenda. But this does not explain why the Comité 
proceeded to mount such an awkward, counterintuitive self-defense. Rather than stressing 
the need to counterbalance political and economic efforts with social and cultural 
projects, much less underscoring the ways in which specifically Franco-German ventures 
could strengthen European ties, the Comité depicted itself as policers of cooperation. Its 
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934Alfred Grosser, “Contrastes,” Allemagne, no. 41 (Feb./March 1956): 1.  
 426 
task involved swimming “against the current that wants exchanges with no matter which 
Germany.” The Comité intended to enforce clear rules about what constituted proper 
company for the French. According to this logic, exchange was not an inherent good, and 
the risk of underwriting resurgent or neo-Nazis ran high.  The Comité therefore promoted 
its ability to keep exchanges in check, not its ability to multiply or enhance such 
efforts.935 
This was only one of the ways in which CFEAN differentiated its understanding 
of cooperation from that of its ally BILD.936 Although the Committee board included a 
number of Christian Democrats and three theologians, the group steered clear of a 
Christian vision of cooperation. References to Western Christendom, Christian 
fellowship, or Christian values, common to BILD, were absent. Instead, when deploying 
a moral vocabulary, Committee members stuck to the language of secular humanism. 
Certainly, both groups saw the need for a return to older values systems after these had 
been eroded by National Socialism (and after the total discrediting of Nazi ideals). 
Aligned by general principles—above all the dignity of the individual and an 
overriding sense of humanity—but divided by specifics, Committee members presented a 
nebulous notion of cooperation. Like the Weimar-era Revue d’Allemagne and Deutsch-
Französische Rundschau, and to a much lesser extent, the Mayrisch Komité, CFEAN’s 
diverse composition and divergent perspectives could cross party lines to appeal to a 
broad base. Yet, this devotion to the appearance of balance left it to readers to determine 
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what was best for the future of Europe. It also meant that the bulletin, and the Comité 
alongside it, did not offer a united front; there was balance but not resolution. 
 
 
A new Germany and a new France? 
 
 The Committee modeled the content of a reasoned Franco-German dialogue, but 
not the form; it did not rely upon a collaborative framework. A major tension lay in the 
fact that the Comité’s French leaders in some ways aped the French occupier in their 
insistence on keeping Germans in a secondary role within the organization. Although the 
Comité worked together with German organizations, above all the Deutsch-Französisches 
Institut in Ludwigsburg, the group did not consider Germans as part of its community; 
they could neither run the organization nor join as ordinary members. Instead, its 
members advocated for Germany, and incorporated German voices into its broader 
message. Germans could participate in CFEAN-sponsored activities and exchanges; they 
could subscribe to its bulletin; they could even give talks and lectures at CFEAN events. 
In the meantime, Germans affiliated with CFEAN like Eugen Kogon publicly lambasted 
the Allied occupiers for their heavy-handed policies and their refusal to grant Germans a 
role in denazification efforts.937  
Although Comité members—and above all Grosser—swore they rejected the 
paternalist dynamic between France and Germany embodied in the relationship between 
occupier and occupied, it is hard not to see some resemblance. Of course the idea that 
certain Frenchmen could steer Germans to a better future was elitist and more than a little 
reminiscent of the occupation itself. Grosser himself was only too aware of the 
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chauvinism of traditional French cultural politics epitomized by the government-run 
institutes that spread the glories of French culture and language throughout the world. In 
fact, the paternalist role of the French in the Comité reflected a certain dirigiste 
managerial style on the part of its members in the realm of culture. These men of 
impeccable repute would steer the German sheep and even the German wolves toward 
the ideal they themselves had modeled. The experts would intervene and plan on behalf 
of (rather than in tandem with) the Germans. In broad strokes, this approach reflected the 
philosophy behind the short-lived Resistance Party (Union Démocratique et Socialiste de 
la Résistance): to shepherd the masses toward a new order. 
But the Comité could point to three ways in which it differed from the 
government’s unilateral cultural politics. First, the initiative for the Comité came from 
below. Second, CFEAN stressed exchanges (as evident in its name, the French 
Committee for Exchanges with the New Germany). This emphasis reflected members’ 
beliefs that the Comité, unlike the occupation administration, distanced itself from the 
mentality of victors and the belief in the primacy of reeducation; instead, they purported 
to consider Germans as equals.938 Finally, unlike the Allied occupiers, who tended to 
import new morals from the outside rather than cultivating German morals from within, 
the Comité sought to identify, then champion promising figures and trends among the 
Germans themselves. French members were “to help the newest, the most valuable 
elements in the state of fermentation in which Germany found itself.”939  
More convincingly, a set of implicit strategies differentiated CFEAN from official 
efforts and more compellingly addressed the tensions at its heart. Excluding collaborators 
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 429 
as well as France’s agents and spokesmen abroad meant that the Comité was neither 
complicit with French crimes of the past nor French diplomacy of the present; it therefore 
exercised the freedom to judge both. Not only did the Comité reject the Nazi model of 
cooperation out-of-hand, but it also dismissed the French occupation administration’s 
efforts as insufficient. This critique was indicative of a broader agenda: as it guided the 
Germans, the Comité also wanted to steer the French toward renewal. Grosser explained, 
“Our Franco-German action is inseparable from our battle to make reason, law and 
respect for liberties triumph in France.”940 If CFEAN sought a new Germany, it also (less 
overtly) sought a new France. 
When discussing Germany, Comité members often turned the tables and 
summoned France to account as well. An Allemagne editorial decried the French public’s 
“systematic anti-Germanism that could only be a new form of racism” as well as the 
“attitudes and arguments inspired by a chauvinism analogous to that for which we could 
reproach the Germans.”941 In similar fashion, Rémy Roure asked the French, searching in 
vain for the new Germany, to turn inward and examine their own nation:  
These old demons of Hitlerism, as we well know, have not been exorcised 
everywhere, and we are aware that the battle continues. These old demons, 
are they not [sic] all over the place on our side? Don’t the neo-Nazis from 
across the Rhine find obliging auxiliaries, accomplices even in our 
country? The battle also continues at home . . . 942 
  
The Comité even regularly took the trouble to fault the French for their relative 
disinterest in establishing contacts with Germans and for the characteristic imbalance in 
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942Rémy Roure, “Fidelité à Mounier,” Allemagne, no. 24 (April/May 1953): 1. 
 430 
requests for exchanges. In such cases, the Germans showed themselves more open to 
reshaping French-German relations than did the French. 
Grosser and others on his team purposefully confronted each side, trying to make 
each side see the error of its ways. Rather than pinpoint common ground or explore the 
complementary aspects of Frenchness and Germanness as had many predecessors, the 
Comité mediated between the two peoples in a new, aggressive manner. Postwar renewal, 
then, was not to be marked by advising or reforming those across the border, so much as 
by self-improvement. For example, when the French public became outraged at a number 
of articles on the massacres at Oradour that surfaced in the German press, Jean 
Schlumberger tried to turn the criticism in the other direction. Whereas these offensive 
articles had appeared in a local rag (actually, cabbage leaves) with no national presence, 
Schlumberger argued, the French press as a whole was negligent for failing to report on 
current problems in Germany, often attributable to the French themselves.943 
Although the Committee urged the French and Germans to work toward renewal 
and to stand on equal footing, its process of French-German cooperation was still driven 
by the French, not the French and Germans side-by-side, much less the Germans 
themselves. Crucially, this structural imbalance was set in place just before the possibility 
for truly reciprocal relations at the state level opened up with the foundation of the 
Federal Republic in 1949. The Comité elected to uphold that older dynamic rather than 
practicing parity avant la lettre, and it would remain a French venture until the 
organization folded almost two decades later. Although the Committee amended its 
membership restrictions for the French relatively early, its strictures against German 
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membership stayed in place. The condition barring those French who had been 
condemned for collaboration, however, quietly passed in October/November 1950 at the 
beginning of the debates over amnesty in the French Chamber of Deputies and a couple 
of months before the passing of France’s first amnesty law.944 The Comité, in theory, was 
more forgiving and more welcoming of French collaborators than of German resisters.   
The Comité’s perspective on German guilt—and therefore on the suitability of 
German participation in the French-German community—was more complex than that of 
BILD, which adamantly opposed the concept of collective guilt. CFEAN’s exclusionary 
membership policies seemed to censure the German population as a whole, yet the 
Committee fought generalizations—including the concept of collective guilt—tooth and 
nail. Grosser explained that “the Germany with which we would like to work to prepare 
the building of an international community does not indiscriminately include all 
Germans: it would exclude those indisposed to erecting a new Germany.”945 In this sense, 
the Committee adopted the general perspective of the two Germanies: that there were 
“good Germans”—the Dichter und Denker—and “bad Germans,” a cliché in French 
thought since the nineteenth century.946 Grosser argued that most Germans had found 
themselves torn between the minority who actively supported Hitler and the minority 
who actively resisted him. He hoped to woo that uncertain majority.947 Emmanuel 
                                                          
944The German government similarly lifted some restrictions on former members of the Nazi Party in May 
1951; still, CFEAN did not open membership to Germans whatever their personal histories. On this change 
in the Federal Republic, see Alf Lüdtke, “‘Coming to Terms with the Past’: Illusions of Remembering, 
Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany,” The Journal of Modern History 65, no. 3 (Sept. 1993): 564.  
 
945Alfred Grosser, “À contre-courant,” Allemagne, no. 14-15 (Oct. 1951): 1. 
 
946Claude Digeon, La crise allemande de la pensée française (1870-1914). (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
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947Alfred Grosser, “À contre-courant,” Allemagne, no. 14-15 (Oct. 1951): 1. 
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Mounier, who corresponded with Karl Jaspers, negotiated this same tricky terrain by 
arguing that the phrase “German responsibilities” better suited the postwar situation than 
“German guilt.”948  Meanwhile, Eugen Kogon, the editor of the Frankfurter Hefte and 
friend to both CFEAN and BILD, explained to several hundred listeners at the Sorbonne 
as well as to Allemagne readers that he hoped to revise the two Germanies thesis such 
that it would refer to the conflicted moral compass within all Germans.949   
Although the Comité did not grant Germans an equal voice, it still presented 
advantages to Germans associated with the organization, as well as to Germans more 
generally. After defeat, openness to France and cooperation with the French served to 
distance Germans from the nationalism, now considered ignominious, prevalent during 
the Nazi years. In the early stages of the Cold War, moreover, the kinds of contacts 
promoted by CFEAN helped contribute to West Germans’ anchorage in the West.950  
The “new Germany” envisioned by the Committee was decidedly not a 
Communist Germany. At his first appearance for the Comité, Eugen Kogon told the 
Sorbonne audience that Germans had “no penchant for Communism,” whether in the 
West or the East.951 From that point onward, the Committee quietly avoided dealing with 
the Cold War, East Germany, or the Communist Party. It justified this evasion on two 
fronts directly linked to the group’s broader ethos. First, the Comité’s reluctance to 
generalize and moralize meant it would not condemn the GDR out-of-hand. “We no more 
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believe that all is bad in the East,” Grosser explained, “than we believe that everything is 
good in the West.”952 Second, CFEAN’s mission to enlighten its readers would founder 
with regard to the East because information would not be easily verifiable for good or for 
bad. Aside from occasional objections to the lack of openness and liberties in the GDR, 
the Comité tended to keep its eyes glued to the West.  
Although the Committee claimed to pursue a nonpartisan agenda, it included no 
Communists in its otherwise politically diverse ranks; moreover, its message spurned 
Communism. The absence of Communists was particularly glaring in light of the 
Committee’s makeup of resisters. Mounier, whose sympathies often aligned with the 
Communists in the early postwar years, had wanted the Communist résistant Robert 
Antelme to round out the board membership.953 Grosser has since sketched the outline of 
his own intervention. In the face of Communist insistence on two Communists as co-
presidents (out of five), Grosser called their bluff.954 Grosser, who frequently has made 
clear his scorn for those following (any) party line, does not seem to have tried hard to 
negotiate with the Communist Party spokesman, as Mounier charged him to do. Instead, 
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953Antelme, whose 1947 L’espèce humaine (The Human Species) drew from his own experiences at 
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954Grosser, Vie de Français, 52. The presence of two Communists at the helm would surely have changed 
the thrust of the Committee. A Communist co-President of CFEAN, for example, would have opposed 
CFEAN’s change of rules regarding French membership; French Communists rejected the notion of 
amnesty. See Rousso, Vichy Syndrome, 51. 
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the plan to include Communists languished. Marxists, fellow-travelers, and sympathizers 
like Sartre, David Rousset, or even Mounier himself apparently were a different matter. 
The Comité was, like most of its predecessors, nonpartisan but terribly politicized. 
Unlike many of its predecessors, however, the Comité did not attempt to couch its 
activism in apolitical terms: “As we conceive them, ‘cultural’ exchanges are not 
impartial. They are a political goal: the edification of an international community from 
where hatreds and national prejudices are excluded.”955 This, then, was one of the first 
times an organization geared toward French-German cooperation acknowledged, and 
even championed, its aspirations as political. Cooperation—even in the form of 
“‘cultural’ exchanges”—was not relegated to the realm of culture, where it seemed less 
threatening (though, as we have seen, not always benign). Instead, an international 
politics was welcomed. At last, in the wreckage of war, culture could be seen as a 
necessary part of international politics, as heralded by the new charter of the United 
Nations.956  
When, on occasion, the Comité claimed to steer clear of politics, it was 
disingenuous, at best a cover to maintain a semblance of neutrality, both national and 
party-based. After a brief, but firm critique of the French closure of the border between 
the Saar and the rest of Germany as well as of the French dismantling of German 
factories, for example, Grosser hemmed and hawed: “Let’s reiterate: we do not take a 
position on political questions. But we must say that the psychological consequences of 
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any act, word, or silence in the political domain risk rendering our efforts totally 
useless.”957 Declaring neutrality did not make it so.   
 
Allemagne, Critical Engagement, and the Administration 
 Alongside the more general (and more punitive) policies of denazification, 
demilitarization, decartellization, and reeducation pursued by the Allied occupiers, the 
French carried out a cultural policy in occupied Germany that relied upon a complex 
mixture of the traditional method of French cultural diplomacy via “rayonnement 
français” and a newer emphasis on exchanges and other activities that would help further 
Germany’s reintegration into the community of nations. In theory, Comité members as 
well as the French administration considered the CFEAN mission to be aligned with 
official efforts for exchanges, but in practice, the two parties often found themselves at 
odds. 
The Comité maintained a complicated relationship with both the French 
occupation administration and its successor, the French High Commission. Like BILD, 
the Committee retained a large degree of freedom from the occupation authorities yet 
received much of its funding from their Cultural Affairs Bureau. BILD, however, 
received about five times as much funding from the French occupation authorities as did 
the Comité.958 Moreover, CFEAN, headquartered in Paris, did not benefit so tangibly 
from the occupation as did BILD; it could not rely on a requisitioned premises or on 
bargain-basement German prices. The main advantage to a home in Paris was that 
CFEAN did not have to abide by the complex rules of living in an occupation zone.  
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CFEAN, however, constantly struggled to make ends meet. The recently 
established international organization Centre d’Échanges Internationaux lent a barebones 
office to the Committee, which it in turn could barely afford to heat. More generally, 
budget troubles led the Comité to cancel its short-lived weekly radio program on 
Südwestfunk and to call off numerous talks and conferences. Regular advertisements for 
donations in the bulletin attest to the fact that subscriptions (that is, membership fees) 
alone could not keep the Committee afloat. Members who neglected to pay their dues 
damaged the organization’s already small budget. At times, the Comité threatened those 
offenders, not with expulsion, but with the fact that their penny-pinching or carelessness 
placed the fate of the entire bulletin in jeopardy.  
The Committee’s journal Allemagne: Bulletin d’Information du Comité 
d’Échanges avec l’Allemagne Nouvelle, which aimed to inform the French public about 
the “new Germany,” adhered to a basic newspaper format but only appeared every other 
month.959 Allemagne not only covered topical affairs, but also publicized a range of 
Franco-German activities. With a print run of 5,000 copies, it attracted far more readers 
than did the Weimar-era Revue d’Allemagne or the Deutsch-Französische Rundschau.960 
Grosser termed the bulletin’s circulation figure a success at the outset but conceded that 
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its stubborn lack of growth represented a failure in the long-term.961 Nonetheless, it 
represented a more stable readership than its contemporary BILD’s Documents.  
With regard to Germany, Allemagne staked out a position somewhere between 
other largely independent journals like BILD’s Dokumente/Documents and French 
government-produced periodicals. Both Dokumente and Documents stood in stark 
contrast to their contemporaries because, in aiming for reconciliation, they tread carefully 
around the issue of Nazi atrocities. Publications with a German audience, including 
Dokumente, of course did not want to alienate potential readers by repeatedly calling 
attention to German crimes. But journals geared to a French audience were different. For 
that reason, Documents’ strategic avoidance of condemnation and its hesitancy to draw 
attention to the power disparity of the occupation stands out. In contrast, administration 
propaganda like the Revue d’Information des Troupes Françaises d’Occupation en 
Allemagne insisted it would “recall each month the evil done by Nazism and the atrocities 
committed by its leaders; our readers will see in these painful pages the reasons why we 
are not allowed to forget that we are in an occupied country.”962 CFEAN’s Allemagne 
bridged the difference: it consistently accentuated both the crimes of the past and the 
mistakes of the present without a sense of moral outrage or heavy-handed propaganda 
geared at those liable to succumb to sympathy for the Germans. 
Allemagne, partially subsidized by the administration itself, lay behind much of 
the friction between CFEAN and the administration. The first issue set a tone for 
struggle. Alfred Grosser, its editor, boldly asserted that there would be “an entire column 
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of the bulletin consecrate[d] to the errors and abuses of the French occupation in 
Germany.”963 Although this column never materialized, the bulletin—and Grosser in 
particular—kept a critical eye on the French cultural administration in Germany as well 
as on independent French cultural efforts in the French zone. In turn, those criticized 
found the bulletin “polemical.” Accusing CFEAN of “biting the hand that feeds it” with 
“acerbic” criticisms, some administrators in the Bureau of Cultural Affairs put enough 
pressure on Grosser that he momentarily caved; Grosser vowed not to publish any more 
“‘unfounded’ criticism” in the subsequent issue of the bulletin.964   
 Certainly, the Comité more often and more avidly criticized the occupation 
administration than did BILD; Dokumente and Documents generally retained a far more 
diplomatic, less fiery tone than did Allemagne. The bulletin displayed a refreshing 
candor, complete with pointed remarks against the occupation administration, desperate 
pleas for more donations, reports of awkward and even downright ugly encounters 
between German and French students, and despairing reports on contemporary arguments 
over the Saar, the European Defense Community, and the resurgence of German 
nationalism (in particular among veterans).  
Some contributors were quick to argue that the French—or the Allied occupiers 
more generally—had squandered their opportunity to reform Germany from within. If 
Joseph Rovan had emphasized the importance of France in shaping Germany’s future in 
his “Allemagne de nos mérites” series in Esprit, which began to appear even before the 
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onset of the occupation, André Philip made clear in the bulletin that such expectations 
had been dashed by the time the Comité began its work. In 1950, this former Minister of 
the Economy, current deputy of the Rhône, and sitting President of the Socialist 
Movement for the United States of Europe, lamented these lost opportunities, considering 
that “the German people awaited us with great hopes, truly as liberators rather than as 
victors, and at that moment everything was possible.”965 In another example, Eugen 
Kogon lashed out against the Allied occupation at a talk at the Sorbonne in May 1949 
(reprinted in the second issue of the bulletin); allied policies, he argued, were 
“condemned to failure beforehand.”966 
Such overt critiques did not go unnoticed in official circles, and Grosser in 
particular was blamed for his infelicities. Like Otto Grautoff in the 1930s, Grosser had a 
remarkable gift for rubbing the authorities the wrong way, even those who supported his 
cause more broadly.967 In part this was because Grosser tended to fashion the Comité as 
more committed to the new Germany than the Allied occupiers. In part, it was due to 
Grosser’s bluntness, both in person and in print. Grosser’s regular editorials in Allemagne 
were feisty and unpredictable; they injected the bulletin with a vitality often lacking in 
the serious, deliberate (and sometimes stodgy) analysis of its main articles.  
In fact, most issues were packed with detailed articles from a fairly technical 
discussion of occupation costs to be paid by the Federal Republic to a panorama of the 
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postwar German publishing industry.968 More importantly, the bulletin worked hard to 
present a diverse array of French and German opinion. In this sense, like the Deutsch-
Französische Rundschau and the Revue d’Allemagne, the bulletin operated as a highly 
democratic forum, which, like its contemporaries Dokumente and Documents, sought to 
reintroduce open discourse after years of steady propaganda. A front-page seven-part 
series on the Franco-German relationship, for example, covered a different party’s views 
from the perspective of one of its own representatives in each issue. An Allemagne article 
criticizing the occupation led board member Barthélémy Ott—who had regularly traveled 
to Germany on behalf of the National Assembly’s foreign affairs commission—to cry 
foul and offer up his own defense of it.969 This diversity of opinion was CFEAN’s point 
of pride, a “guarantee of its impartiality [and] the essential element for France’s and 
Germany’s rising confidence in it.”970 Reading Allemagne was a liberating experience, 
but, like those other journals, it offered no unified vision. With members’ political 
differences and without the occupation authorities as a clear foil, Allemagne did not point 
readers to a clear platform.   
The bulletin’s array of political opinion—with regard to the occupation 
administration, the Schuman Plan, the European Defense Community—was paralleled by 
its contributors’ varied assessments of the experience of French-German encounters. The 
voices of students, journalists, and laborers who partook in encounters (whether tied to 
CFEAN or not) and reported their experiences for the bulletin ranged broadly. If many 
                                                          
968
“Les frais d’occupation en Allemagne occidentale,” Allemagne, no. 8 (Aug./Sept. 1950): 8. This article 
was reprinted from Frankfurter Hefte; “L’édition en Allemagne,” Allemagne, no.11 (Feb./March 1951): 6. 
 
969C.f. “De la Zone à la Trizone,” Allemagne, no. 1 (April 1949); Barthélémy Ott, “Des malentendus à 
dissiper,” Allemagne, no. 2 (June/Aug. 1949): 6, 8. 
 
970Alfred Grosser, “Le Comité a-t-il encore un sens?” Allemagne, no. 17 (Feb./March 1952): 3. 
 441 
articles recorded participants discovering others to be “men like us with whom we could 
live in perfect community,” others reflected more equivocal, and even quite negative 
experiences abroad or at encounters. One student complained that a European youth 
conference in Fritzlar he attended had largely served as excuses for shallow high school 
students to enjoy a nice vacation and for Americans to propagandize against 
Communism. Contributors to the bulletin also showed how a careless word could sour the 
impressions of an entire group and reinforce precisely the ideas such efforts meant to 
combat. In one example, a seemingly innocent discussion about the Korean War turned 
into an uncomfortable reminiscence about hunting partisans in the Savoy.971 
 Its wide range of perspectives points to the fact that the Comité enjoyed a more 
ambivalent relationship with the French administration than that evidenced by their 
periodic squabbles. One of the organization’s first public acts was to side with the leading 
newspaper of the French zone, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, and denounce as a “stupidity” a 
recent clarification of French policy. The occupation administration had announced that 
the death penalty could not be applied to those under age thirteen; the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung and CFEAN, hardly six weeks old, were incensed at the administration’s 
heartlessness. Still, the Comité refused to let the Süddeutsche Zeitung off the hook for its 
polemical and ill-informed assault on the French administration.972 Even as it censured 
the occupation authorities, it defended them from the German paper’s faulty reporting.  
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CFEAN, moreover, took care to offer praise where it was due. From the start, the 
Comité publicly recognized the achievements of the occupation administration in the 
cultural realm. Its criticisms lay, not in the effectiveness of its services, but on the limits 
of budget and personnel—along with the resistance from the other occupiers to allow 
French programs in their zones—that prevented the mushrooming of exchanges and 
cross-border contacts. Mounier himself had signaled his appreciation for the work of the 
cultural administration in the realm of youth exchanges. In Le Monde, he at once praised 
these efforts and slammed the broader allocation of resources within the occupation 
administration: “if I were God in the office of German affairs, I would let go many 
gendarmes and would liberally give power to our office for youth and sports that has 
already achieved the most admirable—and the most modest—work of the occupation.”973 
More generally, Allemagne ceded prime place to the promotion of administration-
sponsored programs. 
CFEAN’s measured critique of the French administration only occasionally 
shifted into high gear. When push came to shove, the Comité did not hold back its 
contempt for policies it viewed as careless or retrograde. If, early on, the Comité 
regretted the ways in which budgetary constraints precluded the occupation 
administration from mounting the sheer number of exchanges and programs its members 
had hoped for, in due time it began to question those initiatives the administration 
promoted altogether. Due to budgetary cuts in the early 1950s, the French High 
Commission in Germany chose to reduce the role of its (largely propagandistic) Press 
Bureau in favor of concentrating its cultural resources on “international encounters”—the 
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kinds of activities favored by both BILD and CFEAN—as well as on French cultural 
institutes. This shift signaled the end of France’s unilateralist policies in Germany and a 
new emphasis on a more equilateral partnership of exchange.974 Soon thereafter, 
however, the administration placed all its eggs in the basket of these cultural institutes. 
CFEAN, BILD, and other independent organizations lambasted the government’s return 
to old models of French cultural diplomacy.975 The Committee’s sustained critique 
against what it considered traditional (and outmoded) French cultural politics—the 
famous rayonnement français that Hans Manfred Bock has called the “hegemonic view” 
of cultural politics aimed at cultural penetration976—brought the wrath of some in the 
administration.  
If the Committee recognized a certain value in the spread of French high culture, 
it found it served only a narrow set of goals:  
It is justified from the national point-of-view, and (we are weak enough to 
buy into it) from the point-of-view of the cultural progress of all nations. 
But we must not delude ourselves about the contribution that such a 
cultural radiance brings to the construction of peace.977  
 
According to this line, the French administration was regressing by falling back upon the 
chauvinist policies of French Institutes abroad and by ignoring the successes, not only of 
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BILD and CFEAN, but even of its own cultural bureau in Germany that had successfully 
organized encounters and exchanges, first through the “Youth and Sports” division, then 
through the “International Encounters” division. 
The Comité’s critique brought not only the wrath of the administration, but also 
protests from other organizations geared toward improving the French-German 
relationship. The Director of the French Institute of Stuttgart considered CFEAN (as well 
as its frequent ally, the Deutsch-Französisches Institut in Ludwigsburg) an agitator. 
Replete with “polemic,” the bulletin, according to the Stuttgart Institute, spread 
calumnies about the institute’s work. The Committee, it seems, encouraged the broader 
French public to avoid the various French Institutes so that they could see the authentic 
Germany; more specifically, it indicted these government-run institutes as “instruments 
of a tele-directed propaganda.” The Institute singled out Fritz Schenk of the Ludwigsburg 
Institute for praise, but his Parisian counterpart Alfred Grosser went unmentioned.978 
   From the administration’s perspective, turning its gaze toward French Institutes 
did not entail giving up on exchanges so much as it meant “pass[ing] the relay” to private 
efforts to coordinate exchanges; such cuts made sense in light of the occupation 
administration’s fading role in Germany.979 Accordingly, the administration was pleased 
by whatever strides CFEAN and BILD made. By 1954, the administration lauded 
CFEAN’s “constructive and courageous position in the face of a certain number of 
delicate problems,” namely the resurgence of French-German hostilities. Even Grosser’s 
                                                          
978AOFAA AC 297/4 No. 242/DGAC/RC/sp Directeur de l’Institut Français de Stuttgart to M. Pechoux (22 
Jan. 1952). 
 
979Corine Defrance, La politique culturelle de la France sur la rive gauche du Rhin 1945-1955 (Strasbourg: 
Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1994), 289-290. 
 445 
most strident opponent in the administration commended the group’s efforts.980 The 
French-German dynamic still swayed with the political winds, as made clear by tensions 
over the Saar and the European Defense Community. CFEAN tried to ensure that when 
these winds blew, the French-German relationship did not snap altogether. It was at these 
moments that the Cultural Bureau most appreciated CFEAN’s efforts, as it “contribute[d] 
to maintaining, at a difficult juncture, a necessary dialogue with objectivity and 
courage.”981 And it was at these moments that the Comité felt the need to redouble its 
efforts.982  
 Quarrels notwithstanding, the French administration proved a loyal ally to 
CFEAN, above all by providing regular (if somewhat paltry) subsidies. However it may 
have balked at CFEAN’s apparent duplicity, the administration vastly preferred it to 
some of its counterparts. Organizations spearheaded by Germans were especially 
susceptible to French mistrust. A group in the Berlin suburb of Steglitz known as the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft zur Pflege der Beziehungen mit Frankreich [German Society for 
the Care of Relations with France] was viewed with suspicion by French authorities as an 
insidious alter ego of CFEAN. Whereas the Comité allowed only French members on its 
steering committee, the Steglitz association included only German members. Moreover, 
the Steglitz group fashioned its name as a direct response to the Comité; both concerned 
themselves with the “care of relations” with the neighboring nation. The German group, 
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located in the American zone, rankled French authorities because it retained no ties to the 
French at all.983 It thus had the potential to misread, or worse, distort French intentions 
and actions. French officials, of course, did not harbor such concerns over the one-
sidedness of CFEAN. Imbalance only presented problems when it favored the other 
party. 
 
Style and Substance 
The Comité sought to tilt the Franco-German conversation away from hatred and 
love, stereotypes and myths, and even culture and history, and turn instead toward 
concrete policy issues. Grosser, for one, was pleased to see debates reoriented around 
specific policy initiatives, such as the Schuman Plan. In fact, he believed the Comité had 
helped contribute to this new casting of the German question in France. He expressed the 
hope that CFEAN could help facilitate hard-nosed discussion without itself imposing an 
agenda: 
But we above all have to make an objective discussion possible, to 
unmask false problems, and to lay down the real facts—without having to 
recommend solutions. That the discussion turns more and more on 
economic and social questions, that one speaks of steel, coal, wages, and 
no more of Eternal Germany or decadent France—that’s considerable 
progress.984 
 
Age-old habits, talk of the obscure, the elusive, the abstract—of the qualities of 
Frenchness and Germanness—would only lead back to the black hole. CFEAN was at 
heart the product of a political scientist, focused on contemporary issues, and veering 
between antagonistic and agnostic toward high culture as an instrument for cooperation. 
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Whereas BILD’s attitude toward the future was noticeably bright, the Committee 
adopted a harder realist stance. There would be “no sentimental effusions, no lyricism, no 
overestimation of what has been achieved. We have sometimes been reproached for 
killing enthusiasm, for discouraging goodwill in this way,”985 Grosser noted. The 
Committee promoted a more reasoned, dispassionate approach and spurned the 
repression of the past. This attitude reflected a point Mounier had expressed as early as 
March of 1945: the need “to put in parenthesis all sentiment and resentment to consider 
with coolness and lucidity the problems, the possibilities, the impossibilities” for 
Germany.986 Accordingly, the Committee praised a conference at the University of 
Hamburg in which German and French participants expressed their divergent 
perspectives on such controversial issues as the administration of the Saar and Ruhr 
without resorting to “slogans” or “outrageous language.” Through such discussions, 
participants “could convince themselves that only a debate of this kind, conducted 
without passion or forgetting, could lead to constructive solutions.”987  
Rather than reverse emotions—to transform fear and hatred into curiosity and 
affection—the Committee tried to filter emotions out of the equation altogether. Whereas 
BILD operated on two different tracks, on the one hand, analyzing French-German 
relations in Documents and Dokumente, and on the other hand, humanizing French-
German relations through person-to-person contacts, the Committee supported such 
contacts but largely pursued the more clinical route. Its insistence on rationality and 
objectivity reflected a broader postwar trend to steer clear of the excessive emotionalism 
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associated with Nazism.988 The experience of the German occupation further reinforced 
skepticism of abstract rhetoric.989 Some have argued that the “generation of 1925,” to 
which Grosser belonged, embraced a staunch realism and a “‘desire for the concrete,’” a 
direction in evidence at the Comité despite the board’s generally older composition.990 
Grosser in particular insisted that French-German relations be governed by facts, and 
therefore meted out corrections regularly.  
Though perhaps constructive, cool detachment impeded the kind of zeal and 
affection generated by BILD. Participants in BILD conferences and exchanges often 
recalled their experience in emotional terms, both in the short and long-term. The 
Committee’s more empirical approach meant that warm testimonials were few and far 
between. In light of Grosser’s persistent fear that the French had become indifferent to 
Germany after the war—a condition as difficult to reverse as hostility—an insistence on 
measured analysis and dispassion might not have represented the wisest strategy. Yet, at 
the same time, surely it went a long way to dispel the superficial ardor, the feel-good but 
hollow gatherings that Grosser and others assumed their predecessors had been. The 
Committee worried that BILD-like events could seamlessly slip into Comité France-
Allemagne-style preening or, equally useless, shameless self-congratulation or empty 
drivel.  
The conviction that Weimar-era groups failed due to an excess of 
sentimentality—an accusation that would have made those activists blanch as it was 
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precisely that reproof that dogged them at the time—drove CFEAN to dismiss emotional 
strategies. Zeroing in on the perceived fatal flaw of its predecessors allowed the 
Committee to suggest its own possibility for success. Yet, perhaps unconsciously, the 
Comité’s prosaic view of cooperation borrowed from the perspective of Otto Grautoff, 
who had similarly distanced his Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft from 
“sentimentalists” and insisted upon the realist platform of his group. 
As a general rule, the Comité pulled its weapons from the arsenal of other Franco-
German groups. Like the Mayrisch Komitee, members of CFEAN spent an inordinate 
amount of energy deconstructing stereotypes and generalizations. The Comité, above all 
Grosser, refused to boil Germany, Germans, or Germanness down to essentials. Regular 
reports about contemporary German society, for example, broke down the analysis of 
“Germans” by class, education, occupation, age, confession, party, and so forth. There 
was no such thing as a typical German. As Grosser argued, “these collective words—
‘they,’ ‘them,’ ‘the Germans’—correspond as little to today’s reality as to that of 
yesterday.”991  
To be sure, such concerns about entrenched notions of Germanness were even 
more warranted than in the past; needless to say, the Nazi years had reinforced certain 
stereotypes about the Germans. Literary critic René Lalou expected more complex 
reasoning from his compatriots. A few years before the creation of the Committee, he 
wondered, “are the French to renounce generosity and the critical sense to the point of 
confusing Mozart with Hitler, Goebbels with Thomas Mann?”992 The Comité tried to 
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show precisely how rejecting all Germans in this way made little sense. Applying the 
same logic used to exclude many a fellow Frenchman, the Committee scorned the 
concept of collective guilt for the Germans. Just as not all of France had resisted, not all 
of Germany was responsible for the sins of the Nazis. This point rang especially true 
among CFEAN members who had lived in camps together with Germans hostile to the 
regime. 
This refusal to label Germans—and alongside it, a broader fixation with 
identity—marked the work of many associated with the Comité. Not only did such ideas 
permeate most of Grosser’s writings, they also meshed well with the fluidity of 
Mounier’s self-positioning and the philosophy of Sartre. In 1951, Élie Gabey—a 
colleague of Sartre’s both at the Comité and more prominently at Les Temps Modernes—
published an interview with the celebrated philosopher in Allemagne; the headline 
tellingly read, “I don’t admit the existence of an eternal German because I refuse to be an 
eternal Frenchman.”993 As in his Anti-Semite and Jew, Sartre decried the condition of 
being categorized and defined by others.  
In its quest to combat reductionist conceptions of Germany, the Committee aimed 
to unravel myths, for example that of the “eternal Germany.” But it also strived to add 
nuance to what it viewed as simplistic attempts to resolve the German question. 
According to the Comité, repressing the past to view all Germans as “good Germans” 
after 1945—a way to “unite against the common danger” of Communism—represented 
as gross a generalization about Germans as the old myths. In this way, the Committee 
sought to cut through quick and easy methods of reconciliation in order to bring about an 
accurate, logical, and incisive debate. 
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 Some within the Committee held that the effort for cooperation needed to be 
grounded in a thorough overhaul of language itself—that stereotypes and clichés 
developed out of words rather than observations. Drawing upon the ideas of Dolf 
Sternberger, Robert d’Harcourt explained in Allemagne the need for “reform of thought, 
which is at the same time a reform of vocabulary. The negative stereotyped formulas bear 
a heavy responsibility. Misunderstandings that create a rift between peoples often 
originate in words.” Allemagne therefore championed the erection of an “Institute of 
Political Philology.”994 To this end, crafting a new set of linguistic referents to describe 
those across the Rhine would reframe the terms of debate and ultimately reorient the 
Franco-German relationship altogether. Absent loaded terminology, French and Germans 
could have a controlled conversation reined in by this new linguistic ethical code.  
Overall, the Comité seemed to prefer the banal to the spectacular as a measure of 
success. Mainly, it concerned itself with rigorous analysis of the issues of the day 
(including acting as a watchdog organization) and with the promotion of regular cross-
border contacts. The Comité did not set up elaborate exchanges or newsworthy charitable 
campaigns, so much as it trumpeted the efforts of others and sought to connect 
individuals to one another or to initiatives of interest. In small, quotidian efforts, the 
Comité saw authenticity. Certainly, Grosser preferred substance over flash and evinced 
more edge than affability. CFEAN’s seriousness may also have stemmed from the 
general discrediting of pomp and spectacle after years of Nazi rule. 
 It is hard to quantify the effectiveness and scope of the Comité’s work as an 
intermediary. Blurbs in Allemagne attest to a multitude of one-off events and exchanges 
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CFEAN helped arrange. CFEAN brought a group of visiting metal-workers from 
Suresnes into contact with counterparts from Solingen, for example. It devised 
educational itineraries for groups traveling on other organizations’ dime. It helped find au 
pairs or host families for individual exchanges. Most of these efforts proved thankless 
work; CFEAN found itself scolding those who benefited from its services yet did not 
bother with membership in the group. 
The Comité favored exchanges and encounters, especially those that transpired in 
everyday settings, such as the workplace, where professional interests could help dictate a 
more concrete conversation. As an intermediary, it therefore helped arrange internships in 
factories and businesses on both sides of the Rhine, assisted other organizations to put on 
conferences and exchanges, and facilitated arrangements for those on grants and 
scholarships. By stressing interpersonal contacts as a means to overcome animosities and 
to view their counterparts across the Rhine as equal partners, the Committee hoped to 
orchestrate a conversation outside the context of the power dynamic. Conferences, 
roundtables, and large lectures with several hundred in the audience at a time aimed at 
what scholars have (rather inelegantly) dubbed multipliers—individuals such as teachers, 
clergy, and journalists who would pass along what they learned directly from CFEAN 
into classrooms, churches, and the media throughout France.  
CFEAN tried to target the broadest possible audience. In fact, it scorned cultural 
events that it viewed as geared toward the “bonne bourgeoisie,” that is to say classical 
music concerts, theater, and art exhibits. In a similar spirit, it refused to help ordinary tour 
groups whose itineraries might be confined only to stops at the casino and the Folies 
Bergère. Grosser’s vision of French-German understanding both spurned superficial 
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contacts among the upper crust and turned away from older notions of achieving 
understanding through a heightened awareness of high culture. If groups like the 
Mayrisch Komitee and the Comité France-Allemagne had promoted these—and the more 
inclusive Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft worked at several levels to boost 
understanding by increasing contacts between citizens (both ordinary and elite), 
cultivating their sense of high (and popular) culture, and informing them about 
contemporary society, CFEAN rejected any variant of cooperation that reeked of elitism. 
Instead, it encouraged a more “authentic” understanding of contemporary society alone; 
high culture, according to Grosser, had little power to reshape the French-German 
relationship. As Grosser explained, “To know a country’s wines, or even its music, is not 
to know the country, for we also need to know what are the economic and social and 
political problems which confront it. It is good that since 1945 Brahms is more often 
heard in France and Ravel in Germany, but mutual ignorance and distrust are not to be 
dispelled in that way. A French article on the German refugee problem does more to 
promote understanding than the translation of ten volumes of Goethe.”995  
Thus, a key thrust of the Comité and its bulletin was to reach out to the masses, if 
not as members per se, at least as participants in French-German contacts. Over and over 
again, Grosser stressed the need to incorporate a broad base, to avoid the perceived 
elitism of prior French-German organizations. This democratic outlook was not 
universally shared. Jean Schlumberger, for one, considered it the function of intellectuals, 
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artists, and experts to improve the public mind.996 Certainly, public improvement 
represented another major component of the Comité’s efforts. The Comité’s work landed 
between the two philosophies: independent experts would enlighten and guide the masses 
about Germany. No light entertainment for the masses; this was a pedagogical project.  
Though the Comité criticized its forebears for their elitism, even the old-fashioned 
Otto Grautoff had recognized the power of film in attracting and educating the broader 
public almost two decades earlier. If such cultural standbys of earlier French-German 
organizations as classical music concerts, plays, and art exhibits catered mostly to the 
middle and upper-classes, such events nonetheless attracted crowds. Entertainment, 
whether in the form of high culture or popular culture, not only would have helped draw 
an audience, but also could have added another form of enrichment to the Comité’s 
program. Instead, its insistence on rigorous content limited its audience and thereby 
blunted its potential impact. It is surprising that such a critique of elitism did not lead the 
Committee to look more closely to popular culture. Surely the Comité could have 
sponsored jazz concerts (as the Americans did so successfully) or fashion shows to 
exhibit the allure of French culture to the masses. Barring that, it could have held sporting 
events to facilitate cross-border interaction. Its main concession to popular culture was to 
screen short films at the Musée Pédagogique in Paris.  
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Continuities and Changes 
As much as we can see CFEAN for what it claimed to be—a wholeheartedly new 
response to the postwar order, informed by a very particular experience of the war and 
the Resistance—we can also see the group revisiting familiar models from the past. Most 
notably, CFEAN represented a return to the Weimar idea of understanding as a basis for 
cooperation. The group’s statutes referred to reciprocal knowledge, and its activities—
above all its articles, talks, and debates—promoted the achievement of understanding 
through a dialectical process. Grosser’s pointed refusal to use words like friendship or 
reconciliation997 distanced the Comité from its contemporary, BILD, and at the same time 
brought it closer to its Weimar antecedents.  
Although the Comité drew upon earlier efforts for French-German cooperation, it 
maintained an ambivalent view of that legacy. CFEAN only acknowledged Nazi-era 
groups like the Comité France-Allemagne/Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft and the 
Groupe Collaboration in the negative sense, as foils against which to define its mission. It 
likewise tended to distance itself from Weimar-era organizations, even as it included 
several veterans from the Weimar years and tapped into important structural and 
rhetorical elements from their earlier efforts.      
Comité member René Lauret had contributed a regular column, “The Chronicle of 
Today’s Politics,” to the Revue d’Allemagne, a column that he could have neatly 
transferred into CFEAN’s contemporary-minded bulletin. And yet, by the late 1940s, he 
treated Grautoff and Boucher’s earlier effort as a mere curiosity. At a 1949 talk, Lauret 
mentioned “once again leafing through the interesting journal Deutsch-Französische 
Rundschau,” and duly noted the many men of “good will and great talent” who 
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contributed (without naming himself as an occasional contributor or referring to his 
recurring role in the larger project). The DFR, explained Lauret, had been filled with 
French and German explicating, debating, and complaining about the differences between 
the two peoples without recognition of the other side’s perspective. Lauret’s dismissal of 
the effectiveness of the DFR/Revue d’Allemagne did not lead to a plea for new strategies. 
Instead, Lauret braided multiple approaches. He fell back upon the old dictum of the 
Mayrisch Komitee: the need to cleanse the press of falsehoods that stir up 
misunderstandings. Lauret joined to that idea a stress on the importance of cross-border 
contacts (reminiscent of the DFG, the Sohlbergkreis and BILD). The new element in 
Lauret’s argument was to fold that combination into the European framework—and even 
here, he could not help referencing Weimar-era efforts.998 
By (rather unjustly) implying that its predecessors had been dupes, the Committee 
projected success for itself. Barriers to success were not external, but internal, and in that 
realm, the Committee had taken precautions. Yet not all its members saw the Committee 
as such a break from previous efforts. Former Mayrisch Komitee member Jean 
Schlumberger recognized that the context had changed from the aftermath of one war to 
the aftermath of the next. But he averred that the goal of both committees remained the 
same: “The sinister Hitlerian parenthesis was closed; there was only to resume the patient 
work where one had left off some fifteen years earlier at the time of the Mayrisch 
Komitee and of the tragic series of missed opportunities.”999 He did not specify whether 
he referred to missed opportunities on the part of the Komitee, or likelier, on the grander 
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political plane. But it was clear in Schlumberger’s mind that the work of cooperation had 
merely been put on hold.    
At a meeting to discuss the 1954 Franco-German Cultural Accords, Edmond 
Vermeil exhibited a tendency among the old guard to muddle past and present efforts. 
Vermeil noted his pride in belonging to CFEAN, but mistook its founding moment for 
1946 (not surprising, given Vermeil’s extensive participation in Franco-German projects 
over the years). More tellingly, he cited Mounier’s initial “simple directive” for the 
organization as “se connaître” (to get to know one another). Se connaître had been the 
journal title for the interwar Ligues des Études Germaniques, over whose board Vermeil 
had presided; it was not a catchphrase associated with the Comité. Throughout his 
remarks, Vermeil invoked a vocabulary reminiscent of interwar efforts for cooperation. 
He spoke of better understanding (se mieux comprendre), and mutual knowledge 
(connaissance mutuelle).1000 This slippage between Weimar-era efforts like the Mayrisch 
Komité, LEG, and even the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft speaks to the many ways 
in which CFEAN extended the work of its forebears. If the circumstances had changed 
dramatically since Weimar, some players imagined themselves still playing the same 
game, on the same team. 
Mounier himself was still addressing the difficulty of solving the French-German 
problem in the same terms Pierre Viénot had invoked in the 1920s. While urging a realist 
approach, Viénot had also mourned the lack of imagination brought to bear to find 
solutions. Echoing Viénot, Mounier argued in 1949: “On the one hand, we could have too 
little imagination and tackle the problems of the twentieth century with the mental 
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[geistig] and political means of the nineteenth;” on the other hand, he worried, fellow 
activists might suffer from “too much [imagination], in that we believe that some 
situations have finally come to an end that have not yet been irrevocably resolved by 
events or which, thanks to similar cycles, could arise again.”1001 
 
Conclusion 
 In its insistence on avoiding all reductionism, the Committee presented a more 
challenging—and more difficult to absorb—set of core ideas than BILD’s broader, more 
flexible position. CFEAN approached the Franco-German dynamic in past and present 
incarnations more realistically, if more confrontationally than BILD. Whereas BILD 
attracted adherents by setting aside blame in the present (and alleging a past of mutual 
resistance to the Nazis) and focusing on Christian duty to a brighter future, the 
Committee relied on mutual purging and dispassionate analysis to address the past, 
present, and future. BILD aimed for reconciliation, the Comité for truth. The Committee 
had the luxury of late birth—three years after the war—when outreach could be seen as a 
bit less revolutionary and such shortcuts were less necessary.  
The lag between the creation of BILD and the creation of CFEAN—the difference 
between 1945 and 1948—was tremendous. Indeed, the first issue of Allemagne appeared 
mere weeks before the birth of the Federal Republic with the signing of the Basic Law in 
May 1949. Accordingly, the Committee by and large dealt with, not the French military 
government, but the High Commission. Because of this issue of timing, CFEAN could 
immediately set its sights on a more forthright conversation between the two peoples; it 
also could count on a greater willingness among the French to appear at the side of 
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Germans. In 1947, both Edmond Vermeil and Robert Minder showed their hesitancy to 
participate in French-German events by declining (along with others) their invitations to 
attend BILD’s Writers’ Conference at Lahr; by the next year, they and many others, 
chose to go to Royaumont for BILD’s second such conference.1002 That same year, both 
lent their names to the infant Comité.  
Although the Comité adopted the more provocative tone, it was the seemingly 
less radical BILD that, in the end, provided a more effective model of cooperation. On 
the surface, with its religious leadership and its calls to revive the Church, BILD 
appeared the more conservative. But, with teams and members from both sides of the 
Rhine, and above all, with its activities that captivated a wider public, BILD managed to 
convince a broader base to consider their former enemies as friends. CFEAN worried 
about the durability of such emotional ties without having first laid a detached framework 
for conversation. Its unabashed intellectualism made for a more remote, less inclusive 
form of cooperation that clashed with its democratic impulses. In the end, the Comité 
functioned well enough as a watchdog, an intermediary, but its associational side 
remained relatively undeveloped. 
CFEAN’s insistence on injecting reason into the public discourse did not mesh 
well with its desires to attract the everyman. And this was only one of the many 
blindspots of the group. The Comité reached out to Germany and stood on the side of 
exchanges, but it was too wary to include Germans in the group itself. It asserted its 
belief in equality, yet its dirigiste approach suggested otherwise. These internal tensions 
highlight the difficulty of what its members were trying to attempt.  
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The Comité, in effect, was far more successful in defining itself against past 
models than it was in articulating a specific and comprehensive prescription for the 
present. Its inchoate vision of cooperation, closely tied to its resolution to display a 
diverse makeup (on the French side), is indicative of the extent to which proponents of 
cooperation struggled to figure out how to situate their mission in the first decade after 
the war. Its loose agenda was symptomatic of postwar disorientation. As the contours of 
both the Cold War and the European movement were taking shape around them, 
champions of French-German cooperation had to determine what they could agree on as 
well as where they fit in the larger political landscape. Caught between chasing the ghosts 
of the past and plotting a more positive course to the future, CFEAN could not settle on a 
clear path. In later years, it at last unequivocally latched onto the European project. 
CFEAN’s ultimate triumph lay in helping to reshape the intellectual landscape. 
Members went on to publish an array of revisionist histories that recast the French-
German relationship. René Lauret’s 1960 Notre voisin l’allemand, for example, aimed to 
consign France and Germany’s “heavy baggage” to history. Others advocated for 
expanding the notion of German studies in France beyond literature and high culture to 
include a more sweeping examination of German “civilization.” And Grosser’s entire 
career would be dedicated to carrying on a sophisticated, rational dialogue between the 
two nations.1003  
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 In many ways, the vision of Weimar-era activists had come full circle. If many 
former résistants dreamed of radical social change, they found in the Committee both a 
far-reaching vision and modest, concrete action that seemed to chip away at the political 
reality of Germanophobia. The Comité fostered a critical spirit, geared toward reforming 
both nations as a way to improve the relationship between the two. Seeking to imbue both 
peoples with a humanitarian, truth-seeking ethos, it modeled the kind of tempered 
conversation the two should have.  Its humanist, progressive spirit not only drew from the 
Weimar era, but from the age of Weimar itself; the Comité, according to Rémy Roure, 
took Goethe’s last words to heart: “more light!”1004 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
When the present fails, the past can usually be counted on to cause friction between 
France and Germany.1005 
 
 
 
The tale of cooperation, both in its Franco-German and European variants, seems 
a straightforward narrative. After a series of false starts such as Locarno, the efforts of 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, and the League of Nations (and perhaps including wartime 
collaboration), the Second World War served as a catalyst for change. French-German 
relations mended as Europe united around that core. But from the vantage point of the 
late 1940s, it would have been possible to consider cooperation in a different light, one 
where those past examples were not so much false starts as important way stations. 
The older strands of cooperation have had a fainter echo in popular memory. The 
more dominant narratives of enmity, war, and occupation overshadowed the work of 
Franco-German activists. Collaboration also seemed to break the link between the 
Locarno era and postwar efforts at cooperation. Furthermore, proponents of Franco-
German friendship helped mask continuities. Each of the groups under question sought to 
stress its originality, its ability to overcome the alleged failures of its predecessors. Thus, 
while civic activists recycled personnel, ideas, and methods, they rejected their debts to 
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the past. And those who did claim a stake in past efforts at cooperation often did so for 
less than idealistic motives.  
To justify their wartime actions, former Nazis and Nazi sympathizers underlined 
the connections between their activities in the 1930s/1940s and those undertaken in the 
postwar period by advocates of European integration. Deploying a language of 
cooperation they had helped shape, they sought to demonstrate their long-term interest in 
France and in Europe. French-German cooperation and European integration represented, 
in this reading, the culmination of their efforts. Otto Abetz, Fernand de Brinon, Friedrich 
Grimm, and Jean Luchaire, for example, defended their reputations by employing these 
narrative strategies in their memoirs or in the courtroom. They could easily identify 
examples of their past activities to promote cooperation and cultural exchange. And in the 
1950s, Abetz and Fritz Bran—along with their old friend and Sohlbergkreis colleague 
Friedrich Bentmann—reinserted themselves into the project for cooperation by joining a 
small association in Karlsruhe known as the Deutsch-Französische Gesellshaft. In this 
way, they, like such members of CFEAN as Jean Schlumberger, renewed old ties to 
French-German societies. The roads to cooperation, as these individuals demonstrate, 
were diverse.  
These twisted, often circuitous itineraries in part reflect the tumultuous years of 
the early-mid twentieth century. Advocating cooperation almost always meant swimming 
against the tide of nationalism. Moreover, the key ruptures of the 1930s and 1940s—the 
rise of the Nazis, war, the German occupation of France, and the French occupation of 
Germany—forced multiple reconsiderations of Franco-German relations. For some, 
1933, 1940, or 1945 (or some moment in the middle) represented an insurmountable 
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barrier on the path to cooperation, or at least a significant detour. Others, daunted but not 
undeterred, continued on the trail of cooperation, adjusting their ideals to evolving 
geopolitical and ideological circumstances. For some, these forks in the road led not to 
fruitful engagement, but to the dead end of collaborationism.  
Mapping these itineraries is further complicated by the willingness or necessity of 
activists to reappraise, renew, and recycle their strategies to fit the shifting geopolitical 
landscape. Most notably, they stretched, compressed, or reshaped notions of cooperation 
to suit the needs of the present, their ideological perspectives, and their diagnosis of the 
root causes of the Franco-German antagonism. Cooperation turned out to be an 
extraordinarily malleable concept that captured a sense of idealism, could imply serving 
the national interest, and spoke to a variety of people with very different sensibilities. 
Franco-German activists were revisionists with regard to the idea of cooperation 
as well as in their constant reinvention of the project by which to achieve it. Their process 
of re-fashioning reveals each iteration as less original than contemporaries often claimed. 
Indeed, these divisions and re-divisions of French-German activists constitute an 
important narrative. The repeated reincarnations of the movement for Franco-German 
cooperation are indicative of an essential desire of these groups: to wipe away the 
burdens of history. Their mission was in part to create Franco-German friendship, which 
either required the forgetting of the grand narrative of contentious Franco-German 
relations or the manipulation of this saga into one that left an opening for cooperation. To 
refer to past efforts that had not somehow changed the Franco-German dynamic (and 
thereby eradicated the need for any such society) would be to undermine the enterprise. 
Almost every new group, then, cribbed its concept, but uprooted its sources. In this way, 
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each new effort would seem a revolution to the uninitiated. An insistence on novelty thus 
helped legitimate each mission—they were crusaders embarking upon uncharted 
territory—and reach new converts. 
Looking at transnational ties complicates the national narratives that we have 
become accustomed to in French and German history. Even in calamitous, hostile times, 
the mental (and sometimes physical) borders between the two peoples remained porous. 
French and German activists worked together in different ways with the aims of simply 
getting to know one another and, more ambitiously, trying to achieve entente, 
understanding, peace, or even reconciliation. Many considered their work as an 
alternative to reframing French-German relations via the more traditional exercise of hard 
or even soft power. Through a form of people’s diplomacy, they could achieve more than 
the diplomats by (re)molding public perceptions of the nation across the Rhine.  
Fundamental and shifting geopolitical asymmetries had a profound impact on the 
direction and scope of efforts for French-German cooperation. The fact of imbalance—
especially the problem of occupation—meant that despite activists’ desires (professed 
and/or genuine) for reciprocity, true partnership would be difficult to achieve. The cases 
examined here have each centered on Franco-German dialogue. Often the dominant 
partner in these conversations paralleled the dominant power. But time and again the 
dominant partner sought ways to soften or even reframe the larger French-German 
relationship in ways that seemed more inviting and palatable. And even in this imbalance, 
the weaker partner still had a say and was invested in the relationship.  
In many ways, the history of Franco-German cooperation mirrors a twentieth 
century Europe marked by long-term continuities despite numerous upheavals. The 
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challenges of relating this story reflect the kinds of problems our historical subjects 
faced: how to bridge and ideally overcome tremendous ruptures. In exploring how these 
activists questioned seemingly impassable divides—national, social, cultural—and then 
observing how they carried this understanding across the dramatic upheavals of twentieth 
century life, we can try to determine how they made sense of their world.  
This dissertation helps reshape the way we look at cooperation in twentieth 
century Europe. It complements the scholarship on postwar Franco-German and 
European cooperation undertaken by economic and diplomatic historians, while arguing 
that intellectual and cultural efforts likewise played an important role in fostering 
healthier international relations. At the same time, it offers a corrective to that literature 
by showing that the quest for cooperation was not simply a postwar construct, but in fact 
emerged from the Locarno era. 
 Some scholars—along with some postwar French-German activists—have 
castigated efforts for rapprochement (whether political or cultural) in the interwar era for 
their ineffectiveness or have even pegged them as all-out failures. But as Gilbert Krebs 
has argued in the case of the pacifist movement, this work was not wholly in vain. 
Though they were a failure in the short-term, those early initiatives provided the “first 
sketches of a dialogue between France and Germany.”1006 In similar fashion, Ilde Gorguet 
has suggested that, while futile at the time, the pacifist movement in the 1920s served as a 
“conceptual laboratory” for post-1945 efforts for French-German reconciliation.1007 I 
argue, in contrast, that by focusing on proponents of cooperation, we can see that the 
conceptual laboratory never closed and its experiments continued. Not only did French-
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German activists draw upon the arguments, rhetoric, and approaches methodically 
worked out during the age of Locarno after 1945, but they also did so in the intervening 
years. As much as some may have warped the larger intent of Locarno-era activists, those 
pursuing cooperation in the Nazi era still built on foundations laid in a more democratic 
age. Postwar champions of cooperation like Alfred Grosser also considered their 
predecessors as negative, but no less important models. Perhaps more concretely, and 
equally important, the efforts of the Locarno era were not fruitless; they established ties 
between specific people both to be continued during the occupation years and thereafter. 
Expanding our time frame beyond the interwar period reveals that, in fact, this has 
been a story of repeated failure. Most of these organizations failed both in terms of their 
specific purpose and in their larger goal of ending the Franco-German enmity. This 
neither discounts the importance of examining their efforts, nor does it undermine the 
value of their work. Even in their failure, Franco-German organizations were always 
sowing the seeds for future entente. Traditional diplomacy seemed to have gone nowhere, 
and diplomats’ efforts always appeared to have been framed reactively and negatively. 
Civic activists in both France and Germany opened up a space where new, more 
positively framed discussions about cooperation could take place. Here, they could 
finesse both their understanding of cooperation and their actual relationships with 
individuals from the other side of the border. The organizations they built took practical 
steps toward understanding, and just as importantly, served as laboratories in which to 
imagine and then test out new forms of cooperation. Such organizations expanded the 
capacity to view the other nation in a positive, or at least more nuanced, light. 
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Their repeated attempts point to the overwhelming challenges confronting the 
project for cooperation. The ability of enmity to overshadow amity is reflected in the 
ongoing struggle that civic activists encountered both in their repeated failures in the face 
of war and occupation, and in their inability to become etched into popular memory. Few 
iconic moments of French-German cooperation can be called to mind: Charles de Gaulle 
and Konrad Adenauer embracing upon the signature of the 1963 Élysée Treaty (Treaty of 
Franco-German Friendship), François Mitterand and Helmut Kohl holding hands at 
Verdun in 1984. But Napoleon marching through the Brandenburg Gate, German troops 
parading down the Champs Élysées in 1871 and 1940, surrenders in the Hall of Mirrors 
or in the train car at Compiègne make for much more striking images. They are at once 
more memorable and more frequently reproduced. 
Yet surely the history of twentieth century Europe is not only one of conflict, but 
also of the attempts to overcome those conflicts. Activists laid out overlapping and 
increasingly dense networks of devotees of cooperation, networks that transcended both 
national borders and the borders between the worlds of diplomacy, business, media, the 
academy, and the arts. Independent efforts for cooperation adopted a broader range of 
strategies and remained far more flexible than official government efforts. These 
organizations not only promoted the idea of cooperation, they practiced cooperation. In 
so doing, they cultivated a relationship that over time has developed into friendship. If 
this friendship still requires constant nurturing, it has at least, since the Élysée Treaty, 
been stamped with each state’s seal of approval.  
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